M. H. S. ANSARI, J. ( 1 ) BRIEF facts of the case are that the petitioner was employed by the State Fisheries Development Corporation, respondent herein (for short Corporation) as its company Secretary by appointment letter dated December 26/29, 1988. The appointment was temporary and petitioner was on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment, which may be extended, depending on performance and efficiency. The appointment was terminable during the probationary period if the petitioner's performance was not found to be satisfactory. ( 2 ) THE service of the petitioner for confirmation became due on January 12, 1990 and a proposal was placed before the Board for confirmation. However, by letter dated May 30, 1990, petitioner was informed as under;the Board of Directors in its 118th meeting held on 15th February, 1990 considered your case and decided to extend your probation period for another 6 months subject to review of your performance after 3 months. But even during this extended period of probation under this Corporation your performance has not improved rather it has been found to be completely unsatisfactory. Whereas it appears that your performance as Secretary to this corporation is not satisfactory and your service as Secretary is no longer required by this Corporation. Under clause 19 (c) your services are liable to be terminated by 3 months' notice by either party without assigning any reason, the Corporation always retaining the right of giving your 3 months' pay in lieu of 3 months' notice. After giving you a personal hearing by the Board of Directors it has been resolved in the 121st Board meeting held today i. e. 30th May, 1990 (afternoon) and you are being paid 3 months' pay by cheque No. 663009 dated 30. 5. 90 drawn on State Bank of India, Bikash Bhawan (G. O. C) Calcutta for Rs. 10,889-10. Your pay for the month of May upto 30. 5. 90 for Rs. 3,212. 35 is being disbursed in cash. ? ( 3 ) THE petitioner was directed to hand over charge. Cheque for the amount stated in the said letter was also forwarded to the petitioner. Petitioner has questioned the said order of termination in the instant writ application. For the said reason, the petitioner did not encash the said cheque. ( 4 ) NONE has appeared on behalf of the respondents nor any affidavit-in-opposition has been filed. Cheque for the amount stated in the said letter was also forwarded to the petitioner. Petitioner has questioned the said order of termination in the instant writ application. For the said reason, the petitioner did not encash the said cheque. ( 4 ) NONE has appeared on behalf of the respondents nor any affidavit-in-opposition has been filed. When the matter was moved before this Court on July 17, 1990, only direction that was issued was that the respondent shall produce the connected papers at the time of hearing and that in the meantime, if any appointment is given to the post of Company Secretary, the same would be abide by the result of the writ petition and the incumbent shall not be confirmed till the disposal of the writ petition. ( 5 ) MR. Milan Bhattacharjee appearing along with Mr. Ayon Banerjee, learned advocates for the petitioner contended that the impugned order of termination is illegal. It was further contended that the petitioner had been assigned additional duties and responsibilities of the post of Manager in addition to Company Secretary and such additional duties were discharged till the impugned order of termination dated May 30, 1990. The impugned order is passed merely to by-pass the disciplinary proceedings and, therefore, it is not an order of termination simpliciter. Reference has been made to the memo being No. 53/con. /90-91 dated April, 1990 issued by the Managing Director of Corporation wherein it was, inter alia, alleged that in the matter of printing of annual report for the Company for the year 1985-86 and 1986-87, necessary caution was not exercised which has resulted in incorrect printing of the composition of Board of Directors, registered address of the Corporation and the name of the Company Secretary during the relevant time. The petitioner was asked to submit his explanation within 7 days of receiving the said notice which has been marked as annexure 'd'. According to the petitioner, the said allegations were made without considering the allotment of duties specified by the previous Managing Director and without verifying whether the printing and proof reading of the concerned report was actually placed before and handled by the petitioner as Company Secretary. Petitioner replied to the said notice denying any liability and no further proceedings were taken thereafter based upon the said allegation or the notice served on the petitioner, annexure 'd'. Petitioner replied to the said notice denying any liability and no further proceedings were taken thereafter based upon the said allegation or the notice served on the petitioner, annexure 'd'. ( 6 ) THE further contention of Mr. Milan Bhattacharjee is with respect to the office circular dated May 3, 1990 issued by the petitioner requesting the staff including all officers of the Corporation to observe punctuality in attending office. The said circular has been marked as annexure 'f'. It is contended that by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the issuance of the said circular mentioning the fact that the officers have not been attending the office punctually displeased a section of the officers of the Corporation and immediately thereafter on May 5, 1990, petitioner was served with another memo being No. 56/con. /1990-91 dated April 23, 1990 is one issued by the Managing Director informing the petitioner that unless he drastically improved his performance, his case for confirmation cannot be considered. Petitioner was cautioned to take sincere efforts in registering his improvement lest the company be compelled to take a very harsh decision, which can be damaging to the career of the petitioner. ( 7 ) IT is, therefore, contended by Mr. Milan Bhattacharjee that the impugned order is punitive in nature. It has been passed vindictively and as and by way of punishment. The threat held out has been put into operation by the impugned order. The petitioner, it was contended is punished on unsubstantiated charges. The Court is entitled to lift the veil and find the real cause for terminating the petitioner's service. The impugned order has been passed without conducting any enquiry or offering any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and thus in violation of principles of natural justice and for that reason, the same is liable to quashed and set aside. Mr. Milan Bhattacharjee relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his contentions. 1) AIR 2001 SC 625 2) AIR 2000 SC 1080 3) AIR 1999 SC 983 4) 2000 (5) SCC 152 . ( 8 ) IT is settled law that the order though innocuous, it is open to the Court to lift the veil and find the cause for terminating the temporary-employment. If it is by way of punishment, then necessarily an enquiry has got to be made in accordance with the rules. ( 8 ) IT is settled law that the order though innocuous, it is open to the Court to lift the veil and find the cause for terminating the temporary-employment. If it is by way of punishment, then necessarily an enquiry has got to be made in accordance with the rules. Otherwise, it is open to the authorities, in terms of the order of appointment or the relevant rules, to terminate the service of a temporary employee without conducting an enquiry. The petitioner is a temporary employee and was on probation. The impugned order of termination (supra) is for the reason that the petitioner's performance as Secretary to the Corporation is not satisfactory and, therefore, his service as Secretary is no longer required by the Corporation. Relying upon clause 19 (c) of the terms of appointment whereby petitioner's services are liable to be terminated by 3 months' notice or pay in lieu thereof and without assigning any reasons and accordingly petitioner was paid 3 months' pay by cheque and was directed to hand over charge. It is thus a case of termination simpliciter and is not per se by way of punishment. So, it cannot be said to be for misconduct. It cannot be denied that the effect of the order has to be looked into. In the case on hand, the service of the petitioner while on probation was terminated in terms of clause 19 (c) of the letter of appointment. In G. B. Pant Agricultural and Technological University v. Kesho Ram 1994 (4) SCC 437 , Supreme Court held as under;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IN this case, since the authority has got power and had exercised it under condition 9 of the conditions of appointment, the termination per se is not illegal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) IN a recent judgment Ruma Pal, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and Anr. , 2002 (1) SCC 520 upon a review of the various judgments of the Supreme Court observed that whenever a probationer challenges his termination, the Court's first task will be to apply the test of stigma or the 'form' test. , 2002 (1) SCC 520 upon a review of the various judgments of the Supreme Court observed that whenever a probationer challenges his termination, the Court's first task will be to apply the test of stigma or the 'form' test. If the order survives this examination, the 'substance' of the termination will have to be found out. It was further observed as under;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . GENERALLY speaking when a probationer's appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. ( 10 ) JUDGED in the light of the above, the impugned order in the case on hand exfacie cannot be held to be stigmatic. ( 11 ) IN the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, its earlier judgment in Benjamin A. G. v. Union of India, 1967 (1) LLJ 718 was considered. In Benjamin's case, cited supra, complaint had been received against a temporary employee and a notice had been sent to the employee to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. An enquiry officer was appointed but before the enquiry was completed, the services of the employee were terminated with one months' salary in lieu of notice. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the order of termination and drew a distinction between the preliminary enquiry and a departmental enquiry. ( 12 ) IN Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U. P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and Anr. (1992) 2 SCC 21, reference has been made to several decisions of the Supreme Court where a simple termination order was passed and the same was not held to be punitive though a departmental enquiry was started, then dropped. Jagannadha Rao, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in that case observed as under;33. (1992) 2 SCC 21, reference has been made to several decisions of the Supreme Court where a simple termination order was passed and the same was not held to be punitive though a departmental enquiry was started, then dropped. Jagannadha Rao, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in that case observed as under;33. It will be noticed from the above decisions that the termination of the services of a temporary servant or one on probation, on the basis of adverse entries or on the basis of an assessment that his work is not satisfactory will not be punitive inasmuch as the above facts are merely the motive and the foundation. The reason why they are the motive is that the assessment is not done with the object of finding out any misconduct on the part of the officer, as stated by Shah, J (as he then was) in Ram Narayan Das case ( AIR 1961 SC 177 ). It is done only with a view to decide whether he is to be retained or continued in service. The position is not different even if a preliminary enquiry is held because the purpose of a preliminary enquiry to find out if there is prima facie evidence or material to initiate a regular departmental enquiry. It has been so decided in Champaklal case ( AIR 1964 SC 1854 ). The purpose of the preliminary enquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of the officer and if a termination follows without giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a case where a regular departmental enquiry is started, a charge-memo issued, reply obtained, and an enquiry officer is appointed - if at that point of time, the enquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, the same will not be punitive because the enquiry officer has not recorded evidence nor given any findings on the charges. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur Case ( AIR 1968 SC 1089 ) and in Benjamin case [ (1967) 1llj 718 (SC)]. In the latter case, the departmental enquiry was stopped because the employer was not sure of establishing the guilt of the employee. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur Case ( AIR 1968 SC 1089 ) and in Benjamin case [ (1967) 1llj 718 (SC)]. In the latter case, the departmental enquiry was stopped because the employer was not sure of establishing the guilt of the employee. In all these case, the allegations against the employee merely raised a cloud on his conduct and as pointed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes case [ (1980) 2 SCC 593 ] the employer was entitled to say that he would not continue an employee against whom allegations were made the truth of which the employer was not interested to ascertain. In fact, the terms of appointment or as permitted by the rules was conferring a benefit on the employee be passing a simple order of termination so that the employee would not suffer from any stigma which would attach to the rest of his career if a dismissal or other punitive order was passed. The above are all examples where the allegations whose truth has not been found, and were merely the motive. ( 13 ) IN Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U. P. and Ors. , (2000) 5 SCC 157, S. Saghir Ahmad, J. considered what is 'motive' and what is 'foundation' as also the difference between the two. It was declared that 'motive' is the moving power which impels action for a definite result or to put it differently, 'motive' is that incites or stimulates a person to do an action. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer take this action ? If it was factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and preliminary enquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, it was held, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and preliminary enquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, it was held, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct. ( 14 ) RUMA Pal, J. in Pavanendra Narayan Verma's case, cited supra, explained the underlying rationale of the several decisions on this aspect, in the following terms;if punishment were restricted to ?evil consequences?, the court's task in deciding the nature of an order of termination would have been easier. Courts would only have to scan the termination order to see whether it ex facie contains the stigma or refers to a document which stigmatizes the officer, in which case the termination order would have to be set aside on the ground that it is punitive. In these cases the ?evil consequences? must be assessed in relation to blemish on the employee's reputation so as to render him unfit for service elsewhere and not in relation to the post temporarily occupied by him. This perhaps is the underlying rationale of several of the decisions on the issue. ( 15 ) THUS, the principles that emerge from the various judgments of the Supreme Court on this aspect of the matter are that - (I) It must be first ascertained as to whether the order of termination is on the face of it stigmatic, if the order refers to any document which stigmatizes the officer, the same would be construed as punitive. An order which states the reason ?unsatisfactory work and conduct is not stigmatic. (II) Before the passing of the order of termination even if a show cause notice has been issued as regards misconduct and thereafter without proceeding further the order of termination simpliciter is passed, it will not be bad. (III) Even, in a case where a regular departmental enquiry is started, charge memo issued, reply obtained and an enquiry officer is appointed and if at that stage, the enquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, the same will not be punitive because the enquiry officer has not recorded evidence nor given any findings of the charges. ( 16 ) THE underlying rationale being that if the temporary appointment or probation is terminated, the Courts have only to see whether the order contains a stigma on the face of it or refers to a document which stigmatizes the officer in which case the termination order would have to be set aside on the ground that it is punitive as such order would jeopardize the rights of a probationer to seek employment elsewhere than the post which he temporarily occupied. ( 17 ) THE letters and documents referred by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned advocate for the petitioner, in the instant case have not been referred to in the impugned order of termination nor they can be regarded as stigmatic, at the worst they can be regarded as unestablished allegations and cannot affect future chances of service elsewhere. ( 18 ) AS the judgments relied upon be Mr. Milan Bhattacharjee have been considered in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma's case and distinguished, it is not necessary to deal with the said judgments in any great details in this judgment. For the reasons aforestated, there is no warrant to interfere with the impugned order. However, as on account of the pendency of the instant writ application, petitioner has not encashed the cheque issued to him which was enclosed to the impugned order of termination, a direction shall issue to the respondents to issue a fresh cheque to petitioner upon the petitioner returning the uncashed cheque to the respondents and within a period of one month from such submission of uncashed cheque by the petitioner to the respondent company. In the result, the writ application is allowed in part with directions as above. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Let urgent xerox certified copies of this judgment and order be furnished to the parties, if applied for, on priority basis. Application allowed