Judgment N.K.Sud, J. 1. The appellant had filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Faridabad for claiming compensation for the injuries received by her in an accident on 13.3.1984. 2. It was claimed that the appellant was riding on the pillion of Hero Majestic M-oped No. HRW-3293 which was being driven by respondent No. 2, the owner of the M-oped. They were proceeding to Ballabagarh. The Moped was being driven in a rash and negligent manner and when they reached near the Escorts Plant No. 1 on Mathura Road, respondent No. 2 did not notice the car coming from the other direction and lost balance on spotting the car. Resultantly, the Moped hit the road-divider. The appellants sustained right wrist fracture. 3. On a consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the claim of the appellant was accepted by the Tribunal vide order dated 9.10.1985 and a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was determined as compensation payable to her. However, the Tribunal held that the compensation was payable by respondent No. 2 alone. It was held that the Insurance Company, respondent No. 1, could not be held liable in view of Clause (a) of Section 1 of the Insurance Policy as it was not the case of the appellant that she was being carried on the Moped by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. 4. The sole contention raised by Mr. R.S. Sihota, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the Tribunal was not justified in absolving the Insurance Company. He relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Amrit Lal Sood and Anr. v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi Thapar and Ors., AIR 1998 Supreme Court 1433 in support of his claim. He contended that even in the case before the Supreme Court, a similar provision had existed in the Insurance Policy and yet it as held that the Insurance company was liable to pay the compensation. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Munishwar Puri. appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company, respondent No. 1, relied on a decision of this Court in Surjit Singh and Anr. v. Santosh Kumari and Ors., 1989 ACJ 466, in which it was held that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 a pillion rider could not claim compensation from the Insurance Company. On the other hand, Mr. Munishwar Puri. appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company, respondent No. 1, relied on a decision of this Court in Surjit Singh and Anr. v. Santosh Kumari and Ors., 1989 ACJ 466, in which it was held that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 a pillion rider could not claim compensation from the Insurance Company. He pointed out that the insurance policy in that case also contained a clause which was identical to Clause (a) of Section 1 of the policy in the present case. 6. I have heard the rival contentions and gone through the authorities cited before me. The learned counsel for the appellant cannot derive any support from the decision of the Apex Court n Amrit Lal Soods case (supra). The relevant clause in the Policy in the case before the Supreme Court, was as under:- "1. The company will indemnify the Insured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the Motor Car against all sums including claimants costs and expenses which the Insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of (a) death of or bodily injury to any person but except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 , the Company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of the employment of such person by the Insured." On the other hand, the relevant clause in the Policy in the case in hand, reads as under :- "1. Subject to the Limits of Liability the Company will indemnify the Insured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of Motor Cycle against all sums including claimants cost and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of (a) death of or bodily injury to any person but except so far as is necessary to meet "the requirements of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 the Company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of the employment of such person by the insured and excluding liability to any person being conveyed in or on the Motor Cycle unless such person is being conveyed by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. " A conjoint reading of the two Clauses clearly shows that Clause (a) under considera tion by the Supreme Court did not contain any exception whereas Clause (a) in the pre sent case, as in the case of Surjit Singhs case (Supra), provided for an exception. This is apparent from the words "and excluding liability to any person being conveyed in or on the Motor Cycle unless such person is being conveyed by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment." 7 Thus, even if as per the Supreme Court judgment, the appellant can be said to be included in the opening part of Clause (a), she shall have to be excluded because of the aforesaid exception provided in the clause itself. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the appellant that she was not riding on the pillion of the Moped by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. The decision of this Court in Surjit Singh s case (supra) fully supports the stand of the Insurance Company. 1, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was justified in absolving the Insurance Company from payment of compensation. 8. The driver of the Moped, respondent No. 2, has filed cross objections denying her liability. No one is present on her behalf despite service, In the absence of any assistance from her side, I find no ground to interfere. 9. No other point has been raised. 10. Resultantly, the appeal as well as the cross objections are dismissed. No costs.