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2002 DIGILAW 41 (GUJ)

UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMOANY LIMITED v. Shivram Mansang Makwana

2002-01-22

M.H.KADRI, Y.B.BHATT

body2002
M. H. KADRI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, at the instance of the Insurance Company challenging the judgement and order passed by the Motor Accident Claims tribunal, Gandhidham, passed under section 163-A of the said Act. ( 2 ) THE claim was preferred before the tribunal under section 163-A of the said act on account of the death of the claimants daughter aged abut five years. This is obvious from the averments made in the application itself. The Tribunal applied the structured formula enumerated in the Second Schedule to the said Act, and took the notional income of the deceased child at Rs. 15000/- per annum as provided by item 6 of the said Schedule. If this notional income of Rs. 15000/- per annum is accepted, the aggregate compensation awarded by the Tribunal on this basis is correct, even according to the learned counsel for the appellant. ( 3 ) HOWEVER, learned counsel for the appellant contends that this notional income cannot be applied in the case of a female child aged five years for the simple reason that firstly this, child had no capacity to earn anything at all, and in any case, such child suffered from a legal disability from earning anything in view of the legislation against -employment of children below the age of 14 years. In this context, it was contended that Schedule 11 to the said Act cannot be applied straightaway as framed by the Parliament in view of the various adverse observations made by the Supreme Court in that regard in a number of decisions. It was further contended that the Motor Vehicles Act, and particularly section 163-A thereof, should he construed as a piece of social legislation and must be interpreted accordingly. ( 4 ) WHILE it is true that the Supreme court has commented adversely in respect of the Schedule 11, this adverse comment is only in a limited context, by pointingout that the "compensation in case of death" as found in the said Schedule, does not tally with the multiplication of the multiplier applicable, and the annual income as stated in the said Schedule. In the instant case we are not concerned with such multiplication. The Court in the instant case is merely required to consider the notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per annum where the operative clause viz. In the instant case we are not concerned with such multiplication. The Court in the instant case is merely required to consider the notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per annum where the operative clause viz. item 6 (a) indicates this notional income in respect of "non-earning persons". The plain and obvious meaning of this phrase would He that the said notional income would apply to those persons who do not earn an income. The legislature has chosen, and we can only assume that such choice is intentional, that this notional income should apply to those persons who do not earn an income either because they are incapable of earning or choose not to engage, in such employment or profession where they can earn an income. In other words, where the person suffers from a physical or legal disability from earning, or ever, voluntarily chooses not to indulge in an income yielding activity, such person would qualify to be within the meaning of "non-earning persons. ( 5 ) IN the premises aforesaid, we find that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be sustained and is required to be rejected. ( 6 ) ON the facts of the case, no other computational error is attributed to the impugned judgement and award. This appeal is, therefore, summarily dismissed. .