JUDGMENT - D.G. KARNIK, J.:---Heard the learned Counsel for respective parties. 2. Rule made returnable forthwith by consent. 3. The respondent No. 2 was employed in the school rule by respondent No. 3 society. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 states that respondent No. 3 is a society registered under Societies Registration Act as well as public trust registered under Bombay Public Trust Act. The services of respondent No. 2 were terminated and therefore she filed an appeal before the School Tribunal under Maharashtra Employees of Private School (Condition of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short M.E.P.S. Act). The oral order of termination was stayed by order of the School Tribunal passed on 18th February 1998 and the said order was confirmed on 28th August, 1999. The respondent No. 2 alleged that despite these orders, she was not allowed to work in the school and she therefore, filed petition under section 13 of the M.E.P.S. Act before the School Tribunal. In the said application she stated that respondent No. 3 school, the respondent No. 4 who was the Secretary and President of the society, and petitioner who was the Head Master of the school were all responsible for the breach of the order. By order dated 29th June 2001, the School Tribunal imposed the penalty of Rs. 5000/- only against the petitioner. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was only the Head Master and not in the management of the school; the management of the school was in the hands of respondent No. 3 society and respondent No. 4 who is the President and Secretary of the respondent No. 3 society. The learned Counsel for respondents 3 and 4 submitted that in the event it is held that there was a breach, respondents 3 and 4 only were responsible because they were in the management and not the petitioner. 5. In the case of (V.D. Nandwate v. D.R. Ambad)1, decided on 19th March, 2002, in Writ Petition No. 478/2002, I held that Head Master cannot be liable for disobeying the order of the Tribunal. The observations in that judgment were made on the basis that the Head Master was not in the management of the school and the management vested in the society which in that case had passed a specific resolution to challenge the order of the School Tribunal in the High Court. The observations in that judgment were made on the basis that the Head Master was not in the management of the school and the management vested in the society which in that case had passed a specific resolution to challenge the order of the School Tribunal in the High Court. In those circumstances, Head Master of that school could not have allowed the petitioner to join the duties. It has to be clarified that it cannot be laid as a general rule that Head Master can never be a person in the management of the school. It would depend on facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, the learned Counsel for respondents 3 and 4 has submitted that the petitioner Head Master was not in the management of the school and respondents 3 and 4 are in the management of the school. In the circumstances the liability, if any, has to be fixed on the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, and the School Tribunal erred in fixing the liability and penalty on the petitioner. 6. In (Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque v. S.A. Azmi others)2, reported in 2001(Supp. 2) Bom.C.R. 37 , this Court has taken a view that for breach of an order of the School Tribunal, direct contempt petition in the High Court cannot be filed but School Tribunal is empowered to execute the order. It was further held that the order of the School Tribunal is like an execution of a decree passed in his favour under Order 21, Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 relying upon another judgment of this Court rendered in (V.S. Deshmukh v. S.A. Ghode)3, reported in 2001(1) Mh.L.J. 261 contended that School Tribunal has no jurisdiction of imposing a penalty which can be imposed only by a competent Court of criminal jurisdiction. In the said judgment a Single Judge has taken the view that the forum of filing of complaint under section 13 of the M.E.P.S. Act, is a Criminal Court of competent jurisdiction. At the first blush there may appear to be conflict between views taken in the aforesaid judgments. In the said judgment a Single Judge has taken the view that the forum of filing of complaint under section 13 of the M.E.P.S. Act, is a Criminal Court of competent jurisdiction. At the first blush there may appear to be conflict between views taken in the aforesaid judgments. After careful analysis, I am of the opinion that there is no conflict between the two judgments; under section 13, aggrieved teacher has two remedies (1) he can file a criminal complaint for punishment and (2) he can file a execution petition. If he prays for punishment, then he has to go to the Criminal Court, but if he wants to simply execute the order then as held in the case of Mohd. Salam Anamal Haque (supra) he can file the execution petition before the School Tribunal. Directing the person to pay a penalty is one of the methods of execution. For example when in execution of a money decree, Civil Court orders detention of a judgment debtor in a civil prison, the Court is not inflicting a punishment but is executing a decree. Viewed thus, the order of payment of Rs. 5000/- made by the School Tribunal can be construed as an order in execution of its previous order. 7. As it has been conceded by the learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 that this order should have been against respondents 3 and 4, I am inclined to modify the order passed by the School Tribunal to that extent. Writ petition is accordingly allowed. Order passed by the School Tribunal is modified and instead of the petitioner the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in this petition are directed to pay Rs. 5000/- to the respondent No. 2. Rule made absolute to that extent. Writ petition allowed. -----