R. B. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) BY this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 12. 5. 1989/ 1. 6. 1989 (Annexure-1) whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service and amount of Rs. 2,21,671. 37 was directed to be recovered from the petitioner and to quash the recovery certificate issued on the basis of the same (Annexure-4 ). Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior advocate assisted by Sri P. N. Roy and Sri S. D. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned standing counsel for the respondents. ( 2 ) THE brief facts necessary for adjudication of the case are that the petitioner was a member of subordinate Agriculture Services, Group II (Development) and his appointment was made with the approval of U. P. Public Service Commission in short called commission and was working as buffer Godown Inspector posted at Basti under the District Agricultural Officer, the respondent No. 3. The petitioner was served a charge-sheet on 22. 2. 1975 and supplementary charge-sheet on 15. 3. 1978. On the basis of report of the inquiry officer the petitioner was dismissed from service on 16. 10. 1980, which was challenged before the U. P. Public Service tribunal, where dismissal order was set aside on 1. 3. 1982. Being dissatisfied the respondents, approached this Court and this Court had been pleased to remand the case to the Tribunal to decide the case on merits. In compliance thereto, learned Tribunal reconsidered the matter and quashed the dismissal by its order dated 20. 12. 1984 and also directed that the amount not recoverable from the petitioner. In compliance to the above order the petitioner was reinstated with arrears of back wages. ( 3 ) IT appears another attempt was made by the department to initiate departmental inquiry by appointing the Project Officer, (Agricultural) Basti, an inquiry officer to make departmental inquiry under the classification, control and appeal rules as applicable for U. P. Civil Service and a fresh charge-sheet dated 31. 1. 1986 was served to the petitioner (on 7. 2. 1986 comprising of the same and identical charges as mentioned in the earlier charge-sheet) placing him under suspension. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 13151 of 1986 before this Court and the suspension of the petitioner was stayed on 22. 10. 1986. 1. 1986 was served to the petitioner (on 7. 2. 1986 comprising of the same and identical charges as mentioned in the earlier charge-sheet) placing him under suspension. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 13151 of 1986 before this Court and the suspension of the petitioner was stayed on 22. 10. 1986. The Writ Petition No. 13151 of 1986 filed by the petitioner was withdrawn as the petitioner was reinstated on 10. 11. 1986. The petitioner had been working thereafter continued to work in Basti till 23. 7. 1986 after that he was transferred to district Ballia, where he was served a dismissal order on 12. 5. 1989/1. 6. 1989 (Annexure-1) which indicates that : "sri Ram Nath Singh, ex-Buffer Godown Inspector and buffer, district Deoria, Salempur, district Basti is dismissed from service. The department shall recover an amount of Rs. 2,21,671. 37 by way of compensation to the loss incurred to the Government by his security, amounts payable and other legal process. " ( 4 ) IT has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that no departmental inquiry could be started on the second time and that two punishments cannot be imposed on the petitioner, first being the dismissal and the second for the recovery of this huge amount from the petitioner. ( 5 ) IT has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that by the earlier order dated 20. 12. 1984 the dismissal order of the petitioner on the similar charges was set aside by learned tribunal and recovery consequent upon was rejected. The order dated 12. 8. 1984 of Tribunal was never challenged and the same become absolute and final. Therefore, for the same and similar charges for which the petitioner has already been exonerated, again a fresh dismissal order cannot be passed, i. e. , punishing the petitioner twice and second time on the charges and for the same cause of action i. e. , the norms of double Jeopardy as provided under Article 20 of the constitution of India is being attracted. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order dated 12. 5. 1989 is barred by the principle of res judicata as for the same cause of action between the same parties the punishment cannot be given second time. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order dated 12. 5. 1989 is barred by the principle of res judicata as for the same cause of action between the same parties the punishment cannot be given second time. It has also been contended that action has been taken behind the back of petitioner by ex parte inquiry and without observing the proper norms for conducting inquiry without fixing time, place and furnishing full documents and affording opportunity for examining and cross-examining the witnesses without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the dismissal order has been passed behind his back. ( 6 ) THE counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents that the departmental inquiry was conducted against the petitioner by serving him another charge-sheet because even after first dismissal having been set aside by the Tribunal and High Court departmental inquiry is not bar on similar charges and even after providing several opportunity, no response and co-operation was rendered by the petitioner, therefore, the ex parte report was submitted by the inquiry officer which was basis that the Director (Agriculture) has correctly passed a dismissal order on 12. 5. 1989/1. 6. 1989 and recovery of amount. ( 7 ) IN the rejoinder-affidavit, the contents of writ petition have been reiterated and has been emphatically controverted the averments of counter-affidavit. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, it has been argued by learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunities and the relevant documents were furnished to him and there was no necessity to change the inquiry officer therefore, dismissal order has been correctly passed. Learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondents contended that there was no specific pleading pointing out which particular relevant document was not supplied to the petitioner due to which he was prejudiced. It was also submitted in reference to (a)Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 117 ; (b) State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K. V. Perumal and Ors. , AIR 1996 SC 2474 and (c) Secretary to Government and Ors. It was also submitted in reference to (a)Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 117 ; (b) State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K. V. Perumal and Ors. , AIR 1996 SC 2474 and (c) Secretary to Government and Ors. v. A. C. J. Britto, AIR 1997 SC 1393 , where Supreme Court has found that it was not necessary to supply every document asked for rather the obligation was only to supply material and relevant documents only thus, the enquiry proceedings had not vitiated for non-supply of irrelevant documents. ( 9 ) THE relevant part of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India read as follows : " (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges : provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 10 ) IN Ghanshyam Das Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 1183 , when the delinquent Forest Ranger failed to attend the departmental enquiry due to paucity of funds resulting from non-payment of subsistence allowance, the 5 Judges Constitution Bench quashed the order of the Government dismissing him from service though giving liberty to the government to start a fresh enquiry in accordance with law against him, observing as follows : "5. As he did not receive subsistence allowance till March 20, 1965, he could not, in our opinion, attend the enquiry. The first payment of subsistence allowance was made to him on march 20, 1965, after a part of the evidence had already been recorded on February 9, 10 and 11, 1965. The enquiry proceedings during those days are vitiated accordingly. The report of the inquiry Officer based on that evidence is infected with the same defect. Accordingly, the order of the Government dismissing him from service cannot stand. The enquiry proceedings during those days are vitiated accordingly. The report of the inquiry Officer based on that evidence is infected with the same defect. Accordingly, the order of the Government dismissing him from service cannot stand. It was passed in violation of the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution for appellant did not receive a reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry proceedings. " ( 11 ) IN Captain M, Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Ors. , 1999 (2) AWC 1579 (SC) : (1999) 2 UPLBEC 1280 (SC) : AIR 1999 SC 1416 , the Supreme Court had held as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . . Suspension notwithstanding non-payment of subsistence allowance is an inhuman act which has an unpropitious effect on the life of an employee. When the employee is placed under suspension, he is demobilised and the salary is also paid to him at a reduced rate under the nick name of subsistence allowance, so that the employee may sustain himself. This Court in O. P. Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. , JT 1987 (3) SC 532, made the following observations with regard to subsistence allowance : "an order of suspension of a Government servant does not put an end to his service under the government. He continues to be a member of the service in spite of the order of suspension. The real effect of suspension as explained by this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India, is that he continues to be a member of the Government service but is not permitted to work and further during the period of suspension he is paid only some allowance- generally called subsistence allowance-which is normally less than the salary instead of the pay and allowances he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that an order of suspension, unless the departmental inquiry is concluded within a reasonable time, affects a Government servant injuriously. The very expression subsistence allowance has an undeniable penal significance. The dictionary meaning of the word subsist as given in Shorter Oxford English dictionary, Vol. (II) at p. 2171 is "to remain alive as on food : to continue to exist". "subsistence" means-means of supporting life, especially a minimum livelihood. The very expression subsistence allowance has an undeniable penal significance. The dictionary meaning of the word subsist as given in Shorter Oxford English dictionary, Vol. (II) at p. 2171 is "to remain alive as on food : to continue to exist". "subsistence" means-means of supporting life, especially a minimum livelihood. " If, therefore, even that amount is not paid, then the very object of paying the reduced salary to the employee during the period of suspension would be frustrated. The act of nonpayment of subsistence allowance, would gradually starve himself to death. On joining Government service, a person does not mortgage or barter away his basic rights as a human being, including his fundamental rights, in favour of the Government. The Government, only because it has the power to appoint, does not become the master of the body and soul of the employee. The Government by providing job opportunities to its citizens only fulfils its obligations under the Constitution, including the Directive Principles of the State Policy. The employee, on taking up an employment only agrees to subject himself to the regulatory measures concerning his service. His association with the Government or any other employer, like instrumentalities of the Government or Statutory or Autonomous Corporations etc. , is regulated by the terms of contract of service or Service Rules made by the Central or the State government. Under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or other Statutory Rules including certified standing orders. The fundamental rights. Including the right to life under article 21 of the Constitution or the basic human rights are not surrendered by the employee. The provision for payment of subsistence allowance made In the Service Rules only ensures non-violation of the right to life of the employee. That was the reason why this Court in State of maharashtra v. Chanderbhan, 1983 (3) SCR 337 : 1983 (3) SCC 387 : AIR 1983 SC 803 , struck down a Service Rule which provided for payment of a nominal amount of rupee one as subsistence allowance to an employee placed under suspension. This decision was followed in fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer and Anr. This decision was followed in fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer and Anr. , JT 1986 SC 394, and it was held in that case that if an employee could not attend the departmental proceedings on account of financial stringencies caused by non-payment of subsistence allowance, and thereby could not undertake a journey away from his home to attend the departmental proceedings, the order of punishment, including the whole proceedings would stand vitiated. For this purpose, reliance was also placed on an earlier decision in Ghanshyam Das Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1973) 1 SCC 656 : AIR 1973 SC 1183 . Since in the instant case the appellant was not provided any subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and the adjournment prayed for by him on account of his illness, duly supported by medical certificates, was refused resulting an ex parte proceedings against him. We are of the opinion that the appellant has been punished in total violation of the principles of natural justice and he was liberally not afforded any opportunity of hearing. Moreover, as pleaded by the appellant before the High Court as also before us that on account of his penury occasioned by non payment of subsistence allowance, he could not undertake a journey to attend the disciplinary proceedings, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer at such proceedings, which were held ex parte, stand vitiated. " in view of the discussions aforesaid, we hold that due to non-payment of subsistence allowance, the inquiry, the punishment of dismissal of the petitioner and dismissal of his appeal, all are void and liable to be quashed by this Court by grant of a writ of certiorari. ( 12 ) THE petitioner has placed reliance on the decision Jagdamba Prasad Shukla v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 2000 (4) AWC 2982 (SC) : (2000) 7 SCC 90 para 8. "where the Supreme Court has held that the payment of subsistence allowance, in accordance with the Rules, to an employee under suspension is not a bounty. It is a right. An employee is entitled to be paid the subsistence allowance. No justifiable ground has been made out for non-payment of the subsistence allowance all through the period of suspension, i. e. , from suspension till removal. It is a right. An employee is entitled to be paid the subsistence allowance. No justifiable ground has been made out for non-payment of the subsistence allowance all through the period of suspension, i. e. , from suspension till removal. One of the reasons for not appearing in inquiry as intimated to the authorities was the financial crunch on account of nonpayment of subsistence allowance and the other was the illness of the appellant. The appellant in reply to the show cause notice stated that even if he was to appear in inquiry against medical advice, he was unable to appear for want of funds on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance. It is a clear case of breach of principles of natural justice on account of the denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant to defend himself in the departmental enquiry. Thus, the departmental enquiry and the consequent order of removal from service are quashed. " ( 13 ) THE petitioner also placed reliance on the judgments of this High Court in K. P. Giri v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 2001 (1) UPLBEC 908 , paras 7 and 8 as well as on Bajrang Prasad Srivastava v. U. P. Pariyojana Prabandha U. P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. and Ors. , 2002 UPLBEC 1321. It was held in the case of K. P. Giri (supra) : "even in the absence of any reply submitted by the petitioner to the charge-sheet, it was incumbent upon the enquiry officer to fix the date in the enquiry and to intimate the petitioner about the same which has not been done in the present case. Moreover, from a perusal of the order of dismissal dated 20. 3. 1998 it will be seen that the management had produced the evidence in support of the charges levelled against the petitioner which had been accepted by the enquiry officer without making any effort to confront the same to the petitioner. Thus, the entire proceedings have been conducted in gross violation of equity, fair play and is in breach of the principles of natural justice. " ( 14 ) IN respect of change of inquiry officer the petitioner has further placed reliance on Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras and Anr. Thus, the entire proceedings have been conducted in gross violation of equity, fair play and is in breach of the principles of natural justice. " ( 14 ) IN respect of change of inquiry officer the petitioner has further placed reliance on Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras and Anr. v. F. X. Farnando, 1994 (2) SCC 746 page 12, where it was held that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, therefore, the supreme Court has directed that an another enquiry officer be appointed in order to remove any apprehension of bias on the part of the respondent. In Indrani Bai (Smt.) v. Union of India and ors. , 1994 Supp. (2) SC 256 para 5. The Supreme Court has held that : "it is seen that right through, the delinquent officer had entertained a doubt about the impartiality of the enquiry to be conducted by the enquiry officer. When he made a representation at the earliest, requesting to change the enquiry officer, the authorities should have acceded to the request and appointed another enquiry officer, other than the one whose objectivity was doubted. " ( 15 ) THE petitioner has placed reliance on Subhash Chand Sharma v. M. D. , U. P. Co-operative spl. Mills Fed. ltd. , 1999 (4) AWC 3227 para 5. In this judgment of this Court it was held that : "in our opinion, after the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet a date should have been fixed for the enquiry and the petitioner should have been intimated the date, time and place of the enquiry and on that date the oral and documentary evidence against the petitioner should have been led in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. If the petitioner in response to this Intimation had failed to appear for the enquiry, then an ex parte enquiry should have been held but the petitioners service should have not been terminated without holding an enquiry. In the present case, it appears that no regular enquiry was held at all. All that was done that after receipt of the petitioners reply to the charge-sheet, he was given a show cause notice and thereafter the dismissal order was passed. In the present case, it appears that no regular enquiry was held at all. All that was done that after receipt of the petitioners reply to the charge-sheet, he was given a show cause notice and thereafter the dismissal order was passed. In our opinion, this was not the correct legal procedure and there was violation of the rules of natural Justice. Since no date for enquiry was fixed nor any enquiry held in which evidence was led in our opinion, the impugned order is clearly violative of natural justice. ( 16 ) IN Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 , the Supreme Court observed : "it is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and the requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted. " ( 17 ) IN S. C. Girotra v. United Commercial Bank, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 212, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order which was passed without giving the employee an opportunity of cross-examination. In Punjab National Bank v. AIPNBE Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 (vide para 66), the Supreme Court held that in such enquiries evidence must be recorded in the presence of the charge-sheeted employee and he must be given an opportunity to rebut the said evidence. The same view was taken in AC. C. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1963 II LLJ 396 and in tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1963 II LLJ 78 (SC ). ( 18 ) THE petitioner has also placed reliance on P. C. Chaturvedi v. U. P. State Textile Corporation ltd. and Anr. , 2001 (4) AWC 3061 , where the subsistence allowance were not paid despite the request made by the petitioner and the Inquiry Officer passed ex parte order and recommended dismissal against the petitioner and the disciplinary authority passed the dismissal on the recommendation made by the Inquiry Officer, such dismissal was quashed. and Anr. , 2001 (4) AWC 3061 , where the subsistence allowance were not paid despite the request made by the petitioner and the Inquiry Officer passed ex parte order and recommended dismissal against the petitioner and the disciplinary authority passed the dismissal on the recommendation made by the Inquiry Officer, such dismissal was quashed. ( 19 ) IN view of the judgment of this Court in Radhey Shyam Pandey v. Chief Secretary, State of uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and Ors. , 2001 (3) AWC 2043 : (20o1) 2 UPLBEC 1976, the order of dismissal of writ petitioner was held not justifiable by this Court (DB) : "the respondents have not conducted the inquiry according to the proper procedure prescribed under Rule 99. No specific date, time and place of inquiry was fixed for documentary evidence against the petitioner which should have been adduced in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. A dismissal order is a major punishment having serious consequences and hence should be passed only after complying with the rules of natural Justice. Since in the present case no regular and proper inquiry was held nor was subsistence allowance paid, hence in these circumstances, it is clear case that the petitioner had not been afforded a fair opportunity much less a reasonable opportunity to defend himself that has resulted in violation of principle of natural justice and fair play. The ex parte inquiry is illegal and the order of dismissal dated 27. 3. 2001 is quashed. " ( 20 ) WHERE the charged employee is exonerated after an Inquiry duly held, a second inquiry on the same facts is legally not permissible as held in Dwarkachand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1958 raj 38 : "if we were to hold that a second departmental enquiry could be held after the previous one has resulted in the exoneration of a public servant, the danger of harassment to the public servant would, in our opinion, be immense. If it were possible to ignore the result of an earlier departmental enquiry, then there will be nothing to prevent a superior officer, if he were so minded, to order a second or a third or a fourth or even a fifth departmental enquiry after the earlier ones had resulted in the exoneration of a public servant. " ( 21 ) RULE of double jeopardy does not bar but absence of power under a rule inhibits a second inquiry as held in State of Assam v. J. N. Boy Biswas, AIR 1975 SC 2277 : 1976 (2) SCR 128 : "no rule of double jeopardy bars but absence of power under a rule inhibits a second inquiry by the disciplinary authority after the delinquent had once been absolved. The appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. We may however make it clear that no Government servant can urge that if for some technical or other good ground, procedural or other, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law that a second enquiry cannot be launched. It can be ; but once a disciplinary case has closed and the official reinstated, presumably on full exoneration, a chagrined Government cannot restart the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise, vested by rules in some authority. The basics of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier enquiry. " ( 22 ) IN the absence of a specific rule, once a disciplinary case is decided on merits, second inquiry cannot be held on the same facts as held in case of Hirdaya Narayan Prasad v. State of bihar, 1975 Lab IC 640 Pat: "in the case of Ajodhya Prasad Pandey v. Union of India, 1971 Pat LJR 515 : (1972) Lab IC 1539, a Bench of this Court had quashed a second departmental proceeding in which a railway servant had been charge-sheeted for the second time on the same allegations of fact which formed the basis of the charge-sheet in the previous departmental proceeding and he has been exonerated of those charges. In the case of Dwarkachand u. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1958 Raj 38 : a Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that once a departmental enquiry is over and a public servant has been exonerated no second departmental enquiry on the same facts can be ordered unless there is a specific provision for reviewing an order of exoneration in the Service Rules or any law. In the case of Devendra Pratap Narain Raj Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 sc 1334 , the Bench decision in Dwarkachand (supra), was noticed by their Lordships of the supreme Court, but the view taken in that case was not dissented from. No decision was cited at the bar in which a contrary view has been taken. !t must, therefore, be held that, in absence of a specific rule, once a departmental enquiry is over and a public servant is exonerated of the charges on merits by the appointing authority, no second departmental enquiry on the facts can be ordered. " ( 23 ) NOW the question arises whether the petitioner after the dismissal/removal has been set aside, has been allowed to reinstate in service and what should be the amount of back wages is to be paid to him. Withdrawal of resignation of the appellant was considered and appellant was entitled to remain in continuity in service was not allowed any back wages if the employee did not actually worked. ( 24 ) IN Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour court, New Delhi and Anr. , (1980) 4 SCC 443 , the Supreme Court has held that reinstatement with full back wages is common principle, however, the Court has power to mould the relief in exceptional cases. In para 6 of Surendra Kumar Verma (supra), it was held: "plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums ; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court to make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The Court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the Court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted. " ( 25 ) IN A. L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited. AIR 1984 SC 1361 , it was held that when the delinquent highly placed officer in public sector though not guilty of misconduct found to have committed lapses in not returning House Building Advance and vehicle Purchase Advance was reinstated after dismissal from service then having regard to all the aspect of the case, the appellant was paid 50% of the back wages for the period since his removal from service up to his reinstatement excluding the period for which he had procured an alternative employment. ( 26 ) IN Dipti Prakash Banerjee a Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, calcutta and Ors. , 1999 (2) AWC 1184 (SC) : (1999) 3 SCC 6o, it was held that the employee was entitled to back wages when the termination of probationer was set aside and in the facts and circumstance of the case the reinstatement was allowed with back wages and continuity in service. , 1999 (2) AWC 1184 (SC) : (1999) 3 SCC 6o, it was held that the employee was entitled to back wages when the termination of probationer was set aside and in the facts and circumstance of the case the reinstatement was allowed with back wages and continuity in service. ( 27 ) IN State Bank of India and Ors. v. T. J. Paul, (1999) 4 SCC 759 , when- the respondent, employee, in doing act prejudicial to the interests of the bank, or gross negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss even if the actual loss was not necessary to attract this clause ahead, enough to hold such employee, respondent, guilty when such bank officer charged to have sanctioned loans without adequate security and without prior approval/ ratification from superior authorities. This was contrary to the departmental instructions but in the departmental proceedings the penalty of removal imposed on respondent employee was found ultra vires and case remitted to the appellant for fresh consideration of penalty in accordance with rules then the order of High Court directing payment of back wages, promotions, increments etc. was allowed to sustain. ( 28 ) IN Hardwari Lal v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 2000 (1) AWC 96 (SC) : 1999 (8) SCC 582 , wherein the appellant, a police constable, charged of having abused his colleague while he (appellant) was under the influence of liquor and neither complainant nor the other employee who accompanied the appellant to hospital for medical examination, examined as witnesses, inquiry was held to be vitiated being in violation of principle of natural justice and plea rejected that there was other material sufficient to come to conclusion one way or the other on the failure to the respondents to examine material witnesses. The finding of departmental enquiry was set aside and the appellant was reinstated, however considering that long time had elapsed between dismissal and reinstatement for which no blame could be made on respondent, 50% of back wages was allowed. ( 29 ) IN Prabhudayal Birari v. M. P. Rajya Nagrik Aapurti Nigam Ltd. , 2000 (4) AWC 2951 (SC) : (2000) 7 SCC 502 , the Supreme Court observed that termination being in contravention of the specific conditions mentioned in the appointment order, the appellant was reinstated in service with back wages. ( 29 ) IN Prabhudayal Birari v. M. P. Rajya Nagrik Aapurti Nigam Ltd. , 2000 (4) AWC 2951 (SC) : (2000) 7 SCC 502 , the Supreme Court observed that termination being in contravention of the specific conditions mentioned in the appointment order, the appellant was reinstated in service with back wages. ( 30 ) IN Municipal Corporation of Delhi (M. C. D.) v. Prem Chand Gupta and Anr. , (2000) 10 SCC 115 , the Supreme Court has held that where termination of respondents services declared invalid being violative of Section 25f of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and keeping in view that the case dragged on for 33 years but neither of the contesting parties were at fault. The delay was due to pendency of the case in Courts and the employer was a Municipal Corporation whose funds were primarily meant for public benefit. In the facts and circumstances of the case, only 50% back wages was allowed with all other consequential benefits. ( 31 ) IN Vinod Bhanti u. State of Bihar and Ors. , (2000) 10 SCC 146 , the Supreme Court has held that the appellant a confirmed employee of Artificial Limb Centre, absented from duty, submitted his resignation but before acceptance of the resignation letter, he withdrew the same. It was held after that having withdrawn the resignation the appellant could not be deemed to have been relieved from service. The Centre remaining nonfunctional for said period and the appellant was allowed to resume work at later stage when centre became non-functional. It was found that the appellant was not in service, therefore, he would be deemed to have been relieved from service. He was entitled to continue in service after the resignation having been withdrawn but he was not entitled for back wages for the period the appellant did not actually worked. ( 32 ) IN Ex-Constable Chhote Lal v. Union of India and Ors. , (2000) 10 SCC 196 , the Supreme court has held that such an opinion of departmental authority that it was not reasonably practical to hold inquiry, was not justified and argument advanced by the respondents that the appellant being a police constable could have influenced witnesses and therefore, dispensing of inquiry was done, such argument rejected. , (2000) 10 SCC 196 , the Supreme court has held that such an opinion of departmental authority that it was not reasonably practical to hold inquiry, was not justified and argument advanced by the respondents that the appellant being a police constable could have influenced witnesses and therefore, dispensing of inquiry was done, such argument rejected. Dispensing of inquiry was not found according to law, therefore, the liberty was given to respondents to proceed against appellant by holding inquiry. It was observed while setting aside the order of dismissal that in view of the nature of the charges against the appellant. ( 33 ) IN Director of Collegiate Education and Anr. v. Sri Jagadguru Panchacharya Vishwa Dharma vidya Peetha and Ors. , (2000) 10 SCC 200 , where the direction of the High Court to the government to pay the back wages and other monetary benefits to respondent No. 3 was set aside as the question of liability of Government to pay the back wages and Ors. benefits was not in issue either before the Tribunal or before the High Court and, therefore, the High Court was justified to pass such a direction. ( 34 ) IN Assistant General Manager, S. B. I. v. Thomas Jone and Anr. , (2000) 10 SCC 280 . In that case Bank employee was dismissed from service on account of his admitting of misconduct of withdrawing money unauthorisedly from customers account. The Industrial Tribunal has power to modify punishment of discharge/dismissal imposed by employer. The Industrial Tribunal ordered reinstatement without back wages and the writ petition filed by the Bank against the award of the Tribunal was dismissed by High Court relying upon Scooters India Ltd. v. Labour court. 1989 (1) SCC 31. It was held that the Bank employee deals with public money and therefore, cannot be treated leniently as has been done by the Tribunal in the case in question and the award of the Tribunal, therefore, modified by inserting an additional condition that the employee would not get any increment for ten years with cumulative effect. However, the reinstatement of the appellant was allowed with back wages without any increment for period of ten years. However, the reinstatement of the appellant was allowed with back wages without any increment for period of ten years. ( 35 ) IN the light of above observations, now it is found that the petitioner has been exonerated on the alleged charges at the early stage and on the similar charges in the second inquiry on the similar and same facts incorporated in the second charge sheet, the second inquiry is not legally permissible when there is no specific rule which empowers the respondents to make a second enquiry. ( 36 ) THEREFORE, the order dated 12. 5. 1989 and 1. 6. 1989 dismissing the petitioner are set aside and no amount shall be recovered from the petitioner. However, since the petitioner has not worked after dismissal order, therefore, he shall be reinstated with all consequential benefits and he shall only be given 50% of the wages for the past. ( 37 ) WITH the above observations the writ petition is allowed. .