R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant is an assessee under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 ("the Act", for short ). The assessing authority (first respondent) passed an order of assessment dated September 26, 2000 for the assessment year April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 determining the total turnover and taxable turnover as Rs. 68,54,742. 85 and Rs. 43,27,924. 55 respectively. In the said order the assessing authority subjected the turnover of Rs. 2,38,239 relating to purchase of old gold articles purchased by the assessee from unregistered dealers, to purchase tax at 4 per cent, under section 6 of the Act. ( 2 ) IN an appeal by the assessee, the second respondent by order dated January 11, 2001 held that since sale of mangalasutras was exempt from tax under the Fifth Schedule, the corresponding purchases were also exempt from tax under Section 6 of the Act and therefore deleted the levy of purchase tax on the said turnover of Rs. 2,38,239. The third respondent in exercise of suo motu revisional power under Section 22a of the Act, passed an order dated September 4, 2001 reversing the decision of the second respondent and restoring the order of the assessing authority, in regard to the said turnover of Rs. 2,38,239 on the ground that no tax had been paid under Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) in respect of the articles manufactured from out of such old gold articles purchased by the assessee from unregistered dealers. ( 3 ) FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal under Section 24 (1) of the Act aggrieved by the subjecting of the said turnover to tax, The appellant claims exemption from purchase tax in regard to gold articles purchased from unregistered dealers to an extent of Rs. 2,38,239 used in the manufacture of mangalasutras (sold by it at a price not exceeding Rs. 5,000 per piece) relying on the exemption Notification No. FD 283 CSL 70 (IV) dated September 10, 1970. 2,38,239 used in the manufacture of mangalasutras (sold by it at a price not exceeding Rs. 5,000 per piece) relying on the exemption Notification No. FD 283 CSL 70 (IV) dated September 10, 1970. ( 4 ) THE notification dated September 10, 1970 relied on by the appellant, issued under Section 8a of the Act exempts the tax payable under Section 6 of the Act, on the purchases of articles of "gold and/or silver", by a manufacturer of such articles subject to the condition that the said manufacturer proves to the satisfaction of the assessing authority that he has paid the tax payable either under Sub-section (1) or Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act on articles of gold, silver manufactured out of the articles so purchased by him. ( 5 ) IN this case, in regard to the articles of gold manufactured by it (out of the gold articles purchased by it from unregistered dealers, relatable to the purchase turnover of Rs. 2,38,239), the appellant did not pay sales tax either under Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) of the Act. The appellant contends that it manufactured gold articles (mangalasutras) out of gold items purchased from unregistered dealers, but no tax was paid under Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) of the Act on sale of such gold articles (mangalasutras) in view of the exemption granted under entry No. 3 of the Fifth schedule which exempted from tax the sale of "mangalasutra or any other symbolic or sacred ornament worn by the bride on the occasion of the marriage when sold at a price not exceeding five thousand rupees per piece". The appellant contends that as it could not pay the tax under section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) of the Act on the gold articles manufactured by it (mangalasutras) from the purchases made from unregistered dealers, on account of the said exemption under entry 3 of the Fifth Schedule, it should not be denied the benefit under notification dated September 10, 1970. It is contended that the benefit sought to be extended by the notification dated September 10, 1970 should not be denied by a strict interpretation of the wording of the notification ; and that the notification should be liberally construed by treating the exemption from payment of tax, as "payment of tax" for purposes of the notification. It is contended that the benefit sought to be extended by the notification dated September 10, 1970 should not be denied by a strict interpretation of the wording of the notification ; and that the notification should be liberally construed by treating the exemption from payment of tax, as "payment of tax" for purposes of the notification. ( 6 ) STRONG reliance is placed by the appellant on the decision of a learned single Judge of this court in Sri Virupaksha Enterprises v. Commercial Tax Officer, Harapanahallai Circle ILR1989 KAR 3163 and the decision in the appeal therefrom commercial Tax Officer v. Sri Virupaksha Enterprises--W. A. Nos. 2137 to 2145 of 1989 decided on July 5, 1990 ). That case related to an assessee which was a tiny scale industry manufacturing non-refined groundnut oil. By notification dated March 28, 1987 issued under section 8-A of the Act, the State Government exempted the tax payable under Section 5 of the act by a dealer on groundnuts/seeds as the last purchaser liable to tax, if such groundnuts/seeds were consumed by him in the manufacture of non-refined groundnut oil in the State and produced proof of payment of tax on the sales of such oil. By an earlier notification dated March 31, 1983, issued under Section 8-A (1) (b) of the Act, the State Government had exempted from tax payable under the Act, the turnover of goods manufactured in Karnataka and sold by all tiny sector industrial units for a period of five years from the date of commencement of commercial production. In view of the exemption granted under the notification dated March 31, 1983, the assessee which was a tiny sector industrial unit, did not pay tax on the sale of non-refined groundnut oil manufactured and sold by it. Consequently when it claimed the benefit of exemption under the notification dated March 28, 1987, it was not possible for it to produce proof of payment of tax on sale of such non-refined groundnut oil manufactured from out of groundnuts/ seeds purchased by it (as last purchaser in the State ). The department contended that as the assessee did not produce proof of payment of tax on sale of the non-refined oil as required by the notification dated March 28, 1987, it was not entitled to exemption under the said notification dated March 28, 1987. The department contended that as the assessee did not produce proof of payment of tax on sale of the non-refined oil as required by the notification dated March 28, 1987, it was not entitled to exemption under the said notification dated March 28, 1987. The said contention was negatived by the learned single judge, by a beneficial construction of the notification dated March 28, 1987 with reference to the earlier notification dated March 31, 1983. The learned single Judge held thus : "the question is not free from difficulty. Unless both the notifications are considered together and an attempt is made to give a purposeful meaning to both the notifications, the benefit under the second notification would not be available to the petitioners. If the literal interpretation and construction is given to the 1987 notification, as argued by the learned Government Pleader, the petitioners would be excluded from the purview of the said notification, and cannot, on the plain reading of it, apply to them. The petitioners would be confronted with such a situation if the 1987 notification is construed literally and the petitioners would not be in a position to, and it would be impossible for them to, produce proof of payment of tax on the sale turnover of the oil. . . . . . . . . The construction that is required to be placed in these cases is one of beneficent construction and not a construction which would be adverse to the subject. The consequences of a construction, will have to be borne in mind by the court while interpreting a notification like the 1987 notification. The test, as observed by the learned author, Francis Bennion, should not result in frustrating the purpose of the Act, or should not work injustice, or is contrary to public policy, or is productive of inconvenience or hardship, and so on. The petitioners who had the benefit of exemption from payment of tax on their sale turnover of oil, as tiny sector units, cannot be expected to produce proof of payment of tax on their sales for getting the additional benefit of exemption of tax on their purchase turnover under the 1987 notification. The petitioners who had the benefit of exemption from payment of tax on their sale turnover of oil, as tiny sector units, cannot be expected to produce proof of payment of tax on their sales for getting the additional benefit of exemption of tax on their purchase turnover under the 1987 notification. The very fact and circumstances that they were not liable to pay tax on their sale turnover under an earlier notification, should be construed in their favour and the insistence on proof of payment of tax on their sale turnover, would be impossible of compliance, besides being unreasonable. " The said decision of the learned single Judge was upheld in appeal by a division Bench of this court on the following reasoning : "the benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax on manufactured goods granted under notification dated March 31, 1983 was available to all tiny sector industries, which included also ground-nut oil industries. But the notification dated March 28, 1987 granting exemption from payment of purchase tax on the purchase turnover of groundnuts on proof of payment of sales tax on the oil manufactured from it, is in respect of all groundnut oil industries. Therefore, unless the benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax given to tiny sector groundnut oil industries under the notification dated March 31, 1983 is treated as proof of payment of sales tax, it would place the tiny sector industries, in a disadvantageous position compared to bigger groundnut oil industries. The tiny sector groundnut oil industries would be deprived of the exemption from purchase tax, whereas the bigger groundnut oil industries would be entitled to such exemption. An interpretation which leads to such discriminatory results should be eschewed. Therefore, it should be held that the production of proof of non-liability to pay sales tax itself constitutes proof equivalent to payment of tax for the purpose of granting exemption under notification dated March 28, 1987. " ( 7 ) THE appellant next placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of central Excise v. Us ha Martin Industries AIR1997 SC 3871 , 2002 (84 ) ECC795 (SC ), 1997 ECR257 (NULL ), 1997 (94 )ELT460 (SC ), JT1997 (7 )SC 557 , 1997 (5 )SCALE600 , (1997 )7 SCC47 , [1997 ]supp3 SCR601 , [1998 ]111 STC254 (SC ), which arose under the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Central Government had issued a notification dated april 7, 1981 exempting from payment of whole of the excise duty leviable on commodities made out of raw materials listed therein (including billets) on which appropriate amount of excise duty had already been paid. The assessee therein manufactured wire-rods from mild steel billets. Excise duty was demanded on the wire-rods since the billets from which the wire-rods had been made were exempted from excise duty and therefore no duty had been paid on the billets. The assessee filed an appeal contending that it was entitled to exemption under the notification dated April 7, 1981. The appellate authority accepted the contention of the assessee and held that input goods cleared on nil payment of excise duty should be treated as goods cleared after payment of appropriate excise duty. The said decision was upheld by CEGAT and confirmed by the Supreme Court on the following reasoning : "what is the idea behind granting exemption to the commodities indicated in the notification ? one reason is that Central Government wanted to save certain raw materials and the end-products made with them from double duty. Another idea, as could be discerned from it, is that the reason which prompted the Central Government to absolve one commodity from duty must as well be applicable to the other commodity which is made out of the former. Therefore, we are not disposed to afford a narrow interpretation to the expression (. e. , on which the appropriate amount of duty of excise has already been paid) as excluding all cases where nil duty was paid for the input materials. Thus, looking from different angles we are inclined to take the view that benefit of exemption from duty can legitimately be claimed by the respondents in respect of those goods referred to in the notifications under consideration the raw materials of which were not exigible to any excise duty at all. " ( 8 ) BUT the decision in Usha Martin [1998] 111 STC 254 (SC) makes it clear that the interpretation placed on one notification cannot be relied on to interpret another notification if the content and intent of the notification is different. " ( 8 ) BUT the decision in Usha Martin [1998] 111 STC 254 (SC) makes it clear that the interpretation placed on one notification cannot be relied on to interpret another notification if the content and intent of the notification is different. In Sri Neelakanteshwar Oil Industries v. State of Karnataka ILR1995 KAR 52 the principles relating to interpretation of exemption provisions under tax laws were stated thus : (i) The choice between a strict and a liberal construction arises only in case of doubt in regard to the intention of the Legislature. When the words used are plain and clear, they have to be construed in the ordinary sense. There is no occasion to resort to any interpretative process, if the words clearly, unambiguously and directly convey the meaning. (ii) All taxing laws should be strictly construed and the assessee shall not be liable to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the liability to pay the tax. Similarly all exemptions from tax must also be strictly construed and limited to the exemption itself ; that is, there can be no extension or widening of the ambit of exemption at the stage of applicability of exemption. But, once the subject of exemption is clearly identified, then the exemption shall be made available to the identified subject, by adopting a liberal construction. (iii) Where the words of exemption are not defined, the proper course is not to give them the widest meaning, but find out the true meaning with reference to the context, by reading the exemption notification as a whole and by keeping in view, the object and purpose of the exemption and the consequences of the different interpretations. (iv) An interpretation which makes the exemption illusory and has the effect of giving by one hand and taking away by the other, should be avoided ; at the same time a liberal interpretation which will do violence to the language employed or which will lead to absurd results, should not also be resorted to. (v) It is always for the person claiming the benefit of exemption to clearly establish that he is entitled to the exemption and this burden cannot be shifted on the Revenue. Keeping in view, the said principles, we will now examine the applicability of the two decisions relied on by the appellant, to the facts of this case. (v) It is always for the person claiming the benefit of exemption to clearly establish that he is entitled to the exemption and this burden cannot be shifted on the Revenue. Keeping in view, the said principles, we will now examine the applicability of the two decisions relied on by the appellant, to the facts of this case. ( 9 ) IN Virupaksha Enterprises [1990] 77 STC 28, this Court considered a case where two distinct benefits (by way of exemption under two different notifications) available to a dealer. First there was an absolute exemption in regard to tax payable on sale of all goods manufactured by a dealer if it was a tiny sector industrial unit. Second was an exemption in regard to purchase tax payable by dealer as last purchaser of groundnuts/seeds if such groundnuts/seeds were consumed by him in the manufacture of non-refined groundnut oil in the State. The intention of first notification dated March 31, 1983 was to give a boost to tiny sector industries by giving them a price advantage so that they can compete with larger industries. The intention of the second notification dated March 28, 1987 was to encourage the manufacture of non-refined groundnut oil by manufacturers. Thus the intention of the State was to give two specific and different exemptions on fulfilling specified conditions. If a dealer was a tiny scale industry and also a manufacturer of non-refined groundnut oil, he was entitled to the two types of exemptions. Under the notification dated March 31, 1983, the dealer was exempt from payment of sales tax on the goods manufactured, because it was a tiny sector industry. Under the notification dated march 28, 1987, the dealer was exempt from payment of tax on groundnut as last purchaser, if it manufactures non-refined groundnut oil from out of the said groundnuts. Proof of payment of tax on sale of non-refined groundnut oil was insisted under the notification dated March 28, 1987 to ensure that only manufacturers of non-refined groundnut oil in Karnataka (and not manufacturers of refined groundnut oil or exporters of groundnut/seeds), got the benefit of exemption from payment of tax as last purchaser on purchase of groundnut/seeds used in such manufacture. But insistence on the production of proof of payment of tax on sale of non-refined groundnut oil manufactured by a tiny scale industry for availing exemption under the notification dated March 28, 1987 and refusal to grant exemption if tax had not been paid on such sales because of exemption under notification dated March 31, 1983, defeated the very purpose of granting the exemption to manufacturers on non-refined groundnut oil, under notification dated March 28, 1987. 9. 1 In Virupaksha Enterprises [1990] 77 STC 28 the court therefore considered a situation where the intention of both notifications was to confer separate and distinct benefits on the dealer, one in his capacity as tiny sector industry and the other in his capacity as manufacturer of non-refined groundnut oil. The intention of the second notification was not to deny the benefit of first notification. Therefore the second notification was read in a manner which did not defeat the purpose and intent of first notification. Therefore, the court held that when the assessee was not liable to pay tax on the sales turnover having regard to the exemption under the earlier notification dated March 31, 1983, insistence on proof of payment of tax on the sales turnover for granting exemption under the later notification dated March 28, 1987 would be impossible of compliance, besides being unreasonable and should not therefore be insisted upon. 9. 2 The position is completely different in this case. Gold jewellery/articles were liable to single point tax on the first or earliest of successive dealers in the State under Section 5 (3) (a) read with entry J (2) of the Second Schedule. The notification dated September 10, 1970 gave exemption in regard to purchase tax payable under Section 6 of the Act in regard to purchase of gold items only if he has paid the tax under Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) of the Act, on the gold articles manufactured from out of the said items. The notification dated September 10, 1970 did not intend to give a dealer in gold jewellery/articles exemption at both purchase and sale points. The notification did not give exemption from purchase tax on gold items purchased, unless tax had been paid under Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) of the Act on the sale of articles made out of such purchased items. The notification did not give exemption from purchase tax on gold items purchased, unless tax had been paid under Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) of the Act on the sale of articles made out of such purchased items. In other words payment of tax under Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) on the sale of articles of gold made out of such purchased items was the condition precedent for availing exemption of purchase tax under the notification dated September 10, 1970. The intention of entry 3 of Schedule V by way of exemption under Section 8, was to give benefit to the purchasers of mangalasutras and other sacred articles used at the time of marriage (provided the price of each of such article was not more than Rs. 5,000 ). The intention of entry 3 of Schedule v is not to give any benefit to the dealer. Therefore the normal and literal meaning should be given to the wording of the notification dated September 10, 1970 and not a "liberal" meaning which will defeat the very purpose of the notification. 9. 3 It is not therefore possible to construe the notification dated September 10, 1970 in this case, as in the manner in which notification dated March 28, 1987 was construed in Virupaksha enterprises, v. Commercial Tax Officer ILR1989 KAR 3163 , as that case dealt with two distinct exemptions intended to benefit the dealer, whereas this case relates to one exemption intended to benefit the dealer and another exemption intended to benefit the purchaser from the dealer. In Virupaksha case ILR1989 KAR 3163 the notification granted exemption to the last purchaser of groundnut/seeds, if it was used in production of non-refined groundnut oil, and production of proof of bills showing payment of tax was basically to ensure that nuts/seeds have been used in the manufacture of non-refined oil. On the other hand, in this case, payment of tax under Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) on the manufactured gold articles is the condition for availing the exemption of purchase tax on purchase of gold items used in such manufacture. A case where payment of tax is only a method of proving the fulfilment of the condition for availing the exemption, cannot be equated to a case where payment of tax is itself the condition for availing the exemption. A case where payment of tax is only a method of proving the fulfilment of the condition for availing the exemption, cannot be equated to a case where payment of tax is itself the condition for availing the exemption. ( 10 ) THE decision in Usha Martin AIR1997 SC 3871 , 2002 (84 )ECC795 (SC ), 1997 ECR257 (NULL ), 1997 (94 )ELT460 (SC ), JT1997 (7 )SC 557 , 1997 (5 )SCALE600 , (1997 )7 SCC47 , [1997 ]supp3 SCR601 , [1998 ]111 STC254 (SC ) is also of no assistance. In that case, having regard to the content and intent of the exemption notification, and the clarification contained in Board's circular dated May 15, 1995 it was held that when inputs are exempted from excise duty, exemption on finished goods cannot be denied on the ground that appropriate duty was not paid on the inputs. The Supreme Court distinguished its earlier decisions in Andhra Re-rolling Works v. Union of India AIR1986 SC 1964 , 1986 (9 )ECC282 (SC ), 1986 ECR344 (NULL ), 1986 (25 )ELT3 (SC ), 1986 (1 )SCALE1208 , 1986 (Supp)SCC263 , [1986 ]2 SCR1001 , [1987 ]64 STC139 (SC ), 1986 (2 )UJ279 (SC ) and Ahura Chemical Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR1981 SC 1782 , (1981 )83 BOMLR513 , 1981 (8 )ELT613 (SC ), 1981 (3 ) SCALE1365 , (1981 )4 SCC277 , [1982 ]1 SCR621 , 1981 (13 )UJ729 (SC ) which had held that benefits of exemption on latter product could be extended only if duty had been paid on the input material, in view of the wording and intent of the notifications considered therein. ( 11 ) IN this case the notification dated September 10, 1970 made available the exemption only if the dealer pays the tax under either Section 5 (1) or 5 (3) (a) of the Act. If the tax was not paid under these sections, the dealer was not entitled to exemption in regard to the purchase tax payable under Section 6 of the Act. When the provision is clear and the intention is clear, placing an interpretation contrary to the wording of the notification as contended by appellant, does not arise. The interpretation sought to be placed by appellant will defeat the very purpose of the notification dated September 10, 1970. When the provision is clear and the intention is clear, placing an interpretation contrary to the wording of the notification as contended by appellant, does not arise. The interpretation sought to be placed by appellant will defeat the very purpose of the notification dated September 10, 1970. ( 12 ) WE, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order of the appellate authority. Appeal is therefore rejected.