Judgment Ashutosh Mohunta, J. 1. Through the present petition under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners have prayed for quashment of the complaint dated April 28, 1993 (Annexure P1) and the summoning order of the same date, passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Muktsar (Annexure P2). 2. The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 11(1) of the Punjab Regulation of Colonies Act, 1975 (for short `the Act) as they had converted the land bearing Khasra No. 3751 min situated at Kotli Road, Muktsar, into residential, commercial, industrial plots, and sold the plots to 24 persons mentioned in the complaint. The petitioners had not obtained any licence for converting the said land into a colony. Thus, they had contravened the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act. The alleged transaction had taken place during the period March 1980 to May 1988. The complaint was filed on April 28, 1993. The learned trial Magistrate passed the impugned summoning order on the same day against the petitioners. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 4. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that respondent was debarred from filing the complaint against the petitioners after the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, which is three years. According to him the alleged transactions had taken place during the period March 1980 to May 1988, whereas the impugned complaint had been filed in April, 1993 and the impugned summoning order was passed as a result thereof. According to the learned counsel, the maximum sentence prescribed under Section 11(1) of the Act is only three years. Thus, the complaint could have been filed within three years of the cause of action. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (Now State), 1988(2) RCR(Crl.) 401 : AIR 1988 SC 1729; and the Single Bench authority of this Court reported as Punjab State through Legal Assistance, Housing and Urban Development, Punjab v. Amardeep Singh and others, 1996 (23) Criminal Law Times 250. 5. In order to controvert the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Naresh Parbhakar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State, has contended that the alleged offence was a continuing offence. 5. In order to controvert the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Naresh Parbhakar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State, has contended that the alleged offence was a continuing offence. Further he submits that the period of limitation had to start from the date of knowledge. Still further, the learned counsel submits that under Section 473, Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court is fully empowered to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Under Section 468, Cr.P.C., the maximum period of taking cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the petitioners, has been prescribed as three years. Though there is a provision for extension of period of limitation under Section 473, Cr.P.C., but that eventuality arises only if the Court is satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is "necessary to do so in the interests of justice". In the present case no application for condonation of delay had been filed by the respondent and the reason for filing the complaint at a belated stage had also not been explained. The principles of natural justice require that the condonation of the delay and the extension of time can be done only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the accused to oppose the plea of the prosecution for the condonation of delay. But in the present case it has not been done. No notice had been given to the petitioners for condition of delay before issuing the impugned summoning order and also before filing the complaint against them. In Srinivas Pals case (supra) there was a delay of 9 years and 6 months in taking cognizance of the matter in a case of rash and negligent driving. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the trial was vitiated. Similarly, in the case Punjab State v. Amardeep Singh (supra) five plots had been sold in the year 1988 and the complaint was filed in the year 1992. The learned Single Judge had held that the complaint was barred by limitation. 7. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the trial was vitiated. Similarly, in the case Punjab State v. Amardeep Singh (supra) five plots had been sold in the year 1988 and the complaint was filed in the year 1992. The learned Single Judge had held that the complaint was barred by limitation. 7. So far as the plea of continuing offence taken by the learned counsel for the State is concerned, I do not find merit in the same. There is no dispute with regard to the provisions of the Section 472, Code of Criminal Procedure. The said provisions do not apply in the present case. The last transaction mentioned in the impugned complaint is alleged to have taken place in May 1988. The complaint was filed on April 28, 1993. Thus, it had taken about five years for the State to file the complaint in Court against the petitioners. In this way, the said plea of `continuing offence under Section 472, Cr.P.C., also falls to the ground. 8. In the light of the above, I allow the petition and quash the complaint (Annexure P1) and the summoning order (Annexure P2). Petition allowed.