Judgment :- S.Sankarasubban, J. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree in O.S. No.37 of 1985 on the file of the sub court, Kasaragod. Appellants are the plaintiffs in the suit. The suit was filed on the following allegations: 2. The plaintiffs and defendants are related to each other as set out in the genealogy given in the end of the plaint. The plaintiffs and defendants are Bunts by caste. Who were formerly governed by the Madras Aliyasanthana Act until this Act was repealed by Kerala Act 30/1976. The properties described in a schedule were allotted to the share of the Kavaru of Chomu shown in the plant genealogy in O.S. No.291 of 1949 on the file of Principal Sub Court, South Kanara. 3. The properties described in plaint B schedule belonging in jenm to the Kavaru of Chomu, were outstanding on usufructuary mortgage. The mortgage was redeemed since then and possession of the redeemed properties was obtained by the Kavaru. The properties described in plaint C schedule from direct Kumki and lagthi to plaint A and B schedule properties. The kavaru has effected vast and valuable improvements in plaint C schedule properties. Applications for assignment to the Kavaru of plaint C schedule properties on darkhast are pending disposal. 4. The first defendant is one Chikkappa Rai. In or about 1965, he put the second defendant, fourth defendant and the deceased Pammunhi, in possession of some items of plaint A schedule properties for the sake of convenience of enjoyment retaining with him possession of the bulk of the properties as the Ejman and Manager of the Kavaru. In or about 1969, differences cropped up between the second defendant, fourth defendant and Pammunhi. The first defendant directed the second defendant, fourth defendant and Pammunhi to enjoy the properties separately. Since 1969, the second defendant fourth defendant and Pammunhi began to enjoy different items of properties separately for the sake of convenience of enjoyment. Pammunhi died in or about 1977. On her death, the second defendant began to cultivate the properties that were formerely being enjoyed by pammunhi. Now bulk of suit properties are in the possession of the second defendant. Some items are in the possession of the first defendant. A few items are in the possession of the fourth defendant. Pammunhi died in or about 1977. On her death, the second defendant began to cultivate the properties that were formerely being enjoyed by pammunhi. Now bulk of suit properties are in the possession of the second defendant. Some items are in the possession of the first defendant. A few items are in the possession of the fourth defendant. The other parties to the suit, including the plaintiffs are not in actual possession of any item of properties. 5. The first plaintiff was given in marriage in July, 1973. Since her marriage, the first plaintiff and her children plaintiffs 2 and 3 are residing in the house of the first plaintiff’s husband. In the family house, every year, “Kola” of Bheemavathi and other “Daivas” has to be performed simultaneously with “Dharma Nema”. The other viniyogas to be performed annually in the family house are “Hariseva”, “Deepavali” and “Thambilas”. Once in a year, a function has to be held to propitiate the dead family members. Provisions have to be made in the suit for the performance of all these viniyogas and functions. Plaint A to D schedule properties are in the joint possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiffs were not paid their share of the income of the suit properties after 1982. Hence the suit was filed for partition of plaint A to D schedule properties into 9 equal shares with metes and bounds and to allot 3 such shares to the plaintiffs and to put them in possession and enjoyment of the same with their share of the income of the properties for the past three years and direct the payment of future profits to the plaintiffs. 6. The plaintiffs case is that Chomu is the Ejamanathi and the properties were allotted to her in the partition suit of 1949. Chomu had four children, Chikkappa Rai (first defendant), Ramakke, Deranna Rai(second defendant) and Balakrishna Rai (third defendant). Vishwanatha Rai (fourth defendant), Subbanna Rai (fifth defendant), Battu alias Battunhi Rai (sixth defendant) and Muthakke alias Kalavathi (first plaintiff) are the children of Ramakke. Kalavathi had two sons, Remakke alias Shakunthala (2nd plaintiff) and Syhamala (third plaintiff). 7. Separate written statements were filed by the defendants. Vishwanatha Rai (fourth defendant), Subbanna Rai (fifth defendant), Battu alias Battunhi Rai (sixth defendant) and Muthakke alias Kalavathi (first plaintiff) are the children of Ramakke. Kalavathi had two sons, Remakke alias Shakunthala (2nd plaintiff) and Syhamala (third plaintiff). 7. Separate written statements were filed by the defendants. In the written statement filed by the first defendant, Chikkappa Rai, it is stated as follows: The description of the properties allotted to the Kavaru of chomu in O.S. No.291 of 1949 as given in plaint A schedule is not correct. It is also stated that Plaint B schedule property was outstanding on usufructuary mortgage. It is denied that plaint C schedule properly forms direct kumki and lagthi to plaint A schedule properties. So far as plaint D schedule properties are concerned, it was assigned to Chomu. The existence of plaint e schedule properties is denied. It is further stated that the properties allotted to Chomu were divided orally in 1962 in the presence of mediators and well wishers and the Kavaru was divided as per the provisions of the Aliyasanthana Act among the members as per stirps basis. Only the properties that were outstanding on usufructuary mortgage dated 7.6.1981 had not been divided by metes and bounds. The said mortgaged property was also redeemed as per O.S. No.44 of 1966. As per terms of the decree in the partition suit filed by the first defendant as O.S. No.23 of 1969, while taking delivery of the rest of the properties after excluding the share allotted to this defendant, the plaintiffs and other defendants have orally divided the redeemed property also. As per the terms of the oral partition in 1962, portions of the redeemed property have been given possession to various members. The particulars of properties allotted to the sub-Kavarus of Chomu’s Kavaru in 1962 and of the mortgaged property at the time of delivery after redemption are shown separately at the end of the written statement. 8. The first plaintiff was a party to both the above suits, viz., O.S. Nos. 44 of 1966 and 23 of 1969, wherein the plaintiffs including the present first plaintiff had pleased oral partition and the court after elaborate trial evidence and arguments, has upheld the oral partition pleaded in the above suits. The said decisions have become final and they are operating as res judicata. 44 of 1966 and 23 of 1969, wherein the plaintiffs including the present first plaintiff had pleased oral partition and the court after elaborate trial evidence and arguments, has upheld the oral partition pleaded in the above suits. The said decisions have become final and they are operating as res judicata. Hence, the present contention of the plaintiffs that the family is joint family till 1976 is therefore unsustainable and the suit is not maintainable. Thus, as per the contention of the first defendant, there has been oral partition in 1962 itself and plaint B schedule properties were mortgaged and the bequeathed redemption was also partitioned subsequently. 9. The second defendant also contended that there is oral partition. The third defendant after admitting the oral partition wanted oral partition of the properties. Defendants 4 and 6 have filed joint written statement. They have paid court fee for the 2/9 share. The fifth defendant also supports the plaintiffs. 10. On the basis of the pleadings, the court below raised as many as 21 issues; the main issues being issue No.6 – whether the oral partition set up is true. Issue No.7 is whether the suit is barred by res judicata by reason of the decision in O.S. No.44 of 1966 and O.S. No.23 of 1969? Exts.A1 to A3(d) were marked on the side of the plaintiffs. Exts. B1 to B12 were marked the on the side of the defendants. The first plaintiff was examined as PW1 and the fifth defendant was examined as DW1. The Court below, after considering the evidence, came to the conclusion that there was an oral partition in the family as stated by the contesting defendants and held that the decisions in the two suits, O.S. Nos. 44 of 1966 and 23 of 1969 operate as res judicata. 11. Before the trial court, the judgment in O.S. No.44 of 1966 was produced as Ext.B7 and copy of the final decree proceedings in O.S. No 23 of 1969 is produced as Ext.B9. The court below came to the conclusion that they was oral partition. It is agreed by both sides that the decision in the appeal as to the correctness or otherwise of the judgment and decree of the court below depends upon the question whether the judgment and decree in O.S. No.44 of 1966 and O.S. No.23 of 1969 operate as res judicata. It is agreed by both sides that the decision in the appeal as to the correctness or otherwise of the judgment and decree of the court below depends upon the question whether the judgment and decree in O.S. No.44 of 1966 and O.S. No.23 of 1969 operate as res judicata. Ext.B7 is the judgment in O.S. No. 44 of 1966. According to sri.P.G. Rajagoplan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, decision regarding oral partition decided in O.S. No.44 of 1966 cannot act as res judicata, as the question was not directly and substantially in issue in the above suit. To appreciate this contention, one has to look into Ext.B7. 12. Ext.B7 is the suit filed by the seventh plaintiff. Seventh plaintiff in the suit is the present first plaintiff. She was a minor at that time and was represented by her guardian. The Suit was filed for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage executed by the Kavaru of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 6 in favour of one Mohammed Shrub for Rs. 6,300/- with damages. Plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 6 were members of the Kavaru. After his death, his daughter Jainabi Sharule got the mortgage right. She assigned her rights to the first defendant and the first defendant was in possession. The case of the plaintiffs is that the first defendant was committing damages by converting portion of the property into areca garden. Defendants 2 and 3 were not willing to file a suit for redemption. In partition , defendants 4 to 6 got divided as a separate Kavaru and the Kavaru of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 got divided orally in 1962. The plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit and on depositing the mortgage amount, the plaintiffs claim redemption with damages. The first defendant contended that she was not liable to be evicted, that the plaintiffs were not competent to file the suit and that she is entitled to value of improvements and also that the claim for damages is not sustainable. The first defendant contended that she was not liable to be evicted, that the plaintiffs were not competent to file the suit and that she is entitled to value of improvements and also that the claim for damages is not sustainable. The second defendant (Chikkappa Rai, who is the first defendant in the present suit) contended that the plaintiffs being the junior members of the Kavaru are not entitled to file the suit, that the oral partition is not true that the first defendant is a deemed tenant entitled to fixity and that in case of redemption first plaintiff is entitled to value of improvements also. The third defendant, who was the head of the Kavaru, contended that she has no funds to file the suit and that she has no objection to the plaintiffs taking a decree for redemption. She admits the partition decree by which defendants 4 to 6 formed a separate Kavaru and also the oral partition in the Kavaru of plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 in the year 1962. Defendants 4 and 5 while admitting the mortgage sued on, contended that the Kavaru got divided as per partition decree, that defendants 4 to 6 are also entitled to shares in the equity and that they are willing to pay their share in the mortgage amount. 13. In the above suit, 8 issues were raised. Issue No.2 is whether the oral partition alleged by the plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 is true and valid. Issue no.3 is whether the plaintiffs are competent to redeem the properties. Issue Nos.2 and 3 were considered together by the learned Sub judge. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, it was observed as follows: “ All the members of this Kavaru except D2 admit the oral partition. D2 is really interested tin denying the oral partition because he wants to see that the mortgage in favour of his wife is not redeemed. The ejmanathy in her written statement admits the oral partition of the Kavaru properties except the equity of redemption. P.Ws 1 and 2 speak about the oral partition. It is stated that there was a mediation in the presence of P.W.2 and one Kanthappa Shetty and that the properties were divided. Shares are said to be in possession of the respective sharers. P.Ws 1 and 2 speak about the oral partition. It is stated that there was a mediation in the presence of P.W.2 and one Kanthappa Shetty and that the properties were divided. Shares are said to be in possession of the respective sharers. D3 admits that till partition she was managing the Kavaru properties assisted by her son D2 and thereafter she is in possession and enjoyment of her share of properties got in oral partition of 1962. As against this we have only the interested version of D.W.1 the 2nd defendant who deposes for the mortgages. Plaintiffs rely on Exts. A5 to A7 which are certified extract of her statements submitted by D1,D2 and D3 regarding the levy of additional land tax. In view of these documents it is argued that unless there was a partition there was not necessary to file separate returns”. Finally, the court observed as follows: “There was no allegation that the Karanavan was disabled from filing the suit. It was held that under the circumstances the suit is not competent”. The court then considered the question whether senior members are not coming forward to file a suit. Thereafter, the court held thus: “In such cases, the plaintiffs are competent to come forward with a suit for redemption. But this question does not arise in view of my finding that the oral partition is true. As co-owner the plaintiffs are competent to file the suit. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find that the oral partition is true and that the plaintiffs are competent to file the suit.” Further in paragraph 36, it is observed as follows: “The plaintiffs have offered to deposit mortgage amount and the value of improvements and they claim a decree for redemption in their favour. Since I have found that the oral partition in the Kavaru of the plaintiffs is true, the members of the Kavaru become co-owners, but it is the admitted case of the plaintiffs that though there was an oral partition in 1962 the equity of redemption was kept joint. That equity of redemption was kept joint. That equity of redemption vests at present in plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 4 to 6. Therefore a decree for redemption ought to be passed in favour of plaintiffs and defendant 2 and 4 to 6. That equity of redemption was kept joint. That equity of redemption vests at present in plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 4 to 6. Therefore a decree for redemption ought to be passed in favour of plaintiffs and defendant 2 and 4 to 6. Defendants 2 and 4 to 6 will contribute their shares in the mortgage money and value of improvements and if that is done the decree will be in favour of plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 4 to 6. A decree of redemption will be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 4 to 6. If defendants 2 and 4 to 6 do not deposit their share of the amount, the plaintiffs are at liberty to deposit the full amount and recover possession on behalf of themselves and defendants 2 and 4 to 6”. 14. Thus, on a perusal of Ext.B7 judgment, it can be seen that the suit for redemption was filed as co-owners by the plaintiffs therein and a decree for redemption was given in favour of the co-owners and not in favour of Kavaru. Thus, we find from Ext.B7 judgment that the question whether there was oral partition or not was considered and found that there was oral partition. As a matter of fact, on behalf of the present first plaintiff it was contended that there was an oral partition. 15. Subsequently, another suit was filed in O.S. No. 23 of 1969. What was produced in the court below was the final decree in O.S. No.23 of 1969, which was produced as Ext. B9. The plaintiff in that suit is Chikkappa Rai, the present first defendant. The present first plaintiff is the seventh defendant there. The final decree states as follows: “the parties have agreed to compromise the matter of the application and that they have put into (court) a deed of compromise, I.A. No. 1236/76 praying that this court will pass a decree in accordance with the terms thereof, this Court in pursuance of the said deed of compromise, both order and decree as follows: 1. that the properties to the share of plaintiff be and hereby is allotted adopting the commissioner’s account Ext.C2 (Index) and the plan, which form part of this final decree, as agreed in the compromise. 2. that the properties to the share of plaintiff be and hereby is allotted adopting the commissioner’s account Ext.C2 (Index) and the plan, which form part of this final decree, as agreed in the compromise. 2. the term of compromise that the properties allotted to the share of the plaintiff as above have already been delivered over to the plaintiff and the plaintiff has taken possession of the same, be and hereby is recorded. 3. the term of compromise that the plaintiff relinquishes his right to claim past and future mesne profits and so he is not entitled to claim any mesne profits, be and hereby is recorded”. The court below considered Ext.B9 and held that there was a partition. 16. A contention was raised that so far as compromise is concerned, the parties have not signed the compromise. The compromise was only signed by the Advocates and that provision regarding minors was not complied with and hence, the compromise should not have been acted upon by the court below. 17. Before this court, respondents 5 to 15 and 16 to 23 have filed a partition, C.M.P. No.6009 of 2000 to receive additional documents. The additional documents are the judgment and decree in O.S. No.23 of 1969. After hearing the parties, we allowed the above C.M.P. by order dated 7.1.2002. We allowed the petition to receive the additional documents because, we found that it was necessary to find out whether there was a preliminary decree passed and whether there was any contention regarding the oral partition in the suit. Accordingly, the judgment and decree were marked as Exts.B13 and B14. From Ext.B13 judgment in O.S. No.23 of 1969, the following facts are revealed. The suit was filed for partition of plaint A schedule properties and allotment of plaint A1 schedule properties to the plaintiff. Plaint A schedule properties along with other properties were obtained by the Kavaru of the plaintiff Chikkappa Rai, who is the first defendant in the present suit and defendants 1 to 10 under a partition deed dated 7.6.1931 in their Kutumba. The Kavaru of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 10 executed a usufructuary mortgage in respect of plaint A schedule properties on 7.6.1931 in favour of one Mohammed Sherule for Rs.6,300/-. After the death of the mortgages, her heirs assigned the mortgage right in favour of his wife, who is the 11th defendant. The Kavaru of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 10 executed a usufructuary mortgage in respect of plaint A schedule properties on 7.6.1931 in favour of one Mohammed Sherule for Rs.6,300/-. After the death of the mortgages, her heirs assigned the mortgage right in favour of his wife, who is the 11th defendant. In this the decree in O.S. No.291 of 1049 of the Sub Court, South Kanara is mentioned. It is further stated that defendants 1 to 7 filed O.S. No. 44 of 1966 for redemption of the mortgage alleging that there was oral partition in respect of the properties other than the equity of redemption over plaint A schedule properties in the Kavaru of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7. In that suit, the present plaintiff was the second defendant. The 11th defendant was the first defendant and defendants 8 to 10 were defendants 4 to 6. There, a preliminary decree for redemption of plaint A schedule properties was passed in favour of the plaintiffs there and also the plaintiff and defendants 8 to 10 there. The redemption price was fixed in that decree as the mortgage amount of Rs.6,300/- and value of improvements Rs.646.44. The plaintiff was given the liberty to pay his share of the redemption price. He was also given the equitable relief that the portion of the plaint A schedule properties where the 11th defendant has raised an areca garden, will be allotted to him in case of partition. Hence, the plaintiff is entitled to get that portion allotted to him in that suit. The plaintiff has given his share of the redemption price to the 11th defendant and obtained release of his share of the mortgage right and also possession of the above mentioned areca garden which is plaint A1 schedule property there. But the court, while passing the final decree in O.S. No.44 of 1966 found that the plaintiff therein was a defaulter and that the plaintiffs in that suit alone were entitled to a final decree for redemption and possession of the mortgaged properties. The plaintiff was entitiled to get plaint A1 schedule properties allotted to him in equity as per the directions in the judgment in O.S. No.44 of 1966. Defendants 1 to 7 continued joint as per Section 36 of the Aliyasanthana Act by which they are governed. The plaintiff was entitled to 1/4th of 1894/2912 share. 18. The plaintiff was entitiled to get plaint A1 schedule properties allotted to him in equity as per the directions in the judgment in O.S. No.44 of 1966. Defendants 1 to 7 continued joint as per Section 36 of the Aliyasanthana Act by which they are governed. The plaintiff was entitled to 1/4th of 1894/2912 share. 18. Written statements were filed jointly by defendants 1 to 7 and defendants 8 and 9. The 10th and 12th defendants filed written statement separately. Defendants 1 to 7 contended that the Kavaru of the plaintiff’s mother got divided from the kavaru of the 8th defendant consisting of defendants 8 and 9 as per the final decree in O.S. No.291 of 1949. It is further stated that there was oral partition in 1962. Similar contentions were raised by the other defendants in the suit. On the basis of the above contentions, eight issues were raised. One of the issues, which is relevant is issue No.2. Issue No.2 is “What are the correct shares to which the parties are entitled?” Because the correctness of the Will depends upon the oral partition of 1962, if there was no oral partition, the share will depend upon the Madras Aliyasanthana Act. Issue No.2 is dealt in paragraph 10 of the judgment. Issue No.2 is “What are the correct shares to which the parties are entitled?” Because the correctness of the Will depends upon the oral partition of 1962, if there was no oral partition, the share will depend upon the Madras Aliyasanthana Act. Issue No.2 is dealt in paragraph 10 of the judgment. It is observed thus: “The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7 continued joint as per Section 36 of the Aliyasanthana Act by which the parites are governed, that defendants 8 to 10 are entitled to 1018/2912 share, that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7 are joinly entitled to 1894/2912, that the mother of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7 now constitute four separate Kavaru………………… Defendants 1 to 7 contend that in the Kavaru of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7, there was an oral partition in 1962 in which all the properties belonging to their Kavaru expecting the equity of redemption over the present plaint A schedule properties were divided between them, that the respective sharers are in possession and enjoyment of the shares so allotted to them, that the case of the plaintiff that their Kavaru continues joint is not true and that since the oral partition took place before the expiration of 15 years from the commencement of the Aliyasanthana Act as provided in Section 36 thereof, the plaintiff is not entitled to per sterps partition as claimed. O.S. No.44 of 1966 was a suit filed by present defendants 1 to 7 for redemption of the mortgage of 7.6.1931 in respect of the plaint A schedule properties”. In respect of plaint A schedule properties, it was held that there was oral partition. It was contended that the properties available for partition have to be divided between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7 as if the partition were in 1962. i.e., within 15 years from the commencement of the Aliyasanthana Act as provided in Section 36 thereof. Thereafter the court held as follows: “Admittedly, the plaintiff’s mother Chomu has got four children viz., the plaintiff, decreased Ramakke-the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant. The 3rd defendant is the son of the 2nd defendant and defendants 4 to 7 are the children of decreased Ramakke. So, half of the properties has to be divided per strips among the five Kavarus. The 3rd defendant is the son of the 2nd defendant and defendants 4 to 7 are the children of decreased Ramakke. So, half of the properties has to be divided per strips among the five Kavarus. The remaining half of the properties has to be divided per capita among the aforesaid nine persons. Thus, it accepted the case of the oral partition. 19. Accordingly, a decree was passed directing partition of the plaint schedule properties into 36 equal shares and allotting plaintiffs 7 such shares. The plaintiff was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.880.13. Thereafter, an application for final decree was filed, which was compromised. There is no case that the preliminary decree was given a go-bye. Thus, we find from Ext.B13 judgment that he present first defendant raised the contention that the Kavaru was not divided in 1962 and hence, he is entitled to partition ignoring the contention of the oral partition. But that contention was negatived. This contention was also necessary for the purpose of a decision in the suit. Thus, we find that in both Exts.B7 and B13 judgments it has been found that there was oral partition in 1962. In the above view of the facts, the judgment will act as res judicata. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants brought to our notice a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sajjadanasthin sayed md. B.E. Edr. V. Musa Dadabhai Ummer and others – A.I.R. 2000 Supreme Court considered as to what is meant by directly and substantially in issue. It is to determine whether the issue is directly and substantially in issue. The court observed as follows: “The test to determine whether an issue was directly and substantially in issue is earlier proceedings or collaterally or incidentally, is that if the issue was necessary to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and was decided, it would have to be treated as directly and substantially’ in issue and if it is clear that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision, then it would be res judicata in a latter case. One has to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue. It is not to be assumed that matters in respect of which issues have been framed are all of them directly and substantially in issue. One has to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue. It is not to be assumed that matters in respect of which issues have been framed are all of them directly and substantially in issue. Nor is there any special significance to be attached to the fact that a particular issue is the first in the list of issues. Which of the matters are directly in issue and which collaterally or incidentally, must be determined on the facts of each case. A material test to be applied is whether the Court considers the adjudication of the issue material and essential for its decision”. There is no dispute with regard to the above proposition. It is true that all issues raised in a case may not be necessary and substantial for the disposal of the matter. Some issues may be necessary. But here, if we examine the two judgments in Exts.B7 and B13. It cannot be said that the issues decided were not necessary and substantially. So far as Ext.B7 is concerned, the question was whether the plaintiffs therein were competent to redeem the mortgage as co-owners. The court found that even if the mortgage was given by the family there was a partition and hence, the members of the family have become co-owners. No doubt, an argument was advanced that even though they are co-owners, the plaintiffs will be entitled to redeem the mortgage on behalf on the family, since the senior members are not coming forward. But in the judgment, the court below specifically says that the issue need not be considered because as already stated, the plaintiffs are co-owners. Further, the decretal portion says that redemption is given not on behalf of the family, but on behalf of the co-owners. Even the co-owners are entitled to deposit the mortgaged money. So far as Ext.B13 judgment is concerned, there also the question whether the oral partition of 1962 was considered. If there is partition in 1962 then the equitable redemption of plaint A schedule properties has to be partitioned as the law stood in 1962. The court very clearly says that there was oral partition and the Kavaru had become divided. Then it has become necessary to determine the question of oral partition in order to find out the shares of the parties. The court very clearly says that there was oral partition and the Kavaru had become divided. Then it has become necessary to determine the question of oral partition in order to find out the shares of the parties. 21. In the above view of the matter, we are of the view that in both Exts.B7 and B13 the question whether there is oral partition of 1962 arose for consideration and the issue directly and substantially arose. It is also interesting to note that the present plaintiff raised the contention that there was partition and the present first defendant denied that there was partition. 22. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the first plaintiff was a minor during the pendency of the two suits, viz., O.S.No.44 of 1966 and O.S. No.23 of 1969. According to him, his interests were not properly safeguarded in those suits and hence, the decisions in those suits cannot be relied on against the plaintiffs. We cannot agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants. A perusal of the plaint shows that no ground has been taken that the decrees in O.S. Nos. 44 of 1966 and 23 of 1969 were not binding and that the minor’s interests were not properly represented. Further, there is no prayer for setting aside the decrees in those suits. Learned counsel contended that it is not necessary for him to make a prayer for setting aside the decrees in those cases, as the present suit shows that he wants to get a decree ignoring the earlier decrees. We fail to appreciate the reasoning on this argument. 23. It is true that minors interest is to be protected and the law is strict in seeing that the proceedings before the court are adequately protected. But that does not mean that any proceedings in which minor was a party can be ignored and a declaration obtained in favour of the minor holding that the previous proceedings were illegal. There is no case that the earlier proceedings are null and void. The proceedings before the court will fail unless it is shown that they were tainted with illegality or irregularity and that the minor has been adversely affected by the judgment. There is no case that the earlier proceedings are null and void. The proceedings before the court will fail unless it is shown that they were tainted with illegality or irregularity and that the minor has been adversely affected by the judgment. In the present case, it can be seen that the minor obtained the fruits of the decrees in the earlier two cases and now he cannot turn round and say that it has affected his interest. Further, we are of the view that since there is no prayer to set aside the two decrees, this argument cannot be entertained. 24. Even though learned counsel, for the appellants argued on the efficacy of the compromise decree, we don’t think, it is necessary to consider the same, because as already stated, Ext.B13 was produced, which is relevant for determining the case. Further Ext.B9 is at the final decree stage. 25. In the light of the above fact, we find that there was oral partition in 1962. The appellants are not entitled to any relief. Hence the judgment and decree of the court below are confirmed. Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.