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2002 DIGILAW 411 (GAU)

Mahesh Doley v. State of Assam

2002-09-24

I.A.ANSARI

body2002
I.A. ANSARI, J.: I have heard Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. B.P. Katakey, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4. I have also heard Mr. A.C. Buragohain, learned Sr. Govt. Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. I, 2 and 5. None has appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 3. 2. I have perused the materials on record including the Govt. notification No. TAD/ST/274/94/Pt/II/225, dated 224.2002 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition), the validity of which is under challenge in this writ petition. 3. Before proceeding any further, it needs be noted that though this writ petition raised a number of issues, which related to not only the validity of the notification dated 11.4.2002, aforementioned but also the constitutionality and virus of Section 80 of the Mising Autonomous Council (Amendment) 1997, the writ petition was, eventually, argued without posing any challenge to the provisions of the said Act. 4. The material and admitted facts, giving rise to this writ petition may, in a short compass, be put as follows : (i) Following the signing of a Memorandum of Settlement (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) on 14.06.1995, between the Government of Assam and the authorised representatives of the Mising Autonomous Demand Committee which is popularly known as the Missing Accord, it was decided to set up an administrative Authority comprising different districts within the State of Assam, in respect of areas predominantly inhabited by the Mising populace. The Accord envisaged constitution of a Mising Autonomous Council (hereinafter referred as "the MAC"). The accord also envisaged constitution of an Interim Council which was to continue till elections to the MAC took place. The Government of Assam enacted the Mising Autonomous Council Act, 1995, which came into force with effect from 13.07.1995. The Act envisages constitution of inter alia, a General Council land Executive Council for the MAC. This Act also envisages the office of a Chief Executive Councillor (hereinafter referred as "the CEC") with powers and functions assigned to him under the said Act. The Act envisages constitution of inter alia, a General Council land Executive Council for the MAC. This Act also envisages the office of a Chief Executive Councillor (hereinafter referred as "the CEC") with powers and functions assigned to him under the said Act. Section 52 of the said Act provides for holding of elections for the purpose of the constitution of the General Council of the MAC and Section 80 provides that the Government should take immediate steps for constitution of an interim Mising Executive Council by nomination until the General Council is constituted under the Act and that the interim Executive Council shall also look after the duties of the Village Council. This Act of 1995 was amended by Assam Act No. XIV of 1997, which was published in the Assam Gazette on 05.05.1997, whereby the erstwhile Section 80 of the Act was substituted by a new Section 80, which reads as follows : "80. The Government shall as soon as possible take steps for the constitution of an Interim General Council by nomination and to nominate the Executive Council there from to perform in addition the functions of the Village Council till the General Council is constituted under this Act. Provided that any or all the members of such Interim General or Executive Council may be removed and replaced by any other person by the Government at any time." (ii) In consequence of the enactment of the said Act and the signing of the Mising Accord, the Government constituted an Interim General Council and an Interim Executive Council for administration of the MAC, which was to function till regular General Council and the Village Council were constituted by holding elections in exercise of the powers contained under Section 52 of the said Act. Eventually the present writ petitioner came to be appointed as the Chief Executive Councillor (CEC) of the MAC by notification dated 03.11.1997 (Annexure- 2 to the writ petition) issued by the Government of Assam. The notification appointing the writ petitioner as the CEC came to be challenged by the earlier CEC by filing Civil Rule No. 5151 of 1997. This apart, two other writ petitions, namely, Civil Rule Nos. The notification appointing the writ petitioner as the CEC came to be challenged by the earlier CEC by filing Civil Rule No. 5151 of 1997. This apart, two other writ petitions, namely, Civil Rule Nos. 3236 of 1996 and 2888 of 1997 were also filed in this Court challenging inter alia, the constitutional validity of Section 80 of the said Act and praying for inter alia, directions to hold regular elections for the purpose of constituting the MAC. By a common document and order dated 10.03.1998, this Court disposed of all the said three writ petitions upholding inter alia, the validity of Section 80 of the said Act, the powers of the State Government to remove the nominated members of the said Council and also to dissolve and/or reconstitute the Council. This Court directed the Government inter alia, to hold elections to the MAC within eight months. However, the present writ petitioner's nomination as CEC was not interfered with. In the meanwhile, the Government of Assam vide a notification dated 29.07.1998 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) constituted a fresh Interim Mising General Council and the Interim Mising Executive Council of the MAC with the present petitioner retained as the CEC of the newly created MAC. Following this notification, the present writ petitioner along with other members of the Interim General as well as Executive Council continued to discharge the administrative responsibilities under the said Act till issuance of the impugned notification dated 11.04.2002 aforementioned. (iii) The notification dated 29.07.98, aforementioned was challenged by Shri Rajiv Pegu and others by filing Civil/Rule No. 4400 of 1998. The learned Single Judge, who was in session of the matter, disposed of CR No. 4400 of 1'998 aforementioned on 25.11.98 by quashing the impugned notification dated 29.07.98, aforementioned and directed the Deputy Commissioner to take charge of the MAC. The present writ petitioner challenged this judgment by filing Writ Appeal No. 383 of 1998. The said Writ Appeal came to be disposed of finally on 19.12.1998 and while so disposing of the appeal, a Division Bench of this Court directed that elections to the Council be held by 31st July 1999, and that the present writ petitioner shall be allowed to function as the CEC till holding of the elections. The Division Bench further directed that the respondent authorities should not seek further time for holding of elections unless the same becomes unavoidable. The Division Bench further directed that the respondent authorities should not seek further time for holding of elections unless the same becomes unavoidable. Thus, the judgment of the learned Single Judge came to be modified to the extent so indicated. However, the Government of Assam failed to hold elections within 31.07.1999, as had been directed by this Court on 19.12.98 in Writ Appeal No. 383 of 1998 aforementioned and accordingly filed an application being Misc. Application No. 121 of 1999 seeking extension of further time for holding elections to the General Council of the MAC. In view of the Government's said application seeking further time for holding of elections, the present writ petitioner too filed a separate application in Writ Appeal No. 383 of 1998 aforementioned, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 188 of 1999, wherein the present writ petitioner contended that since he had been functioning as CEC and as the Government was seeking further time for holding elections, the position of the writ petitioner as the CEC as well as the position of Interim Mising Council, headed by the present writ petitioner, should not be disturbed and they be allowed to continue to so function till holding of the elections for regularly constituting the MAC. By order dated 10.11.1999, a Division Bench of his Court disposed of the Misc. Case No. 188 of 1999 (arising out of Writ Appeal No. 383 of 1998 aforementioned) with the direction that the Interim Mising Executive Council headed by the present writ petitioner would continue to remain in office till holding of elections of the MAC. The elections were however, not held and in the meantime, a petition being PIL No. 28 of 2001 came to be filed by the Mising Autonomous Demand Committee and three others seeking inter alia a direction for dissolving the Interim MAC constituted on 29.07.1998 which was headed by the present writ petitioner and for nominating a new Interim Mising Autonomous Council. This Court admitted the PIL and directed issuance of notices to all the respondents including the present writ petitioner, who was arrayed as respondent No. 5 in the said PIL. This Court admitted the PIL and directed issuance of notices to all the respondents including the present writ petitioner, who was arrayed as respondent No. 5 in the said PIL. The present writ petitioner filed a counter affidavit on 19.11.2001, in the PIL No. 28 of 2001 aforementioned stating inter alia, that the said PIL had not been filed bona fide but at the instance of the Congress (I) which had come to power by defeating the AGP following the elections held in Assam. This Court, on 21.11.2001, disposed of the PIL No. 28 of 2001 aforementioned with the direction that the Government may exercise the powers under Section 80 of the said Act to replace the members of the Interim Council but while doing so, it must adhere to the principles of natural justice. The Division Bench also directed that the Government must not resort to vindictive and arbitrary action and/or Section 80 should not be used as a tool to throw out political opponents. The Division Bench further recorded the assurance of the learned Advocate General, Assam, that everything would be done in accordance with law. By a notice dated 24.12.2001 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) issued by the government to the MAC, headed by the writ petitioner, certain allegations of financial irregularities and misappropri­ation of public fund against the Interim Council were communicated to the present writ petitioner and the Interim Council headed by him. The MAC submitted a reply to the said show cause notice by their letter dated 18.01.2002 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) refuting the accusations made in the said notice of show cause. After reply was so submitted on 18.01.2002, no further communication was received by the MAC on this issue from the end of the Government, but, suddenly by notification dated 11.04.2002, aforementioned, the Government has replaced and reconstituted the Interim General as well as Executive Council of the MAC and removed the present petitioner and others. 5. Though the State respondents have contested this case, they have not filed any affidavit. However, the private respondent No. 4 who has replaced the writ petitioner as the CEC has filed his affidavit and contested this case without disputing and denying the material facts stated hereinabove, the case of the private respondent No. 4 being in brief, thus. 5. Though the State respondents have contested this case, they have not filed any affidavit. However, the private respondent No. 4 who has replaced the writ petitioner as the CEC has filed his affidavit and contested this case without disputing and denying the material facts stated hereinabove, the case of the private respondent No. 4 being in brief, thus. The writ petition is not maintainable inasmuch as it is only the petitioner, who was the CEC has approached this Court to allow him to continue in terms of the earlier notification, dated 29.07.98, afore­mentioned, more so, when the writ petition does not state that the same has been filed on behalf of the General Council as well as Executive Council and/or that the writ petitioner has been authorised by the members of the Interim General or the Executive Council to file the present writ petition. As the members of the Interim General as well as Executive Council have not approached this Court, no relief can be granted to the writ petitioner. The Government has correctly and validly exercised the powers vested in it under Section 80 of the said Act and it was so done following serious allegations of misappropriation and foul play with the finance and administration of the Council. The Interim Council constituted by the impugned notification is broad-based inasmuch as the Interim General Council has 25 members and the Executive Council has 15 members, whereas the previous Interim General Council consisted of 15 and the Executive Council consisted of 9 members The exercise of powers by the Government in re-constituting the Interim General and Executive Council is bona fide. As the members of the Interim Council are nominated members, they have no legal right to continue to function as nominated members and they are not entitled to be given opportunity of showing cause before removing them from the Interim Council. No steps were taken by the writ petitioner or the Interim Council headed by him, to hold elections and the writ petitioner wants to continue to remain in occupation of the chair of the CEC on one pretext or another. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 80 is barred by res-judicata. No steps were taken by the writ petitioner or the Interim Council headed by him, to hold elections and the writ petitioner wants to continue to remain in occupation of the chair of the CEC on one pretext or another. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 80 is barred by res-judicata. Moreover, as there were allegation of financial misappropriation of public fund by the Interim Council which was headed by the petitioner, a notice was issued to the said Interim Council by the Secretary, WPT and BC Department, regarding these allegations. The writ petitioner replied thereto and, upon considering the matter in its entirety, the Government was satisfied that the writ petitioner must not be allowed to continue to function as the CEC. The writ petitioner has also failed to show any prejudice having been caused to him by the impugned notification. The writ petition has, therefore, no merit. 6. Presenting the case, on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Mishra has drawn my attention to Annexure-VIII, which contains the notification dated 11.4.2002, aforementioned, whereby the Interim Mising Autonomous General as well as Executive Council have been reconstituted by the Government by replacing the members of the earlier Interim General as well as Executive Council. Mr. Mishra has submitted that though this notification speaks of having reconstituted the Interim General as well as the Executive Council in exercise of the powers contained in Section 80 of the said Act, this Section does not, in fact, contends Mr. Mishra, empower the State Government to reconstitute the Council itself, General or Executive. It is also contended by Mr. Mishra that even if it is assumed that the said Act permits replacement of the members of the Interim General as well as Executive Council, the Council itself, General as well as Executive, is irreplaceable inasmuch as Section 5 of the said Act makes it clear that the Council is a juristic person having perpetual succession and common seal and hence, the powers exercised by the Government of Assam in issuing the notification reconstituting the Council is, according to Mr. Mishra, wholly without any valid and legal foundation. The notification, thus, which seeks to reconstitute the Interim Council, is itself reiterates Mr. Mishra, without jurisdiction and void ab initio. 7. Mishra, wholly without any valid and legal foundation. The notification, thus, which seeks to reconstitute the Interim Council, is itself reiterates Mr. Mishra, without jurisdiction and void ab initio. 7. For his above contention that the Interim General as well as Executive Council is a juristic person and cannot be reconstituted under Section 80 of the said Act, Mr. Mishra has sought to derive strength from HM Seervai 's Constitutional Law of India (1997 publication), wherein at para 9.19 page 444, it has been, I find, observed as follows: "9.19. In legal theory, a person is "any being whom the law regards as capable of rights or duties" and as so defined, persons are either natural or legal. A natural person is a human being legal persons are being, real or imaginary, who for the purposes of legal reasoning are treated in greater or less degree in the same way as human beings. A corporation which is an entity distinct and separate from its members, is an example of a legal person. In considering whether the State is a corporation and, therefore, a person, Salmond explains how in England, the monarchical form of Govt. has made it unnecessary to treat the State as a corporation, i.e. a legal person." (Emphasis is supplied by me). 8. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. B.P. Katakey has submitted that the said Act was enacted as a result of an Accord popularly known as Mising Accord and as per the memorandum of settlement reached in this Accord, which is Annexure-I to the writ petition, the State Government was to constitute, as an interim measure, an Interim Council, which was to continue to function till elections to the council took place. This Accord was reached, points out Mr. B.P. Katakey, on 14.6.95, and an Interim Council headed by the writ petitioner as the CEC was formed as per notification (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) issued by the Government of Assam as far back as on 03.11.97, but since then on one pretext or another the writ petitioner has remained as the CEC, despite the fact that serious financial irregularities and other misappropriation of fund had been committed by the petitioner and the council, which he had been heading. In a situation such as this, the removal of the petitioner from the office of the CEC had become submits Mr. In a situation such as this, the removal of the petitioner from the office of the CEC had become submits Mr. Katakey, essential and the petitioner as well as the other nominated members of his Council had to be removed by taking recourse to the impugned notification dated 11.4.2002, aforementioned. Though this notification states that the Interim General as well as Executive Council stand reconstituted, the fact remains, submits Mr. Katakey that by virtue of this notification (Annexure-8 to the writ petition), the Council has been retained inasmuch as it has not been replaced, but it is only the members of the Council, who have been replaced, which, of course, had the affect of reconstituting the Council itself and, on the basis of mere tactical interpretation of the words "reconstitution", occurring in this notification the notification cannot, as a whole, be regarded as void. 9. It is also submitted by Mr. Katakey that though the entire Council was replaced by the notification dated 11.4.2002 aforementioned, none has come with any grievances before this Court except the petitioner and hence, the writ petition is strictly speaking not maintainable inasmuch as all the member of the Interim Council are satisfied with what the Government has done. This apart no resolution of the Council, Executive or General exits, points out Mr. Katakey, authorising the petitioner to take recourse to law. In this view of the matter also, the writ petition is, contends Mr. Katakey, not maintainable. In fact, submits Mr. Katakey, with the help of the present notification, the Interim Council, both General as well as Executive, have been made broad-based by inducing more members in both the bodies than what their strength, in the past was. 10. While dealing with the above submission made on behalf of the parties, it is essential to point out that there is strictly speaking no dispute before me that the Interim General Council is a body corporate under Section 5 of the said Act having perpetual succession and a common seal. However, under the said Act, no definition of the Executive Council exists to show that even the Executive Council is a body corporate, but by parity of reading, it can be safely held that both the Council, the General as well as the Executive are juristic persons and these two bodies are independent of and distinct from their members. However, under the said Act, no definition of the Executive Council exists to show that even the Executive Council is a body corporate, but by parity of reading, it can be safely held that both the Council, the General as well as the Executive are juristic persons and these two bodies are independent of and distinct from their members. Be that as it may, since the Interim Council is, undoubtedly, an entity, which is distinct and separate from its members, it is not possible strictly speaking, either to replace the Interim Council, General or Executive or to reconstitute the same, but the members of the Interim Council, both General as well as Executive, may, under Section 80 of the said Act, be removed inasmuch as the proviso to Section 80 clearly lays down that any or all the members of the Interim General or Executive Council may be removed and replaced by any other person by the Government at any time. 11. In other words, though the members of the Interim General as well as Executive Council may strictly speaking be removed by the Government by taking recourse to the proviso to Section 80 of the said Act, there being no parallel provisions in the said Act enabling the Government to remove/replace/reconstitute the Interim Council itself, General or Executive, the reconstitution of the Interim Council as such, is not possible. 12. However, in the case at hand, on removal of all the members of the Interim General as well as Executive Council, the Interim Council itself stand, in effect and factually speaking reconstituted. Since the removal/replacement of the all members of the Interim General as well as the Executive Council has the affect of reconstituting the Interim General as well as the Executive Council, it will be, in my firm view, too pedantic and hyper-technical approach on the part of this Court if it holds that though the removal/ replacement of the members constituting the Interim Council, General as well as Executive, has the affect of reconstituting the Council itself, the impugned notification is bad in law on ground that the said Act nowhere envisages replacement/ reconstitution of the council itself. 13. In short, though strictly speaking, reconstitution of the Interim Council is not possible, the removal or replacement of all its members will, however, have the affect of reconstituting the Council itself. 13. In short, though strictly speaking, reconstitution of the Interim Council is not possible, the removal or replacement of all its members will, however, have the affect of reconstituting the Council itself. Situated thus, the mere fact that the notification dated 11.4.2002 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) aforementioned mentions of reconstitution of the Interim, General as well as Executive Council, it cannot be struck down for the removal as indicated above, of the members of the Council, as a whole does have the affect of reconstituting the Council. Viewed from this angle, the mere fact that the notification dated 11.4.2002, afore­mentioned speaks of the reconstitution of the Interim General as well as Executive Council which is legally not permissible, the notification cannot be struck down on such technical infirmities. 14. Thus, the question, which now, arises for consideration is this whether the removal of the petitioner by virtue of the notification dated 11.4.2002 afore­mentioned is valid ? 15. While dealing with the above aspect of the matter, it is pertinent to note that Mr. D.K. Mishra has pointed out that earlier three Civil Rules namely CR No. 3263/96, 2888/97 and 5151/97 were disposed of by this Court on 10.3.98. In these Civil Rules, Section 80 of the Mising Autonomous Council (Amendment Act), 1997 was under challenge, whereby a proviso to Section 80 was attached, which reads as follows: "Provided that any of the members of such Interim General or Executive Council may be removed or replaced by any other person by the Government at any time." 16. While disposing of the said three Civil Rules by a common judgment and order, on 10.3.98, this Court; points out Mr. Mishra, though upheld the validity of Section 80, it also, at the same time, laid down that a person affected by an order passed under the proviso to Section 80 will have the right to approach this Court challenging such an action. 17. Similarly, while disposing of the Civil Rule No. 4400/98 aforementioned, this Court made it clear, further points out Mr. Mishra, that the discretion/power under Section 80 must be exercised by the Government fairly and reasonably and must be regarded as incidental or consequential to the power itself. 18. While disposing of the CR No. 4400/98 aforementioned, the learned Single Judge, submits Mr. Mishra, that the discretion/power under Section 80 must be exercised by the Government fairly and reasonably and must be regarded as incidental or consequential to the power itself. 18. While disposing of the CR No. 4400/98 aforementioned, the learned Single Judge, submits Mr. Mishra, quashed the impugned notification dated 29.7.98, whereby the Interim Council was reconstituted and directed that the Deputy Commissioner shall take charge of the council and the election shall be held within the month of July, 1999, as proposed by the State of Assam. This decision was points out Mr. Mishra, challenged in Writ Appeal No. 383/98 by the present writ petitioner but as per the agreement reached between the State Government and the appellant i.e. the present writ petitioner, who was at the relevant time, the CEC of the Interim Mising Executive Council, the Division Bench of this Court, vide its order dated 19.12.98, disposed of the matter in terms of the agreement reached between the parties concerned, whereby the appellant was allowed to continue as the CEC of the Interim Missing Autonomous Council. Subsequently, points out Mr. Mishra, vide order dated 10.11.98, passed in Misc. Case No. 188/99, arising out of the Writ Appeal No. 383/98 aforementioned, this Court directed, as per the agreement reached between the parties concerned, that the Council would continue to remain in office as long as the elections do not take place. It is submitted by Mr. Mishra that in terms of this order, the petitioner's appointment as the Chairman of the Interim Mising Autonomous Council could not have been terminated and he could not have been replaced till such time that the order remained in force or the elections to the Council were held. 19. The replacement of the Interim General as well as Executive Council by impugned notification dated 11.4.2002, aforementioned, contends Mr. Mishra, is thus, a blatant abuse of the petitioner's vested in the Government by the proviso to Section 80 of the said Act and it is in total violation of the agreed direction given in this regard by the Division Bench of this Court. Viewed from this angle, the issuance of the impugned notification dated 11.4.2002 aforementioned, is, contends Mr. Mishra, wholly without jurisdiction and may be treated as void ab initio. 20. It has also been submitted by Mr. Viewed from this angle, the issuance of the impugned notification dated 11.4.2002 aforementioned, is, contends Mr. Mishra, wholly without jurisdiction and may be treated as void ab initio. 20. It has also been submitted by Mr. Mishra that the PIL 28/2001 afore­mentioned came to be registered in this Court on the basis of the application made by Mising Autonomous Demand Council and the Division Bench of this Court, on 21.11.2001, disposed of the said PIL with the following observations and directions: "This PIL shall stand disposed of with a direction that the Govt. may exercise the power under the proviso to Section 80 of the Mising Autonomous Council (Amendment) Act, 1997. This is quoted below : 'Provided that any or all the members of such Interim General or Executive Counsel may be removed and replaced by any other person by the Government at any time.' This must not be vindictive and arbitrary action and/or it should not be used as a tool to throw out political opponent. The learned Advocate General. Assam assures that all the things will be done in accordance with law and nothing untowards shall happen. The learned Advocate General also assures that he will instruct the State of Assam to start and complete the process of election as early as possible preferably within a period of six months." (Emphasis supplied by me). 21. It is essential to note, submits Mr. Mishra, that this Court has made it clear in the PIL 28/2001 aforementioned that the principles of natural justice are to be observed, while exercising the powers contained in the proviso to Section 80 and that this power has to be exercised in a prudent and fair manner and that the action of the Government cannot be vindictive or arbitrary. 22. In terms of the above order, submits Mr. Mishra, the State respondents must satisfy that they had observed the principles of natural justice and their act of removing the Interim General as well as Executive Council is not arbitrary or vindictive. Far from this, the petitioner and his council have been removed, submits Mr. Mishra, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the Council or to the person(s) concerned and that no reason has been assigned for exercising such drastic powers, which clearly indicates, contends Mr. Far from this, the petitioner and his council have been removed, submits Mr. Mishra, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the Council or to the person(s) concerned and that no reason has been assigned for exercising such drastic powers, which clearly indicates, contends Mr. Mishra, that the powers have been exercised vindictively and on political considerations to throw out the political opponents by a political party, which came to occupy the seat of power. 23. Pausing at this stage, Mr. Mishra has also pointed out that by the letter, dated 24.12.2001 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition), addressed to the Interim Mising Executive Council, represented by the Chief Executive Councillor, Interim Mising Autonomous Council, Gogamukh, Dhemaji, and the Chief Executive Councillor, Interim Mising Autonomous Council, Gogamukh, Dhemaji, the Commissioner and Secretary, WPT and BC Department, Dispur, brought to the notice of the addressees some allegations of financial irregularities and misappropriation of public fund levelled against the Interim Mising Autonomous Council. On receiving this letter, the petitioner and his Council did reply back offering their comments in the matter. On receiving this reply, dated 18.1.2002 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), the State Government maintained complete silence but, suddenly, by the impugned notification dated 11.4.2002, afore­mentioned, removed the petitioner and others and reconstituted the Council. Issuing of the letter containing allegations as aforesaid and the act of reconstituting the Council by the impugned order leaves, contends Mr. Mishra, a stigma on the petitioner and his council as if the petitioner and the Council headed by him have been removed because of financial irregularities and misappropriation of public fund, though before issuing the impugned notification, the State respondents did not even consider the matter in its entirety by taking into account the reply of the petitioner nor did the State respondents give any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and his Council, which was, insists Mr. Mishra, a gross denial of the principles of natural justice and fair play. Such an action on the part of the State is highly illegal and may not be allowed to stand good on record. So contends Mr. Mishra. 24. Mr. Mishra has also submitted that unless applicability of the principles of natural justice are expressly or by necessary implication stands excluded, Courts must presume that the principles of natural justice are present in the enactment in question. In support of this contention, Mr. So contends Mr. Mishra. 24. Mr. Mishra has also submitted that unless applicability of the principles of natural justice are expressly or by necessary implication stands excluded, Courts must presume that the principles of natural justice are present in the enactment in question. In support of this contention, Mr. Mishra has referred to Dr. Rashlal Yadav -Vs-State of Bihar and others (1994)5 SCC 267 . 25. Mr. Mishra has further submitted that no act done by any authority in exercise of its subjective satisfaction can be sustained in law if it suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. In support of this contention, Mr. Mishra has referred to Khudiram Das -Vs- The State of West Bengal and others (1975) 2 SCC 100 . 26. Deriving strength from the law laid down in Dr. Darshanlal Yadav (supra) and Khudiram Das (supra) Mr. Mishra has submitted that there is nothing to show from the wordings of the proviso to Section 80 that the power to remove/replace the members can be exercised by the Government arbitrarily on ignoring the principles of natural justice. The writ petitioner has, however, been removed, contends Mr. Mishra, arbitrarily and, hence, his removal needs to be struck down by this Court. Mr. Mishra has also submitted that the Government had no material(s) to feel satisfied bona fide that the removal of the petitioner from the Council was necessary. The power under Section 80 has, thus, been exercised, complains Mr. Mishra, arbitrarily leaving an indelible stigma on the character conduct of the petitioner, which is impermissible in law when done without adhering to the principles of natural justice. 27. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. B.P. Katakey has reiterated that the petitioner is the only person, who has expressed his grievances against the impugned order and none of the member of the Interim General as well as Executive Council have come forward to agitate against their removal or replacement. 28. In view of the fact that none of the other members of the superseded Interim General and/or Executive Council have expressed any grievances against the reconstitution of the Council. Mr. Katakey contends that the petitioner's grievances are motivated as he wants to continue to remain glued to the Chair of the CEC. 29. It is pointed out by Mr. 28. In view of the fact that none of the other members of the superseded Interim General and/or Executive Council have expressed any grievances against the reconstitution of the Council. Mr. Katakey contends that the petitioner's grievances are motivated as he wants to continue to remain glued to the Chair of the CEC. 29. It is pointed out by Mr. Katakey that all the members and office bearers of the Interim General Council as well as Executive Council including the petitioner were nominated by the Government and hence their appointments, by way of nomination, were governed by the doctrine of pleasure and they could have been removed at any point of time, by the Government and none of them including the petitioner can have any grievances if they are so removed. 30. In support of his above contention, Mr. Katakey has referred to Om Narain Agarwal and Others -Vs- Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur and Others (1993) 2 SCC 212. 31. It is also submitted by Mr. Katakey that for removing a nominated person from the Interim General as well as Executive Council, principles of natural justice are not to be observed inasmuch as such removal does not attach any stigma to the person or persons removed. Viewed from this angle, submits Mr. Katakey, the removal of the petitioner and/or other members of the Council aforementioned are in conformity with law and the same cannot be objected to. Reliance in support of the contention is placed by Mr. Katakey on the case of Krishna -Vs- State of Maharashtra and others (2001) 2 SCC 441 . 32. It is submitted by Mr. Katakey that the Government was bound to remove the writ petitioner on account of serious allegations of misappropriation and financial irregularities and the petitioner was, points out Mr. Katakey, given adequate opportunity of showing cause and it was after the petitioner had replied thereto and upon consideration of petitioner's reply that the authorities concerned, upon finding the reply not satisfactory removed the members of the Council including the petitioner. 33. Since the principles of natural justice are, contends Mr. Katakey, given adequate opportunity of showing cause and it was after the petitioner had replied thereto and upon consideration of petitioner's reply that the authorities concerned, upon finding the reply not satisfactory removed the members of the Council including the petitioner. 33. Since the principles of natural justice are, contends Mr. Katakey, not required to be observed, while removing a nominated member from any statutory body, it was adequate compliance of the principles of natural justice, when the petitioner and the Council were given opportunity of showing cause against the allegations aforementioned and the petitioner can have no right to agitate that he was not afforded opportunity of hearing and or that he has been unjustifiably removed. It is sufficient, reiterates Mr. Katakey, that the petitioner and his Council were given opportunity of showing cause and their reply had been duly considered by the State Government. Support for this contention is sought to be derived by Mr. Katakey from the law laid down in Grosons Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. & Another -Vs- State of U.P. and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 604 , wherein it has been observed as follows: "In the present case, the appellant was given an opportunity to show cause and it did reply to the show cause which was duly considered by the State Government. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the respondents while blacklisting the appellant was in conformity with the principles of natural justice." (Emphasis is supplied by me). 34. It is further contended by Mr. Katakey that even if it is assumed that the petitioner was removed following allegations of financial irregularities against him. The principles of natural justice stood satisfied. When the petitioner was given opportunity of showing cause against the allegations made regarding his performance and also the performance of his Council. Hence, the petitioner cannot challenge his removal by the impugned order on the ground of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. In support of this contention, Mr. Katakey has referred to M/s. Jain Export (P) Ltd. -Vs-Union of India & Ors. (1998) 3 SCC 579, wherein it has been held as follows : It has not been disputed that show cause notices were issued, causes shown and considered by the statutory authorities. It maybe that more of opportunities than extended were expected by the applicant in view of the fact that last stakes were in issue. (1998) 3 SCC 579, wherein it has been held as follows : It has not been disputed that show cause notices were issued, causes shown and considered by the statutory authorities. It maybe that more of opportunities than extended were expected by the applicant in view of the fact that last stakes were in issue. The observance of the rules of natural justice is not referable to the fairness of the stake but is essentially related to the demands of a given situation. The position here is covered by statutory provisions and it is well settled that rules of natural justice do not supplant but supplement the law." (Emphasis is supplied by me). 35. Mr. Katakey has also submitted that even if there is breach of the rules of natural justice, the Court may refuse to grant relief, if the Court is of the view that no prejudice has been caused to the affected parties. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Katakey, the petitioner has not been prejudiced at all inasmuch as he has no statutory right or legal right to remain glued to the Chair of the CEC and his status being that of a nominated person, his removal cannot be treated to have caused any prejudice to him. In this view of the matter, the impugned order deserves, pleads Mr. Katakey, no interference at all in support of this contention. Mr. Katakey has referred to Aligarh Muslim University and others -Vs- Mansoor Ali Khan (2002) 7 SCC 529 wherein it has been held as follows: "There can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example, where no prejudices is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. In Ridge -Vs- Boldwin. it was held that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other de facto" prejudice need to be proved. But since the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in India. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed by the Supreme Court on several cases. Since K.L. Tripathi case, the Supreme Court has consistently applied the principles of prejudice in several cases. But since the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in India. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed by the Supreme Court on several cases. Since K.L. Tripathi case, the Supreme Court has consistently applied the principles of prejudice in several cases. The "useless formality*' theory is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or undisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" as discussed in S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jog Mohan there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. In the ultimate analysts, the applicability of the theory depends on the facts of a particular case. (Emphasis is supplied by me). 36. Mr. Katakey has further submitted that if the rights are granted by a statute, it can also be taken away by the statute. Viewed from this angle, submits Mr. Katakey, the petitioner was appointed as CEC by virtue of the notification issued under Section 80 of the said Act and, hence, in exercise of the powers vested in the Government under the proviso to Section 80 of the said Act, the petitioner has been removed. Though the Division Bench of this Court in PIL-28/2001 aforementioned has observed in its order dated 21.11.01 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) that while exercising the powers under the proviso, principles of natural justice and fair-play are to be observed, the decisions of the Apex Court in Om Narain Agarwal (supra) as well as Krishna (supra) clearly show, according to Mr. Katakey, that for a nominated member, observing the principles of natural justice are not essential. In this view of the matter, contends Mr. Katakey, no notice was required to be given to the Council or the petitioner to show cause against their proposed removal and the action taken by the State Government to remove the petitioner and his Council cannot be treated as violative and may not he interfered with. This apart submits Mr. In this view of the matter, contends Mr. Katakey, no notice was required to be given to the Council or the petitioner to show cause against their proposed removal and the action taken by the State Government to remove the petitioner and his Council cannot be treated as violative and may not he interfered with. This apart submits Mr. Katakey, when the petitioner was appointed as the CEC, his appointment was challenged in C.R. No. 4400 of 1998 on the ground that the writ petitioner's removal under Section 8Q to the said Act was illegal and that there was denial of the principles of natural justice, by this Court held that Section 80 is valid and the authority concerned have the power to dissolve the body and reconstitute the same and that the principles of natural justice cannot said to have been violated. Since the petitioner, submits Mr. Katakey, is the beneficiary of such a judicial order, he cannot, now, claim that he ought to have been heard before removing him from the office, which he was so holding. In support of this contention, Mr. Katakey has referred to M. C. Mehta - Vs- Union of India & Ors., (1999) 6 SCC 237 , wherein it has been laid down as follows : "The above case is a clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refused to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law." (Emphasis is supplied by me). 37. Repelling the above submissions made on behalf of the respondent No.l, Mr. Mishra has submitted that every policy decision of the Government is subject to judicial review and it can be interfered with if it is motivated, malafide or arbitrary. 38. It is also submitted by Mr. Mishra that it is immaterial that the petitioner has approached this Court and others, who were also removed, have not. Mishra has submitted that every policy decision of the Government is subject to judicial review and it can be interfered with if it is motivated, malafide or arbitrary. 38. It is also submitted by Mr. Mishra that it is immaterial that the petitioner has approached this Court and others, who were also removed, have not. As long as the petitioner can prove breach of fair play and of the principles of natural justice in removing him from the office which he was holding he can be given the relief, which he may be found entitled to, and such relief cannot be declined merely on the ground that others, who are also affected by the same order, have not approached this Court. It is also submitted by Mr. Mishra that even for removal of nominated members, observance of the principles of natural justice is a sine qua non. 39. It is also submitted by Mr. Mishra that the doctrine of pleasure has no application in the present case inasmuch as there is nothing in the said Act to show that the nominated members or office bear of the Interim General and or Executive Council will hold their offices as long as the Government pleases. 40. It is further submitted by Mr. Mishra that there was gross violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as there was nothing in the materials on record to show that the State respondents had even the courtesy to look into the reply submitted by the petitioner to the notice of showing cause served on him. In this view of the matter, none can claim, contends Mr. Mishra, that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as stigma has been attached to the petitioner by removing him from office and thus penalty has been inflicted on him on account of the allegations levelled against him, for no other reason or reasons, points out Mr. Mishra, have been assigned or could have been assigned by the respondents for removing the petitioner from the office, which he was holding. 41. Mr. Mishra, have been assigned or could have been assigned by the respondents for removing the petitioner from the office, which he was holding. 41. Mr. Mishra has pointed out that despite specific orders given in this case on 24.04.02, when this writ petition was admitted and the rule was issued the State respondent have not produced the relevant records to show the circumstances in which the Government resorted to the issuance of notification, which stands impugned in this writ petition. Viewed from this angle, submit Mr. Mishra, the Government has failed to justify the removal of the petitioner and his Council by the impugned notification and the same needs to be set aside and quashed with a direction given to the State respondents to revert to the status quo ante by allowing the petitioner to rejoin and function as the CEC. 42. In a nut-shell what appears to be the rival contentions expressed before me on behalf of the parties appearing before me, is this. While according to Mr. D.K. Mishra, unless the Statute itself gives an indication otherwise applicability of the rules of natural justice are to be read into, while interpreting a statute to ensure fairness and to protect the action from being challenged on the ground of arbitrariness and that there can be noting called unfettered discretion immune from judicial review ability so as to reduce the possibility of exercise of powers by the authority" concerned arbitrarily the submission of Mr. B.P. Katakey is that the concept of doctrine of pleasure may be specifically embodied in a statute or it may be present impliedly in the statute and if the doctrine of pleasure is applicable in a given case, principles of natural justice would cease to apply and for this reason, removal of a nominated member from a body elected or otherwise cannot be challenged on the ground of not being given any opportunity of hearing before the removal was ordered. Even where the principles of natural justice are according to Mr. Katakey, required to be observed, it is not necessary to extend opportunity of hearing to the person concerned if the principles of natural justice are substantially observed in the given case and or if the decision would have remained unaltered, had even opportunity of hearing been accorded. 43. Even where the principles of natural justice are according to Mr. Katakey, required to be observed, it is not necessary to extend opportunity of hearing to the person concerned if the principles of natural justice are substantially observed in the given case and or if the decision would have remained unaltered, had even opportunity of hearing been accorded. 43. As a principle of law, what have been contended before me on behalf of the parties, one may not have any dispute but the application thereof to a given case may be a subject of controversy and unless set at rest convincingly it may lead to aberrations in the administration of justice. For effective application of law, it is always essential to have factual matrix of the case clearly established. 44. What is established in the present case is that the petitioner was appointed as the CEC of the Interim Council under the provisions of Section 80 of the said Act. Though, initially, there was no provisions in Section 80 of the said Act for removal of a nominated member, the proviso added, subsequently, to Section 80 vested in the Government the powers to remove such a nominated member. That the petitioner and the entire body of the Interim General as well as Executive Council were not elected members, but were mere nominated members is not in dispute before me. It is also not in dispute that the members as a whole of the Interim General as well as Executive Council, can be removed by taking recourse to Sec-80 of the said Act. The question, which now, arises for consideration is thus, whether the removal of the petitioner from the office of Chief Executive Councillor is sustainable in law? 45. In order to show that the removal of even a nominated member is not possible without observing the principles of natural justice, Mr. D.K. Mishra has relied upon, as already indicated above, Dr. Rash Lal Yadav (supra) and Khudkam Das (supra). 46. A careful reading of the decision of the Apex Court in Dr. R.L. Yadav (supra) shows that unless a statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes the application of the principles of natural justice/Courts are bound to read into the statute requirements of observing the principles of natural justice. Rash Lal Yadav (supra) and Khudkam Das (supra). 46. A careful reading of the decision of the Apex Court in Dr. R.L. Yadav (supra) shows that unless a statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes the application of the principles of natural justice/Courts are bound to read into the statute requirements of observing the principles of natural justice. While interpreting the statutes, which are silent with regard to application of rules of natural justice, the Court must insist on compliance of the rules of natural justice in every case of administrative action having civil consequences. I am guided to adopt its view from the law laid down in Rash Lal Yadav (supra) in the following words: "6. Where the statutes is silent and a contrary intention cannot be implied, the requirement of the applicability of the rule of natural justice is read into it to ensure fairness and to protect the action from the charge of arbitrariness. Natural justice has thus secured a foothold to supplement enacted law by operating as an implied mandatory requirement thereby protecting it from the vice of arbitrariness. Courts presume this requirement in all its width as implied unless the enactment supplies indications to the contrary as in the present case. 9. What emerges from the above discussion is that unless the law expressly or by necessary implication excludes the application of the rule of natural justice, courts will read the said requirement in enactment that are silent and insist on its application even in cases of administrative action having civil consequences." (Emphasis is added). 47. Coupled with the above, the law laid down in Khudiram Das (supra) shows that even when a decision is permissible to be taken on the subjective satisfaction reached by an authority, such subjective satisfaction can be challenged on the ground of arbitrariness, for, there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial review ability. I am led to adopt this view from the following observations of the Apex Court: "10. There is also one other ground on which the subjective satisfaction reached by an authority can successfully be challenged and it is of late becoming increasingly important. The genesis of this ground is to be bound in the famous words of Lord Halsbury in Sharp -Vs-Weakefield........ when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities.... The genesis of this ground is to be bound in the famous words of Lord Halsbury in Sharp -Vs-Weakefield........ when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities.... that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion.... according to law and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague, fanciful, but legal and regular. So far as this ground is concerned, the Courts in the United States have gone much further than the Courts in England or in this court........But in England and India, the Courts stop short at merely enquiring whether the grounds on which the authority has reached its subjective satisfaction are such that any reasonable person could possibly arrive at such satisfaction. If "to use the words of Lord Greene M.R. in Associate Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. -Vs-Wednesbury Corporation" words, which have found approval of the house of Lords in Smith V. West Ellor and Rural District Council and Faweid Properties Ltd. V. Buckhimgham County Council "the authority has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the Courts can interfere". In such a case, a legitimate inference may fairly be drawn either that the authority "did not honestly form that view or that in forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts." Ross V. Papadopollos. The power of the Court to interfere in such a case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision by the statutory authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether this statutory authority has contravened the law by acting in excess of the power which the legislature has confided in it is on this ground that the order of preventive detention made by the District Magistrate in Debu Mahto V. State of West Bengal was struck down by this Court. 11. This discussion is sufficient to show that there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from Judicial reviewability. The truth is that in a Government under law, there can be no such thing as unreviewable discretion." (Emphasis is supplied by me) 48. As against the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. 11. This discussion is sufficient to show that there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from Judicial reviewability. The truth is that in a Government under law, there can be no such thing as unreviewable discretion." (Emphasis is supplied by me) 48. As against the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Katakey's contention is that a nominated member holds office in a body elected or otherwise, during the pleasure of the authority, who nominates and when the doctrine of pleasure ceases, the nominated member can be removed. In a given case, when the doctrine of pleasure applies, principles of natural justice would become inapplicable. When, however, the removal of the member leaves stigma or leads to any penal consequences, then, observing the principles of natural justice becomes essential. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Mishra, there is nothing in the provision of the said Act to show that the nominated member's tenure will be governed by the doctrine of pleasure. I do not find any force in this contention of Mr. Mishra inasmuch as the doctrine of pleasure may be explicitly expressed in a legislation or it may be impliedly present in the given legislation. In view of the fact that there is nothing in the provisions of the said Act to show that for every removal, stigmatic or otherwise, an opportunity of showing cause has to be extended to a nominated member, there is no escape from the conclusion that the doctrine of pleasure is impliedly present in the proviso to Section 80. Thus, not only the nomination of a person as a member of the Interim General or Executive Council depends on the pleasure of the Government, but that his/her removal also depends on the pleasure of the Government and except when the removal is stigmatic or penal in nature, the principles of natural justice will not be applicable. 49.1 am guided to come to the above conclusion from the following observations in Krishna (supra). “8. Having considered the submissions for the parties and after perusing the language of the sections, we have no hesitation to hold, that the field of Section 6 and Section 10 are separate. The removal spoken under Section 6 is removal without any stigma while the removal under Section 10 is removal with penal consequences attaching stigma. If submission for the appellant is accepted, viz. The removal spoken under Section 6 is removal without any stigma while the removal under Section 10 is removal with penal consequences attaching stigma. If submission for the appellant is accepted, viz. Section 6 empowers and Section 10 lays down the conditions and procedure to remove, then removal of trustee could only be for penal consequences and not otherwise. If that be so, there could be no reason to enact Section 6 as Section 10 covers such cases. It is significant, the removal under Section 6 is confined only to such trustees who are covered under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and who are also nominated by the State Government Rights of trustees falling under the aforesaid clause (e) are rights created under a statute and hence that very creator can always limit or curtail such right. In such cases, if a trustee is removed, he cannot project any grievance that no opportunity was given to him. If any right which is creature of statute is limited or curtailed by that very statute in the absence of any other right under that very statute or the Constitution of India, such trustee cannot claim any right based on the principle of natural justice. 9. The removal spoken of here neither casts any stigma nor leads to any penal consequences. This clearly reveals the doctrine of pleasure, which is implicit in this section. In any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or it may be implicit. It is open for the courts, while interpreting any provision to spell or read with other provisions of the statute if so intended to read impliedly in the absence of any explicit words that subverse the intent of the legislature. 11. Once doctrine of pleasure is applicable neither the principle of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving an opportunity before removal would arise. It is significant when stigma is cast then sub-section (3) of Section 10 specially provides for giving an opportunity to such incumbent before passing an order of removal under Section 10, while there is no such corresponding sub­section under Section 6. Thus 'intent of legislature is very clear which reinforces the inference which we have drawn that doctrine of pleasure is implicit under Section 6." (Emphasis is added by me) 50. Thus 'intent of legislature is very clear which reinforces the inference which we have drawn that doctrine of pleasure is implicit under Section 6." (Emphasis is added by me) 50. Section 6 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936, provides that the term of the trustee shall be five years, but he may be removed from office by the State Government at any time before completion of such term, whereas Section 10 provides that the State Government may remove a trustee, who has, in its opinion, so fragrantly abused his position as a trustee as to render his continuance as a trustee detrimental to the public interest. It is not specifically mentioned in Section 6 that the nominated trustee's appointment will rest with the pleasure of the Government. Even then, the Apex Court took the view that as far as Section 6 is concerned, removal of a trustee depends on the doctrine of pleasure, but so far as Section 10 is concerned, since stigma is cast, when the person concerned is removed as a trustee, opportunity of showing cause is required to be given to the person concerned. 51. It is, no doubt, true that in Om Narain Agarwal (supra), the Statute specifically contained the expression that the nominated member "shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government. The Apex Court had, therefore, no hesitation in holding that since the initial nomination of the members concerned itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government and if such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there, can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution if the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. I am guided to form the above opinion from the following observations of the Apex Court in Om Narain Agarwal (supra): "11. The right to seek an election or to be elected or nominated to a statutory body depends and arises under a statute. The initial nomination of the two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. The right to seek an election or to be elected or nominated to a statutory body depends and arises under a statute. The initial nomination of the two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of an provision of the Constitution in the case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. 12. In our view, such provision neither offends an Article of the Constitution nor the same is against an public optic or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of an violation of principles of natural justice is not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political consideration." (Emphasis is supplied by me) 52. What, thus, crystalizes from the above discussions is that if a statute provides for the members to be nominated in a body, elected or otherwise, on political consideration or subjective satisfaction, the removal of such a person will depend unless explicit or by necessary implications excluded by the statute governing such nomination, on the pleasure of the authority concerned. Such nomination shall be enjoyed by such nominated members during the pleasure of the authority making the nomination but when the pleasure ceases on subjective satisfaction or even on political considerations, such a removal, without specifically complying with the principles of natural justice is possible, provided, of course, that such removal is not stigmatic or penal in nature. Such nomination shall be enjoyed by such nominated members during the pleasure of the authority making the nomination but when the pleasure ceases on subjective satisfaction or even on political considerations, such a removal, without specifically complying with the principles of natural justice is possible, provided, of course, that such removal is not stigmatic or penal in nature. This view can be adopted not only from the law laid down in Om Narain Agarwal (supra) and Krishna (supra), but even from the law laid down in Rashlal Yadav (supra) wherein it has been observed to the effect that when the ordinance unmistakably reveals legislature's intendment to exclude the rule of giving an opportunity to hear before the exercise of power of removal, such a removal without giving any opportunity of hearing is maintainable. 53. Keeping in view the position of law discussed above, let me now, come to and deal with, the facts of the present case vis­-a-vis the law as indicated hereinabove. 54. While coming to the case at hand, it is of utmost importance to note that it is not in dispute before me that the Interim General as well as Executive Council was constituted under the provisions of Section 80 of the said Act, which vests the Govt. with power to constitute an Interim Mising Council by nomination until General Council is formed after election. A careful reading of Section 80 shows that no criterion/criteria has/have been fixed for making nomination of the members, office bearers of the Interim General/Executive Council. Similarly for the purpose of removal and or replacement of any person(s) from the Interim General or Executive Council, no condition has been laid down in the proviso to Sec. 80. 55. Situated thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that for the nomination to, and/or removal from, the Interim General or Executive Council the discretion entirely rests with the Govt. and though not expressly laid down in the said Act, the person(s) nominated to the Council will hold the office during the pleasure of the State Government. If the initial nomination are made on the basis of political considerations, there will be no violation of law if such nominated members are removed or replaced on political considerations. 56. In the above view of the matter, I do not find, if I may reiterate, any force in the contention of Mr. If the initial nomination are made on the basis of political considerations, there will be no violation of law if such nominated members are removed or replaced on political considerations. 56. In the above view of the matter, I do not find, if I may reiterate, any force in the contention of Mr. Mishra that for every removal of a nominated person, opportunity of showing cause and/or of hearing is required to be accorded. However, if the removal is adopted as a measure of punishment or if the removal will leave stigma on the person (s) to be removed, principles of natural justice will have to be observed. 57. If the directions of the Division Bench contained in the order dated 21.11.2002, passed in the PIL No. 28/01, are to be interpreted in consonance with the law laid down by the Apex Court, then the interpretation of Section 80 has to be that when the removal of the nominated person(s) from the Interim General or Executive Council is penal or stigmatic in nature, the same cannot be done without adhering to the principles of natural justice, otherwise, the removal will be construed as vindictive and arbitrary inasmuch as the same cannot be resorted to, as observed in the PIL No. 28/2001 as a tool to throw out the political opponents casting stigma on them. Considered from this angle, it is clear that the power to remove the nominated members) under the proviso to Section 80 is unfettered if removal does not leave any stigma on the conduct, reputation of the person sought to be removed, the removal will be justified, but if the removal is inflicted as a measure of punishment or is stigmatic in nature, the same cannot be done without adhering to the principles of natural justice. 58. In the case at hated, the petitioner and his Interim Council were admittedly served with the letter dated 24.11.2002 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) whereby allegations of financial irregularities and misappropriation of public fund by the Interim Mising Autonomous Council were levelled. The petitioners along with others, it appears from their letter dated 18.01.2002 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) refuted the allegations so made against them. The petitioners along with others, it appears from their letter dated 18.01.2002 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) refuted the allegations so made against them. However, there is not even an iota of material on record to show that the comments, explanation offered by the petitioner and the member of the said Interim Council were ever considered by the Govt. before the impugned notification dated 11.04.2002 aforementioned was issued. 59. It is worth noticing that despite a clear direction given by this Court at the time of issuing the Rule on 21.04.2002 to call for the records, the records have not been produced by the Govt. The Govt. has, in fact, chosen as already indicated above, not to even file any affidavit-in-opposition. This apart, in para 16 of the writ petition, it is asserted by the writ petitioner that after submission of their reply on 18.01.2002, no further communication was received by them from the end of the Govt. and it was presumed that the Govt. was satisfied with the explanation given by the writ petitioner and hence, under no circumstances, the notice, dated 24.11.2002 can be made basis for issuing the impugned notification. These assertion too have gone undisputed by the State Government. 60. Situated thus, one has no option but to hold and I do hold that the State respondents did not consider and/or take into account the letter dated 18.01.2002 aforementioned before issuing the impugned notification. This, in turn, shows that the impugned notification was indeed issued arbitrarily and without following the principles of natural justice, despite the fact that the removal, in question, was penal and stigmatic in nature. 61. Though Mr. Katakey has referred to Grosong Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. (supra) and M/s. Jain Export (P) Ltd. (supra) to show that it is enough compliance of the principles of the natural justice, if opportunity to show cause is given and reply to the notice received is only considered by the Govt. 61. Though Mr. Katakey has referred to Grosong Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. (supra) and M/s. Jain Export (P) Ltd. (supra) to show that it is enough compliance of the principles of the natural justice, if opportunity to show cause is given and reply to the notice received is only considered by the Govt. before issuing the notification ordering removal of the nominated persons, what is, however, of immense importance to note is that there is absolutely no material on record to indicate that the reply dated 18.01.2002 to the show cause notice aforementioned was ever considered by the State Government before issuing the impugned notification, looked at from this angle the conclusion, which is irresistible to draw from the sequence of events that the petitioner and his Interim Council were removed following the allegations of financial irregularities of the fund of the Council and that though such removal was highly stigmatic in nature, principles of natural justice were not adhered to. 62. It logically follows from the above conclusion that the notification aforementioned has been issued arbitrarily without complying with the minimum possible requirements of the principles of natural justice viz. consideration of the reply of the petitioner to the notice to show cause. Hence, the impugned notification is illegal and cannot be allowed to stand good on record. 63. I may pause here to point out that though Mr. Katakey has referred to the case of Aligarh Muslim University (supra) to show that absence of notice, unless causes prejudice, cannot vitiate an order, suffice it mention here that once the removal in the manner in which it has been resorted to is penal and stigmatic in nature, prejudice caused to the reputation of the petitioner and the Interim Council headed by him is apparent, particularly, when their reply aforementioned were, according to the materials on record, not even considered by the appropriate authorities. 64. 64. As far as the case pf M.C. Mehta (supra) is concerned, the same does not help at all the case of the respondents inasmuch as in this case, the Apex Court has laid down that it is not always necessary for Courts to strike down order merely because it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and that the Court can refuse to exercise its discretion in striking down such an order if the same will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the O.P. in violation of the principles of natural justice or which is otherwise not in accordance with law. 65. It has been contended by Mr. Katakey that the present writ petitioner was made the CEC by removing Rajib Pegu and others from the earlier Interim Council, but before their removal from the Interim Council and present writ petitioner's nomination thereto, principles of natural justice were not observed and, hence, writ petitioner's removal without observing principles of natural justice does not call for interference. In this regard, it may be mentioned here that the present writ petitioner is not being replaced by Shri Rajib Pegu aforementioned and, hence, the law laid down in M.C. Mehta's case (supra) cannot be applied to the facts of present case. This apart, apparently, the removal of Shri Rajib Pegu and others was according to the order dated 25.11.1998 passed in Civil Ruje, No. 4400/98 and stigmatic in nature and, hence, breach of the rules of natural justice did not vitiate the order of his rejnoyal from office. 66. What, therefore, emerges from the above discussions is that while removal simpliciter of a nominated member from the interim Mising Autonomous Council is possible without observing the Principles of natural justice, no such removal is possible if it is inflicted as a measure of punishment or is stigmatic in nature. Since in the case at hand, the removal is stigmatic in nature and the same has been resorted to arbitrarily and without adhering td the principles of natural justice, the impugned notification on dated 11.04.2002 aforementioned is illegal and must be struck down. 67. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition succeeds. The impugned notification dated 11.04.2002 aforementioned is hereby set aside and quashed. 67. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition succeeds. The impugned notification dated 11.04.2002 aforementioned is hereby set aside and quashed. The notification dated 11.04.2002 aforementioned shall henceforth be treated as non-est in law and the Interim General as well as Executive Mising Autonomous Council which stand removed/replaced by virtue of the notification under challenge, are hereby resorted with immediate effect.