JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The writ petitioner, Shri Nityananda Mahadani (hereinafter referred to as Mahadani) was an employee of a nationalized bank namely Punjab National Bank (for short Bank). Mahadani was scheduled to retire from the service of the Bank on 31.5.1985. By a charge-sheet dated 9.3.1985 certain charges were levelled against him relating to misconduct alleged to have been committed by him between July, 1979 to October, 1981 when he was working as Accountant at Branch Office of the Bank at Purulia. By the Order of dismissal dated 20.5.1985 Mahadani was dismissed from the service of the Bank with immediate effect. 2. Gravity of charges was apparent from the "Statement of Imputation of Misconduct" which reads as follows :–– "STATEMENT OF IMPUTATION OF MISCONDUCT IN SUPPORT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGE AGAINST SHRI N. N. MAHADANI. CHARGE I : a) Shri Mahadani revived/set up overdraft limits in following accounts showing FDRs. as securities but such FDRs were non-existent. Name of OD a/c Limit set up Date of Remarks Party revival/ sanction i) Fuel 529 1.50 lacs -- The OD limit of Rs. 3 lacs earlier sanctioned, had been cancelled on 19.2.81 with remarks "Returned to party. Subsequently limit of Rs. 1.50 lacs was revived against non-existent FDRs under signature of Shri Mahadani. ii) S.K. 556 1.50 lacs 30.3.81 The earlier OD limit had been Saraogi cancelled & the FDRs were returned to the party by the BM in February, 81. on 30.3.81 Shri Mahadani revived the limit under his sig nature against nonexistent FDRs. iii) S.S. Mali 556 1.50 lacs 24.2.81 The OD limit of Rs. 1.50 lacs earlier sanctioned had been cancelled on 24.2.81. A note regarding cancellation of limit was made by Shri Mahadani. The limit was again revived against nonexistent FDRs under signature of Shri Mahadani with out putting any date of revival but advance of Rs. 1.50 lacs was made on 22.7.81. iv) K.C. 528 3 lacs -- The limit earlier sanctioned had Enterprise been cancelled on 19.2.81 by B. M. Subsequently the limit was revived against nonexistent FDRs under signature of Shir Mahadani. b) While reviving/setting up limits in accounts as mentioned at 'a' above, no documents were taken from the parties, no entry was made in Documents Register, limit sanction register etc.. b) While reviving/setting up limits in accounts as mentioned at 'a' above, no documents were taken from the parties, no entry was made in Documents Register, limit sanction register etc.. Further, details of the FDRs were not mentioned in the ledger headings which indicate deliberate attempt to keep these transactions concealed. CHARGE II During Shri Mahadani's tenure as Accountant & Second man at BO: Purulia a large scale of unauthorised business was continuing. To quote :–– a) Limits were set up in many accounts to route unauthorised business, pertaining to fake bills & adjusting the DD's out of the overdrafts account so that DD's purchased do not outstand for a period of more than one month. For instance. 12.1.81 By ODD 31869-45 " To DD No. (809, 810, 857) 30118-00 25.2.81 To Amt.to ODD 786, 813, 814, 863, 864 & 42) 78246-50 4.6.81 By ODD 489-492 49477-00 " To ODD 307-310 47401-60 " To Overdue intt. on DDs 307-310 1101-80 20.7.81 By ODD 680 51444-80 " To ODD 362, 670, 372 45397-25 (OD A/C No. 507 Industrial Stores Supply Corpn.) 28.11.80 By Chq. 199300-00 " To ODD 772 200534-00 15.3.81 By DD 171 199300-00 " By ODD 31 reversed 203953-42 (OD 505 Indian Agencies) b) DD's were not realised at the destination in all cases, rather most of them were adjusted by purchasing new DD's for adjustment of old one and the vouchers were passed debit: ODD : Credit: ODD. For instance, Date DD No. Old DD adjusted Amount Date of adjustment 18.6.81 534 383, 384, 386, 399, 37073-54 3.7.81 424, 438, 439 " 536, 537. 445, to 447, 465 100000-00 2.7.81 to 467 " 540 306, 252 17176-50 2.7.81 22.6.81 554 289, 292 44893-15 1.8.81 29.6.81 621 343-346 48644-75 23.9.81 " 622 389, 398, 387, 388 48126-75 " c) Fictitious accounts were opened in order to accommodate the borrowers in an irregular manner to facilitate different group concerns to avail finance. to quote :–– Name of a/c No. Limit 1. Gopal Mohta 639 Rs. 1.5 lacs against security of FDR for Rs. 2 lacs which was not in existence. 2. Hari Tantia 640 Rs. 1.5 lacs against security of an FDR of Rs. 2 lacs, which was not in existence. to quote :–– Name of a/c No. Limit 1. Gopal Mohta 639 Rs. 1.5 lacs against security of FDR for Rs. 2 lacs which was not in existence. 2. Hari Tantia 640 Rs. 1.5 lacs against security of an FDR of Rs. 2 lacs, which was not in existence. CHARGE III The setting up/revival of O/D limits as mentioned in charge earlier under signature of Shri Mahadani were to be reported in monthly statement of limit sanctioned (PNB 207). This was not done by him. CHARGE IV As second man & Accountant it was his duty to ensure that proper books of accounts are maintained at the branch. During Shri Mahadani's stay at the branch, partywise D/D Register, Deviation Register were not being maintained. Entries were not being properly made in the BC-cum-Documents Register for limit sanctioned. DDs to the tune of lacs of Rupees have been purchased in certain accounts without drawing up proper CR's or setting up D/D limits. These things could continue as adequate vigilance & efforts were lacking on the part of Shri Mahadani." 3. The enquiry against Mahadani in respect of the charges levelled against him was conducted by Shri J.K. Bag as Enquiry Officer who was not the disciplinary authority. On 17.5.85 the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry proceedings ex parte on the ground that Mahadani did not participate in the proceedings. The Dy. General Manager, Zonal Office of the Bank being disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held Mahadani guilty of the charges levelled against him. Mahadani was dismissed from the service of the Bank with immediate effect. The relevant part of the order of dismissal dated 20.5.1985 is set out hereunder :–– "Considering the enquiry report and the records of the enquiry proceedings submitted by Shri J.K. Bag, Enquiry Officer who conducted the enquiry proceedings in your case, Dy. General Manager, Zonal Office, Calcutta, the Disciplinary Authority has decided to impose upon you the punishment of dismissal from the Bank's service with immediate effect for the following lapses committed by you while functioning as Accountant BO Purulia, vide order as under :–– "Shri N.N. Mahadani was served with charge sheet dated 9.3.85 for the serious irregularities committed by him while working as Accountant at BO Purulia. Shri Mahadani did not submit his statement of defence despite extension allowed as requested by him vide letter dated 19.3.85. To look into the truth of imputation of lapses as contained in the aforesaid charge-sheet enquiry proceedings were initiated. The Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on 17.05.85. I find that Enquiry Officer has conducted the enquiry proceedings ex-parte as Shri Mahadani did not participate in the proceedings. I have gone through the enquiry report and the records of the enquiry proceedings and find that the Enquiry Officer has come to the conclusion that the following charges mentioned in the above charge sheet have been established against Shri Mahadani :–– –– He set up/revived OD limits in various accounts showing FDRs as securities but such FDRs were non-existent and he did not make entry of such limits into Documents Register, Limit Sanctioned Register. –– He failed to report the large scale unauthorised business being conducted at the branch and thus failed in his duties as second man. –– He did not report the facts of setting up/revival of OD limits in the prescribed periodical returns to the higher authorities. –– He did not have proper control over branch routine and thus failed to discharge his duties sincerely. I agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and hold Shri Mahadani guilty of the above mentioned serious charges. In view of the above, I decide to impose upon Shri Mahadani the punishment of dismissal from Bank's service with immediate effect. I order accordingly." In view of the above, the punishment of dismissal has been imposed upon you with immediate effect. One copy of the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer is enclosed for your perusal and record." 4. Though Mahadani was not supplied with a copy of the enquiry report before he was dismissed from the service of the Bank yet a copy of the enquiry report was furnished to him alongwith the order of dismissal. 5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of dismissal, Mahadani on 9.10.1985 preferred an appeal which was rejected by the General Manager of the Bank, the appellate authority, by his order dated 13.2.1986. The relevant part of the appellate order dated 13.2.1986 is set out hereunder–– "ORDER Shri N.N. Mahadani, Ex-Officer Incharge, P.O. Gopinathpur-Charge Sheet dt.9.3.85-APPEAL. 5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of dismissal, Mahadani on 9.10.1985 preferred an appeal which was rejected by the General Manager of the Bank, the appellate authority, by his order dated 13.2.1986. The relevant part of the appellate order dated 13.2.1986 is set out hereunder–– "ORDER Shri N.N. Mahadani, Ex-Officer Incharge, P.O. Gopinathpur-Charge Sheet dt.9.3.85-APPEAL. The records of the disciplinary case comprising charge sheet dated 9.3.85 served upon Shri N.N. Mahadani for the serious irregularities committed by him while working as Accountant at BO : Purulia, records of enquiry proceedings including reports of the Enquiry Officer and the orders passed by the Zonal Manager, Calcutta as Disciplinary Authority imposing upon him the punishment of dismissal, have been placed before me. On perusal of the records I find that Shri Mahadani did not submit his statement of defence to the said charge sheet and also did not participate in the enquiry proceedings and proceedings were held exparte. I also find that the Disciplinary Authority while agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer held Shri Mahadani guilty of the following charges :–– –– He set up/revived DD limits in various accounts showing FDRs as securities but such FDRs were non-existent and he did not make entry of such limits into Documents Register, Limit Sanctioned Register; –– He failed to report the large scale unauthorised business being conducted at the branch and thus failed in his duties as second man; –– He did not report the facts of setting up/revival of DD limits in the prescribed periodical returns to the higher authorities; –– He did not have proper control over branch routine and thus failed to discharge his duties sincerely. The appeal submitted by Shri Mahadani against the aforesaid punishment has also been placed before me and on perusal I observe that he has mainly raised following grounds:–– –– That no opportunity was given to him to rebut the charges; –– That no notice from Enquiry Officer for appearing before him was received and enquiry was held ex parte; –– That the Enquiry Officer has gone beyond his jurisdiction and based his findings on presumption; –– That no notice of hearing on proposed punishment was served upon him and the punishment was awarded without giving any opportunity. I have considered the points raised by Shri Mahadani in his appeal and going through the records of the disciplinary case/proceedings I observe that Shri Mahadani did not submit his statement of defence within the stipulated period but requested vide his letter dated 8.4.85 for extension for a week for the purpose. Thereafter enquiry proceedings were initiate vide order dated 23.4.85. Thus he had enough opportunity to submit his statement of defence rebutting the charges. The Enquiry Officer also vide his telegram dated 3.5.85 informed Shri Mahadani that the preliminary hearing was fixed for 16.5.85 at his address at BO : Gopinathpur and Bankura. Confirmatory copies of telegrams were received back undelivered with the remarks "Left without address-redirect to sender". In view of this I feel that enough opportunity was given to Shri Mahadani to submit his defence and to participate in the proceedings but he did not avail the opportunity. As he was due for retirement on 31.5.85 there was no alternate with Enquiry Officer but to conduct the proceedings ex parte. I also considered the findings of Enquiry Officer and find that they ar8' based on the documentary evidence produced during the proceedings and as such the plea of Shri Mahadani that Enquiry Officer has gone beyond his jurisdiction is not acceptable. There is also no provision under Discipline & Appeal Regulation for proposing the punishment before imposing the same. In view of the above I do not find any ground to interfere with the decision of the Disciplinary Authority. The appeal submitted by Shri Mahadani is, therefore, rejected and the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is hereby confirmed. Shri Mahadani be informed accordingly." 6. The learned Advocate appearing for Mahadani, calling in question the entire disciplinary proceeding and the order of dismissal argued the following points :–– 1. The order of dismissal was issued without serving notice of enquiry on Shri Mahadani, 2. Delay in framing charges for long six years is violation of principles of natural justice, 3. Delay in framing charges amounts to condonation of the alleged misconduct, 4. No opportunity was afforded to Shri Mahadani by sending enquiry report and list of exhibits before the order of dismissal was passed, 5. No notice of proposed punishment of penalty was served upon Shri Mahadani before passing the order of dismissal, 6. Delay in framing charges amounts to condonation of the alleged misconduct, 4. No opportunity was afforded to Shri Mahadani by sending enquiry report and list of exhibits before the order of dismissal was passed, 5. No notice of proposed punishment of penalty was served upon Shri Mahadani before passing the order of dismissal, 6. List of documents relied upon by the disciplinary authority during enquiry was not served upon Shri Mahadani thereby depriving him of just, fair and reasonable opportunity of defending his case. 7. Forfeiture of gratuity and employer's share of provident fund was illegal. Re : Point Nos. 1 and 6. In paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the writ application mahadani averred that he was not served with any notice by the disciplinary authority regarding hearing of the disciplinary proceeding and the disciplinary authority most illegally proceeded with the enquiry proceedings ex-parte which is against all cannons of the principles of natural justice. Mahadani further averred that the disciplinary authority without sending the notice of hearing of the enquiry proceedings to his permanent residential address at Bankura deliberately sent a telegram to the Bank's branch at Bankura and also Pay Office at Gopinathpur when he was on leave and the said telegram instead of being redirected to his permanent residential address, was returned with the postal remark "left without address redirected to sender". According to Mahadani, such action of the respondents was illegal and mala fide. Mahadani further averred that his permanent address was duly recorded in the Service Book and the disciplinary authority ought to have collected his said address from the service Book and ought to have given him a just, fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing. His grievance is instead of doing so the disciplinary authority most illegally proceeded with the disciplinary proceedings without serving any notice and, therefore, the entire proceeding was vitiated because of illegal action on part of the respondents. 7. In Paragraph 8 of the Bank's affidavit-in-opposition it has been stated, inter alia, as follows :–– "I consider it necessary to state that in the month of May, 1985, the petitioner was not on sanctioned leave on any day. 7. In Paragraph 8 of the Bank's affidavit-in-opposition it has been stated, inter alia, as follows :–– "I consider it necessary to state that in the month of May, 1985, the petitioner was not on sanctioned leave on any day. From January, 1985 till the date of his dismissal from service, the petitioner enjoyed the sanctioned leave as under: Casual Leave 14.01.1985 … … one day 15.01.1985 … … one day 16.01.1985 … … one day Privilege Leave From 19.04.1985 to 23.04.1985 ... ... Five day". 8. In the said Paragraph-8 of the Bank's affidavit-in-opposition it has further been stated, inter alia, as follows :–– "With reference to Paragraph-9 of the said petition, I say that the order dated 23.4.85 of the Disciplinary Authority to hold the departmental enquiry in respect of the said charge sheet was sent to the petitioner under registered post to Gopinathpur Branch (Distt. Bankura) of the Bank where he was then posted and working as Office-Incharge. As Office-Incharge of the said Gopinathpur Branch, it was incumbent upon the petitioner as per bank's rules to obtain prior sanction of the Regional Manager before proceeding on leave or leaving station. He had also added responsibility of suggesting alternative arrangements to the Regional Manager for smooth functioning of the office during his leave period. The petitioner was aware that his retirement was due on 31.5.85 and having come to know that enquiry had been ordered by the disciplinary Authority in respect of the said charge sheet, he with an intention to avoid completion of the enquiry before the date of his retirement absented himself from the said Gopinathpur Branch from 2.5.85 onwards violating the Bank's rules as stated above and also without leaving any address where he could be available during his absence from the branch. Sri Mahadani did not seek prior sanction of the Regional Manager for taking leave from 2nd May, 1985 onwards and leaving station. It is observed from the branch records that Sri Mahadani handed over keys to the Cashier of the branch on 30.4.1985 by an office order in a very unauthorised manner. As per Bank's rules, cash at the branch is kept under joint custody of the Cashier of the branch and the Incumbent Incharge Sri Mahadani was working as Incumbent Incharge and by handing over his own keys to the Cashier, he violated the Bank's rules. As per Bank's rules, cash at the branch is kept under joint custody of the Cashier of the branch and the Incumbent Incharge Sri Mahadani was working as Incumbent Incharge and by handing over his own keys to the Cashier, he violated the Bank's rules. Moreover, he did not specify the reasons for going on leave and period of leave in the said Office order. He also failed to make elaborate arrangement for functioning of the office during his absence." 9. The Enquiry Officer in his enquiry report recorded the reasons for holding the enquiry ex-parte. The relevant part of the enquiry report in this regard is set out hereunder:–– "On receipt of the appointment order of 23.4.85, I issued notice to the Presenting Officer on 24.4.85 under intimation to the delinquent officer Shri Mahadani, to submit necessary papers/documents, list of witnesses etc. Accordingly the Presenting Officer submitted related papers/documents on 2.5.85. I on 3.5.85 sent telegram to Shri N.N. Mahadani, the charge-sheeted Officer, at his both the addresses – (i) PN Bank, Gopirampur and (ii) PN Bank, Bankura, fixing the date of enquiry on 16th May, 1985 at 10 A.M. at PN Bank premises, Purulia. In the telegram Shri Mahadani was requested to present before the enquiry proceedings. It was further indicated in the telegram that if he (Shri Mahadani) fails to attend, the enquiry will be decided ex-parte. The telegramphic communication of 3.5.85 was further confirmed vide Regd. with A/D confirmatory letter. The letters were sent by post vide Regn. No. B-1221 and B-1222 dated 6.5.85. On the appointed date and time the delinquent Officer employee did not turn up (even upto 6 PM) not he deputed any assisting officer. He failed to communicate any message also. By sending telegram, registered letter (in confirmation of the telegram) well before the enquiry date, I am of the opinion that reasonable communications were made with due care. I have thus reasons to believe that Shri Mahadani avoided to face the enquiry. My opinion is further strengthened from the fact that he did not reply to the charge sheet dated 9.3.85 served on him, although he acknowledged the same on 19.3.85. He did not submit his reply even within 13.4.85 upto which time he sought for extension. I have thus reasons to believe that Shri Mahadani avoided to face the enquiry. My opinion is further strengthened from the fact that he did not reply to the charge sheet dated 9.3.85 served on him, although he acknowledged the same on 19.3.85. He did not submit his reply even within 13.4.85 upto which time he sought for extension. In such an eventuality, I, therefore, decided to hold the enquiry ex-parte, as, in my opinion, sufficient opportunity be given to the employee to present himself". 10. Mahadani in paragraph-8 of his a affidavit-in-reply stated, inlet alia, as follows:–– "It is significant to note that the respondents admitted that the enquiry officer sent telegram to the petitioner only at the branch office and not at the permanent residential address which are available in the service record lying on the branch office and also at the Regional Office and the enquiry officer also did not send the notice at Patna Address which was available in my leave application lying at the Regional Office. I say that the respondents did not comply with the Article 20 of the Punjab National Bank Officers' Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations 1977. The said Article is as follows: "Article 20. Leave order, notice and other process made or issued under these regulations shall be served in person on the officer, employee concerned or communicated to him by registered post at his last known address". I say that my residential address is duly recorded in the office of respondents but the respondents did not deliberately sent the said purported telegram and/or notice to my residential address which is the last known address to the respondents according to my service records. I say the enquiry officer behind my back hold the said purported disciplinary proceedings against me and decided ex-parte without giving me sufficient opportunity to defend my case. The said disciplinary proceedings is completely bad in law and the decision on the basis of the said ex-parte disciplinary proceedings is not binding on me. I further say that as per the regulations of leave as per prevailing practice in the village branches with regard to the application for leave. I have applied to the appropriate authority for sanction of leave from 2nd May, 1985 to 22nd May, 1985 and I am entitled to such leave under the regulations of leave. I further say that as per the regulations of leave as per prevailing practice in the village branches with regard to the application for leave. I have applied to the appropriate authority for sanction of leave from 2nd May, 1985 to 22nd May, 1985 and I am entitled to such leave under the regulations of leave. It is significant to note that the respondents earlier did not raise any allegations about the leave of petitioner and in fact the respondents, have paid the salary to the petitioner during the said period of leave and the respondent with an ulterior motive raised the said allegation after filing the writ application in order to mislead the Hon'ble Court and the said application has no substance at all. It is completely false to allege that notices had been sent by the enquiry officer should be deemed to be proper and good service upon the petitioner and it is also untrue to allege that under the Punjab National Bank Officers' Service Regulation 1979, the notice is required to be sent to the last known addresses of the delinquent, which was in the present case, duly sent to the petitioner that two known addresses as mentioned in the said enquiry report". 11. The learned Advocate for Mahadani argued that one of the principles of natural justice is that a party must have due notice when the Tribunal (in this case the disciplinary authority) will proceed. In support of his argument the learned Advocate referred to and relied upon a decision reported in (1) AIR 2000 SC 2198 (Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary. Syndicate Bank's Staff Association), wherein Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of the Reported decision observed as follows :–– "It is no point laying stress on the principles of natural Justice without understanding their scope or real meaning. There are two essential elements of natural Justice which are : (a) no man shall be Judge in his own cause; and (b) no man shall be condemned, either civilly or criminally without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge made against him. There are two essential elements of natural Justice which are : (a) no man shall be Judge in his own cause; and (b) no man shall be condemned, either civilly or criminally without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge made against him. In course of time by various judicial pronouncements these two principles of natural Justice have been expanded, e.g., a party must have due notice when the Tribunal will proceed; Tribunal should not act on irrelevant evidence or shut out relevant evidence; if the Tribunal consists of several members they all must sit together at all times; Tribunal should act independently and should not be biased against any party; its action should be based on good faith and order and should act in just, fair and reasonable manner. These in fact are the extensions or refinements of the main principles of natural justice stated above." 12. The learned Advocate for Mahadani also referred to and relied upon another Supreme Court decision in (2) Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel reported, at (1985) 3 SCC 398 . The learned Advocate relying upon paragraph-84 of the Reported decision argued that the principle qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita altera, acquum licot dixerit, haud acquum fecerit, i.e., "he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have done what is right" or, in other words, as it is now expressed, "justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done" shall apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. 13. The learned Advocate for Mahadani relying upon paragraph 96 of the Reported decision in Tulsiram Patel case (supra) rightly argued that the audi alteram partem rule, in its fullest amplitude means that a person against whom an order to his prejudice may be passed should (i) be informed of the allegations and charges against him, (ii) be given an opportunity of submitting his explanation thereto, (iii) have the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided against him, (iv) be allowed to inspect the documents which are relied upon for the purpose of being used against him, (v) be allowed to have the witnesses who are to give evidence against him, examined in his presence, (vi) have the right to cross-examine the witnesses examined and (vii) be allowed to lead his own evidence, both oral and documentary, in his defence. The learned Advocate of Mahadani rightly stated that the process of a fair hearing need not, however, conform to the judicial process in a Court of law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a quasi-judicial or administrative inquiry. 14. A three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in (3) Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1914 , in paragraph 4 of the reported decision laid down the requirements relating to holding of proper enquiry. The relevant lines read as follows: "An enquiry cannot be said to have been properly held unless, (i) the employee proceeded against has been informed clearly of the charges levelled against him, (ii) the witnesses are examined-ordinarily in the presence of the employee-in respect of the charges, (iii) the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any relevant matter, and (v) the enquiry officer records his findings with reasons for the same in his report". 15. What is the law relating to principles of natural Justice? In short, the law relating to principles of natural justice is discussed herein after. 15. What is the law relating to principles of natural Justice? In short, the law relating to principles of natural justice is discussed herein after. As far back as in 1949, in (4) Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 ALL ER 109 it was held that principles of natural justice cannot be put in a strait-jacket. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not ....... the law of the land but supplement it. It was observed by Supreme Court in (5) Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198 , that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Supreme Court in (6) A.K. Kripak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 (156-57), held that what particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts, and circumstances of that case, the frame work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened, the Court has to decide whether observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. Supreme Court in (7) Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40 (42), held that it is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislature and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of the power. Megarry, J. in (8) Hounshow London Borough Council v. Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd. (1971 Ch 233) recorded a warning that the principles of natural justice must be confined within their proper limits and not allowed to run wild. 16. Ormond, L. J., in (9) Norwest Hlst Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Trade, (1978) 1 Ch 201 (at 207) said––"The House of Lords and this Court have repeatedly emphasised that the ordinary principles of natural justice must be kept flexible and must be adapted to the circumstances prevailing in a particular case". House of Lords in (10) Bushell v. Secy. of State for Environment, (1980)2 ALL ER 608 held that the absence of statutory rules as to the conduct of local enquiry of local enquiry under the Highways Act, 1959, the procedure to be followed was a matter of discretion for the Secretary of the State and Inspector - the only requirement being that the procedure followed should be fair to all concern including the general public. Our Supreme Court in (11) A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982)1 SCC 271 , held that the objective of the principles is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal to the person whose rights are going to be affected. In (12) Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984)3 ALL ER 935, House of Lords treated principles of natural justice and a fair hearing as synonymous. 17. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. In paragraph-14 of the reported decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel; (supra) a few instances had been stated. 17. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. In paragraph-14 of the reported decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel; (supra) a few instances had been stated. It is not necessary to refer to all those definitions except those of : (a) Lord Esher M.R. who in (13) Vionet v. Barret, (1885)55 LJRB 39(41), defined natural justice as "the natural sense of what is right and wrong" but thereafter in (14) Hopkins v. Smethwick Local Board on Healthy, (1890)24 QBD 712 (716), instead of using the definition given in Vionet v. Barret (supra) chose to define natural justice as "fundamental Justice" and (b) Harman, L.J., in the Court of appeal, in (15) Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963)1 QB 539 (538) equated natural justice with "fair play in action", a phrase favoured by Bhagwati, J. in (16) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 (625-26). 18. Our Supreme Court in (17) Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 (197), held that procedure which is unjust or unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness thereby vitiating the law which prescribes that procedure and consequently the action taken under it. There is no static measure of unreasonableness which can be applied to all situations alike. The question "Is this procedure reasonable?" implies and postulates the enquiry as to whether the procedure prescribed is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. The word 'reasonable' means "fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances. Fit and appropriate to the end in view. Having the faculty of reasons; rational, governed by reasons; under the influence of reasons; agreeable to reasons. Thinking, speaking, or acting according to the dictates of reasons. Not immoderate or excessive being synonymous with rational, honest, equitable, fair, suitable, moderate, tolerable. Cass v. State 124 Tex. Cr.R. 208, 61 S.W.2d 500". (Blacks' Law Dictionary; Centennial Edition). 19. In (18) R v. Beare, (1988)2 SCR 387 (SC) (Can), the Supreme Court of Canada while interpreting the words "Principles of fundamental justice" in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 said that it "guarantees fair procedure but does not guarantee the most favourable procedure that can possibly be imagined". (emphasis added) 20. 19. In (18) R v. Beare, (1988)2 SCR 387 (SC) (Can), the Supreme Court of Canada while interpreting the words "Principles of fundamental justice" in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 said that it "guarantees fair procedure but does not guarantee the most favourable procedure that can possibly be imagined". (emphasis added) 20. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (supra), in paragraph 104 of the reported decision it was held that the concept of natural justice is a magnificent thorough-bred on which this nation gallops forward its proclaimed and, let us pray, its destined goal as "justice, social economic and political". This thorough-bred must not be allowed to turn into a wild and unruly horse, careering off where it lists, unsaddling its rider, and bursting into fields where the sign "no parsaran" would put up. 21. In Administrative Law, Rules of natural justice are foundational and fundamental and law is now well settled that the principles of natural justice are part of the legal and judicial procedures. Prof. Wade in his Administrative Law (1988) at page-503 has very aptly observed that the principles of natural justice are applicable to almost the whole range of administrative powers. (See (19) R.L. Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-odn.) H.S. School, 1993 AIR SCW 2400 at 2406, 2407, para-9). 22. Ordinarily, in a disciplinary proceeding there is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. (See (20) Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991)1 SCC 588 , (595), para- 13). 23. The learned Advocate for Mahadani argued that in the instant case by not giving any opportunity of hearing to Mahadani the disciplinary authority violated all cannons of principles of natural justice. The learned Advocate argued that the Bank is an authority within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, when the Bank acts in violation of the principles of natural justice it acts arbitrarily in violation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and its action becomes null and void making the same liable to be set aside and quashed. 24. 24. No doubt the Bank being a nationalized bank is an authority and thereby a State within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution. The definition of State in Article-12 is limited in its application only to Part-III and by virtue of Article-36 to Part-IV; it does not extend to any other provisions of the. Constitution (See (21) A.I.S.S.E. Assocn. v. Defence Minister-cum-Chairman, AIR 1989 SC 88 , para-8). 25. It is well settled that violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14 : therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is violation of Article-14. Article-14 guarantees that any law or State action violating the article will be struck down. (See Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel; AIR 1985 SC 1416 , para-95). 26. In (22) A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Rayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531 the majority view expressed in paragraph-57 of the reported decision, inter alia, was as follows : "No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity." 27. The learned Advocate for Mahadani rightly argued that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. No doubt appearance of injustice in denial of justice. It is the dialogue with the person likely to be affected by the proposed action which meets the requirement that justice must also be seen to be done. The right to be heard has two facets, intrinsic and instrumental. The intrinsic value of that right consists in the opportunity which it gives to individuals or groups, against whom decisions taken by public authorities operate, to participate in the process by which those decisions are made, an opportunity that expresses their dignity as persons. The instrumental facet of the right of hearing consists in the means which it affords of assuring that the public rules of conduct, which result in benefits and prejudices alike are in fact accurately and consistently followed. (See Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 , para 47). 28. The instrumental facet of the right of hearing consists in the means which it affords of assuring that the public rules of conduct, which result in benefits and prejudices alike are in fact accurately and consistently followed. (See Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 , para 47). 28. The question whether the failure to observe the principles of natural justice matters at all, if such observance would have made no difference was considered by Supreme Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan ( AIR 1981 SC 136 ) wherein Chinappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court said: "The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary". A Bench of five Judge of Supreme Court in Olga Tellis (supra) held that the observations made in S.L. Kapoor (supra) sum up the true legal position regarding the purport and implications of the right of hearing. Paragraph-48 of the reported decision in Olga Tellis (supra) is set out hereunder: "Any discussion of this topic would be incomplete without reference to an important decision of this Court in (23) S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1981)1 SCR 746 , 766 : ( AIR 1981 SC 136 at p.147). In that case, the Supersession of the New Delhi Municipal Committee was challenged on the ground that it was in violation of the principles of natural justice since, no show cause notice was issued before the order of supersession was passed. Linked with that question was the question whether the failure to observe the principles of natural justice matters at all, if such observance would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. After referring to the decisions in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 at p.68 : (24) John v. Rees, (1970)1 Ch 345 at p.402, (25) Annamunthodo v. Oilfield Workers' Trade Union, (1961)3 ALL ER 621 at p.625(HL); (26) Margarita Fuentes Otal v. Robert L. Shevin, (1972)32 Law ED 2d 556 at p. 574; (27) Chintepalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Secy. (Food & Agriculture) Govt. Society Ltd. v. Secy. (Food & Agriculture) Govt. of A.P., (1978)1 SCR 563 at 567, 569-70: ( AIR 1977 SC 2313 at pp.2316 and 2318 and to an interesting discussion of the subject in Jackson's Natural Justice (1980 Edn.), the Court, speaking through one of us, Chinnappa Reddy, J. said: "In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference it natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced". These observations sum up the true legal position regarding the purport and implications of the right hearing." (emphasis added) 29. S. L. Kapoor (supra) was also considered by a two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in (28) State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma; (1996)3 SCC 364 . In Paragraph-21 of the reported decision in State Bank of Patiala (supra) it was observed, inter alia, as follows: "Pausing here, we may notice two decisions of this Court where test of prejudice was rejected, viz., Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Secy, (Food and Agriculture) Govt. of A.P. and S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan both rendered by three-Judge Benches". 30. In paragraph-22 of the reported decision in State Bank of Patiala (supra) S.L. Kapoor (supra) was considered. Said paragraph-22 is set out hereunder: "Similarly S.L. Kapoor case was one where a Municipal Committee was superseded even without a notice to the Committee, again a case like Ridge v. Baldwin. After referring to certain English and Indian decision, Chinnappa Reddy, J. made the following observations: (SCC p.395, para 24) : "In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal." The observations made in S.L. Kapoor have to be understood in the context of the facts of that case - and, of course, subject to the dicta of the Constitution Bench referred to hereinafter." 31. Unfortunately in State Bank of Patiala (supra), the attention of the Court was not drawn to the above quoted paragraph-48 of the reported decision in Olga Tellis (supra), which was rendered by a five-Judge Bench of Supreme Court. 32. "dicta of the Constitution Bench" referred to in paragraph-22 of State Bank of Patiala (supra) is the dicta of the Constitution Bench in (29) Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993)4 SCC 727 . 33. In paragraph-33 of the reported decision in State Bank of Patiala (supra) the Court summarised the principles laid down by the Court in that case. Said paragraph-33 is set out hereunder: We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee) : (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under – "no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. 4(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action - the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e. between "no notice/ "no hearing" and "no fair hearing". In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e. between "no notice/ "no hearing" and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem) (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No.5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.) (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision." (emphasis added) 34. So far principle summarised in serial (3) of paragraph-33 of the reported decision in State Bank of Patiala (supra) is concerned it will be important to take into consideration the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in (30) Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959) 359 US 535: 3 L Ed 2d 1012, which was related to the service of a person. So far principle summarised in serial (3) of paragraph-33 of the reported decision in State Bank of Patiala (supra) is concerned it will be important to take into consideration the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in (30) Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959) 359 US 535: 3 L Ed 2d 1012, which was related to the service of a person. In (31) Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 at 1635 Supreme Court held as follows: "It is well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959) 359 US 535: 3 L Ed 2d 1012 where the learned Judge said: "An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword". (emphasis added) 35. In (32) B. S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, AIR 1984 SC 363 at para-22 Supreme Court held, inter alia, as follows: "The aforesaid principle laid down by Mr. justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959) 3 Law Ed 2d 1012 has been accepted as applicable in India by this Court in (33) A.S. Ahluwalia v. Punjab State, (1975)3 SCR 82 : ( AIR 1975 SC 984 ) and in subsequent decision given in (34) Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, (1975)3 SCR 619 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ). Mathew, J. quoted the above-referred observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval." 36. The principle laid down by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the principles summarised in serial (3) of paragraph-33 of the reported decision in State Bank of Patiala (supra) in some areas are not compatible with each other and cannot operate concurrently. Mathew, J. quoted the above-referred observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval." 36. The principle laid down by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the principles summarised in serial (3) of paragraph-33 of the reported decision in State Bank of Patiala (supra) in some areas are not compatible with each other and cannot operate concurrently. According to the principles summarised in serial-(3) of paragraph-33 of State Bank of Patiala (supra) procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent employee; those procedures are conceived in the interest of the delinquent: violation of any or every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. In my view this concept is not compatible with the abovementioned rule of administrative law laid down by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and made applicable in India by our Supreme Court. 37. Keeping in mind the principles laid down (1) by five-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Olga Tellis case (supra), (2) majority view of seven-Judge Bench in A.R. Antulay (supra), (3) five-Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (supra) and (4) aforesaid rule of administrative law laid down by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton (supra) which has been approved and made applicable in India by Supreme Court, as discussed hereinabove, I am of the opinion that in the matter of any action by a State within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution if a Court comes to a conclusion that there is a violation of the principles of natural justice then there is no alternative but to hold that such action is arbitrary and violates Article-14 of the Constitution and therefore, a nullity. If however, the Court finds that no prejudice has been suffered by the person concerned then following the ratio decidendi in State Bank of Patiala (supra) the Court should record that there is no violation of principles of natural justice. But after recording that there is a violation of the principles of natural justice in the matter of an action of the State within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution the Court cannot say such action of the State has not violated Article-14 of the Constitution because such violation has not caused any prejudice to the person concerned. But after recording that there is a violation of the principles of natural justice in the matter of an action of the State within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution the Court cannot say such action of the State has not violated Article-14 of the Constitution because such violation has not caused any prejudice to the person concerned. To make the matter clear, when the question to be decided is whether there is any violation of principles of natural justice or not in respect of an action of a State within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution, then, as soon as the Court records the conclusion that there is violation of principles of natural justice then and then there is a violation of Article-14 of the Constitution and no further prejudice is required to be shown or proved. But if the Court following the ratio decidendi in State Bank of Patiala (supra) comes to a conclusion that no prejudice has been suffered then Court must record the conclusion that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. 38. In support of the argument that violation of principles of natural justice is immaterial unless the person concerned suffers prejudice, often reference is made to five-Judge Bench decision of Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993)4 SCC 727 . In my view for the proper appreciation of the ratio/decidendi of the above case it is necessary to have a look at the issues involved in the case and the reasons for referring the matter to a five-Judge Bench. Because of a conflict in the two decisions of Supreme Court one in (35) Kailash Chander Asthana v. State of U.P., (1988)3 SCC 600 and the other in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan; (1991)1 SCC 588 , both delivered by the Benches of three learned Judges, the case between Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (supra) was referred to a Bench of five-Judge of Supreme Court. Ramzan Khan; (1991)1 SCC 588 , both delivered by the Benches of three learned Judges, the case between Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (supra) was referred to a Bench of five-Judge of Supreme Court. The questions involved in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (supra) have been record in paragraph-2 of the reported decision which is set out hereunder: "The basic question of law which arises in these matters is whether the report of the enquiry officer/authority who/which is appointed by the disciplinary authority to hold in inquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee, is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment, if any, to be awarded to him. This question in turn gives rise to the following incidental questions: (i) Whether the report should be furnished to the employee even when the statutory rules laying down the procedure for holding the disciplinary inquiry are silent on the subject or are against it? (ii) Whether the report of the enquiry officer is required to be furnished to the delinquent employee even when the punishment imposed is other than the major punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank? (iii) Whether the obligation of furnish the report is only when the employee asks for the same or whether it exists even otherwise? (iv) Whether the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case will apply to all establishments – Government and non-Government, public and private sector undertakings? (v) What is the effect of the non-furnishing of the report on the order of punishment and what relief should be granted to the employee in such case? (vi) From what date the law requiring furnishing of the report should come into operation? (vii) Since the decision in Mohd. (v) What is the effect of the non-furnishing of the report on the order of punishment and what relief should be granted to the employee in such case? (vi) From what date the law requiring furnishing of the report should come into operation? (vii) Since the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case has made the law laid down there prospective in operation, i.e., applicable to the orders or punishment passed after November 20, 1990 on which day the said decision was delivered, this question in turn also raises another question, viz., what was the law prevailing prior to November, 20, 1990?" The decision in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (supra) was rendered in respect of the questions involved in that matter as recorded in paragraph-2 of the reported decision and the decision rendered should be understood in the context of those questions, only. It is now well settled that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. In (36) Qainn v. Leathem, (1901 AC 495) Earl of Halsbury LC laid down the following principle: "Now before discussing the case of (37) Allen v. Flood, (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all". The above principle laid down in Qainn v. Leathem (supra) has been approved and made applicable in India by Supreme Court. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all". The above principle laid down in Qainn v. Leathem (supra) has been approved and made applicable in India by Supreme Court. There are so many decisions on this point, suffice it to refer to (38) State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhat Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647 at 651. It is well settled that it is the rule deducible, from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts. (See-(39) Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar; AIR 1976 SC 1766 , para-7). In my opinion law laid down by Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (supra) is a very special law and applicable only in respect of furnishing or non-furnishing of enquiry report in a case of imposition of punishment. Doctrine of prejudice which was made applicable in a case of furnishing or non-furnishing of enquiry report cannot be made applicable, in my opinion, to each and every other action of State within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution. Unlike England, we have a written Constitution which contains Part-III; the fundamental rights. In India any action of the State within the meaning of Article-12 which violates principles of natural justice is arbitrary and violates Article-14 of the Constitution. In support of this view relevant lines from paragraph-95 of the reported decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (supra) are set out hereunder. "The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article-14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject-matter of that Article. "The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article-14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject-matter of that Article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus : violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14 : therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article-14". The principles emerged from the discussion made hereinabove is summarised as follows:–– (a) When any action of the State within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution violates the principles of natural justice then such violation also amounts to violation of Article-14 of the Constitution Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (supra). (b) No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the fundamental right; violation of fundamental right itself renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity (A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (supra). (c) The observations made by Chinnappa Reddy, J. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan (supra) to the effect that non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary, sum up the true legal position regarding purport and implications of the right of hearing Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation; (supra). (d) Defined procedures even though generous and conceived in the interest of the employee of a State within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution must be scrupulously observed. An act of a State within the meaning of Article-12 in violation of such defined procedures is illegal and is liable to be set aside and quashed. (Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India; AIR 1979 SC 1628 at 1635 reiterated in B. S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute; (supra). 39. In the instant writ proceeding admittedly the charge-sheet dated 9.3.85 containing the charges was served upon Mahadani. Therefore, Mahadani was informed clearly of the charges levelled against him. Mahadani had the opportunity to deny the allegations levelled against him by showing cause to the charge-sheet. 39. In the instant writ proceeding admittedly the charge-sheet dated 9.3.85 containing the charges was served upon Mahadani. Therefore, Mahadani was informed clearly of the charges levelled against him. Mahadani had the opportunity to deny the allegations levelled against him by showing cause to the charge-sheet. After receiving the charge-sheet, Mahadani prayed for some time to reply acknowledging on 19.3.85 the receipt of the charge-sheet. Competent authority on the prayer of Mahadani extended the time to show cause upto 13.4.1985. But Mahadani did neither deny the allegations levelled against him nor showed cause even before the date of the order of dismissal. Therefore, first requirement of proper enquiry was complied with. 40. On 17.6.2002 in course of hearing of this writ proceeding the file containing the enquiry proceeding against Mahadani was produced before the Court by the learned Advocate for the Bank. I personally had gone through the office file EJO/DAC/SS produced before me by the learned Advocate for the Bank and I found that registered envelope bearing No. B-1222 addressed to Mahadani, C/o. Punjab National Bank, Gopinathpur, District Bankura is available in the said office file and on the said registered envelope the postal authority recorded on 17.5.85 "left without address" and the registered envelope was redirected to the sender i.e. Punjab National Bank, Burrabazar Branch. In the said office file I also found another registered letter bearing No. B-1221 addressed to Mahadani, Officer-Incharge, Punjab National Bank, Gopinathpur, Bankura. This letter was also redirected to the sender with the comment "left without address". On 17.6.2002 in course of hearing the learned Advocate for the Bank also produced a xerox copy of the personal file of Mahadani which contained the xerox copy of the leave application of Mahadani wherein Mahadani prayed for leave from 2.5.85 to 8.5.85. On 18.6.2002 when the matter was again taken up for hearing I once again had gone through the office file EJO/DAC/SS produced by the learned Advocate for the Bank and it appeared that in respect of registered envelope with A/D bearing No. B-1222 the postal authority tried to serve the said registered envelope on Mahadani on 10.5.85, 11.5.85, 13.5.85, 14.5.85 and 16.5.85 but Mahadani was not available. I further found in respect of the registered envelope bearing No. B-1221 that the same was tried to be served on Mahadani on 9.5.85 10.5.85, 11.5.85, 13.5.85, 14.5.85 and 15.5.85 but could not be served as Mahadani was not available. Mahadani in his writ application admitted that disciplinary authority sent the notice of hearing of the enquiry proceedings at Bank's Branch at Bankura and also pay Office at Gopinathpur when he was on leave. The case of Bank was that in the month of May, 1985 Mahadani was not on sanctioned leave on any day. As recorded earlier, I found from the xerox copy of the application for leave of Mahadani that he prayed for leave from 2.5.85 to 8.5.85. Assuming that Mahadani was on leave as prayed for by him in the month of May, 1985 then also it was from 2.5.85 to 8.5.85 and not beyond that. But, as recorded earlier, the registered envelopes were sent to him at Bank's Branch at Bankura and also Pay Office of the Bank at Gopinathpur which were sought to be served upon Mahadani on various dates after 8.5.85. Mahadani was supposed to remain present at his office, during the office hours, when he was not on leave. Admittedly Mahadani did not pray for any leave beyond 8th May, 1985, Scheduled date of retirement of Mahadani was 31.5.85. The registered envelopes sent to Mahadani informing him the date of hearing of disciplinary proceedings could not be served upon Mahadani due to his unauthorised absence. It is not a case where no attempt was made to serve notices of hearing regarding disciplinary proceedings upon Mahadani. In the instant case all possible steps were taken for service of notices upon Mahadani but could not be served because he was not available for his unauthorised absence. It is apparent that Mahadani wanted to remain unauthorised absent to avoid service of notice upon him because he was scheduled to retire on 31.5.85. Now Mahadani cannot turn round and say that the disciplinary proceeding had been vitiated due to non-service of notice upon him. Principle nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem means: no one maintains an action arising out of his own wrong applies. A man cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. He should not be permitted to plead in his interest a self-created necessity. Principle nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem means: no one maintains an action arising out of his own wrong applies. A man cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. He should not be permitted to plead in his interest a self-created necessity. Under the circumstances I am of the view that though proper and lawful attempts were made for service of notice regarding disciplinary proceeding upon Mahadani but the same could not be served due to his own wrongful action. Mahadani by his own action chose not to take part in the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him. Mahadani relied upon Article-20 of the Punjab National Bank Officers' Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1977. The said Article-20 has been quoted in the earlier part of this judgment. Said article requires that leave order, notice and other process made or issued under the aforesaid Regulations of 1977 shall be served in person on the officer, employee concerned or communicated to him by registered post at his last known address. I have already discussed hereinabove that two registered notices were sent to him at the address of Bank Branch at Bankura and at the address of Bank's Pay Office at Gopinathpur but the said registered notices could not be served upon Mahadani as he was not available. As on those days when the registered notices were tried to be served upon him, Mahadani was not on leave the office address where the registered notices were sent should be considered as the last known address. 41. One of the points though not seriously pressed by the learned Advocate for Mahadani was list of documents relied upon by the disciplinary authority during enquiry was not served upon Mahadani thereby depriving him just, fair and reasonable opportunity of defending his case. As discussed earlier Mahadani had enough opportunity to reply to the charge-sheet. Mahadani had enough opportunity to remain present in course of the disciplinary proceeding. Mahadani had enough opportunity to call for the documents for inspection on which the disciplinary authority relied upon. Mahadani even could have asked, before the enquiry started, the disclosure of the documents which were relied upon by the disciplinary authority in course of the disciplinary proceeding. Mahadani simply did not take any such action and by remaining silent he wanted to gain time so that he could retire from the service on 31.5.85. Mahadani even could have asked, before the enquiry started, the disclosure of the documents which were relied upon by the disciplinary authority in course of the disciplinary proceeding. Mahadani simply did not take any such action and by remaining silent he wanted to gain time so that he could retire from the service on 31.5.85. Therefore, this point No.6 also fails. 42. Under the circumstances I am of the opinion that the enquiry held against Mahadani was a fair and proper enquiry:–– Re: Point Nos. 2 and 3. It was argued by the learned Advocate for Mahadani that the charges levelled against Mahadani were stale charges. According to Mahadani alleged misconduct alleged to have been committed by him occurred during July, 1979 to October, 1981 when he was working as Accountant at Branch Office at Purulia, the charge-sheet was dated 9.3.1985. Therefore, apparently there was a gap of six years in maximum. The learned Advocate for Mahadani had drawn the attention of the Court to paragraphs 27 and 28 of the writ application wherein it had been stated that the disciplinary proceeding was started after the expiry of four to six years from the date of the alleged transaction furnished in the charge-sheet and there was inordinate delay giving rise transmission of waiver or condonation on part of the management. The learned Advocate for Mahadani referred to and relied upon (1) a decision of Single Bench of this High Court in (40) Samarendra Narayan Ghose v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at 1984(1) CLJ 56 wherein it was held that admitted and unexplained delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings constitutes violation of principles of natural justice, (41) L. W. Middleton v. H. Playfair, AIR 1925 Calcutta 87 wherein a Division Bench of this High Court held that master keeping servant in service after discovering him to be guilty of misconduct justifying dismissal cannot afterwards dismiss him on that ground. It was held that if a master on discovering that his servant has been guilty of misconduct which would justify a dismissal yet elects to continue him in his service he cannot at any subsequent time dismiss him on account of that which the master has waived or condoned and (42) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bam Singh, AIR 1990 SC 1308 wherein Supreme Court held that when there is no satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay in issuing the charge-memo then it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with. In the present writ proceeding the respondents in paragraph 21 of affidavit-in-opposition stated that the illegal transaction on part of Mahadani was not previously known to the authorities of the Bank and those transactions were detected at a later stage while dealing with the disciplinary case against the Branch Manager Shri A.B. Das. It was further stated in paragraph 21 of the said affidavit-in-opposition that as soon as the illegal actions of Mahadani were made known to the authorities of the Bank, the charge-sheet in question was issued against the petitioner. It was further stated that there was no legal bar to initiate the disciplinary proceeding against Mahadani which was before two months from the date of his retirement from service. It was stated in said paragragh 21 of the affidavit-in-opposition that immediately after detection the petitioner was called upon to submit his remarks on the irregularities detected during the investigation which were mentioned in the charge-sheet by registered letter dated 16.7.1982 addressed to Mahadani by the Regional Manager, Calcutta while Mahadani was posted as Office-Incharge at Moinpur Branch. Despite repeated reminders Mahadani failed to submit his remarks. Thus it is clear that as soon as the irregularities and involvement of Mahadani were detected, prompt action was taken asking Mahadani to submit his remarks and thereafter a charge-sheet was issued. Under these circumstances I am of the view that there is no inordinate delay amounting to either violation of principles of natural justice or waiver or condonation of misconduct. In the facts and circumstances of the present case I am of the view that the charges levelled against Mahadani cannot be said to be stale charges. Under these circumstances I am of the view that there is no inordinate delay amounting to either violation of principles of natural justice or waiver or condonation of misconduct. In the facts and circumstances of the present case I am of the view that the charges levelled against Mahadani cannot be said to be stale charges. I am further of the opinion that in view of the principles laid down in Quinn v. Leathem (supra), and Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar (supra), decisions reported in 1984(1) CLJ 56 , AIR 1925 Calcutta 87 and AIR 1990 SC 1308 cannot be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case because those involved in the reported decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned Advocate for Mahadani while pressing his points Nos. 2 and 3 were absolutely different. Under the circumstances points Nos. 2 and 3 also fail. Re: Point No.4. Admittedly the enquiry report was not furnished to Mahadani before he was dismissed from the service. Enquiry report was furnished to Mahadani along with the order of dismissal. Mahadani in his writ application had annexed the enquiry report. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case paragraph-31 of the reported decision in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (supra) is very relevant which is set out hereunder: "Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The Courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The Courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunal which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law." In course of argument the learned Advocate for Mahadani pointed out two alleged prejudices suffered by Mahadani namely, (1) no finding that the notice of hearing was served upon Mahadani or there was refusal by Mahadani and (2) enquiry report was based on surmise and conjecture and not on legal evidence. That will also be the correct position in law." In course of argument the learned Advocate for Mahadani pointed out two alleged prejudices suffered by Mahadani namely, (1) no finding that the notice of hearing was served upon Mahadani or there was refusal by Mahadani and (2) enquiry report was based on surmise and conjecture and not on legal evidence. Regarding the first aspect raised by the learned Advocate for Mahadani suffice it to say that the enquiry officer recorded the reasons why the enquiry was held ex parte and I while dealing with points 1 and 6 argued by the learned Advocate for Mahadani in detail dealt with this point and it is not necessary to repeat those. Regarding the second aspect the learned Advocate for Mahadani pointed out that in the enquiry report it had been stated "the P.O. proved". The learned Advocate for Mahadani argued how P.O. meaning thereby the Presenting Officer can prove. I am of the view that the learned. Advocate for Mahadani failed to appreciate the matter in its proper perspective. In a criminal case it is often stated prosecution proves the case but in fact the facts are proved by the witnesses. Here also by the words "the P.O. proved" the enquiry officer mean that the Presenting Officer by producing the evidence and examining the witnesses proved. This is a case where allegations against Mahadani were proved by documentary evidence and in course of the disciplinary proceeding only two witnesses were examined to proved the documents. The disciplinary proceeding was entirely based on documents. Therefore, I find no wrong in recording by the enquiry officer that "the P.O. proved" that the first cheque for Rs.1 lakh (one lakh) was passed by Mahadani and Shri B. Banerjee as Accountant and Manager respectively. The learned Advocate for Mahadani also argued that the words "a thorough search" used by the enquiry officer are absolutely vague, there is nothing in the inquiry report to show that who made the search. As I said the disciplinary proceeding against Mahadani was based entirely upon documentary evidences. The words "a thorough search" it means a thorough search of documents. The learned Advocate for Mahadani also argued that the words "got identified" used by the enquiry officer are also vague. It was argued that there is no disclosure about who identified the signature of Mahadani. The words "a thorough search" it means a thorough search of documents. The learned Advocate for Mahadani also argued that the words "got identified" used by the enquiry officer are also vague. It was argued that there is no disclosure about who identified the signature of Mahadani. As I said earlier that only two witnesses were examined and the signature of Mahadani in the ledger sheet was identified by the witnesses. Under the circumstances I am of the view that the alleged prejudices suffered by Mahadani as argued by his learned Advocate are not at all tenable. Mahadani, against the order of dismissal, preferred an appeal. There also Mahadani did not say that due to non-furnishing of the enquiry report before the order of dismissal he was prejudiced. The relevant part of his appeal before the appellate authority is set out hereunder: "I beg to prefer this appeal against the order of dismissal passed against me on 20.5.85 on purported charge sheet dated 9.3.85, on the following amongst other grounds:–– 1. The order of dismissal is bad-in-law and contrary to natural justice. 2. Although the charge sheet was issued on 9.3.85 order four heads for alleged misconduct with a statement of imputation, no opportunity was given to me to rebut the charges. The domestic enquiry was held ex parte, without even ........ the fact whether I was served with any notice of enquiry. 3. No notice from the Enquiry Officer ... appearing before him was served upon me and I did not know about it at all. 4. A plain reading of the report of enquiry would reveal that the Enquiry Officer has gone beyond his jurisdiction and based his finding on presumptions without any basis of facts. 5. Although my retirement till due on 31.5.85, the Disciplinary Authority preferred to pass the most harsh punishment of dismissal on false and flimsy grounds on 20.5.85, i.e. just 10 days before my retirement. 6. I assert and appeal that all the charges levelled against me are false, baseless and misconceived. 7. No notice for hearing on proposed punishment was served on me and the punishment has been awarded without giving any opportunity. 8. I have an unblemish with distinction of serving the bank since 1947. In the facts and circumstances, I pray that the order of dismissal ground on 20.5.85 be withdrawn, and for this I shall ever pray. 7. No notice for hearing on proposed punishment was served on me and the punishment has been awarded without giving any opportunity. 8. I have an unblemish with distinction of serving the bank since 1947. In the facts and circumstances, I pray that the order of dismissal ground on 20.5.85 be withdrawn, and for this I shall ever pray. I am of the view that due to non-furnishing of enquiry report before passing the order of dismissal the petitioner did not suffer any prejudice because entire proceeding was based on documentary evidence and the documents were proved by two witnesses produced before the enquiry officer. Thus, this point also fails. Re : Point No.5. The learned Advocate for Mahadani argued that no notice of proposed punishment of penalty was served upon Mahadani before passing the order of dismissal and this violated the principles of natural justice as explained by Supreme Court in (43) Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra reported at (1998)7 SCC 84 . In Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (supra) the only contention urged for the appellant was that the Punjab National Bank Officer's Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1977 did not require an opportunity of being heard being given to the delinquent officers when the disciplinary authority disagreed to the findings of the enquiry authority once the enquiry authority had given a hearing to them. That was the issue involved in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (supra) which would be evident from paragraph 7 of the reported decision. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the reported decision are set out hereunder wherein Supreme Court laid down the law relating to the issues involved in that case. "18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most, unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of gum, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case". "19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principle of natural justice have to be read into regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and, give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer". The facts and circumstances involved in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behan Misra (supra) is absolutely different from those involved in the present writ proceeding. The facts and circumstances involved in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behan Misra (supra) is absolutely different from those involved in the present writ proceeding. In the instant case the disciplinary authority did not differ with the enquiry officer's report on the other hand disciplinary authority accepted the report of the enquiry officer and agreed with the finding of the enquiry officer. Therefore, there was no necessity of an opportunity of being heard given to Mahadani before punishment was imposed upon him. The argument of the learned Advocate for Mahadani cannot be accepted and the same is rejected. Re: Point No.7. The learned Advocate for Mahadani argued that respondent No.2 had only paid Mahadani his own contribution to the provident fund but did not pay employer's contribution to the provident fund, without assigning any reason. The learned Advocate for Mahadani further argued that employer's contribution to provident fund and gratuity were illegal withheld without assigning any reasons. Learned Advocate for Mahadani argued that the retirement benefits of Mahadani regarding (a) payment of gratuity and (b) the employer contribution of provident fund with upto date interest should be paid to Mahadani. No argument has been advanced by the learned Advocate for Mahadani regarding alleged arrear amount of increment of salary from July, 1982 to July, 1984. The learned Advocate for Mahadani referred to and relied upon Sections 13 and 14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and Section 10 of Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The learned Advocate appearing for the Bank has drawn my attention to sub-section 6 of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Gratuity Act). The learned Advocate appearing for the Bank has drawn my attention to sub-section 6 of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Gratuity Act). Said sub-section 6 of Section 4 of the Gratuity Act is set out hereunder "(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),–– (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused; (b) the gratuity payable to an employee (may be wholly or partially forfeited), (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, or (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment." Forfeiture of gratuity is mandatory for the circumstances mentioned in subsection 6 of Section 4 of the Gratuity Act. The use of the word "shall" makes the provision mandatory. Employer has no choice to pay gratuity to an employee if the circumstances mentioned in the said sub-section 6 of Section 4 of the Gratuity Act are present. It is true that in the instant writ proceeding Mahadani was dismissed from the services of the Bank for misconduct. Against the order of dismissal Mahadani preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, the General Manager of the Bank and the appellate authority by an order dated February 13, 1986 dismissed the appeal preferred by Mahadani. In the instant case admittedly no opportunity was given to Mahadani to show cause so far non-payment of gratuity is concerned. 43. The learned Advocate for the Bank has drawn my attention to Regulation 46 of Punjab National Bank (Officers) Service Regulation, 1979 which is set out hereunder: "GRATUITY (1) Every officer shall be eligible for gratuity on : (a) retirement (b) death (c) disablement rendering him unfit for further service as certified by a medical officer approved by the Bank (d) resignation after completing ten years of continuous service; or (e) termination of service in any other way except by way of punishment after completion of 10 years of service. (2) The amount of Gratuity payable to an officer shall be one month's pay for every completed year of service, subject to a maximum of 15 months' pay. Provided that where an officer has completed more than 30 years of service, he shall be eligible by way of Gratuity for an additional amount at the rate of one-half of a month's pay for each completed year of service beyond 30 years. Provided further that pay for the purpose of Gratuity for an officer who ceased to be in service during the period 1.7.1993 to 31.10.1994 shall be with regard to scale of Pay as specified in sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 4". (emphasis added) It is apparent from above quoted Regulation 46 that in a case of termination of service by way of punishment an officer is not eligible for gratuity. The validity of this Regulation 46 has not been challenged in the present writ proceeding. Punjab National Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979 were framed by the Board of Directors of Punjab National Bank in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19 read with sub-section 2 of Section 12 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. I am of the view that Punjab National Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979 have statutory force of law and Regulation 46 of the said Regulations of 1979 is mandatory and should be strictly followed. Mahadani was found guilty of misconduct and he was dismissed from the services of the Bank by way of punishment, Mahadani was not eligible for gratuity in view of the aforesaid Regulations 46. 44. So far payment of provident fund is concerned Mahadani was paid employee's share of the provident fund contribution after his dismissal but it is the case of the Bank that it was for his dismissal on ground of misconduct, Mahadani was not entitled to get employer share of provident fund contribution of Rs. 44,833.35. The learned Advocate for the Bank relied upon Rule 14 of Punjab National Bank Employees' Provident Fund Rules, (as amended upto February, 1977) and argued that in view of the aforesaid Rule 14 the petitioner is not entitled to the share of employer's contribution in the provident fund. 44,833.35. The learned Advocate for the Bank relied upon Rule 14 of Punjab National Bank Employees' Provident Fund Rules, (as amended upto February, 1977) and argued that in view of the aforesaid Rule 14 the petitioner is not entitled to the share of employer's contribution in the provident fund. Aforesaid Rule 14 is set out herein below: "If any member shall be dismissed or discharged from the service of the Bank of embezzlement or any dishonest act, deed or omission or misconduct resulting in loss to the Bank, the Trustees shall on application of the Board of Directors pay to the Board out of such member's individual account in the Funds such portion thereof not exceeding the Bank's contribution to it, as the Directors might ask the Trustees to pay, and the demand of the Directors and the receipt of the Bank for any payment so made, shall be complete discharge to the Trustees. In the event of any such payment the remaining amount out of the Provident Fund balance shall be paid to him. The recovery of such losses by the Bank shall be limited to the extent of such financial loss only". This Rule 14 of Punjab National Bank Employee' Provident Fund Rules, 1977 is not under challenged. In paragraph 14 of the affidavit-in-opposition Bank, inter alia; stated as follows: "The apprehended loss of the Bank on account of serious lapses and irregularities on the part of the petitioner amounting to dishonest act, deed or omission or gross misconduct on his part is about Rs. 20,06,143.82/- as per the summary of particulars given hereinbelow: At BO Purulia Rs.18,93,478.82 At BOs Moyanapur and Gopinathpur Rs. 1,12,665.00 Total– Rs. 20,06,143.82 Full particulars of the said sum of Rs. 18,93,478.82 are given in a separate sheet marked with letter–"A". Regarding the other loss of Rs. 1,12,665.00 the particulars are given hereinbelow:– AT BO Moyanapur amount (Rs.) 1/Unit/shop closed/non-existent as per special Investigation report 70.436.00 2/Sanctioned beyond power to the extent of 25,800.00 3/Limitation expired 629.00 At BO Gopinathpur 4/Sanctioned beyond power to the extent 10,000.00 of Audit Section reported verbally 5,800.00 on 19.4.85 that all loaning powers of Shri Mahadani has been ceased vide Development Section letter dated 8.3.85. During his tenure at PO Gopinathpur Sri Mahadani sanctioned two T/L (IRDP) for Rs. 2700/- and Rs.1100/- and one D/L against FDR for Rs. During his tenure at PO Gopinathpur Sri Mahadani sanctioned two T/L (IRDP) for Rs. 2700/- and Rs.1100/- and one D/L against FDR for Rs. 2,000/- Total – 1,12,665.00 Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 was not applicable to any Bank. By virtue of a Notification being GSR-2 dated 18.12.1965 the Act was made applicable to every Bank doing business in one State or Union Territory. In this connection reference may be made to GSR-170 dated 20th January, 1966 published in the Gazette of India, Part-II-Sec.3 (i) No.6 dated February 5, 1966 issued by Department of Social Security. Said GSR-170 dated 20th January, 1966 reads as follows:–– "GSR 170 – New Delhi, the 20th January, 1966– In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 read with sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), the Central Government hereby makes the following Scheme further to amend the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 namely :–– 1. This Scheme may be called the Employees' Provident Funds (Amendment) Scheme, 1966. 2. In the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952, in clause (b) of sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 1, sub-clause (iii) shall be renumbered as sub-clause (1 iii) and before sub-clause (1 iii) as so renumbered, the following sub-clause shall be inserted, namely :–– "(1 ii) as respects banks doing business in one State or Union territory and having no departments or branches outside that State or Union territory covered by the notification of the Government of India in the Department of Social Security No. G.S.R.-2 dated 18th December, 1965, come into force on the 31st day of January, 1966". 45. Punjab National Bank had branches in more than one State even prior to 1966. Therefore, even in terms of the aforesaid Government Notification Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 is not applicable to the Bank. The Bank is guided and governed by the Punjab National Bank Employees' Provident Fund Rules 1977. The nature of misconduct for which the petitioner had been dismissed from the services of the Bank clearly shows that Rule 14 of the Punjab National Bank Employees' Provident Fund Rules, 1977 has application in the matter and Mahadani is not entitled to have the share of employer's contribution in the provident fund. Thus Mahadani was not entitled to get (a) gratuity and (b) employer's contribution to provident fund. Thus Mahadani was not entitled to get (a) gratuity and (b) employer's contribution to provident fund. Under these circumstances this point also fails. In view of the discussions made hereinabove all the points argued by the learned Advocate for Mahadani failed and the writ petition is dismissed. Interim order, if there be any, is vacated. However, there shall not be any order as to costs.