Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 4 (KER)

Sadasivan Nair v. State of Kerala

2002-01-03

BELLUR NARAYANASWAMY SRIKRISHNA, M.RAMACHANDRAN

body2002
JUDGMENT B.N. Srikrishna, C.J. 1. These two Original Petitions cover large areas of common ground, though marginally different on facts, and seek reliefs, which also are, to certain extent, common. Hence, it is convenient to dispose of both these Original Petitions by a common Judgment. 2. Facts O.P. No. 17934 of 2000 In O.P. No. 17934 of 2000 the petitioner is a Professor and Director of the School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as the University). The University is governed by an Act known as the Cochin University of Science and Technology Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Act was brought into effect from 30th November, 1986. S.17 of the Act, as is originally enacted, read as follows: 17. The Syndicate.- (1) The Syndicate shall be the Chief Executive body of the University and shall consist of the following members, namely:- (i) The Vice-Chancellor (ii) The Pro-Vice Chancellor (iii) The Director of Technical Education (iv) The Secretary to Government, Higher Education Department (v) The Chairman of the Kerala State Committee on Science and Technology (vi) Three Deans of Faculties of the University by rotation in the Alphabetical order of the Faculties in every two years (vii) An expert from the field of Industry and Commerce, nominated by the Chancellor (viii) Five members of the Senate, nominated by the Government, of whom one shall be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and one shall be a teacher (ix) An official representative of the University Grants Commission, nominated by the Commission (x) Two persons nominated by the Government from among the members of the Legislative Assembly of Kerala (2) The term of office of the members nominated under items (vii), (viii), (ix) and (x) in sub-s. (1) shall be four years from the date of their nomination and they shall not be eligible for re-nomination: Provided that no person nominated in his capacity as a member of the Legislative Assembly shall hold office as a member of the Syndicate for a longer period than three months after he has ceased to be such member of the Legislative Assembly, unless in the meanwhile, he again becomes a member of the Legislative Assembly. The first salient feature to be noticed in this section is that there is a power vested in the Chancellor of the University, the State Government as well as the University Grants Commission to nominate certain members to the Syndicate of the University. The second salient feature in the parent Act is that under sub-s. (2) of S.17 the members nominated under items (vii), (viii), (ix) and (x) in sub-s. (1) of S.17 are not eligible for renomination and their term is restricted to four years. 3. By Ordinance No. 7 of 2000, brought into effect from 3rd June 2000, S.17 was amended and the words and they shall not be eligible for re-nomination were deleted from the main body of sub-s. (2) of S.17. The direct consequence of this deletion was that the members nominated under items (vii), (viii), (ix) and (x) in sub-s. (1) of S.17 were not debarred from being re-nominated. We are not concerned with the rest of the amendments carried out by Ordinance No. 7 of 2000. Ordinance No. 7 of 2000 was repealed and replaced by Ordinance No. 9 of 2000 with effect from 27th July 2000; this Ordinance in turn was repealed and replaced by Ordinance No. 6 of 2001 with effect from 28th January 2001, which too came to be repealed and replaced by Ordinance No. 27 of 2001 with effect from 31st March, 2001. Ordinance No. 27 of 2001 lapsed with effect from 21st June, 2001 because it was not placed before the State Legislative Assembly within six weeks as required by clause ((2) of Art.213 of the Constitution of India. In the meanwhile, on 16th February, 2000, the State Government in exercise of its powers under S.17(1)(x) and 17(2) of the Act as amended by Ordinance No. 7 of 2000, nominated one Dr. K.C. Joseph, M.L.A. (third respondent) to the Syndicate of the University. As a follow up of this nomination, the University issued notification, No. GA EL 4/86, dated 17th June 2000 notifying such nomination of the third respondent by order, dated 16th June 2000 and declared that the term of office of the said member would be four years from the date of his nomination, ie., from 16th June 2000 to 15th June 2004 subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes thereunder. 4. 4. The petitioner, who is a Professor and Director of the School of Legal Studies, has challenged the validity of the Ordinance and prayed that this Court should declare Ordinance No. 7 of 2000 (Ext. P1) as invalid, void and inoperative and restrain enforcement of the said Ordinance as well as the continuation of the third respondent as a nominated member of the Syndicate of the second respondent University. A declaration is also sought that the Ordinance and all steps taken pursuant thereto are illegal, void and inoperative. It is also prayed that the amended Ordinance No. 9 of 2000 (Ext. P4) be declared to be void, illegal and inoperative. 5. O.P. No. 31014 of 2001 In O.P. No. 31014 of 2001 the first petitioner, a Professor in the School of Management Studies of the Cochin University of Science and Technology, and the second petitioner, an Assistant Registrar of the said University, challenge the continuation of the said Dr. K.C. Joseph, (the first respondent there), as a member of the Syndicate and seek a declaration that all actions of the Syndicate in which the first respondent had participated are null and void for want of legal validity and pray for a writ of quo-warranto and a writ of prohibition to restrain the first respondent Dr. K.C. Joseph from continuing as a member of the Syndicate of the third respondent University. 6. (A) Challenge to Statute The contention of Dr. P. Leelakrishnan, learned Counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 17934 of 2000, is founded on Art.14 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel contends that the unamended S.17 of the Act contained a wholesome provision that a person who had once been nominated by the Government under item (x) could not be re-nominated. By removing this bar, by the offending Ordinance, the State Government has been invested with arbitrary power of nominating any person of its choice (provided he is an M.L.A.) for any number of successive terms. This power, in the submission of the learned counsel, is arbitrary, unguided, uncanalised and is likely to lead to arbitrariness in its exercise. Hence, the learned counsel contends that the amendment carried out by Ordinance No. 7 of 2000 and successively replaced through series of Ordinances finally ending in Ordinance No. 27 of 2001, is void for inconsistency with Art.14 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the learned counsel contends that the amendment carried out by Ordinance No. 7 of 2000 and successively replaced through series of Ordinances finally ending in Ordinance No. 27 of 2001, is void for inconsistency with Art.14 of the Constitution of India. In the alternative, it is contended by the learned Counsel that we must read down the provisions of the amended sub-s. (2) of S.17 of the Act to mean that there is no power of re-nomination at all vested in the State Government so as to sustain its constitutionality. 7. The learned Counsel referred to and cited for support a Judgment of the Supreme Court in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829 . This was a case in which the Air India Corporation had a general rule that an Air Hostess would retire from service on reaching the age of 30 years or on marriage, whichever was earlier, but another regulation provided for further extension of service of the employees beyond the age of retirement, for an aggregate period not exceeding two years, except in the case of Air Hostesses where the service could be extended upto a period of five years only on the employee being found medically fit. One of the Air Hostesses challenged the service regulations of Air India Corporation on the ground that it was discriminatory as against women employees and also on the ground that though a power had been vested in the Managing Director to extend the service of Air Hostesses for a period beyond the age of retirement, such power was arbitrary as it was uncanalised and unguided. The Supreme Court upheld the contention and was of the view that the distinction made between male and female employees, who carried out same or almost the same type of duties, only on the ground of sex, was discriminatory and hit by Art.14. With reference to the power vested in the Managing Director to extend the service of Air Hostesses for a period of five years beyond the age of retirement, the Supreme Court took the view that the regulation armed the Managing Director with uncanalised and unguided discretion to extend the age of Air Hostesses at his option and hence there was excessive delegation of power. The Supreme Court observed that a discretionary power was not necessarily arbitrary, but where a statute confers power on an authority to decide matters of moment without laying down any guidelines or principles or norms, the power has to be struck down as being violative of Art.14. 8. Dr. Leelakrishnan laid great emphasis on these observations of the Supreme Court and urged that what the offending Ordinance has done is to vest uncanalised and unguided power of making successive nominations of the same persons in the State Government, ad infinitum. Hence, he contends that the amendment is vitiated by arbitrariness and hit by Art.14. 9. It is not possible to accept this broad contention. The Statute in question, namely S.17 of the Act, is replete with guidelines and canalization of power. Clauses (vii), (viii), (ix) and (x) of sub-s. (1), of S.17 of the Act empower nominations to the Syndicate. Clause (vii) is the power of the Vice Chancellor to nominate an expert from the field of Industry and Commerce; Clause (viii) is the power of the State Government to nominate five members, one of whom shall be a member of the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and one shall be a teacher; Clause (ix) enables the University Grants Commission to nominate an official representative of the Commission to the Syndicate; Clause (x) enables the State Government to nominate two persons from among the Members of the Legislative Assembly of Kerala. In our Judgment, none of these clauses enables the nominating authority to exercise an arbitrary and unguided discretion. The discretion is very much canalised and guided by the criteria indicated in the Statute itself. The contention of the Counsel that under the parent Act the discretion to be exercised for nomination under Clause.17(1)(x) was subjected a further restriction, that the bar against re-nomination having been removed, the amendment injects arbitrariness into the provisions of sub-s. (2), is difficult for us to accept. The contention of the Counsel that under the parent Act the discretion to be exercised for nomination under Clause.17(1)(x) was subjected a further restriction, that the bar against re-nomination having been removed, the amendment injects arbitrariness into the provisions of sub-s. (2), is difficult for us to accept. It is open to the Legislature to enact a legislation for delegation of authority after framing guidelines subject to which the delegatee has to exercise the authority, and if at any time, out of the several restrictions or guidelines the Legislature, chooses to alter, amend or even revoke one such guideline or restriction, the Statute does not thereby incur the vice of arbitrariness for the other inbuilt guidelines are still operative in the Statute, albeit, that one of them has been removed, modified or even revoked. In our Judgment, the situation brought about by the amendment to S.17(2) by the successive amendments from Ordinance Nos. 3 of 2000 to 6 of 2001 is but elimination of one bar or restriction. This, per se in no manner changes the character of the power that was already vested in the different delegates under sub-s. (2) of S.17. 10. It is also not possible for us to take the view that the amendment is so unreasonable so as to fall foul of Art.14. The material on record suggests that the University and the State Government were of the view that the service of an expert member of the Syndicate need not be dispensed with merely because he had once been nominated to the Syndicate. The view taken was that it would be discriminatory as against a nominated member to hold such a member ineligible for nomination for all time in future. For this reason also, it was thought necessary to remove the restriction against re-nomination. The other reason given for the amendment is that it was intended to bring the Act on line with similar provisions in other University Acts. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out Acts of similar nature like Mahatma Gandhi University Act and the Kerala University Act. Both these Acts while not providing for a total bar against re-nomination, contain a proviso that a renominated person cannot hold office for more than two terms in succession. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out Acts of similar nature like Mahatma Gandhi University Act and the Kerala University Act. Both these Acts while not providing for a total bar against re-nomination, contain a proviso that a renominated person cannot hold office for more than two terms in succession. Learned Counsel contended that if such a provision was made in S.17(2), it would have been reasonable, but leaving it open for the State Government or nominating authority to make such nomination ad infinitum in succession is bad and hit by the vice of arbitrariness. Here again, we are unable to accept the argument. As to how for many terms a nominated member should be continued, is a matter of experience, Judgment and overall discretion of the nominating authority. It may be that in one Statute the power of nomination is capable of being exercised only for two successive terms. But, some other Statute may make it capable of being exercised for four successive terms. These are all matters of expediency and no hard and fast rule about them can be laid down. The fact that there is a power of re-nomination available under the amended Statute does not necessarily mean, in the facts of the present case, that the State Government has been invested with unguided and uncanalised or arbitrary power so as to infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.14 of the Constitution of India. 11. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel that S.17(2) as amended by Ordinance No. 7 of 2000 is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. Hence, there is really no occasion for reading down the said provision. Learned Counsel, however, referred to a Judgment of the Supreme Court in Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, 2001 (3) KLT 651 as an authority for reading down the provision so as to render it constitutional, where another reading would render it unconstitutional. In our Judgment, such a situation does not arise here. 12. There is also a second contention of mala fides urged by Dr. Leelakrishnan. We must say that this is even less impressive. The only allegation of mala fides is contained in Para.8 of O.P. No. 17934 of 2000. In our Judgment, the averments therein are not only vague, but are also incapable of sustaining the charge of mala fides in a constitutional challenge. Leelakrishnan. We must say that this is even less impressive. The only allegation of mala fides is contained in Para.8 of O.P. No. 17934 of 2000. In our Judgment, the averments therein are not only vague, but are also incapable of sustaining the charge of mala fides in a constitutional challenge. In any event, the averments have been denied both by the State Government and the 4th respondent Minister, and we find no material whatsoever to take the view that the Ordinance itself was enacted to benefit the third respondent Dr. K.C. Joseph or any other particular person. The charge of mala fides, therefore, fails. 13. Learned Counsel for petitioners cited a Judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in B.A. Hasanabha v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1998 Karnataka 91. That was a case where the elections to the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Market Committees were held and members of the party in office were found to have been elected with a slender majority. As the facts showed, the State Government amended the provisions of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act by inserting a provision which enabled the State Government to appoint sufficient number of nominees to the Agricultural Produce Market Committees. The Court found that this was done with the clear motive of varying the political balance in the Agricultural Produce Market Committees and, on this ground alone, the Ordinance was bad. We are unable to find any parallel here. It is urged, though, in fairness, we must say very faintly, that beneficiary of the Ordinance Dr. K.C. Joseph happened to be from the same political party as the party in power. Assuming this to be true, thereby does not hang a tale of mala fides sufficient for this Court to interfere. 14. Thus, we are of the view that the challenge to the validity of the Ordinance as amended by Ordinance No. 7 of 2000 and successively saved upto Ordinance No. 27 of 2001 cannot be sustained. Nor can the amendment be declared to be unconstitutional, or bad for any of the reasons urged. 15. We may, incidentally, point out that what are really challenged in O.P. No. 17934 of 2000 are Ext. P1 and Ext. P4 Ordinances. Ext. Nor can the amendment be declared to be unconstitutional, or bad for any of the reasons urged. 15. We may, incidentally, point out that what are really challenged in O.P. No. 17934 of 2000 are Ext. P1 and Ext. P4 Ordinances. Ext. P1 is Ordinance No. 7 of 2000 which was repealed by Ordinance No. 9 of 2000, which in turn was repealed by Ordinance No. 6 of 2001, which was repealed and replaced by Ordinance No. 27 of 2001. Strictly speaking, neither Ext. P1 nor Ext. P4 Ordinance was in existence on the date on which the petition was filed. In any event, as on today, all Ordinances including the last one, (ie., Ordinance No. 27 of 2001), have lapsed. For this reason also, we are not inclined to make any declaration of the nature as sought. 16. (B) Challenge to Appointment That takes us to the other aspect of the matter, namely, the challenge to the appointment of Dr. K.C. Joseph. Both Dr. Leelakrishnan and Mr. Dharmadan, who appears for the petitioner in O.P. No. 31014 of 2001, strongly urged that, even if the appointment of Dr. K.C. Joseph was valid when it was made on 17th June 2001, since the Ordinance which removed the bar against the appointment of Dr. K.C. Joseph itself expired on 21st June 2001, the status quo ante must be deemed to have revived and the bar against renomination of Dr. Joseph would resurrect and Dr. Joseph must be held ineligible to continue as member of the Syndicate. 17. In the first place, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel Sri. V.N. Achutha Kurup, who appears for Dr. K.C. Joseph that what is really challenged in these two Writ Petitions is the notification issued by the University and not the nomination order of the State Government. In a strict sense, the contention of Mr. Kurup is correct. There is really no challenge at all to the nomination made by the State Government. What is really challenged is the consequence of such nomination made. 18. Even if we do not take such a strict view of the matter, we find it difficult to accept the contention. The board proposition canvassed, namely, that upon lapsing of a temporary statute, everything done under or in consequence of the Statute vanishes into thin air, is too startling a proposition to accept. 18. Even if we do not take such a strict view of the matter, we find it difficult to accept the contention. The board proposition canvassed, namely, that upon lapsing of a temporary statute, everything done under or in consequence of the Statute vanishes into thin air, is too startling a proposition to accept. Learned Counsel pointed out a passage in Maxwell on interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition, page 17) wherein the Judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Hamilton Gell v. White, (1922) 2 KB 422, has been discussed. Atkin, L.J. held that a provision not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act would not make any difference as it only applies to the specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or other of the events specified in the statute. The case of Abbott v. Minister of Lands, 1895 AC 425 is also discussed therein. In our view, neither of these two cases help us in deciding the matter. Both are cases which arose out of the situation of a repealed statute. As far as we are concerned, we are governed by the Kerala General Clauses Act, which takes care of a situation arising consequent to the repeal of a permanent statute. It is well settled law that S.6 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to a situation consequent upon the lapse of a temporary statute. See in this connection State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 , M.R. Pratap v. Director of Enforcement, New Delhi, 1969 CriLJ 1582 and K. Cherian v. K. Chandy, 1958 KLT 105 . This principle would apply to the situation governed by S.4 of the Kerala Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 also. 19. What is the consequence of the lapse of a temporary statute is discussed in several Judgments of the Supreme Court. In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 , a Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court had occasion to examine this issue. Elections to the Cuttack Municipality had been rendered invalid by a Judgment of the High Court. An Ordinance validating the elections was issued to override the Judgment of the High Court under Art.226. It was intended to save actions taken and powers conferred under the provisions of the Municipality Act. Elections to the Cuttack Municipality had been rendered invalid by a Judgment of the High Court. An Ordinance validating the elections was issued to override the Judgment of the High Court under Art.226. It was intended to save actions taken and powers conferred under the provisions of the Municipality Act. One of the contentions before the Supreme Court was that the Ordinance was for a temporary duration and lapsed on 1st April, 1959. Hence the appeal which was filed before the Supreme Court had become infructuous and, as soon as the Ordinance lapsed, the invalidity of the Municipal elections - declared by the High Court and cured by the validating Ordinance - revived and, therefore, the appeal before the Supreme Court had to fail. The Supreme Court reiterated the Judgment of Patanjali Sastri, J. in S. Krishnan v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 301 that the general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. That is why the Legislature can, and often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is in some respects similar to that of S.6 of the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court referred to the situation in Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1947 AC 362 as illustrative of the point. It pointed out that where a temporary statute rendered an act, a criminal offence and prosecution was commenced therefor, prosecution had to end with the lapse of the temporary statute, but that conviction rendered under the temporary statute would not become invalid merely because the temporary statute expired after the conviction had been rendered, unless there was a special provision made by the Legislature either in the original statute or otherwise. In fact, the Supreme Court opined that it would not be reasonable to hold that the general rule about the effect of expiration of a temporary Act is inflexible and admits of no exceptions. For instance, an offence committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires. If a prosecution has not ended before that day, as a result of the termination of the Act, it will ipso facto terminate. For instance, an offence committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires. If a prosecution has not ended before that day, as a result of the termination of the Act, it will ipso facto terminate. But is that an inflexible and universal rule? In the opinion of the Supreme Court, what the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act would be must depend upon the nature of the rights or obligations resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and upon their character, whether the said right and liability are enduring or not. The Supreme Court reiterated the observations of Parker, B. in the case of Steavenson v. Oliver, (1841) 151 E.R. 1024 at PP 1026-1027. There is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed: the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) become as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions imposed, and the duration of the provisions, are matters of construction. Finally, the Supreme Court said, therefore, in considering the effect of the expiration of a temporary Statute, it would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. If the right created by the Statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person, that right cannot be taken away because the Statute by which it was created has expired. If a penalty had been incurred under the Statute and had been imposed upon a person, the imposition of the penalty would survive the expiration of the Statute. That appears to be the true legal position in the matter. 20. This proposition was reiterated by another five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P., 1985 (3) SCC 198 . Under an Ordinance known as Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Ordinance promulgated by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, certain posts were abolished. The Ordinance lapsed as it was disapproved by the State Legislature. The question that the Supreme Court had to consider was whether the lapsed posts would revive and the incumbents would be entitled to be continued in service. The Ordinance lapsed as it was disapproved by the State Legislature. The question that the Supreme Court had to consider was whether the lapsed posts would revive and the incumbents would be entitled to be continued in service. The Supreme Court pointed out that clause (2) of Art.213 of the Constitution requires that every Ordinance shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or, where there is Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council. The Supreme Court explained that the words shall cease to operate, would only mean that it should be treated as being effective till it ceases to operate on the happening of the events mentioned in clause (2) of Art.213. The Constitution does not provide that the Ordinance would become ineffective, but only directs that it shall cease to operate from the happening of the contingency. The Supreme Court in the Judgment reiterated the proposition of law laid down in Bhupendra Kumar Boses case (supra) and also approved of the observation of Paker, J. in Steavenson v. Oliver, 151 E.R. 1024, and held that the abolition of the posts and the declaration that the incumbents of those posts would cease to hold those posts under S.3 of the Ordinance being completed events, there was no question of their revival or the petitioners continuing to hold those posts any longer. To similar effect are the observations of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Haran Chandra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal. 907 at para 23. 21. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, referred to Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 1998 (5) SCC 643 , as striking a discordant note. We straightaway notice that the Judgment in Krishna Kumar Singhs case (supra), is a Judgment of two learned Judges, both of whom disagreed on this vital proposition itself. Actually, the Order of the Court is noted in Para.74 and 75. In view of the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges, the matter was directed to be placed before the Honble Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench. Actually, the Order of the Court is noted in Para.74 and 75. In view of the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges, the matter was directed to be placed before the Honble Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench. In our view, therefore, Krishna Kumar Singhs case (supra) is not authoritative, for Krishna Kumar Singhs case (supra) decides nothing. The law stands concluded as decided in Cuttack Municipal case and reiterated in Venkata Reddys case. 22. No other Judgment of the Supreme Court or of any other High Court on this issue has been brought to our notice which takes any other view. 23. Now, we come to the question of application of the principle of law on the facts before us. The facts before us show that on 16th June, 2000 the State Government in exercise of its powers under the amended S.17(2) nominated Dr. K.C. Joseph who was also a sitting member of the Syndicate, for another term from 16th June, 2000 to 15th June, 2004. Since we have taken the view that the Ordinance removing the bar against re-nomination of the member under clause (x) of sub-s. (1) of S.17 of the Act is valid, the nomination of Dr. K.C. Joseph made by the State Government on 16th June, 2000 was a perfectly valid exercise in law. Consequently, the said Dr. K.C. Joseph was a lawfully constituted member of the Syndicate from that day. In our view, this was a completed action and the said Joseph as a member of the Syndicate was entitled to continue in office until the expiration of the term of his office or his removal for any other reason permissible in law and on any such contingency happening. All that has been urged is that the Ordinance which had removed the disability or bar against re-nomination of Dr. K.C. Joseph for a specific period has ceased to exist. In our considered Judgment, the mere fact that the temporary Statute, the Ordinance, expired cannot reverse a fait accompli and completed event, namely valid nomination of Dr. K.C. Joseph to the membership of the Syndicate. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that Dr. Josephs appointment should be treated as a continuing process liable to termination upon the expiry of the Ordinance. Dr. K.C. Joseph to the membership of the Syndicate. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that Dr. Josephs appointment should be treated as a continuing process liable to termination upon the expiry of the Ordinance. Dr. Josephs appointment as a nominated member cannot be put on par with a continuing criminal prosecution which was referred to by the Supreme Court in Venkata Reddys case (supra) and Cuttack Municipal Elections case (supra). On the other hand, in our view, the case of Dr. K.C. Joseph is exactly similar to the case considered by the Court of Appeal in England in Steavensons case (supra). 24. Para.2 of the offending Ordinance No. 7 of 2000 makes it very clear that the provisions of the Act 31 of 1986 were to be temporarily amended by the Ordinance. Thus, we are of the view that the lapsing of this temporary Statute does not give rise to the legal effect as contended by the petitioners, nor does it require automatic vacation of the post occupied by the said Dr. K.C. Joseph. Since the nomination of Dr. Joseph as a member of the Syndicate was a valid action on the date on which it was made under law, it continues to be valid until expiry of the term or till he is validly removed under any law. In the result, we dismiss both the Original Petitions. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.