DIPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) BY the Court. The factual matrix and questions of law raised being similar, both the writ petitions were heard analogously and are disposed of by this common order. For the sake of clarity and convenience the facts in the w. P. No. 3627/2000 are adumbrated. ( 2 ) THE petitioner, M/s. M. P. State Co-operative Oilseeds Growers federation Ltd. , is a Co-operative society registered under the provisions of m. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is engaged in the business of procurement, processing and marketing of oilseeds, agricultural produce and its products etc. The Head Office of the petitioner is situated at Bhopal and it has various units at different parts in the State of M. P. The Act was enacted by the State Legislature to organise and develop co-operatives as democratic instruments and peoples institutions based on self help and mutual aid and for curbing exploitation and ensuring socio-economic development of people with particular emphasis on weaker section of the society. Section 31 of the Act provides that the registration of society shall render it a body corporate. Section 64 of the Act provides that any dispute touching the constitution, management of business, terms and conditions of employment of a society on the liquidation of a society shall be referred to the Registrar by any of the parties to the dispute. It is pleaded that a dispute can be raised by the persons provided in various clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 64 of the Act. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioner it had availed credit facilities from the M. P. State Co-operative Bank Ltd. till the year 1995-96. the Financing bank had shown its unwillingness of finance, as a result of which it was suggested that a consortium may be formed. Accordingly three banks, namely, m. P. State Co- operative Bank Ltd. , Bank of Baroda and Bank of Maharashtra formed the consortium under the leadership of the M. P. State Co- operative bank Ltd. The leader of the consortium is a co- operative society registered under the Act. It is put forth that the respondent No. 1. Bank of Baroda, a nationalised bank had extended the credit facilities to the petitioner for the purpose of running its business with the consortium Banks, the respondents nos. 3 and 4. It is put forth that the respondent No. 1. Bank of Baroda, a nationalised bank had extended the credit facilities to the petitioner for the purpose of running its business with the consortium Banks, the respondents nos. 3 and 4. The said respondent No. 1 filed an application forming the subject-matter of O. A. 325/99 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur against the petitioner and other members of the consortium for recovery of the amount mentioned in the said application. After receipt of the notice from the Tribunal the petitioner entered appearance and filed an application raising preliminary objection in regard to the maintainability of the application. It was contended by the petitioner before the Tribunal that the petitioner is a cooperative society and the respondent No. 1 was its creditor and, therefore, the bank could not have filed an application before the Tribunal for realisation of its dues by taking recourse to the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for brevity 1993 Act' ). The respondent-Bank filed its reply to the preliminary objection and the Tribunal by order dated 26. 5. 2000, Annexure P/5, came to hold that availing of loan cannot be regarded as an activity pertaining to the business of the society and hence, the recovery of claim under the 1993 Act was maintainable. The Tribunal further held that the subject- matter did not fall within the purview of Section 64 of the Act. ( 4 ) BEING dissatisfied with the aforesaid order the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as 'the Appellate Tribunal ). Before the Appellate Tribunal it was. contended by the petitioner that proceeding before the Tribunal was not maintainable and the Tribunal has erroneously decided the issue of jurisdiction. The M. P. Rajya Sahakari Bank Maryadit, the respondent No. 3 herein, supported the stand of the petitioner and contended that a Bank cannot approach the Tribunal under the provision of the 1993 Act and they are required to approach to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies for recovery of loans. It was putforth by the said Bank that all members of the consortium are required to file recovery suit jointly under the leadership of the leader of the consortium instead of taking individual action. The Appellate Tribunal by order dated 13. 9. 2000, Annexure P/6, dismissed the appeal. It was putforth by the said Bank that all members of the consortium are required to file recovery suit jointly under the leadership of the leader of the consortium instead of taking individual action. The Appellate Tribunal by order dated 13. 9. 2000, Annexure P/6, dismissed the appeal. It is averred in the petition that the orders passed by the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are illegal, unjustified and run counter to the provisions of the Act. It is also put forth that both the forums below have not taken into consideration the scheme of the Act and has erroneously come to hold that action could be initiated under the 1993 Act. It is also urged that the Act provides a special forum and the 1993 Act cannot have an overriding effect over the Act in question. ( 5 ) A return has been filed by the contesting respondent No. 1 contending, inter alia, that the petitioner is guilty of suppression of facts and, therefore, the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court should not have exercised in its favour. It is put forth that after the impugned order was passed by the appellate Tribunal the petitioner filed another appeal which was registered as appeal No. 124/2000 whereby they prayed before the Appellate Tribunal for further relief seeking permission to file their affidavit in evidence and the said appeal was allowed by the Appellate Tribunal on 9. 10. 2000. A copy of the said order has been brought on record as Annexure R / l. It is put forth that in compliance of the order passed vide Annexure R / 1 the petitioner filed necessary affidavit by way of evidence and they did not challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal and have accepted its jurisdiction, as is apparent from the order dated 9. 10. 2000. It is further put forth that the provision of the 1993 Act is a special legislation enacted solely for the purpose of recovery of dues of the banks and financial institutions and has an overriding effect over the earlier act. 10. 2000. It is further put forth that the provision of the 1993 Act is a special legislation enacted solely for the purpose of recovery of dues of the banks and financial institutions and has an overriding effect over the earlier act. It is urged that the respondent-Bank had of course, agreed to finance the petitioner but not strictly under the consortium and hence, the documents which were executed by the petitioner in favour of the financing banks do not take away the right of the respondent-Bank inasmuch as the petitioner had executed separate documents in favour of each of the financial banks including the answering respondent. Thus, it has been stated by the respondent No. 1 that when a loan has been advanced in its individual capacity a financier has nothing to do with a consortium. It is further put forth that a proceeding under the 1993 Act is absolutely maintainable and the respondent No. 1. Bank Is not required to approach the competent authority under the Act. It is also setforth that in the case at hand the proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner as well as the State of M. P. who had stood the guarantor and, therefore the proceeding would be maintainable before the tribunal. ( 6 ) I have heard Mr. V. K. Tankha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Rohit Arya, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 4. ( 7 ) IT is submitted by Mr. Tankha that the Tribunal has grossly erred in law in its determination of jurisdiction Inasmuch as the lis in question falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies. It is urged by him that the Tribunal has fallen into error by holding that availing of loan cannot be regarded as touching of business of the society. The learned senior Counsel has further submitted that the appellate Tribunal has erred in law by holding that the 1993 Act is of a special law, and therefore, overrides the provisions of the Act inasmuch as the special law which has been enacted by the Parliament relates to the sphere of the List 1 Union List whereas the act comes within the domain of the State Legislature under List II State list and, therefore, the 1993 Act cannot infringe or encroach upon the matter provided by the State Act. The learned counsel has putforth that the State may be the guarantor but its impleadment in the application would not bring the controversy within the ambit and sweep of the 1993 act and oust the jurisdiction of the authority under the Act to decide the controversy of this nature. It is proposed by him that the lis in question would come within the concept of dispute and if Sections 64 and 82 of the act are read conjointly it would be crystal clear that the Registrar or his nominee of Board of Nominees alone have the jurisdiction to decide the same under the Act. Mr. Tankha, learned Senior Counsel has also contended that the State cannot be treated as a "person" and hence, the provision of the 1993 Act would not apply. ( 8 ) MR. Rohit Arya, learned counsel for the respondent No. , per contra, has contended that the 1993 Act being a special piece of legislation would override the provision of the Act. He has also contended that the State is a person and as it has been impleaded as a guarantor the Registrar, Co-operative societies would have no jurisdiction to entertain the (is in question. ( 9 ) THE core question that arises for consideration is whether in the case at hand, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide the lis. The said aspect has to be decided keeping in view the various submissions raised at the Bar. I shall deal with the essential contentions in seriatim. ( 10 ) FIRST I shall deal with the contention with regard to availing of loan to carry on business by a society. It is worthnoting here that the Tribunal recorded a finding that mere availing of loan from the Bank cannot be termed is business of the society and, therefore, the proceeding for recovery of the loan amount by the Bank before the Tribunal is not affected. The aforesaid finding of the Tribunal has been reversed by the appellate Tribunal and the appellate Tribunal has held that Section 64 of the Act clearly stipulates the dispute must be touching the business of the society and the society is statutorily permitted to take loan from the banks and financial institutions and the amount of loan is utilised for the purpose of the business. As the appellate Tribunal, thus, has clearly held that if a dispute arises with regard to recovery of loans certainly it would be a dispute relating or touching the business of the society. In my considered opinion the finding of the appellate tribunal is absolutely correct and is in consonance with the language employed under Section 64 of the Act. Hence, I need not have to dilate much in that regard, and think it apposite to confer the stamp of approval to the said conclusion. ( 11 ) THE next aspect which requires to be considered whenever the State can be regarded as a person under the 1993 Act. In this regard it is necessitous to view the relevant provision of the Act. Section 2 of the said Act defines various terms. Section 2 (g) defines "debt" as under ;"2 (G) "debt" means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the Bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil Court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on the date of the application. " ( 12 ) THIS definition uses the word "person". It is the stand of the respondent-Bank before the Tribunal that the loanee- Federation had availed the loan and the State Government was the guarantor. Submission of Mr. Tankha is that the State cannot be regarded as a 'person'. In this context I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of State Trading corporation of lndia Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1993 SC 1811. In that case a nine Judge Bench interpreted the term 'citizen' in a broader spectrum. In the case of Union of lndia v. Jabbi and Duma, AIR 1968 SC 360 , their Lordships held that the statute applies to State as much it does to a citizen, unless, it expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from its operations. In that case a nine Judge Bench interpreted the term 'citizen' in a broader spectrum. In the case of Union of lndia v. Jabbi and Duma, AIR 1968 SC 360 , their Lordships held that the statute applies to State as much it does to a citizen, unless, it expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from its operations. In the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1967 SC 997 , it was held as under :"the rule of construction that the King is not bound by a statute unless he is expressly named or brought in by necessary implication, which was accepted by the Privy Council- in interpreting statutes vis-a-vis the Crown is in consistent with and incongruous in the present set up. We have no Crown; the archaic rule based on the prerogative and perfection of the crown has no relevance to a democratic republic; it is inconsistent with the rule of law based on the doctrine of equality. It introduces conflicts and discrimination. There is, no justification to accept the English canon of construction, for. it brings about diverse results and conflicting decisions. On the other hand, the normal construction namely, that the general Act applies to citizens as well as to State unless it expressly for by necessary implication excepts the State from its operation steers clear of all the anomalies. It prima facie applies to all states and subjects alike, a construction consistent with the philosophy of equality enshrined in our Constitution. The natural approach avoids the archaic rule and moves with the modern trends. This will not cause any hardship to the State. The State can make an Act. if it chooses, providing for its exemption from its operation. Though the State is not expressly exempted from the operation of an Act, under certain circumstances such an exemption may necessarily be implied. Such an act, provided it does not infringe fundamental rights, will give the necessary reliefs to the State. . . . . " (Quoted from the placitum) ( 13 ) IN this context, I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3297 , wherein the apex Court held as under :"95. . . . . " (Quoted from the placitum) ( 13 ) IN this context, I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3297 , wherein the apex Court held as under :"95. The maxim reddendo singula singulis will apply to the interpretation of the word "person" in its generic sense with its width would not be cut down by the specific qualification of one species, i. e. natural "person" when it is capable to encompass, in its ambit, natural persons, juristic person and constitutional mechanism of governance in a democratic set up. It has already been held and bears no repetition, that the State by Cabinet form of Government, is a persona ficta a corporate sole. "their Lordships further proceeded to hold :"the word 'person' would include both natural persons as well as juristic person and constitutional Government. "again in paragraph 96 their Lordships further expressed as under :"96. The word "person" in Section 3 (l) (a) would, therefore, be construed to include not merely the natural persons, in the -context of tribal and non-tribal who deal with the land in scheduled areas by transfer inter vivos but all juristic person in the generic sense, including the corporation, partnership firm, a company, any person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 14 ) RECENTLY the Gauhati High Court in the case of State of Assam v. State of Bank Bikaner and Jaipur, AIR 2000 Gau 149 , held as under :"15. In view of the above, I hold that the word 'person' cannot be given a restricted meaning to exclude the 'state' for the purpose of recovery of debt under the Act when the State was allowed to stand as surety / guarantor, the State is bound by its obligation. " ( 15 ) FROM the aforesaid enunciation of law there remains no trace of doubt that the word "person" used in the dictionary clause under the 1993 act would in its ambit and sweep include the "state", moreso, in absence of any kind of exemption in the said statute. " ( 15 ) FROM the aforesaid enunciation of law there remains no trace of doubt that the word "person" used in the dictionary clause under the 1993 act would in its ambit and sweep include the "state", moreso, in absence of any kind of exemption in the said statute. ( 16 ) NEXT contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is a loanee even if it is assumed that the petitioner had availed a loan from the respondent No. 1, Bank and the State stood as a surety for the petitioner, then also the dispute would come within the purview of the act. Section 64 of the Act deals with disputes and arbitration. In this context it is apposite to reproduce the Section 64 of the Act. It reads as under :"64. Disputes. Section 64 of the Act deals with disputes and arbitration. In this context it is apposite to reproduce the Section 64 of the Act. It reads as under :"64. Disputes. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, management or business, terms and conditions of employment of a society or the liquidation or a society shall be referred to the Registrar by any of the parties to the dispute if the parties thereto are among the following : (a) a society, its committee, any past committee, any past or resent officer, any or present agent, any past or present servant or a nominee, heirs or legal representative of any deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, or the liquidator of the society; (b) a member, past member or a person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member of a society or of a society which is a member of the society; (c) a person other than a member of the society who has been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had business transactions and any person claiming through such a person; (d) a surety of a member, past member or deceased member or a person other than a member who has been granted a loan by the -society, whether such a surety is or is not a member of the society; (e) any other society or the liquidator of such a society; and (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a dispute shall include (i) a claim by a society for any debt or demand due to it from a member, past member or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (ii) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (iii) a claim by a society for any loss caused to it by a member, past member or deceased member, any officer, past officer or deceased officer, any agent, past agent or deceased agent, or any servant, past servant or deceased servant, or its committee, past or present, whether such loss be admitted or not; (iv) a question regarding rights, etc. including tenancy rights between a housing society and its tenants; and (V) any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of the society or representative of the society or of composite society : provided that the Registrar shall not entertain any dispute under this clause during the period commencing from the announcement of the election programme till the declaration of the results. (3) If any question arising whether a dispute referred to the Registrar is a dispute, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. " ( 17 ) LEARNED Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also referred me to the Section 82 of the Act. The said provision reads as under :"82. Bar of Jurisdiction of Courts. (1) Save as provided in this Act, no civil or revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of (a) the registration of a society or of bye-laws or of an amendment of a bye-laws; (b) the removal of a committee and the management of the society after such removal; (c) any dispute, required to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees; (d) any matter concerning the winding up and the dissolution of a society. (2) While a society is being wound up, no suit or other legal proceedings relating to the business of such society shall be proceeded with, or instituted against, the liquidator as such or against the society or any member thereof, except by leave of the Registrar and subject to such terms as he may impose. (3) Save as provided in this Act, no order, decision or award made under this Act shall be questioned in any Court on any ground what- soever. " ( 18 ) SUBMISSION of Mr. Tankha is that as the respondent No. 1 is a creditor of the society the said dispute would come within the ambit and sweep of Section 64 (l) (f) of the Act and, therefore, the matter has to be adjudicated by the Registrar of the Society. " ( 18 ) SUBMISSION of Mr. Tankha is that as the respondent No. 1 is a creditor of the society the said dispute would come within the ambit and sweep of Section 64 (l) (f) of the Act and, therefore, the matter has to be adjudicated by the Registrar of the Society. It is his submission that this is a special provision covered under Entry No. 32 of the List II State List and, therefore, the legislation made by the Parliament which may come within the Entry No. 45 of List- I cannot intrude or infringe to nullify the provisions of a law made by the State Legislature which is exclusively within its jurisdiction. The learned senior Counsel submitted that Section 18 of the 1993 Act bars the jurisdiction of the other forums but the same cannot override the provisions of Section 64 of the Act inasmuch as a special legislation enacted by the Parliament may have overriding effect over the earlier legislations enacted by the Parliament in exercise of power conferred on it in respect of the field mentioned in the list-I, Union List and the List III, Concurrent List, but it would not have any operation or effect in respect of the statute enacted by the State Legislature in exercise of exclusive powers conferred on it under the List-II, State List. The learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of M /s. Phoneix Impex v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1,998 Raj 100, wherein a division Bench-of the Rajasthan High Court referred to the provisions of the 1993 Act. Banking Laws and the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and came to hold that a Co-operative Society may be a banking company but it does not become a company under Indian Companies Act, 1956. After so holding in paragraph 14, the Division Bench ruled thus :"14. We do not find any merit in this connection that the Act No. 51 of 1993 shall prevail over the provisions of the Rajasthan Act of 1965. The two enactments are under the powers vested in the two different legislatures. There is no overlapping of the jurisdiction. The subject of. We do not find any merit in this connection that the Act No. 51 of 1993 shall prevail over the provisions of the Rajasthan Act of 1965. The two enactments are under the powers vested in the two different legislatures. There is no overlapping of the jurisdiction. The subject of. co-operative societies is not included in the Union List rather it comes in Entry 32 of List II of Schedule VII appended to the Constitution, and therefore, this argument cannot be allowed to prevail that the provisions of Rajasthan Act of 1965 dealing with recovery of the loons from its members by the co-operative societies are violative of the provisions of the Union List. The cases relied on by learned counsel for appellant hardly carry point stressed by him. Rather in the case of Smt. Sadha singh, AIR 1970 Pun] and Har 528 (supra), it has been held that the banking business of co- operative societies does not fall in Entry No, 43 of List I and State Legislature is competent to regulate the functions of the co-operative societies engaged in the business of banking. " ( 19 ) SUBMISSION of Mr. Tankha, learned Senior Counsel is that in view of the aforesaid decision and the law passed by the different Legislatures the section 18 of the 1993 Act would have no play and the Act would hold the filed. ( 20 ) MR. Rohit Arya, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 tried to impress this Court by citing number of decisions that Section 18 of the 1993 Act would have overriding effect as it is a special piece of legislation and a provision in the later legislation would have overriding effect over a special provision in a special Act which had come into existence at earlier point of time. The decisions cited by him relate to the enactment passed by the same Legislature. Mr. Rohit Arya has placed strong reliance on the decision rendered in the case of I. C. I. C. I. v. Vanjinad Leathers Ltd. , AIR 1997 Ker 273 , wherein the Kerala High Court ruled that the 1993 Act is a special law which has overriding effect over another special law, that is the Companies Act, 1956, mr. Mr. Rohit Arya has placed strong reliance on the decision rendered in the case of I. C. I. C. I. v. Vanjinad Leathers Ltd. , AIR 1997 Ker 273 , wherein the Kerala High Court ruled that the 1993 Act is a special law which has overriding effect over another special law, that is the Companies Act, 1956, mr. Tankha, as has been indicated hereinbefore has put immense emphasis on the aspect that the Companies Act, 1956 was enacted by the Parliament in exercise of power under List I. The learned counsel has also referred to entry 97 of List - I. It is submitted by him that once Entry No. 32, List II is specific an enactment brought forth by the Parliament cannot nullify the provisions of the State law. It is submitted by him that even if the residuary power is taken recourse to that cannot whittle the powers of the State Legislature. ( 21 ) ORDINARILY I would have proceeded to decide the aforesaid aspect but in the present case, the same does not require to be dealt with. I may hasten to add that in the case of M /s. Phoneix Impex, AIR 1998 Raj 100 (supra), a division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has expressed the opinion that the 1993 Act does not override the provisions of the Societies Act. In the said case the question arose for consideration is whether the 1993 Act is applicable for the purpose of recovery of debts by the Co-operative Bank due to its members. In that context the said decision was rendered. I may not be understood to have stated that the said decision is distinguishable as far as the overriding effect is concerned. I am not deciding the said issue in the case at hand as in the instant case the proceeding has been initiated by the respondent-Bank not only against the petitioner-Federation, a Co-operative society but also against its guarantor, the State Government. I have already held that State is a person and, therefore, proceeding can be initiated against the State also under the Act. Where a proceeding is initiated against a loanee-soclety and a guarantor as in the instant case the provisions enshrined under Section 64 of the Act would have no applicability. It is not a. dispute between a society and its members. Where a proceeding is initiated against a loanee-soclety and a guarantor as in the instant case the provisions enshrined under Section 64 of the Act would have no applicability. It is not a. dispute between a society and its members. It is not a dispute exclusively between a society and its creditor. It in fact, is a controversy between bank/creditor on one hand and the society and its guarantor on the other. If a decree would be passed both the loanee as well as the guarantor may be jointly and severally liable. Once a guarantor comes into picture and is impleaded as a party application of Section 64 of the Act becomes non-operational. ( 22 ) IN this context I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Bharat Co-operative Transport Society Ltd. , Bairagarh v. Punjab National bank, Bhopal, 1978 0 MPLJ 271 . In the said case the society concerned had borrowed money from the Punjab National Bank. The question that arose for consideration whether this was a dispute referable to the registrar under Section 64 of the Act. The learned single Judge referred to the expression "dispute touching the business of a society" and placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. M /s. Dulichand Jugraj jain, AIR 1969 SC 1320 , and came to hold that co-operative society carrying on business of transport purchasing scooter for office is not touching with the business of society and the dispute is not covered under Section 64 of the Act. While so holding, the learned single Judge also referred to another aspect that surety is not amongst the parties enumerated in Section 64 of the Act. I may profitably quote paragraph No. 5 from the aforesaid decision :"5, The revision must fail on quite another ground. Shri Dharampal sharma, the surety. is not amongst the parties enunciated in Section 64. Had he been a surety for a member who had been granted loan by a society, he could be a party to the dispute under clause (d) of Section 64 (1 ). But here the society is a debtor and Sharma is a third person standing surety for the society. Section 64 (1) does not cover such a surety by any of the Clauses (a) to (1 ). But here the society is a debtor and Sharma is a third person standing surety for the society. Section 64 (1) does not cover such a surety by any of the Clauses (a) to (1 ). A suit against him could not go to the registrar, Civil Court alone had jurisdiction. " ( 23 ) THUS, from the aforesaid pronouncement of law there remains no trace of doubt that a surety or a guarantor who is a third person qua the society is not covered by any of the clauses of Section 64 of the Act. In the case at hand the State had stood as guarantor and indubitably it is a third party. Ergo, the dispute would not be covered under Section 64 of the Act and the provisions of the 1993 Act would be applicable in full force. ( 24 ) IN view of my preceding analysis, I do not perceive any merit in any of the submissions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and come to hold that the Tribunal would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the lis in question. ( 25 ) CONSEQUENTLY, both the writ petitions, being sans substance, stand dismissed without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .