JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows:–– This writ petition was filed by the Association of Heads of Anglo Indian Schools being a registered society challenging the amendment incorporated to regulation 24 and introducing regulation 24A in the Code of Regulations for Anglo Indian and other listed Schools, 1993. The said amendment provided for an appeal for the employees dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by the employer also prescribing the appeal forum and the procedure to be followed by it. Such amendment was published in the Extra Ordinary Calcutta Gazette dated April 28, 1999. 2. Contention of the writ petition is that the said provision of appeal from a disciplinary action by the management of the institution takes away the right of management from the governing body of the school who are enjoying the protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India as a minority community. 3. The facts relevant for deciding the present writ petition are that the code of regulation was framed originally in the year 1929 having no provision for appeal from any disciplinary action against any teacher by the governing body of a school. Notification was issued by the Government of West Bengal on December 24, 1993 framing new regulations which were published on January 21, 1994. The present petitioner filed writ petition challenging principally the proviso to regulation 24(f) of the said regulation wherein a provision of appeal was introduced. By the judgment and order dated September 1, 1994, reported in (1) 1994 (2) CHN 391 writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge of this Court holding, inter alia, that proviso to Clause 24(f) of the said regulations is inapplicable to the Anglo Indian Schools in West Bengal which are minority institutions as it offended the guarantee contained in Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The appeal Court by its judgment and order dated December 21, 1994 reported in (2) 1995 (1) CLJ 351 as regards the said aspect held that Clause 24(f) is inapplicable to minority institutions. Government of West Bengal issued notification dated November 17, 1998 substitution the proviso to Clause 24(f) of the said regulations of 1993 by a new proviso and introducing new clause 24A constituting a Tribunal for deciding such appeals and the same is subject matter of challenge herein. 4. Mr. Government of West Bengal issued notification dated November 17, 1998 substitution the proviso to Clause 24(f) of the said regulations of 1993 by a new proviso and introducing new clause 24A constituting a Tribunal for deciding such appeals and the same is subject matter of challenge herein. 4. Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that only question requires decision in the present proceeding is that of creation of such an appellate forum whether affects the right of the governing body to administer institution managed by minority community. Law, in this connection, has been cited as decided in the case of (3) State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial reported in AIR 1970 SC 2079 , (4) Ahamedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1974 SC 1389 , (5) Lilly Kurian v. SR. Lewina reported in AIR 1979 SC 52 , (6) All Saints High School, Hyderabad v. Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1980 (2) SCC 478 , (7) Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association v. Union of India reported in AIR 1987 SC 311 , (8) Mrs. Y. Theclamma v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1988 SC 305 , (9) MH Walters v. Basel Mission Higher Education Centre reported in AIR 1991 SC 2230 and (10) Lilly Kurian v. University Appellate Tribunal reported in 1997 (2) SCC 240 . 5. Reference was also made on behalf of the petitioner to the judgments in the cases of (11) Union of India v. K. S. Subramanian reported in AIR 1976 SC 2433 , (12) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Chandra Trivedi reported in AIR 1976 SC 2547 and (13) N.S. Giri v. Corporation of City of Mangalore reported in 1999(4) SCC 697 for indicating the duty of High Court to follow opinions expressed by larger benches of Supreme Court. 6. Mr. P. K. Roy, learned Counsel for the private respondents contended that the present provision of appeal introduced by amendment impugned herein creates an impartial tribunal and therefore, is not hit by Article 30 of the Constitution or the law relied on by the petitioner. 6. Mr. P. K. Roy, learned Counsel for the private respondents contended that the present provision of appeal introduced by amendment impugned herein creates an impartial tribunal and therefore, is not hit by Article 30 of the Constitution or the law relied on by the petitioner. It is contended that after the proviso to regulation 24(f) of the regulations was set aside up to the level of the Division Bench of this Court, the present amendment was introduced creating an impartial tribunal and providing for sufficient guideline and therefore, such provision is not hit by the observations made either by the learned Single Judge or by the Division Bench in respect of earlier clause 24(f) of the Regulations. The observations made in the judgments cited on behalf of the petitioner have also been dealt with by Mr. Roy contending that the law in this connection was finally settled in the case of Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association (supra). With regard to the contention of the petitioner that the judgment in the case of Frank Anthony did not notice the law decided in the case of Lilly Kurian has been controverted on a contention that law in this respect has been decided in the judgment of Frank Anthony's case and therefore, mere omission to refer to judgment in the Lilly Kurian case has no serious effect. With regard to the judgment in the second Lilly Kurian case, it has been contended that same was passed without noticing the judgment in the case of Frank Anthony and therefore, does not lay down any good law being per in curium. 7. It has been stated that education being a state subject in terms of provision of Articles 154 and 162 of the Constitution read with Schedule 7 to the Constitution and the judgments in the case of (14) B. N. Nagrajan v. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1966 SC 1942 and (15) Bishwambhar Dayal v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1982 SC 32 , the amendment of regulation having provided an impartial tribunal and that too issued by the appropriate authority, does not require any interference by this Court. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Balai Chandra Roy, learned Advocate General representing the State authorities contended that the right to administer educational institution by minority does not include right of mismanagement or to maladminister it and therefore, interference under the present amendment being available only in cases of three major punishments and that too by an impartial tribunal presided over by a personnel having held the office of the level of District Judge, does not require any interference by this Court. Mr. Roy argued that Frank Anthony's case has decided the law finally. Even though the judgment in the first Lilly Kurian case was not considered in the Frank Anthony case but it duly took into consideration all the judgments on the basis of which first Lilly Kurian case was decided. 9. It is further contended that in such history of decisions by the Apex Court, the High Court is required to follow the course as decided in the case of (16) Bholanath Karmakar v. Madan Mohan Karmakar reported in AIR 1988 Cal 1 . Applying the said principle, the decision in the case of Frank Anthony case has to be followed by this Court in the present case. As argued by the learned Advocate General, the provision to appoint a person of the level of District Judge and proceeding being controlled by the Code of Civil Procedure and the principles of natural Justice, cannot be held to be arbitrary in any manner. The restriction I of such a tribunal only in the case of three major penalties also does not amount to any extensive interference on the right of management of governing body. 10. While replying to the contention of the respondents, Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, apart from dealing with the judgments cited by the respondents also further relied on the judgments in the cases of (17) General Manager, Telecom v. A. Srinivasa Rao reported in 1997 (8) SCC 767 and N. S. Giri v. Corporation of City of Mangalore reported in 1999 (4) SCC 697 which settled the question of application of precedents in present circumstances. 11. Law has been decided in various cases, as relied on by the respective parties, for deciding what forum provided to a teacher/employee dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by the governing body, will affect the right of the management by the minority under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. 12. 11. Law has been decided in various cases, as relied on by the respective parties, for deciding what forum provided to a teacher/employee dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by the governing body, will affect the right of the management by the minority under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. 12. This aspect was first considered by the Supreme Court by its Seven Judge Bench in (18) Kerala Education Bill case reported in AIR 1958 SC 956 . While giving its advisory opinion, the Bench held, inter alia, that it is possible to introduce permissible regulatory measure even in regard to minority institutions though rights of minority in administering their institutions have been recognised. 13. In the case of Ahamedabad St. Xaviers College Society (supra) Section 51A of the Gujarat University Act was considered as to whether it violates the right under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. It was held that a permissible regulatory measure can be introduced even with regard to a minority institution and though restriction in some respects for maintaining standard on education in the institution, were found to be permissible but restrictions on the right of administration in a minority institution has been held to be violative of Article 30. The power of the Vice-Chancellor to approve any order of penalty imposed by the management of the institution, was found to be providing a blanket power to the Vice-Chancellor without any guidance and therefore, Section 51A of the Act was held to be not applicable to minority institution as the provisions empowering the Vice-Chancellor was held to be not permissive regulatory measure as it conferred arbitrary power on the Vice-Chancellor to take away the right of administration of the minority institutions. The Tribunal of Arbitration provided in Section 52A also was held to be not applicable to the minority institutions as the tribunal was to be constituted having one member nominated by the governing body of the college, one member nominated by the member concerned and an umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor. In the said judgment what was deprecated was the unguided and uncanalised power on an outsider in the matter of administration and not the power on outsider was made totally prohibited. 14. Law thus discussed in various cases show conclusively that an appellate provision to an outsider has not been declared totally prohibited. In the said judgment what was deprecated was the unguided and uncanalised power on an outsider in the matter of administration and not the power on outsider was made totally prohibited. 14. Law thus discussed in various cases show conclusively that an appellate provision to an outsider has not been declared totally prohibited. It is consistently held that some controlling measures are permissible. In Paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment in the case of Ahamedabad St. Xaviers College Society (supra) it was observed by Ray, C. J. which is as follows :–– "46. The ultimate good of a minority institution too imparting general secular education is advancement of learning. This Court has consistently held that it is not only permissible but also desirable to regulate everything in educational and academic matters for achieving excellence and uniformity in standards of education. "47. In the field of administration it is not reasonable to claim that minority institutions will have complete autonomy. Checks on the administration may be necessary in order to ensure that the administration is efficient and sound and will serve the academic needs of the institution. The right of a minority to administer its educational institution involves, as part of it, a co-relative duty of good administration." 15. In the same judgment, Khanna, J. while concurring as regards invalidity of Section 51A of Gujarat University Act, observed in Paragraph-105 of the judgment, as follows:–– "Although disciplinary control over the teachers of a minority educational institution would be with the governing council, regulations, in my opinion, can be made for ensuring proper conditions of service of the teachers and for securing a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action against the teachers. Such provisions which are calculated to safeguard the interest of teachers would result in security of tenure and thus inevitably attract competent persons for the posts of teachers. Such a provision would also eliminate a potential cause of frustration amongst the teachers. Regulations made for this purpose should be considered to be in the interest of minority educational institutions and as such they would not violate Article 30 (1). Clause (a) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 51A of the impugned Act which make provision for giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against a penalty to be proposed on a member of the staff of an educational institution would consequently be held to be valid. Clause (a) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 51A of the impugned Act which make provision for giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against a penalty to be proposed on a member of the staff of an educational institution would consequently be held to be valid. Clause (b) of those sub-sections which gives a power to the Vice-Chancellor and officer of the University authorised by him to veto the action of the managing body of an educational institution in awarding punishment to a member of the staff, in my opinion, interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing body over its teachers. It is significant that the power of approval conferred by cl. (b) in each of the two sub-sections of Section 51A on the Vice-Chancellor or other officer authorised by him is a blanket power. No guidelines are laid down for the exercise of that power and it is not provided that the approval is to be withheld only in case the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of service is mala fide or by way of victimisation or other similar cause. The conferment of such blanket power on the Vice-Chancellor or other officer authorised by him for vetoing the disciplinary action of the managing body of an educational institution makes a serious inroad on the right of the managing body to administer an educational institution. Clause (b) of each of the two sub-sections of Section 51A should, therefore, be held to be violative of Article 30 (1) so far as minority educational institutions are concerned." 16. Similar unguided power given to the syndicate by Section 56 (4) of the Kerala University Act was held to be a provision taking away the power of disciplinary action from the governing body and the managing council and conferring the same upon the university and therefore, is not applicable to minority institutions. 17. In the first case of Lilly Kurian (supra), a similar provision of appeal to the Vice-Chancellor of the University against any order passed by the management in respect of the penalties as contained in Ordinance 33 (4) was under consideration. Considering the various case laws on the subject, the finding of the Five Judge Bench in the said case as recorded in Paragraph-52 thereof is as follows :–– "52. Considering the various case laws on the subject, the finding of the Five Judge Bench in the said case as recorded in Paragraph-52 thereof is as follows :–– "52. The power of appeal conferred on the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 (4) is not only a grave encroachment on the institution's right to enforce and ensure discipline in its administrative affairs but it is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power. The extent of the appellate power of the Vice-Chancellor is not defined; and, indeed, his powers are unlimited. The grounds on which the Vice-Chancellor can interfere in such appeals are also not defined. He may not only set aside an order of dismissal of a teacher and order his reinstatement, but may also interfere with any of the punishments enumerated in items (ii) to (v) of Ordinance 33 (2), that is to say, he can even interfere against the infliction of minor punishments. In the absence of any guidelines, it cannot be held that the power of the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 (4) was merely a check on maladministration." 18. In the case of Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association (supra), the Bench considered a similar provision of appeal under Sections-8 and 11 of Delhi School Education Act, 1973. The said provision is as follows :–– "8. Terms and conditions of service of employees of recognised private schools––(1) The Administrator may make rules regulating the minimum qualifications for recruitment, and the conditions of service, of employees of recognised private schools : Provided that neither the salary nor the rights in respect of leave of absence, of retirement and pension of employee in the employment of an existing school at the commencement of this Act shall be varied to the disadvantage of such employee. Provided further that every such employee shall be entitled to opt for terms and conditions of service as they were applicable to him immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director. (2) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director. (3) Any employee of a recognised private school who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank may, within three months from the date of communication to him of the order of such dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, appeal against such order to the Tribunal constituted under Section 11. (4) Where the managing committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to the Director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval of Director : Provided that the managing committee may suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the gross misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under Section 9 of the employee : Provided further that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the Director approved by him before the expiry of the said period. (5) Where the intention to suspend, or the immediate suspension of an employee is communicated to the Director, he may, if he is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension, accord his approval to such suspension. 11. Tribunal––(1) The Administrator shall, by notification, constituted Tribunal, to be known as the "Delhi School Tribunal", consisting of one person : Provided that no person shall be so appointed unless he has held office as a District Judge or any equivalent judicial office. (2) If any vacancy, other than a temporary absence, occurs in the office of the presiding officer of the Tribunal, the Administrator shall appoint another person in accordance with the provisions of this section, to fill the vacancy and the proceedings may be continued before the Tribunal from the stage at which vacancy is filed. (3) The Administrator shall make available to the Tribunal such staff as may be necessary in the discharge of its functions under this Act. (3) The Administrator shall make available to the Tribunal such staff as may be necessary in the discharge of its functions under this Act. (4) All expenses incurred in connection with the Tribunal shall be defrayed out of the Consolidated Fund of India. (5) The Tribunal shall have power to regulate is own procedure in matters arising out of the discharge of its functions including the place or places at which it shall hold its sitting. (6) The Tribunal shall for the purpose of disposal of an appeal preferred under this Act have the same powers as are vested in a Court of appeal by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (5 of 1908) and shall also have the power to stay the operation of the order appealed against on such terms as it may think fit." 19. The Two Judge Bench considering the judgments in the case of Kerala Education Bill (supra), (19) Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1963 SC 540 , State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial (supra), Ahamedabad St. Xaviers College Society (supra), and other cases mentioned in the judgments, upheld the validity of Section 8 (3) providing for the appeal provision read with Section 11 of the Act. While considering the law the Bench held that the "the management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies the member of its staff, the opportunity to achieve the very object of Article 30 (1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education". The relevant part of the judgment dealing with said provision of Section 8 (3) and Section 11 as contained in Paragraph-18 thereof is as follows :–– "Keeping in mind the views of the several learned Judges. It becomes clear that Section 8 (2) must be held to be objectionable. Section 8 (3) provides for an appeal to the Tribunal constituted under Section 11, that is, a Tribunal consisting of a person who has held office as a District Judge or any equivalent judicial office. The appeal is not to any departmental official but to a Tribunal manned by a person who has held office as a District Judge and who is required to exercise his powers not arbitrarily but in the same manner as a Court of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal is not to any departmental official but to a Tribunal manned by a person who has held office as a District Judge and who is required to exercise his powers not arbitrarily but in the same manner as a Court of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. The right of appeal itself is confined to a limited class of cases, namely, those of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and not to every dispute between an employee and the management. The limited right of appeal, the character of the authority constituted to hear the appeal and the manner in which the appellate power is required to be exercised make the provision for an appeal perfective reasonable, in our view. The objection to the reference to an Arbitration Tribunal in the Nine Judge Bench case was to the wide power given to the Tribunal to entertain any manner of dispute and the provision for the appointment of umpire by the Vice-Chancellor. Those defects have been cured in the provisions before us. Similarly, the provision for an appeal to the Syndicate was considered objectionable in State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial, AIR 1970 SC 2079 (supra), as it conferred the right on the university." 20. In the case of T. Theclamma (supra), two Judge Bench of Supreme Court upheld the validity of sub-section 4 of Section 8 of Delhi Education Act, 1973 though the said provision provided for a condition of approval by director in respect of a suspension order passed by the Managing Committee and the judgment was passed considering the law decided in the case of Frank Anthony (supra) as also first Lilly Kurian case (supra). The relevant portion of the said judgment as contained in Paragraphs-11 and 12 thereof are as follows:–– "11. It would be seen that the decision of the Court in Frank Anthony Public School's case ( AIR 1987 SC 311 ) with regard to the applicability of sub-section. (4) of Section 8 of the Act to the unaided minority educational institutions is based on the view taken by the majority in All Saints High School's case ( AIR 1980 SC 1042 ) which in its turn, was based on several decisions right from In re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 ( AIR 1958 SC 956 ) down to St. Xavier, including that in Lilly Kurian ( AIR 1979 SC 52 ). Xavier, including that in Lilly Kurian ( AIR 1979 SC 52 ). It is therefore, difficult to sustain the argument of learned Counsel for the respondents that the decision in Frank Anthony Public School's case holding that sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act was applicable to such institutions was in conflict with the decision of the Constitution Bench in Lilly Kurian's case and therefore required reconsideration. The contention of learned Counsel for the respondents that sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act requiring the prior approval of the Director for the suspension of a teacher was a flagrant encroachment upon the right of the minorities under Art. 30 (1) of the Constitution to administer educational institutions established by them is answered in all the earlier decisions of this Court right from In re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 down to that in All Saints High School's case which have been referred to by the Court in Frank Anthony Public School's case. These decisions unequivocally lay down that while the right of the minorities, religious or linguistic, to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice cannot be interfered with, restrictions by way of regulations for the purpose of ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof can validly be prescribed. 12. It cannot be doubted that although disciplinary control over the teachers of a minority educational institution is with the management, regulations can be made for ensuring proper conditions of service for the teachers and also for ensuring a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action. As the Court laid down in Frank Anthony Public School's case the provision contained in sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is designed to afford some measure of protection to the teachers of such institutions without interfering with the managements, right to take disciplinary action. Although the Court in that case had no occasion to deal with the different ramifications arising out of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act, it struck a note of caution that in a case where the management charged the employee with gross misconduct, the Director is bound to accord his approval to the suspension. Although the Court in that case had no occasion to deal with the different ramifications arising out of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act, it struck a note of caution that in a case where the management charged the employee with gross misconduct, the Director is bound to accord his approval to the suspension. It would be seen that the endeavour of the Court in all the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional obligation to protect what is secured to the minorities under Art. 30(1) with the social necessity to protect the members of the staff against arbitrariness and victimisation." 21. In the case of All Bihar Christian Schools Association (supra) approving the provision contained in Section 18 of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management & Control) Act, 1982 having a sub-section thereunder which permits the School Service Board to scrutinise whether disciplinary proceedings taken by the Managing Committee have been in accordance with the rules and no more. Paragraphs-21 and 22 of the said judgment as quoted hereinbelow in relevant for the present purpose. "21. Clauses (a) to (k) of Section 18(3) lays down terms and conditions for granting recognition to a minority school, and these are regulatory in nature which seek to secure excellence in education and efficiency in management of schools. These provisions do not confer any unguided blanket or veto power on any outside agency or authority to veto the decision of the management of the school. Instead minority's right to manage its school in accordance with rules framed by it is fully preserved. The Legislature has taken care to confer a limited power on the School Service Board for granting approval to appointment and dismissal of a teacher which are necessary in the interest of educational need and discipline of the minority school itself. The terms and conditions applicable to a recognised minority school do not compel the management of a minority school to surrender its right of administration instead the management is free to administer its school in accordance with the rules framed by it. 22. Guarantee of freedom to a minority institution under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution does not permit the minority institution to act contrary to law and order, Law of contract, industrial laws or other general laws which are enacted for the welfare of the society. 22. Guarantee of freedom to a minority institution under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution does not permit the minority institution to act contrary to law and order, Law of contract, industrial laws or other general laws which are enacted for the welfare of the society. If the minorities' claim for immunity from the law of the land is upheld that would be unreasonable and against the interest of the minority institutions themselves. In (20) Christian Medical College Hospital Employees' Union v. Christian Medical College Vellore Association, Civil Appeal No. 8818 of 1983, decided on 20th October, 1987 : (reported in AIR 1988 SC 37 ) a question arose whether Sections 9A, 10, 11A, 12 and 33, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were applicable to educational institutions established and administered by minorities which are protected by Clause (1) of Art. 30 of the Constitution. This Court, answered the question in affirmative. The Court held that the labour legislation was applicable to the management of a minority educational institution and it observed thus (at p.50):–– "These rights which are enforced through the several pieces of labour legislation in India have got to be applied to every workman irrespective of the character of the management. Even the management of a minority educational institution has got to respect these rights and implement them. Implementation of these rights involves the obedience to several labour laws including the Act which is under consideration in this case which are brought into force in the country. Due obedience to those laws would assist in the smooth working of the educational institutions and would facilitate proper administration of such educational institutions. If such laws are made inapplicable to minority educational institutions, there is every likelihood of such institutions being subjected to maladministration. Merely because an impartial tribunal is entrusted with the duty of resolving disputes relating to employment, unemployment, security of work and other conditions of workmen it cannot be said that the right guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India is violated. Merely because an impartial tribunal is entrusted with the duty of resolving disputes relating to employment, unemployment, security of work and other conditions of workmen it cannot be said that the right guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India is violated. If a creditor of a minority educational institution or a Contractor who has built the building of such institution is permitted to file a suit for recovery of the money or damages as the case may be to him against such institution and to bring the properties of such institution to sell to realise the decretal amount due under the decree passed in such suit is Art. 30(1) violated? Certainly not. Similarly the right guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution is not violated, if a minority school is ordered to be closed when an epidemic breaks out in the neighbourhood, if a minority school of building is ordered to be pulled down when it is constructed contrary to town planning law or if a decree for possession is passed in favour of the true owner of the land when a school is built on a land which is not owned by the management of a minority school. In the same way if a dispute is raised by an employee against the management of a minority educational institution such dispute will have necessarily to be resolved by providing appropriate machinery for that purpose. Laws are now passed by all the civilised countries providing for such a machinery." 22. The case of Manohar Harries Walters (supra) a Two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was decided in the facts of the said case and the judgment therein does not help deciding the present question. 23. In the second Lilly Kurian case (supra) the provision of law which was under consideration was also a power of appeal before an appellate tribunal under the Kerala University Act, 1974 and the relevant finding of the two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the said case as contained in Paragraphs-15 and 17 are as follows:–– "15. This appeal before us from the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, therefore, appears to be the final round of litigation between the parties. Do Sections 60(7) and 61 of the Kerala University Act, 1974 violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution? This appeal before us from the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, therefore, appears to be the final round of litigation between the parties. Do Sections 60(7) and 61 of the Kerala University Act, 1974 violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution? Under Section 60(7) any teacher who is aggrieved by an order passed in any disciplinary proceedings can file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. The Appellate Tribunal has the power, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and after further such enquiry as may be necessary, to pass such order in appeal as it may think fit - including an order of reinstatement of the teacher concerned: Section 61 gives a right of appeal to a teacher in respect of past disputes which are spelt out there. This Court, in the case of St. Xavier's College observed in connection with Article 30(1) that the right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to administer educational institutions of their choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of minority institutions, similarly regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration. The right to administer is not the right to maladminister. The Court (AIR p. 1399, para 41: SCC p. 750, para 41) made a distinction between a restriction on the right of administration and a regulation prescribing the manner of administration. It said: "The choice in the personnel of management is a part of the administration. The university will always have a right to see that there is no maladministration. If there is maladministration the university will take steps to cure the same." 17. The decision of this Court in the case of the appellant herself in Lilly Kurian v. St. Lewina is more directly in point in the present case. This Court held that the conferment of a right of appeal to an outside authority (like the Vice-Chancellor in that case) took away the disciplinary power of a minority educational authority, particularly because the appellate power was unlimited and undefined. The grounds on which he could interfere had not been defined and he had unlimited powers, including the power to interfere with the punishment imposed. The grounds on which he could interfere had not been defined and he had unlimited powers, including the power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Such an unguided and uncanalised power which could be exercised in appeal constituted interference with the right of a minority institution to administer its own institutions. It could not be construed merely as a check on maladministration. The same is the position with Sections 60(7) and 61 of the Kerala University Act of 1974. Once again, the power of appeal is "uncanalised" and "unguided" and the Appellate Tribunal can even order reinstatement of a dismissed teacher. In the light of the ratio laid down by these decisions, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, in the impugned judgment, has rightly held that Section 60(7) and Section 61 of the Kerala University Act, 1974 give powers to the Appellate Tribunal that are uncanalised and unguided. These Sections are, therefore, inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed to religious and linguistic minorities by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. We do not see any reason to take a different view. Obviously we are not concerned in the present appeal with the provisions of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act, 1985 which confers very different and more specific and limited appellate powers on the Appellate Tribunal." 24. As discussed hereinabove, it is apparent that consistently right of Managing Committee of the minority institutions to administer the institutions has been recognised applying Article 30 of the Constitution of India, But it is also consistent that some controlling measures for keeping the standard of education and for applying the law, has been held to be permissible. Even in respect of disciplinary measure against teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution, rights of the Managing Committee is recognised and upheld though a provision of appeal by a member of the staff having suffered an order imposing penalty, has been upheld so long it does not exercise unguided and uncanalised power by an outsider. Such appellate Tribunal when has been constituted taking care of the guidelines for filling up such office and providing requisite powers, the control by such appellate authority has not been deprecated. Even the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have not deviated from the aforesaid. 25. Such appellate Tribunal when has been constituted taking care of the guidelines for filling up such office and providing requisite powers, the control by such appellate authority has not been deprecated. Even the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have not deviated from the aforesaid. 25. The judgments by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench in respect of the appeal provision at the instance of the present petitioner at an earlier stage quashed the then prevailing provision of law as contained in proviso to Regulation 24(f) of Code of Regulations for Anglo Indian and Other Listed Schools, 1993. 26. Even the said Division Bench of this Court when disapproved the earlier provision in Clause 24(f), it recorded its finding as follows:–– "78. The aforementioned decisions leave no manner of doubt that any provision which seeks to take away the right of the managing committee to pass any order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank would be violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Such a provision may, however, be upheld if an independent Tribunal wholly unconnected with the affairs of the institution as in the case of Delhi Act or a provision is made to oversee that the governing body complies with the principle of natural Justice." 27. A comparison between two provisions providing appeal shows that earlier the aggrieved member of a staff suffering a dismissal or removal order or an order resulting in reduction in rank, could prefer a reference to an Arbitration Committee which will be appointed by the Chairman of the State Board. This was held to be a power given to the outsider and such power was held to be unguided and uncanalised. 28. The provision of appeal on amendment is as follows:–– "AMENDMENT 1. For proviso to clause (f) of the Regulation 24 of the said Regulations, the following clause shall be substituted: "Provided that any employee who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank may, within a period of 90 days from the date of communication to him/her of the order of such dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, appeal against such order to the Tribunal constituted under Section 24A. 2. 2. After Regulation 24, a new Regulation 24A shall be inserted in the said Regulation as under: "24A Constitution function and working procedure of the Tribunal–– (a) The School Education, Department shall by appropriate order and in consultation with the Judicial Department of this Government constitute a Tribunal to be known as the Codified School Tribunal consisting of one person, who shall be called the Presiding Officer; Provided that no person shall be so appointed unless he has held office not below the rank of a District Judge or any equivalent Judicial Officer (b) If any vacancy other than temporary absence occurs in the office of the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal the Department of School Education shall, in consultation with the Judicial Department of this Government, appoint another person to fill the Vacancy; (c) The Presiding Officer as appointed shall ordinarily hold office for a term of three years; (d) The Department of School Education shall make available to the Tribunal such staff and funds as may be necessary for the discharge of its functions under this code; (e) That Tribunal shall have power to regular its own procedure in matters connected with the discharge of its functions; (f) In conducting the hearing of an appeal, the Tribunal shall follow the principles of natural justice and endeavour to dispose of such appeal as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from the date of preferring such appeal; (g) The Tribunal shall for the purpose of disposal of an appeal preferred under this code be deemed to have the same powers as are vested in a Court of appeal by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 including the power to stay the operation of the disciplinary action appealed against, as an interim measure, on such terms as it may think fit; (h) The decision of the Tribunal, be it of dismissal of the appeal by upholding the disciplinary action complained of or by allowing the appeal, thereby setting aside such be final and binding on all parties concerned." 29. Presently therefore, the appeal is to be heard by the appellate authority constituted by a person who has held office not below the rank of District Judge or any equivalent judicial officer. 30. Presently therefore, the appeal is to be heard by the appellate authority constituted by a person who has held office not below the rank of District Judge or any equivalent judicial officer. 30. It also appears that such appointment is to be made by the Central Education Department and in consultation with the judicial department of the Government for constituting the Tribunal. Appeal is available only in case dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and not in other cases of penalty. Further guideline has been provided that the Tribunal shall follow the principles of natural Justice. The power of the Tribunal has been also according to the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it appears that now the appellate Tribunal has been provided with sufficient guidelines and such power cannot be said to be unguided or uncanalised. 31. Moreover, a similar provision in the case of Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association (supra) was upheld by the Apex Court. Therefore, applying the law as aforesaid, I find that the impugned provision does not suffer from irregularity as argued and therefore, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Later–– After considering the prayer of the learned Advocate for the petitioners and upon hearing the learned Advocate for the respondents, there will be stay of operation of this order for a period of two weeks. Xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be delivered on priority basis.