Appellant came to this Court with a plea that he joined the State police department as a Constable in the year 1963. His date of birth was recorded as 23rd June41. He stated that he came to know that his actual date of birth is 8th July,44. This fact, he came to know in the year 1982 when he was promoted to the post of Sub-Inspector. Thereafter, he filed representations also. As these representations were not being considered, he preferred a writ petition bearing SWP No. 1533/96. This writ petition came to be decided on 10th Feb99 directing the respondent State to decide the disputed question of fact. Thereafter the matter was considered by the respondents and an order was passed on 17th April99. The date of birth of the appellant as originally recorded i.e. 23rd June41 was sustained. He challenged this order in a writ petition. This writ petition stands dismissed. Now an appeal has been preferred under Clause 12 of Letters Patent. 2. A learned Single Judge of this Court while dismissing the writ petition upheld the order passed by the competent authority on the plea that after inordinate delay, the competent authority was not required to go into the question as to whether the date of birth was rightly recorded or not. 3. The order which has been passed by the Inspector General of Police has been placed on the record as Annexure D. Para 1 of this order takes note of the fact that earlier a writ petition was preferred and that was disposed of on 10th Feb99. Para 2 of the order makes recital of the fact that in terms of the decision given by this Court, the matter has been examined. Para 3 makes mention of the fact that appellant was summoned and he was given oportunity to produce relevant evidence. The fact that he placed on record the school leaving certificate and the discharge certificate issued by the Government Higher Secondary School Pallanwala and Khalsa High School, Srinagar, has been adverted to. Thereafter in para 4 of the order, it is mentioned that the case of the appellant was examined minutely. Reference has been to a decision given by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dina Bandu Majumdar. Thereafter in para 4 of the order, it is mentioned that the case of the appellant was examined minutely. Reference has been to a decision given by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dina Bandu Majumdar. Ultimately it has been concluded that "the dispute has been raised at the verge of his supperannuation which cannot be accepted in view of the pronouncements made by their Lordships of the Apex Court...." 4. The above reasoning given by the competent authority was sustained by the learned Single Judge while deciding writ petition. It is against this order, the present appeal has been preferred. 5. It be seen that the argument which has been put across by the competent authority i.e, the Inspector General of Police, could have been taken note of when earlier writ petition was decided on 10th Feb99. That writ petition was pending in this Court since 1996. It was, as indicated above, decided on 10th Feb99. While deciding that writ petition, it was observed "the question as to what should be the correct date of birth of the petitioner is a question which is to be decided by the respondents." Therefore, what was required to be done was to decide the issue on merits and not to non-suit the appellant on the ground of delay and laches. If infact, his date of birth is as projected by him, then whatever benefits he was entitled to should have been given to him. He had approached this Court almost three years before his retirement date. The appellant had produced school leaving/discharge certificate from a recognised institution and also from a Government institution. This fact stands mentioned in the order itself passed by the competent authority. These certificates have also been placed on the record as Annexure A and Annexure B. In both the certificates, the date of birth of the appellant has been recorded as 8th July44. Therefore, what was required to be done by the competent authority was to see as to whether these certificates are genuine or not and as to whether reliance could be placed on these certificates. This has not been done by the competent authority. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the said authority, which conclusion was upheld by the learned Single Judge while deciding the petition on 1st Aug 2000, cannot be accepted. This has not been done by the competent authority. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the said authority, which conclusion was upheld by the learned Single Judge while deciding the petition on 1st Aug 2000, cannot be accepted. The competent authority, as indicated above, should have considered the matter on its merits as per the decision given in the earlier writ petition of the petitioner decided on 10th Feb99. 6. The fact that a school certificate has some evidential value is a matter on which there cannot be two opinions. The view expressed by the Supreme Court of India in the case of AIR 1981 SC 361, Harpal Singh and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, can be cited in this regard. See also AIR 1964 SC 1625, Mohd Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P. As a matter of fact, in the case reported as Shanmugham v. The State, 1984 Cri, L. J. 1081, it was held that where the school registers contains the names in an unambiguous terms, these can be relied upon. Other decisions on the same subject are reported as AIR 1988 SC 1796, Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit and AIR 1993 SC 2448, Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab. Even in the case of Updesh Kumar and Others v. Prithvi Singh & Ors., (2001)2 SCC 524, The Supreme Court of India took note of the correction made in the Matriculation Certificate by the Haryana School Education Board. It was observed that this correction was made in pursuance of official duties and it has to be presumed that this was done in accordance with the law. 7 In view of the above, this appeal is allowed. The Judgement impugned is set aside. Respondent authorities are directed to determine as to whether the certificates produced by the appellant are genuine or not. If they are genuine and have been issued in the discharge of official duties, then these would be given effect to and the date of birth of the appellant would be accordingly corrected. Let this exercise be now done within a period of two months from the date, a copy of this order is made available to respondents by the appellant.