JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties.An application has been moved by the learned counsel for the respondent for recalling the order passed by this Court on 25th Feb., 2002, allowing the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appeal, in fact, has been presented after 144 days from the date of limitation. 2. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the notices were issued in respect of the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act which were returnable on 23rd Feb., 2002 and 23rd Feb., 2002, which was an office date, having been declared as a holiday on account of Idd, the matter could not have been posted for hearing on merit of the application on 25th Feb., 2002 because of the intervening Sunday on 24th Feb., 2002. Learned counsel has filed his Vakalatnama on 26th Feb., 2002. 3. The record reveals that after the notices were issued returnable on 23rd Feb., 2002, which was a Saturday, an application has been moved by the learned counsel for the appellants on 21.2.2002 to get the matter listed on 22nd Feb., 2002 pointing out that the service on the respondent is already complete. However, the date was not pre-poned; but the case was permitted to be listed in Court on 25.2.2002 only, when the case would otherwise have been listed, as Rule was returnable on 23.2.2002. On 21st Feb., 2002, office reported that the notices have been returned after service and as per the permission granted by the Court, the matter was listed on 25th Feb., 2002. There is no dispute about the fact that on 25th Feb., 2002, on the first date on which respondent could have put appearance, if they were to wait for the last date, no appearance was put by anyone. In these circumstances, we are not impressed by the contention that the matter could not have been listed for orders on 25th Feb., 2002. 4. Otherwise also, we have examined the merit of the application and objections raised by the learned counsel about allowing of the application. Having perused the application and reply, we are satisfied that there was sufficient cause which prevented the appellants from filing appeal within limitation and the delay otherwise was also liable to be condoned and appeal admitted. 5. Accordingly, application for recalling the order dated 25.2.2002 is rejected. 6. Having perused the application and reply, we are satisfied that there was sufficient cause which prevented the appellants from filing appeal within limitation and the delay otherwise was also liable to be condoned and appeal admitted. 5. Accordingly, application for recalling the order dated 25.2.2002 is rejected. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on merit also. The respondent-petitioner was aggrieved of the order dated 15th Feb., 1999 (Annx. 4 to the writ petition), by which he was informed that his candidature is being cancelled from the list of selected candidates by the Selection Board constituted under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989. 7. The petitioner had applied for being appointed as Constable in pursuance of Advertisement dated 24.9.1998 which invited the applications by 24th Oct., 1998. Column No. 17 of the application form required a candidate to disclose the information about any criminal case with which the applicant may have been connected. The requisite information which was to be furnished by an aspirant in column No. 17 of the application form required him to disclose (1) whether he had been involved in any criminal case?; (2) whether he had been arrested in connection with any case?; he had to furnish details, if the answer was in affirmative, and (3) lastly he had to inform whether he had been punished in any case?. If the answer was in affirmative, he had to furnish details. The petitioner had answered all the three queries in column No. 17 in negative by mentioning the word "Nahi". The application form having been provisionally accepted, the petitioner was invited for interview on 21st Oct., 1999. He was interviewed and his name was included in the select list of the candidates on 22nd Oct., 1999 when he was required to furnish another form as a part of the verification by the police about his antecedents. It was revealed in pursuance thereto for the first time that the incumbent had been prosecuted for offences under sections 147, 341, 323 and 149 IPC in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Suratgarh and he was acquitted of that charge by the trial Court on 31st Oct., 1998. We notice that the acquittal has taken place after the last date of furnishing the application form had expired. We notice that the acquittal has taken place after the last date of furnishing the application form had expired. In other words, as on the date the application was furnished by the petitioner in pursuance of the notice, he had not been acquitted and a criminal case was pending against him which fact undisputedly he had not disclosed in his application form. 8. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned Single Judge that since the petitioner had been acquitted of the charge in respect of trial held against him and he has furnished information in response to the form given to him for furnishing the information about police verification, he has voluntarily disclosed the facts about pendency of the criminal case as well as its result before the question of .taking decision arose for the respondents whether to offer or not to offer appointment. Since the petitioner had been acquitted of the charge as back as on 30th Oct., 1998 the non-disclosure of such information prior to furnishing the form for police verification cannot be held against him for cancelling of his candidature and denying him appointment in accordance with his place in merit amongst the selected candidates by the selection committee. 9. On the other hand, it has been contended by learned counsel for the non-petitioners-appellants that since the applicant was required to disclose facts not only about the result of the case but about the pendency of the case as well as its result, if any, which had happened prior to the furnishing of the application and he had deliberately not disclosed those facts, he is not entitled to any relief and the non-petitioners were within the province of their authority to cancel the candidature in not offering appointment to him for want of this disclosure. Learned counsel placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision in Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar, [ (1996) 11 SCC 605 ] and Full Bench decision of this Court in Dharam Pal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2000 Vol. 2 RLW Page 815) . Learned counsel for the respondent has invited attention of the Court to a later decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, Delhi v. Dhaval Singh [ (1999) 1 SCC 246 ] . 10. Learned Single Judge agreed with the contention of the petitioner and has allowed the writ petition. 2 RLW Page 815) . Learned counsel for the respondent has invited attention of the Court to a later decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, Delhi v. Dhaval Singh [ (1999) 1 SCC 246 ] . 10. Learned Single Judge agreed with the contention of the petitioner and has allowed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the facts of the case brought the case within the province of ratio laid down in Dhaval Singh relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Hence this appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has urged firstly that on facts there is an error in the judgment under appeal in noticing that the petitioner had disclosed the fact about pendency of criminal trial against him and about its decision prior to the interview and he also disclosed this fact after interview was conducted during the police verification. He pointed out from the averments made in the petition itself that at the time of conduct of interview no such disclosure was made by the petitioner, he has informed this fact only when he was called upon to do so for police verification of his antecedents which taken place after selection. With this premise, he has contended that on the basis of the ground on which Sushil Kumar's case has been distinguished in Dhaval Singh's case, is non existent, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the appellants were right in rejecting the candidature of the respondent-petitioner. 12. We are of the opinion, after having considered the contentions raised before us and the principle enunciated in the decisions referred to above, that this appeal deserves to be accepted. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants is right in his submission that no disclosure about the trial and its pendency was made any time during selection process. At the time when the application was filed the questions were answered in the negative. For the first time such information was given only when he was required to furnish a form for police verification. This fact was not brought before the authorities voluntarily by way of any inadvertent mistake committed by him at the time of interview. The learned Single Judge has apparently misconstrued the averments made in the petition about disclosure of the information at the time of interview. This fact was not brought before the authorities voluntarily by way of any inadvertent mistake committed by him at the time of interview. The learned Single Judge has apparently misconstrued the averments made in the petition about disclosure of the information at the time of interview. In the petition, it has been clearly averred about the disclosure of the information as under: "The petitioner was called for interview vide interview letter dated 3.10.1999. He was interviewed on 21.10.1999 and was selected for the post of Constable Driver. His name was shown in the selection list at Serial No. 66. On the very next day i.e. on 22.10.1999 a police verification form supplied to the petitioner, in which he has to furnish the information whether the applicant had been involved in a Criminal act, had been ever arrested, released on bail, had been convicted by any Court. In that police verification form, petitioner mentioned that a criminal case was registered against him under sections 323, 147 and 149 IPC at police station - Suratgarh, Distt. Sri Ganganagar on 17.9.1994 in which he was acquitted by the competent Court vide its judgment dated 31.10.1998." 14. Thus, it is apparent, it was nowhere claimed by the petitioner that he had informed while making verification of his original certificates etc. about the criminal case he had suffered and its result to any person at the time of interview or before the interview nor is it his case that before he was required to furnish information for police verification he had conveyed on his own the relevant information required of him in column 17 of the application form. Therefore, it is apparent that the disclosure made by the petitioner in response to the verification details required of him on 22.10.1999 but he had made no attempt to bring to the notice of appointing authorities about the trial and its result. 15. In this premise, if we examine the various decisions brought to our notice during the course of hearing, the principle which emerges clearly is that if a candidate who is required to disclose information about his involvement in a criminal case at the time of furnishing application and its result as well as about his arrest which has taken place in any case, it is a material information which can result in rejection of his candidature. The later disclosure, if it is voluntary, without any soliciting leading to reasonable conclusion that the earlier nondisclosure was a bona fide inadvertent mistake and not with any oblique motive and the incumbent was not waiting for the result of the pending trial before making such disclosure, the same can be considered an extenuating circumstance for overlooking the lapse. In such case, consideration by the authorities is required for sustaining his candidature. The law only requires that if such information is transmitted voluntarily then due application of mind should be applied by the authorities concerned before declining appointment in pursuance of the selection made. However, it appears to be undeviated principle where no disclosure has been made voluntarily with any sense of regret but deliberate nondisclosure was made with a definite negative assertion about the particulars of information required, it amount to material non-disclosure liable in forfeiture of candidature. 16. Sushil Kumar's case arose in very similar circumstances. It was a case in which the incumbent had appeared for recruitment as Constable in Delhi Police Service in the year 1989-90. He cleared the written test and was found physically fit by endurance test and was provisionally selected for the post of Constable in Police Service subject to verification of character and antecedents by the local police. On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such that he was not desirable in service and that resulted in cancellation of his provisional selection. Against the communication of cancellation of his provisional selection, the candidate approached the Central Administrative Tribunal through an original application. The Tribunal allowed the application and directed the appointing authorities to offer appointment to the petitioner on his turn as per merit. The Court observed: "The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for consideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. Appointing authority, therefore, has rightly focused this aspect and found it not desirable to appoint him to the service." 17. We may notice from the report that the appointing authority has taken into consideration that it is not desirable to appoint a person who starts with falsehood in giving information in his application. 18. Following the aforesaid decision, a Full Bench of this Court, on a reference made to it because of the divergent opinion expressed by the Division Benches, had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter. One of the questions which was referred to the Full Bench for opinion was: 'Whether the ultimate acquittal of a candidate, who was prosecuted on a criminal charge, would condone or wash out the consequences of suppression of the fact that he was prosecuted?' 19. The question was answered by Hon'ble Chief Justice with Hon'ble Bhagwati Prasad concurring in the following term: 'Ultimate acquittal of a candidate who was prosecuted on a criminal charge would not condone or wash out the consequences of suppression of the fact that he was prosecuted.' 20. The position was made more than clear in Dhaval Singh's case on which great reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondent. It was a case in which the chronology of facts will reveal true import of the ratio and the reason for distinguishing the decision of the Apex Court in Sushil Kumar's case. The application form was submitted by the incumbent on 21/27.8.1995 and he was provisionally selected after passing the written test and physical endurance test for the recruitment on the post of Constable and was interviewed pending verification of his character. However, before any order of appointment could be issued in his favour, he realising the mistake, wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 15.11.1995 in which he disclosed the particulars by clearly mentioning that he had inadvertently not mentioned about the criminal case pending against him in the appropriate column due to lack of knowledge. However, before any order of appointment could be issued in his favour, he realising the mistake, wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 15.11.1995 in which he disclosed the particulars by clearly mentioning that he had inadvertently not mentioned about the criminal case pending against him in the appropriate column due to lack of knowledge. However, subsequent to conveying of this information he was acquitted of the charge on 8.12.1995. Before that, his candidature had been cancelled on 20.11.1995. After acquittal, he again made a representation before the Commissioner of Police for reconsideration of his case in view of later acquittal. The representation was turned down by the Commissioner. That led to filing of an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Central Administrative Tribunal allowed the original application and the order of cancellation of his candidature as well as rejection of representation was quashed. 21. It is in the aforesaid circumstances, the matter when was considered by the Supreme Court in an appeal. The Court observed that the respondent had voluntarily conveyed the information about the criminal prosecution which was pending at the time of submitting the application and which he had inadvertently failed to mention in the appropriate column, before the Commissioner considered for making offer of appointment. The Supreme Court further found that while passing an order on 20.11.1995 the authority had not taken note of the information conveyed by the respondent on 15.11.1995 and cancelled the candidature of the candidate. The Supreme Court said: "It is not as if information was given by the respondent regarding the inadvertent mistake committed by him after he had been acquitted by the trial court - it was much before that. It is also obvious that the information was conveyed voluntarily." 22. Thus, it is apparent that it was the essence of the decision of the Supreme Court that the requisite information was conveyed to the concerned authority voluntarily, before he had to take decision of offering or not offer appointing in view of the selection which was conveyed and it was conveyed, more importantly while the trial was still pending and not waiting of the acquittal. It was not a case in which after knowing about acquittal the lapse has been sought to be cured by conveying the information alongwith the acquittal order. It was not a case in which after knowing about acquittal the lapse has been sought to be cured by conveying the information alongwith the acquittal order. With these strong premise indicating the bona fide mistake on the part of the candidate in not divulging the information in the first instance but correcting the lapse by informing the appropriate authority without knowing about the result, which had come later, it was found that the concerned authority did not apply its mind to the intimation given by appellant before cancelling appointment. It will be apposite to quote the Court when it say: "In vain, we have searched through the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Police and the other record for any observation relating to the information conveyed by the respondent on 15.11.1995 and whether that application could not be treated as curing the defect which had occurred in the Form. We are not told as to how that communication was disputed of either. Did the competent authority ever have a look at it, before passing the order of cancellation of candidature? "The cancellation of the candidature under the circumstances was without any proper application of mind and without taking into consideration all relevant material. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly set it aside." 23. In the present case, it cannot be said that the appointing authority has acted without taking into consideration the relevant material which had come before it. It cannot be contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that he conveyed the information without waiting for the result. We have earlier noticed that the last date for furnishing the application for was 24th Oct., 1998. Apparently, it was a clear case in which the petitioner did not disclose the material information which was to his knowledge available with him and has tried to mend the fences only when the stage arose for police verification and he was required to furnish further information after the interview was over. In fact he had by writing 'Nahi' in column No. 17 had taken a positive stand about non-existence of such antecedent, which was a clear attempt to mislead the Selection Board. 24. In fact he had by writing 'Nahi' in column No. 17 had taken a positive stand about non-existence of such antecedent, which was a clear attempt to mislead the Selection Board. 24. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the facts of case reveal that it is governed by the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar's case as well as in Dhaval Singh where the exception has been carved out and the Full Bench decision of this Court, all of which bind us.Accordingly, appeal succeeds. The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the petition is dismissed. No orders as to costs.Appeal Allowed - Order of Single Judge set aside. *******