JUDGMENT : M. Papanna, J. - This is an appeal preferred from Jail by the appellant challenging the judgment dated 22.1,1994 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Koraput-Jeypore in S.C. No. 46/93 convicting him u/s 302, I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo R.I. for life. 2. Case of the prosecution is that on 12.11.1992 while one Nachika Samudu (informant) of village Palaputu was in his house, accused Nachika Deruku of his village came and told him that in the night of 10.11.1992 due to quarrel with his wife Bamuni, he assaulted her out of anger by means of a thenga and an axe as a result of which she fell down unconscious in their house. In the following morning he saw her dead. After much thought whether he would disclose the incident to his relations in the village, he told his father and thereafter to the informant and others that he killed Bamuni (deceased). On hearing the incident, the informant along with Laxman Khara, Sindir Mandingi, D. Sukur went to the house of the accused and found the deceased lying dead. There also the accused told them that he killed 'the deceased due to quarrel by means of a thenga and an axe. Thus after the matter was discussed in the village, the informant lodged information in Narayan Patna Police Station. Basing on the said information Narayan Patna R.S. Case No. 48/92 was registered. During investigation, the investigating Officer visited the spot, held inquest over the dead-body of the deceased, seized all the incriminating materials, sent the dead-body for post mortem examination and placed charge sheet ultimately against the accused on completion of investigation in all respects. 3. Accused, who pleaded innocence, took a plea of alibi and false implication by the police. 4. For proof of the charge against the accused evidence of twelve witnesses has been pressed into service. P.W. 1 is the informant. P.W. 2 is Nachhika Teli, P.W. 3 (Huika Masuri) is a witness to the inquest held on the dead-body of the deceased. P.W. 4 (Naga Bansa Govinda) is a witness to frequent quarrel between the accused and the deceased. P.W. 5 (Loha Subudhi) is a witness to the seizure of weapons of offence and a mat. P.W. 6 is the brother of the deceased. P.Ws. 7 and 8 are the hostile witnesses. P.W. 9 is scribe of the F.I.R. (Ext. 1). P.W. 4 (Naga Bansa Govinda) is a witness to frequent quarrel between the accused and the deceased. P.W. 5 (Loha Subudhi) is a witness to the seizure of weapons of offence and a mat. P.W. 6 is the brother of the deceased. P.Ws. 7 and 8 are the hostile witnesses. P.W. 9 is scribe of the F.I.R. (Ext. 1). P.W, 10 is a Police Constable attached to Narayan Patna Police station. P.W. 11 is the Medical Officer, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead-body of the deceased whereas P.W. 12 is the Investigating Officer, who after completing investigation submitted charge sheet against the accused. 5. On the other hand, no witness has been examined for the defence. 6. On consideration of the evidence on record, the learned trial Judge came to hold that the accused is the author of the crime. Accordingly, he was convicted and sentenced as stated above. 7. The main contention raised by Shri R.N. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the learned trial Judge has committed error in convicting the accused basing on his extra-judicial confession which is inadmissible in evidence because of being involuntary in nature for which it does not inspire confidence. On the other hand, Shri A. N. Routray, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State has supported the impugned judgment. 8. This is a case of entirely circumstantial evidence relying on which the accused has been convicted and sentenced by the learned trial Judge as, stated above. In the case of State of U.P. v. Harimohan and Ors. reported in 2000 (7) Sup 516 the Apex Court has ruled that it is often said that witnesses may lie, but the circumstances cannot. To convict a person on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution must be clearly established. The proved circumstances must be such as would be reasonably exclude the possibility of innocence of the accused. The circumstantial evidence should be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. Their Lordship have also held that the chain of circumstances furnished by the prosecution should be so complete as not to lead any reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. 9. The circumstantial evidence should be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. Their Lordship have also held that the chain of circumstances furnished by the prosecution should be so complete as not to lead any reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. 9. Keeping in mind the well established position of law as aforesaid, we have to examine each of the circumstances to find out whether the accused is the real perpetrator of the crime. The incriminating circumstances found against the accused persons may be categorised as below : (i) Medical evidence as spoken to by P.W. 11; (ii) Accused and the deceased being husband and wife, were residing together in their house at the material time; (iii) The accused made extra-judicial confession to P.Ws. 1 and 2 admitting his guilt or suggesting the inference that he is the real culprit; (iv) Discovery of Weapon of offence M.Os. I and II by the I.O. (P.W. 12) on the information of the accused and seizure of the same at his instance; (v) Seizure of blood stained wearing apparels of the deceased; and (vi) Report of the Medical Examiner. 10. Medical evidence is an important circumstance in the case at hand. Let us now examine whether death of the deceased is homicidal or suicidal in nature. A perusal of oral evidence of P.W. 11 corroborated by Post-mortem report (Ext. 6) incidates the following external injuries : (1) Cut injury 5 x 3 x 21/2 c.ms. over the scalp of the occipital region; (2) Abrasion 4x2x1 c.ms, over the left shin of tibia; (3) Abrasion around the wrist-joint, right side; (4) Abrasion 4x2x1 cms situated 3 cms. lateral to left kneews; (5) Bruise x 8 x 6 cms. over the left breast and chest, and (6) Bruise covering the whole face, nose and fore-head. On dissection of the dead-body of the deceased as indicated in Ext. 6, one haematoma containing half-litre of blood over the frontal and parietal bones was found corresponding to external injury No. 6. That apart, there was a contusion over the pectroralis major and minor muscles of the left side corresponding to external injury No. 5. Also 5th and 6th ribs on the left side on the axillary line ware foun3 fractured. 6, one haematoma containing half-litre of blood over the frontal and parietal bones was found corresponding to external injury No. 6. That apart, there was a contusion over the pectroralis major and minor muscles of the left side corresponding to external injury No. 5. Also 5th and 6th ribs on the left side on the axillary line ware foun3 fractured. P.W. 11 categorically opined on the basis of the aforesaid examination that the deceased met a homjcidal death caused owing to intra-cranial haemorrhage and shock as a result of haemorrhage in different injury sites. Medical opinion has also made it clear that the injuries as per Ext. 6 are sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased. Therefore, the learned trial Judge, on the basis of medical evidence, came to hold that the injuries sustained by the deceased were anti-mortem in nature and she died a homicidal death. We affirm the finding of the learned trial Judge since the defence did not challenge the medical evidence on this aspect during the trial northe learned counsel appearing for the appellant before us has challenged the same. 11. The circumstance, that the accused and the deceased were living together in one house at the material time is no less important to connect him with the complicity of the crime. The deceased is the wife of the accused. This fact having been not disputed by the defence, it is clear that they were living together as wife and husband in their house. But the most pertinent question is, whether the accused was present in his house at the material time. He pleaded alibi. At trial, the defence did not suggest to any of the witnesses that during the night of the occurrence, the accused was not present in his house. It is only during his examination u/s 313, Cr.P.C., he pleaded so, which having been not supported by any defence evidence, the said plea of alibi has been rightly rejected by the learned trial Judge. We can safely rely on the version of P.W. 6 to the effect that the accused was present in his house in the evening prior to occurrence and was quarreling with his wife. He was assaulting her in spite of his protest. We can safely rely on the version of P.W. 6 to the effect that the accused was present in his house in the evening prior to occurrence and was quarreling with his wife. He was assaulting her in spite of his protest. Thus, the circumstance, that the accused and the deceased were living together as husband and wife in one house and at the material time when the deceased died he was present in the said house, has been fully established. 12. The next circumstantial evidence relying on which the learned trial Judge found the accused guilty of the offence u/s 302, I.P.C. convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid, is extra judicial confession. According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, such evidence relating to extra judicial confession being a weak piece of evidence, the learned trial Judge has gone wrong in forming the same as the basis of conviction of the accused. On the other hand, the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate for the State urged that extra-Judicial confession made by the accused is since true and voluntary, can be relied upon by the Court without any corroboration. In view of rival contentions advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties, we feel it expedient to discuss the law on extra judicial confession. 13. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Act') has not defined the term 'confession'. Section 24 of the Act deals with confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, which is irrelevant in criminal proceedings. The meaning of the term 'confession' as given in the Chambers Dictionary is acknowledgement or admission of a crime or fault by a person charged with crime. Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act deal with such confession. Ordinarily, confession or admission is evidence against the person, who makes it. But the confession made to a Police Officer is not admissible in evidence against the accused as contemplated u/s 25 of the Act. In the case at hand, the accused, who is said to have made confession or his guilt retracted the same. As such the bone of contention is, whether such retracted confession can be of any assistance to the prosecution to reach a conclusion of guilt of the accused. 14. The learned trial Judge has found the extra judicial confession made by the accused to P.Ws. 1 and 2 to be credible. As such the bone of contention is, whether such retracted confession can be of any assistance to the prosecution to reach a conclusion of guilt of the accused. 14. The learned trial Judge has found the extra judicial confession made by the accused to P.Ws. 1 and 2 to be credible. No doubt, the confession alleged to have been made by the accused has been subsequently retracted by him. But if such extra judicial confession is found to be true and voluntary, there is no legal bar to convict the accused basing on such retracted confession. In a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Dasa Marandi v. State of Orissa 1997 (13) OCR 204 it has been ruled as below : "Retracted confession may form the legal basis of conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntary. The requirement for corroboration is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law'. The proper approach is to consider the confession as a whole on its merit and use it against the maker thereof, if the Court unhesitatingly comes to the conclusion that it was made voluntarily and the reasons for making the confession, and its retraction must be weighed and if the retraction is found to be an after thought, the retraction should not weigh with the Court. An extra judicial confession if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The same is to be proved like any other fact. Where there is nothing to show that a witness had any motive to implicate the accused falsely, the evidence relating to extra judicial confession can be relied upon. If the witnesses examined to prove such confession is found to be dependable and trust worthy, the extra judicial confession alone can form the basis of conviction." 15. Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the case at hand, we have examined the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 whom the accused made extra judicial confession. P.W. 1 is the Headman of the village who deposed clearly and categorically that the accused told him that he killed his wife in the last night. At this he went to the house of the accused along with some villagers and found her lying dead in the said house. 1 and 2 whom the accused made extra judicial confession. P.W. 1 is the Headman of the village who deposed clearly and categorically that the accused told him that he killed his wife in the last night. At this he went to the house of the accused along with some villagers and found her lying dead in the said house. P.W. 2 another villager of the accused was also told by the latter that he killed his wife. He also went to his house where the deceased was lying dead. During cross-examination, however, he said that the accused did not tell him anything for which he was declared hostile. On scrutiny of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and also on reading of F.I.R. (Ext. 1) disclosing such extra judicial confession made by the accused, we are satisfied that the accused made extra judicial confession voluntarily and the same being found to be true, we rely on the same unhesitatingly and use it against the maker thereof. Though he retracted it subsequently, but such retraction is found to be an after thought. The evidence of P.W. 1 does not suffer from any legal infirmity particularly when the confession made by the accused has not been procured under coercion or pressure. In 2000 (3) Sup 402 (Gura Singli v. State of Rajasthan) the Apex Court has held that extra judicial confession if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the Court to convict the accused for commission of the crime as alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. In the case of Prabodh Verma and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, the Apex Court observed that it is not open to the Court trying the criminal case to start with presumption that extra-judicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of circumstances, the time when confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. Court has to find out whether the person who claims that a confession was made before him is a person on whom accused could repose confidence. It would depend on the nature of circumstances, the time when confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. Court has to find out whether the person who claims that a confession was made before him is a person on whom accused could repose confidence. It cannot be called a weak piece of evidence if it withstands, the following tests : (i) Is the witness proving the confession generally credible ? (ii) Is his relation with the accused of such nature that the latter could confide in him ? (iii) Is there any motive for the witness to implicate the accused falsely (the witness might be trying to save himself or some one else by laying the blame on the accused)? And (iv) Is the confessional statement consistent with other facts and circumstances brought on record 7 16. In the case at hand, the evidence about the extra-judicial confession comes from the mouth of P.W. 1 who is a village head man. He appears to be unbiased and not even remotely inimical to the accused in respect of whom nothing is brought out during cross:examination by the defence. Hence we are convinced that his evidence does not indicate that he has a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. As a matter of fact, the words spoken to by P.W. 1 are very clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Therefore, after subjecting his evidence to a rigorous test on the touch stone of credibility, it appears to us that the extra judicial confession can be relied upon to base conviction of the accused. In the case of Prabodh Verma and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, it is viewed that no doubt an extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. But, however, when it is corroborated by surrounding circumstances and other reliable evidence is available, it must be taken into consideration. The Hon'ble Apex Court has taken a view in The State of Assam Vs. Bhubhan Chandra Dutta and Another, that there is no reason why the witnesses falsely implicate the appellant in the murder of his wife. The Apex court held the accused responsible for the death of his wife in the said case basing on his confession made to his wife's uncle and cousin. 17. Bhubhan Chandra Dutta and Another, that there is no reason why the witnesses falsely implicate the appellant in the murder of his wife. The Apex court held the accused responsible for the death of his wife in the said case basing on his confession made to his wife's uncle and cousin. 17. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case applying the settled principle of law as discussed above, we consider P.W. 1 before whom the accused made extra judicial confession, as a truthful, reliable and dependable witness. Accordingly, we hold that the accused rather went to the village headman (P.W. 1) voluntarily and made extra judicial confession which, in view of the established position of law is legally acceptable. 18. The next circumstance is discovery of the weapons of offence M.O.I. (Axe) and M.O. II (Lathi) on which the learned trial Judge based conviction of the accused. In this regard, we have perused the evidence of the I.O. (P.W. 12), which goes to indicate that he arrested the accused during the investigation of the case and while in police custody, the accused gave him information regarding concealment of M.Os. I and II in his house in presence of the witnesses. The accused led the I.O. and the witnesses to his house and showed the weapons of offence, which were kept in the corner of the front room of his house where the deceased was lying dead. He proved the seizure of M.Os. I and II made under seizure list Ext. 9. Seizure of M.Os. I and It finds corroboration in the evidence of P.W. 5 who has correctly identified the said M.Os. used by the accused in causing the injuries sustained by the deceased, which has been further corroborated by medical evidence to the effect that the external injury No. 1 as per Ext. 6 has been caused by M.O. I (axe) and the other injuries were caused by M.O. II (lathi). In our opinion, the trial Judge has rightly accepted and relied upon the evidence of the I.O. (P.W. 12) regarding search and seizure of the weapons of offence. Evidence of the I.O. can be believed to be correct as the same is not otherwise shown to be untrustworthy as well as unreliable. It cannot be rejected mainly because he is a Police Officer. Evidence of the I.O. can be believed to be correct as the same is not otherwise shown to be untrustworthy as well as unreliable. It cannot be rejected mainly because he is a Police Officer. We rely on his evidence when he says that he recovered and seized M.Os. I and II from the house of the accused basing on his information. During cross-examination, the defence failed to render his evidence untrustworthy or unreliable. Thus, we feel it safe to act upon the same in this case. Our view is fortified by a ruling of the Supreme Court reported in 2000 (7) Sup 728 (State Government of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil and Anr.) wherein it is held as follows : "It is fallacious expression that when recovery is affected pursuant to any statement made by the accused, the document prepared by the Investigating Officer contemporaneous with such recovery must necessarily be attested by independent witnesses." It is clear from the settled principle of law quoted above that the Court has to believe the version of a Police Officer to be correct, if the same is not shown to be unreliable otherwise. Therefore, judging the facts of the case in the light of the above decision it cannot be said that the learned trial Judge has committed illegality in accepting the evidence of P.W. 12 regarding seizure of the weapons of offence. On further perusal of the materials on record, we have found that the prosecution has been able to prove the inquest report (Ext. 2) through P.W. 6 and also P.W. 12 to the effect that there were marks of injuries on the dead-body of the deceased inflicted by axe on her back side head and injury marks found on her body caused by lathi. The report of the Chemical Examiner (Ext. 13) has also been proved by the I.O. to the effect that the axe sent for chemical examination was stained with human blood of 'B' group and also the saree of the deceased was stained with human blood of 'B1 group. The circumstantial evidence consisting of medical evidence gives assurance to the existence of other circumstances as shown above against the culprit. The circumstantial evidence consisting of medical evidence gives assurance to the existence of other circumstances as shown above against the culprit. The extra-judicial confession corroborated by other surrounding circumstance in the case as discussed above cogently established the guilt of the accused whom we hold unhesitatingly as the real author of the crime of murder of his own wife. Therefore, we are amply satisfied with the entire evidence having cumulative effect as brought on reco,rd by the prosecution leading to the only conclusion that within all human probabilities the appellant and non-else murdered his wife. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant has further contended that the prosecution case cannot be said to have been established beyond all reasonable doubt particularly when the prosecution has failed to establish motive of the accused for commission of the alleged crime. We do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant as the prosecution case, as revealed from F.I.R. (Ext. 1), clear indicates that the accused assaulted his wife out of anger by means of a thenga during the course of quarrel between them. The F.I.R. story of the prosecution case is corroborated by the statement of P.W. 1 (informant) to the effect that the accused confessed before him that he killed his wife in the last night. During cross-examination he added strength to his statement stating that the accused told him that he had been to his land and after returning he assaulted his wife by lathi and she died. Motive is purely a state of mind only known to the perpetrator of the crime. That being so, we have seen how the prosecution proved the offence with which the accused is charged relying on circumstantial evidence having cumulative effect pointing conclusively to the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. In such a view of the matter, contention of the learned counsel for the appellant stands rejected. 20. In view of our discussion made above, we uphold the conviction of the appellant. We have now to consider the question of sentence. The circumstances of the case proceeding the homicide admits of no doubt that the appellant assaulted his wife by means of an axe and lathi and thereby causing injuries which are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause her death. We have now to consider the question of sentence. The circumstances of the case proceeding the homicide admits of no doubt that the appellant assaulted his wife by means of an axe and lathi and thereby causing injuries which are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause her death. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted not to impose on him, the highest penalty of law as he had no intention to kill the deceased. It is true that during quarrel between the appellant and his wife, the homicide was committed. However, since there are no materials on record to show that such homicide was committed in the heat of passion on grave provocation, we are not inclined to visit the homicide committed intentionally with the lesser penalty than imposed by the learned trial Judge. 21. The result is that the conviction as well as sentence impugned in the appeal are upheld. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal being devoid of any merit. B.P. Das, J. 22. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed