1. If a person has been deprived of his ability to do something that he had enjoyed doing or had hoped to do, then money may enable him to enjoy other things instead. Money however, is not a recompense for loss of something having money value. It is given as some consolation for the distress that is the consequence of a loss on which no monetary value can be put. This is known as solace approach and has also been described as functional approach. This theory has found acceptance in the Canadian Courts. Thus Dickson. J, in Adnrews Vs. Grand and Toy Alberta Ltd., 83 DLR (3d) 452, observed: "The (functional approach) attempts to assess the compensation required to provide the injured person ˜with reasonable solace for his misfortune". ˜Solace" in this sense is taken to mean physical arrangements which can make his life more endurable rather than "solace" in the sense of sympathy. The money for future care is to provide physical arrangements for assistance, equipment and facilities directly related to the injuries. Additional money to make life more endurable should then be seen as providing more general physical arrangements above and beyond those relating directly to the injuries.� 2. Then there is the conceptual view. This treats the loss of a limb as a loss of an asset or property. The loss, though intangible, is said to have a value and then there is the theory of personal approach. This approach values feeling in addition to the loss of asset. The damages are to be determined not in relation to impersonal asset price but in relation human happiness, by evaluating the difference between the happiness the victim would have enjoyed if he had not been injured and the happiness or unhappiness he has experienced and will experience as an injured person. See Wise Vs. Kay, 1958-65 ACJ 208 (CA England). So far as the Indian system is concerned, the concept of full and fair compensation under several heads is recognised. The judicial precedents in this regard are in abundance and need not to be quoted. What is required to be quoted is the view expressed in Bird Vs. See Wise Vs. Kay, 1958-65 ACJ 208 (CA England). So far as the Indian system is concerned, the concept of full and fair compensation under several heads is recognised. The judicial precedents in this regard are in abundance and need not to be quoted. What is required to be quoted is the view expressed in Bird Vs. Cooking and Sons Ltd., 1951 (2) LTR 1260, wherein Birkett, L.J. observed :- "Although there is no fixed and unalterable standard, the courts have been making these assessments for many years, and I think they form some guide to the kind of figure which is appropriate. When, therefore, a particular matter comes up for review; one of the questions is, how does this accord with the general run of assessment over the years in comparable cases." 3. The Courts in India have always tried to assess the full and fair compensation and when this is done, the principles laid down from time to time are taken note of. The elaborate discussion of this would be found in the case reported as 1995 ACJ 366, R.D. Hattangadi Vs. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others. In these two appeals preferred by the State, the respondent-writ petitioners were electrocuted and sustained burn injuries. 4. The facts in each of the case are as under:- In Letters Patent Appeal No. 30/2002, the respondent writ petitioner, Altaf Ahmad Ganai was playing volley-ball in the school ground alongwith his class-mates. When they were playing, the ball went near an electric transformer. Respondent No. 1 made an effort to retrieve it and in the process, he came in contact with the Transmission live lines of the electric transformer which was installed there. He was electrocuted and sustained burn injuries. As a result of this, his one arm and one leg had to amputated. As there were injuries to the vital parts of body, he claimed compensation. According to him, this accident occurred as the State and its functionaries were remiss placing the transformer at a place which was not fully protected. The fact that the students could have a free access and preventive measures were adopted by the State was projected. It was in these circumstances, compensation to the extent of Rs.5 lacs was claimed. This prayer of the respondent writ petitioner has been allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The fact that the students could have a free access and preventive measures were adopted by the State was projected. It was in these circumstances, compensation to the extent of Rs.5 lacs was claimed. This prayer of the respondent writ petitioner has been allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. This being questioned in this Letters Patent Appeal. 5. In Letters Patent Appeal 37/ 2000 the respondent writ petitioner namely Miss Afroza, a teenager and a student of 6th standard in Government High School, Keegam, Pulwama, came in touch with live electric wires of a transformer on 6th April 1995. She sought compensation to the extent of Rs.7 lacs. A learned Single Judge has allowed the compensation to the extent of Rs. 2.70 lacs. The State has come in appeal. 6. The defence of the State in the two appeals is similar. It is stated that Article 226 of the Constitution of India or for that matter Section 103 of the State Constitution was not available to the writ petitioners. It is Stated that it was a monetary claim and therefore, the claim for damages could not be entertained and adjudicated upon in writ jurisdiction. 7. In LPA 37/2000, the sovereign immunity has also been claimed and it is submitted that compensation could not be allowed in favour of the writ petitioner. 8. So far as the maintainability of writ petitions is concerned, this should not detain us for long. There are numerous decisions which support the proposition that where there is no disputed question of fact, then a writ petition can be entertained and compensation/damages can be allowed. These decisions are only being referred to without elaborating the principle of law mentioned in each of them as the principle of law laid down in these decisions is that the State must repair the damage done by its officers and when injury is caused to a person on account of negligence on the part of State and its functionaries. This has been brought even within the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Some of these decisions given by the Supreme Court of India are as under:- i) Radul Singh Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1993 SC 1056; ii) Nilapati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Vs. State of Orissa and others, 1993 (2) SCC 746; iii) Bhuwneshwar Singh Vs. Some of these decisions given by the Supreme Court of India are as under:- i) Radul Singh Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1993 SC 1056; ii) Nilapati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Vs. State of Orissa and others, 1993 (2) SCC 746; iii) Bhuwneshwar Singh Vs. Union of India and others, 1993 (4) SCC 327; iv) Maniyeri Madhavan Vs. Inspector of Police, Cannano, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 501; v) Sehastian M. Hongrary Vs. Union of India. AIR 1984 SC 1026; vi) Consumer Education and Research Centre Vs. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 922. 9. The fact that compensation has been allowed in those cases where damage has been caused on account of electrocution are also there in the Law Reports. These are Jairam Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 HP 13 and AIR 1988 SC 206. 10. The question as to whether the appellant State is liable to pay damages and whether negligence can be attributed to it be now examined. 11. In Poonam Verma Vs. Ashwin Patel, 1996 CCJ 721, the Supreme Court of India enumerated following three constituents of negligence: i) A legal duly to exercise due care on the part of the party complained of towards the party complaining the former™s conduct within the scope of the duly; ii) Breach of the said duty; and iii) Consequential damage. 12. Failure to keep the required caution and safeguards would clearly amount to negligence and such a negligence is actionable under the law of Torts. See Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat 1994 ACJ 902. The Supreme Court of India in the above case quoted the meaning of negligence as defined by Winfield in the following words:- "Negligence as a tort is the breach of a legal duty to take care which results in damage, undesired by the defendant to plaintiff." 13. Thus, negligence is the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 14. The Courts do recognise that there are many activities which are so hazardous that they constitute constant danger to the person or property of others. 14. The Courts do recognise that there are many activities which are so hazardous that they constitute constant danger to the person or property of others. Such activities can be prohibited altogether by law or can be allowed to be carried on for the sake of their social utility but in accordance with their statutory provision laying down safety measures and providing for sanctions of non-compliance. The basis of this liability is foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of the activities. This is founded on the principle of strict liability where negligence based on foreseeable harm is presumed. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English Common Law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands Vs. Fletcher, 1968 PR 3 HI 330. Blackburn J., the author of the said rule had observed in the said decision as under:- The rule of law is that the person who for his own purpose, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does so he is primafacie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." Thus, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. As indicated above, the basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. Thus, in such cases, the negligence comprehends that the foreseeable risk would be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. 15. The Privy Council in the case of Quebeo Railway, Light Heat and Power Company Ltd. Vs. Vandry and others, 1920 Law Reports Appeal Cases, 662, observed that the company supplying the electricity is liable for the damages without proof that it had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of violent wind and high tension current found its way through the low tension cable into the premises of the respondents was held to be not a justificable defence. In W.B. State Electricity Board Vs. Sachin Banerjee, 1999 (9) SCC 21. the Electricity Board adopted a defence that the electric lines were illegally hooked for pilferage purposes. In W.B. State Electricity Board Vs. Sachin Banerjee, 1999 (9) SCC 21. the Electricity Board adopted a defence that the electric lines were illegally hooked for pilferage purposes. The Supreme Court of India observed that the Board cannot be held to be negligent on the said fact situation but the question of strict liability in the above case was not taken up. 16. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decision in England. The decision given by House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. Vs. Eastern Countries Leather, 1994 (1) All England Law Reports (HL) 53 can be cited with advantage. This principle gained approval in India also. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of India. 1990 (1) SCC 613 and a two Judge Bench in the case of Kaushunma Begum Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.. 2001 (2) SCC 9. adopted this principle. As a matter of fact, in an earlier decision reported as M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India, 1987 (1) SCC 395, the Supreme Court of India has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability. In the above case, the Supreme Court of India observed that where an enterprise is engaged in a harzardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm any one on account of the ˜accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident. 17. In Alka Vs. Union of India. 1995 ACJ 1254. the Delhi High Court imputed negligence on the authorities where the accident was caused by running motor of water pump and the victim was a girl of tender age of six years. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applied brushing aside the explanation of the respondents that the children used to trespass into the premises and the authorities were not liable. It was observed that a trespassing child of a tender age of six years would not be knowing the implication and gravity of putting her hand in a running motor and it was for the authorities concerned to give ample protection in this regard. 18. It was observed that a trespassing child of a tender age of six years would not be knowing the implication and gravity of putting her hand in a running motor and it was for the authorities concerned to give ample protection in this regard. 18. It is thus concluded that there is an absolute liability of the State to keep the electric installations in safe bounds so that these are not easily accessible to general public and are not able to cause any injury to a person passing near by these electric installations. While ascertaining this duty to take care, one has to keep in mind the difference between an adult visitor and a child visitor. The child will meddle whereas an adult will not and what is safe for an adult may not be safe for a child. Thus in the case of Glasgow Corporation Vs. Taylor, (1922) 1 AC 44, a garden was being maintained by the Corporation. There were poisonous shrubs infornt of the gate which were easily accessible and could be opened by young children. A child entered the garden and ate some berries of the poisonous shrubs which presented a tempting appearance to the children and died. The Corporation had-known of the fact of existence of poisonous shrubs. It had taken no steps to warn the children or to prevent them in reaching that part of the garden. The father of the deceased child filed a suit. The Corporation was held liable for want of due care to the children. It was observed that so far as children are concerned, there is a duty "not merely not to dig pitfalls for them, but not to lead them into temptation." 19. In both the cases in hand, it has come on record that the transformers were placed at a place which was easily accessible. There were no barricardes. Even, the fencing was also not done. It is not the case of the State that it had taken all reasonable precautions and that the students climbed over the fencing and opened the gate and then entered the place where the transformers were placed. All that has been stated in LPA 32/2002 is that the transformer had been installed long back in the corner of the school garden. All that has been stated in LPA 32/2002 is that the transformer had been installed long back in the corner of the school garden. It is staled that the school children had always been playing different games in the ground and no accident had taken place earlier. It is, however, nowhere stated that the transformer in question was fenced or sufficient safeguards were provided which could prevent the entry into the area where the transformer was installed. 20. In LPA 37/2000, as indicated above, the respondent writ petitioner came in touch with live electric wires of a transformer. It was stated by the appellant that the said™ transformer was fixed at a safe height which was beyond the reach of respondent writ petitioner. It is staled that the transformer had developed some fault in April 95. It is stated that the villagers without waiting for the stall of the concerned department lowered down the transformer to the ground level™. It is further stated that the transformer was got repaired by the villagers and it was not placed at the place from where it was lowered down. Reference is being made to the state of affairs in the State as it existed in April 95. The existence of militancy is being referred to with a view to avoid liability which existed in the State. It is Stated that it is the villagers who are responsible for the said occurrence and not the appellant. 21. The above plea on the face of it shows that the State has tried to shift the burden from their officers to the villagers. This is not a permissible defence and as a matter of fact, as the villagers were able to have access to the transformer and as they were able to lower it down for getting The same repaired goes to show that no safeguards were provided and on account of this, the occurrence took place. The State was remiss in performance of its duties and therefore, it cannot shift the burden from its officers to the villagers. 22. The question of quantum of compensation be examined. In the case of respondent writ petitioner Miss Afroza, on account of the injury, her left arm had to be amputated. She claimed compensation to the extent of Rs. 7 lacs. The learned Single Judge, however, allowed compensation to the extent of Rs. 22. The question of quantum of compensation be examined. In the case of respondent writ petitioner Miss Afroza, on account of the injury, her left arm had to be amputated. She claimed compensation to the extent of Rs. 7 lacs. The learned Single Judge, however, allowed compensation to the extent of Rs. 2.70 lacs for the loss of one arm of the respondent writ petitioner. We are of the opinion that the amount so allowed for the loss of one arm is fully justified. In the Indian society, marrying a girl with disablement is a social problem. This factor and the factors projected by the learned Single Judge do justify the grant of compensation. We as such found no reason to differ with the view so expressed by the learned Single Judge. We however, observe that in a welfare State, the respondent writ petitioner would be entitled to certain other benefits also. An artificial limb may not remove the deformity but it can, to some extent, lessen the hardship faced by the respondent. The State would see to it that in addition to the amount already allowed, the above aspect of the matter is also taken care of and an artificial limb would be provided to the respondent writ petitioner. She was eleven years of age when occurrence took place; now she is going to attain majority. The development of her bones must be complete. Once an artificial limb is provided, it would not require any further alteration. Therefore, in addition to the amount of compensation allowed, the respondent as indicated above should also be entitled to an artificial limb and this would be provided at the State expense. 23. Coming to the appeal in the case of Altaf Ahmad Ganai, the argument put across is that the compensation at the rate of Rs. 5 lacs is on the higher side. 24. It be seen that the respondent writ petitioner (Altaf Ahmad Ganai) has lost one arm and one leg. Can it be said that a provision of Rs. 5 lacs in this regard is on the higher side? In Shashendra Lahiri Vs. Unicef, 1998 ACJ 859, the victim had suffered several fractures in leg resulting in shortening of the leg by three inches. The injured in the above case was 17 years of age. He was a student of B. Com. This shortening of leg resulted in permanent disability. In Shashendra Lahiri Vs. Unicef, 1998 ACJ 859, the victim had suffered several fractures in leg resulting in shortening of the leg by three inches. The injured in the above case was 17 years of age. He was a student of B. Com. This shortening of leg resulted in permanent disability. He had undergone bone-grafting and hospitalisation for quite some time in different hospitals. An amount of Rs. 33,000 was allowed by the Claims Tribunal. The amount was enhanced in appeal to the extent of Rs. 58.000. The Supreme Court of India awarded Rs. 4 lacs in addition to Rs. 58.000 already awarded. Interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum was also allowed from the date of claim till its payment. In view of the above, we are of the opinion; i) That a writ petition is maintainable for claiming compensation; ii) That the State was under a duty to see that the electric installations are properly fenced and are placed in a position so that these are not accessible to the general public and the children in particular; iii) That precautions indicated at serial (ii) were not taken in both the cases in hand; iv) That the appellant State cannot claim immunity by shifting the burden as it has been done in one of the case to the villagers. Even if it be presumed that the villagers had lowered the transformer, even for this negligence is ultimately attributable to the State and as indicated above, it cannot escape the liability: v) That the quantum of compensation in both the cases has been fixed by taking into consideration the right parameters. In case of Altaf Ahmad Ganai. he has lost one arm and one leg and in case of Miss Afroza, she has lost one arm. The compensation as indicated above, is just and fair. Both these appeals as such are found to be without merit and are dismissed.