ORDER : (Per B.S.A. Swamy, J.) These two appeals involving common questions of law and facts arise out of a common judgment passed by a learned single Judge of this Court and they can be disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The parties herein are referred to as they are arrayed in the suits for the sake of convenience. 3. In these two appeals, this Court is called upon to decide the effect of deletion of section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act, 1950 (Act No. XXI of 1950)- hereinafter referred to as 'the Tenancy Act'-. The main issue to be decided in these appeals is whether both the suits (O.S.Nos.1001 of 1978 and 1174 of 1981) filed by the plaintiffs are liable to be dismissed as the suit transaction is hit by Section 47 of the Tenancy Act. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 4. The defendant in both the suits, Mohd. Qutubuddin filed O.S.No.38 of 1963 on the file of the Munsif Magistrate (West), Hyderabad against Syed Basharat Ahmed and his wife Smt. Ummatul Basheera Begum for permanent injunction by contending that he obtained lease of the suit schedule property in the year 1949 and that he was a protected tenant. During the pendency of the suit, Smt. Ummatul Basheera Begum wife of Syed Basharat Ahmed sold the property to one Smt. Muneera Sultana, first plaintiff, under a registered sale deed dated 28-7-1964 (Ex.A-2). By a Judgment and decree dated 30-11-1964, the said suit filed by the defendant was dismissed holding that he was in unlawful possession and the aspect of protected tenancy could not be gone into by the Civil Court. He carried the matter in appeal, by filing A.S.No. 76 of 1965 on the file of the Court of the I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and the said appeal was allowed by judgment and decree dated 16-9-1965 to the extent of protecting his possession as he is in possession of the property and further holding that as he failed to prove that he is a protected tenant, he is only a trespasser. Basharat Ahmed died on 5-10-1965 after the judgment in A.S.No. 76 of 1965. Then the wife of Basharat Ahmed filed Second Appeal No. 320 of 1966 in this Court. Basharat Ahmed died on 5-10-1965 after the judgment in A.S.No. 76 of 1965. Then the wife of Basharat Ahmed filed Second Appeal No. 320 of 1966 in this Court. During the pendency of the Second Appeal, she filed C.M.P. No.3179 of 1966 to bring on record Smt. Muneera Sultana and her power of attorney, Sri A. Tuljasingh, as additional appellants in the Second Appeal by stating that the land in question was sold to them and that petition was allowed. By judgment and decree dated 25-3-1969 the Second Appeal was allowed by this Court holding that the possession of the defendant is that of a trespasser and he is not entitled to injunction against the real owners. In the normal course, the plaintiffs would have got this decree executed and recovered possession by initiating execution proceedings. Perhaps, on legal advice, the plaintiffs represented by their power of attorney filed a suit in O.S. No. 2549 of 1977 on the file of the Court of the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the defendant, who was declared as a trespasser in the earlier proceedings, for recovery of possession of 4000 Square Yards out of the total extent of 9680 square yards bearing Municipal No.19-3-744 corresponding to Old No. 134/3 situated outside Gazibanda, Hyderabad and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs over the remaining extent of 5680 square yards. Subsequently, the said suit was re-numbered as O.S.No. 1001 of 1978. 5. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs filed another suit in O.S.No. 1424 of 1978 on the file of the Court of IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the same defendant seeking permanent injunction restraining him from cutting any trees or grass or ploughing or cultivating any portion of 4000 square yards and also restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs over the remaining extent of 5680 square yards and the same was re-numbered as O.S.No.1174 of 1981. Both the suits were clubbed together and by a common judgment and decree dated 19-11-1990, the trial Court dismissed the suits holding that Ex.A-2 sale deed dated 28-7-1964 is void and unenforceable for want of sanction by the Tahsildar under Section 47 of the Tenancy Act and validation under Section 50-B of the Tenancy Act and no title could be conveyed by way of void document. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, plaintiffs 2 and 3 preferred C.C.C.A. Nos. 28 and 29 of 1991 before this Court. During the pendency of the appeals, they have also filed C.M.P.No. 20357 if 1997 in CCCA.No. 29 of 1991 seeking amendment of the plaint by adding the relief of recovery of possession in respect of land measuring 5680 square yards. A learned single Judge of this court, by a common judgment and decree dated 19-3-1995 allowed C.C.C.A. No. 28 of 1991 by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court holding that no permission of the Tahsildar is required as Section 47 of the Tenancy Act was deleted from the statute book by the time the suit was instituted and dismissed C.C.C.A. No. 29 of 1991 by confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court in O.S.No. 1174 of 1981 holding that the defendant perfected his title to the property by adverse possession. The learned single Judge also dismissed the application filed for amendment of the plaint. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the learned single Judge, the plaintiffs preferred L.P.A. No. 134 of 1999 and the defendant preferred L.P.A. No. 131 of 1999 to the extent it went against their interests. SUBMISSIONS: 7. Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the defendant strenuously contends that since the transaction had taken place in the year 1964 at the time when Section 47 of the Tenancy Act was on the statute book, no valid title could have been conveyed to the plaintiffs by the owners of the suit schedule land. 8. Sri M. Rama Rao, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, contends that since Section 47 is deleted from the statute book by the time the suit was filed, the suit transaction cannot be treated as void on the ground that prior permission of the Tahsildar for conveyance of the property was not obtained. Both the counsel relied on several judgments in support of their contentions and as there was some ambiguity in the legal position, we heard the arguments advanced by both the counsel at length. 9. Both the counsel relied on several judgments in support of their contentions and as there was some ambiguity in the legal position, we heard the arguments advanced by both the counsel at length. 9. Before considering the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, we are inclined to refer to the objects for which the Tenancy Act was enacted and also the scheme of the Act along with the amendments made to the Tenancy Act from time to time. 10. The Tenancy Act was brought on the statute book with the object of-(i) regulating the relations of landholders and tenants of agricultural land and alienation of such land; (ii) preventing the landholders from sub-dividing the agricultural holdings; (iii) assuming the management of the agricultural lands in certain circumstances; and iv) introducing cooperative farms. 11. Section 2 (o) of the Tenancy Act defines 'permanent alienation'- as to include any sale, exchange or gift and any transfer of a right of occupancy or of the patta of a holding but does not include any disposition by will. From this it is clear that even if a right of occupancy is transferred, it is considered as permanent alienation. 12. Chapter II of the Tenancy Act deals with family holdings. Chapter III deals with tenants and their rights, the maximum rents payable by them and the circumstances under which the tenancy can be terminated. Chapter IV deals with protected tenants. Chapter V deals with restrictions on transfers of agricultural land. Chapter VI deals with management or acquisition of uncultivated, improperly cultivated or surplus lands. Chapter VII deals with the provisions of fragmentation and consolidation of holdings. Chapter VIII deals with cooperative farms. Chapter IX deals with constitution of Tribunal, procedure and powers of authorities, appeal, etc. Chapter X deals with offences and penalties. Chapter XI deals with miscellaneous provisions. 13. The scheme as disclosed by the provisions of the Act is to regulate the relationship between landholders and tenants and it does not affect the rights inter se between two persons setting up rights of ownership to a particular land or a dispute between an owner and a trespasser or a person other than a tenant. 13. The scheme as disclosed by the provisions of the Act is to regulate the relationship between landholders and tenants and it does not affect the rights inter se between two persons setting up rights of ownership to a particular land or a dispute between an owner and a trespasser or a person other than a tenant. The main purpose of bringing this enactment is to see that no land holder disposes the land without retaining the land less than the family holding and to protect the possession of the protected tenants from the unscrupulous landholders and to see that alienations are not made in contravention of the provisions of the Act. It is also important to note that at the time of introducing the legislation, the Government in office was thinking of formation of cooperative farms. 14. The Tenancy Act came into force on 11-6-1950. At that time, Section 47 did not find place and it was incorporated by Amendment Act No. 23 of 1951. Section 47 of the Tenancy Act read as under:'(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any decree or order of a Court, no permanent alienation and no other transfer of agricultural land shall be valid unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Tahsildar; Provided that the Tahsildar may declare a permanent alienation or any other transfer of agricultural land to be valid if commencement of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1954 and possession of the land transferred was given to the vendee before such commencement if application for sanction is made within one year after such commencement.(2)Applications for such previous sanction shall be made and disposed of in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed.'- 15. Again by Amendment Act No.3 of 1954, a proviso was incorporated to Sec. 47 and the word "Collector' was substituted by "Tahsildar'. As per sub-section (2) of Sec. 47, applications for previous sanction that were made shall be disposed of in accordance with the procedure that may be prescribed. To our mind, it appears, Section 48 was also incorporated along with Sec. 47 specifying restrictions on grant of sanction. As these provisions underwent several changes, we would like to refer the purport of these two provisions. To our mind, it appears, Section 48 was also incorporated along with Sec. 47 specifying restrictions on grant of sanction. As these provisions underwent several changes, we would like to refer the purport of these two provisions. As per Section 48, Tahsildar is not expected to grant prior sanction if the land held by the alienor or transferor is left with less than a family holding after alienation. Under the proviso to Section 48, this requirement was dispensed with in the case of an alienor, who is not an agriculturist or intends to give up the profession of agriculture or alienating the whole of the land in his possession or transferring the land for good and sufficient reasons retaining a basic holding or the area of the land held by the alienee or transferee after alienation or transfer would exceed three times the family holding so determined after excluding the land held by him, which is in possession of a protected tenant and relinquishes his right of resumption of land owned by him for his personal cultivation. Again the Government was given power to relax these conditions. Likewise, if the land is under mortgage, the Tahsildar is not expected to grant sanction for alienation. Under Section 48-A, if a protected tenant acquired a right of ownership under Sec. 38 or Section 38-D or Section 38-E and if eight years have not elapsed, the Tahsildar may sanction permission on payment of compensation to the protected tenant a sum equivalent to the reasonable price so determined so on and so forth. 16. Under Section 48-A, if a protected tenant acquired a right of ownership under Sec. 38 or Section 38-D or Section 38-E and if eight years have not elapsed, the Tahsildar may sanction permission on payment of compensation to the protected tenant a sum equivalent to the reasonable price so determined so on and so forth. 16. Again, by Act No.6 of 1964, Sec. 50-B was incorporated-(a) validating the allegations and other transfers of agricultural lands that have taken place after 10-6-1950 but before A.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Agricultural Holdings Act') came into force and where possession of such land was given to alienee or transferee before the date the act came into force; and (b) on or after coming into force of the Agricultural Holdings Act but before the date of commencement of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Agricultural Lands (Third Amendment) Act, 1969 and where possession of land was given to such alienee or transferee before such commencement and such alienation or transfer is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act and the alienee or transferee has to approach the Tahsildar for a certificate declaring that such alienation or transfer is valid within the period prescribed for the purpose. 17. Under sub-section (2) of Section 50-B, on receipt of such application, the Tahsildar, after making such enquiry and after satisfying himself that the consideration if any payable to the alienor or transferor or has been paid or deposited within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, require the alienee or transferee to deposit in the office of the Tahsildar an amount equivalent to the registration fee and stamp duty that would have been payable had the alienation or transfer been effected by registered document in accordance with the provisions of the Indian registration Act. Under sub-section (3) of Section 50-B, the validation of any alienation or transfer of any land shall not affect the right accrued to any person under Section 37-A or Section 38 or Section 38-E of the Act. Under sub-sec. (4) of Section 50-B, the Collector may suo motu at any time call for the record relating to any certificate issued or proceedings taken by the Tahsildar under this Section to satisfy himself about the legality and propriety of the certificate issued. Under sub-sec. (4) of Section 50-B, the Collector may suo motu at any time call for the record relating to any certificate issued or proceedings taken by the Tahsildar under this Section to satisfy himself about the legality and propriety of the certificate issued. The time limit prescribed for validation of the alienation seemed to have been extended from time to time and the last extension expired on 31-3-1972. 18. A combined reading of these provisions would give us an impression that the main purpose and intendment of incorporating Section 47 in the Tenancy Act is to see that the landholders shall not alienate the land as the Government is contemplating to introduce ceilings on agricultural holdings in the erstwhile Telangana State. The intention of the Legislature can be gathered from the provisions of Section 50-B of the Tenancy Act. Admittedly, the tenancy Act came into force on 11-6-1950 and the Agricultural Holdings Act came into force in the year 1961. By that time several alienations or transfers have taken place and in fact after the enactment of Agricultural Holdings Act also, some of the landholders seemed to be alienating the land apprehending further reduction in the land holdings. Hence, under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Sec.50-B, even the alienations made after the Agricultural Holdings Act prior to Third Amendment Act, 1969 were also held to be valid provided the transfer or alienation is not inconsistent with the provisions of Agricultural Holdings Act. Likewise, it is also seen from Section 48, the Tahsildar is not expected to grant prior sanction if the holding of the alienor is reduced to less than that of a family holding unless the alienor is giving up the profession of agriculture and the holding of the alienee is not exceeding three times after excluding the land held by him under the possession of protected tenant and he relinquishes the right of resumption. We should also keep in mind that in the subsequent amendments made to the Tenancy Act, the Government conferred title on protected tenants and they were declared as owners of the land. 19. We should also keep in mind that in the subsequent amendments made to the Tenancy Act, the Government conferred title on protected tenants and they were declared as owners of the land. 19. From the above it is clear that the intention of the Legislature in incorporating Section 47 is to see that the landholder shall not alienate the land to his detriment by not retaining a minimum extent of land i.e., the family holding and that the holding of the alienee shall not exceed more than three times of the land holding specified under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act and also to see that the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act are not circumvented. It is also to be noted that Sections 47 and 50-B all on the statute book simulaneously till Secs. 47 and 48 are deleted by Act No. 12 of 1969. A combined reading of these two provisions gives us an impression that the alienation that had taken place in contravention of Section 47 i.e., without obtaining prior sanction of the Tahsildar, is void. After incorporating Section 50-B in the Tenancy Act, the transaction became voidable at the instance of either the landholders or the tenant on the land or the Government, but by no others. When once it becomes voidable transaction, at the option of the parties it can be treated as a valid alienation. 20. Admittedly, in this case, the alienation seemed to have taken place after introduction of Section 50-B i.e., on 28-7-1964. nextly, it is seen that in the earlier litigation, during the pendency of the Second Appeal, the original and owner impleaded the plaintiffs in this suit as additional appellants in S.A.No. 320 of 1966 and at that time the defendant did not raise any contention that the plaintiffs cannot be brought on record as additional appellants as the transaction being void and the judgment was rendered declaring him as a trespasser in the presence of the plaintiffs and that became final. 21. After the earlier proceedings attained finality, the defendant filed a petition before the Revenue Divisional Officer, West Division, Hyderabad in File No. 4/2/104/70 to declare him as a protected tenant over the suit scheduled property. 21. After the earlier proceedings attained finality, the defendant filed a petition before the Revenue Divisional Officer, West Division, Hyderabad in File No. 4/2/104/70 to declare him as a protected tenant over the suit scheduled property. In that petition, the plaintiffs filed an application seeking permission of the Revenue Divisional Officer to get themselves impleaded as party respondents and the same was allowed on 5-7-1965 and the defendant was directed to amend the petition before 16-8-1965. As the defendant failed to amend the petition, The Revenue Divisional Officer dismissed the petition and the defendant carried the matter in appeal to the Joint Collector who allowed the same by order dated 10-1-1967 directing the Revenue Divisional Officer to give an opportunity to the petitioner to amend the plaint and proceed with the case. Though the defendant filed the amended petition on 12-6-1967, he did not produce any evidence in support of his only and specific plea that he is a protected tenant and ultimately the said petition was dismissed and that order became final. Even at the stage when the plaintiffs filed implead petition or after the petition was dismissed, the defendant did not choose to question the correctness of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in any competent forum and it has become final. 22. Now we have to consider the effect of deletion of Section 47 from the statute in the light of observations made in the judgments referred supra as well as other decisions which were cited by the counsel for the plaintiff. 23. In Nathulal v. Poolchand, 1970 AIR SC 546 their lordships of the Supreme Court while considering a similar provision, viz., Sec. 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 wherein the land could not be sold to an alienee, not being an agriculturist, without sanction of the State Government, held that though there was no condition in the contract that the sanction as required under Section 74 could be obtained, it must be implied that the transferor will obtain and sanction of the authority concerned since it is a well settled proposition that where by a statute, property was not transferable without the permission of the authority, the agreement to transfer the property must be deemed subject to implied condition that the transferor will obtain the sanction from the authority concerned. In fact, the said judgment was considered by their lordships in M. Pochamma (27 infra) and vital differences between the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act and the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act were pointed out in paragraph 31 of the judgment as hereunder:'1. While under Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Act no land could be sold to an alienee, not being an agriculturist, without sanction of the State Government, Section 47 of the A.P. Act clearly declared that no permanent alienation or other transfer of any agricultural land shall be valid, unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Tahsildar.2. There is no provision in the Madhya Bharat Act which corresponds to Section 50-B of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act, under which validation of transfers could be effected even later, once again emphasizing that validation of the transfer was essential.3. Since there was possibility in Nathulal (16 supra) for securing permission and thus complying with Section 70 (4) of the Madhya Bharat Act, Section 53-A was presumably held to safeguard the possession of the transferee. But in the facts of the case, their lordships observed that the possibility of securing sanction came to an end by 31-3-1972 and after that there was no possibility of validating the sale transactions.'- 24. In Qudrat Ullah v. Bareilly Municipality, 1974 AIR SC 396 their lordships of the Supreme Court considered the additional ground raised by the respondent-municipality that after repeal of Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 and introduction of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 wherein the buildings owned and vested in the State and Central Government and local authorities are exempted from the provisions of the Act under Section 2 of the said Act, the Board is entitled to an ejectment decree even if the earlier contracts are held to be leases in favour of the appellant and the effect of the repeal of the earlier Act. Counsel for the Municipality contended that the effect of repeal of a statute in the absence of saving clause is that it has to be considered as if the statute, so repealed, has never existed. Counsel for the Municipality contended that the effect of repeal of a statute in the absence of saving clause is that it has to be considered as if the statute, so repealed, has never existed. In paragraph-24 of the judgment, their lordships formulated the question to be answered to the following effect: ' The only further question is whether it is permissible for this Court to take note of the extinguishment of the statutory tenancy at this stage and grant relief to the appellant accordingly.'-Their lordships in paragraph -27 held as under: From what we have stated above, it follows that the argument of any vested right in the defendant being taken away does not hold good; nor is there any foundation for the contention that the later Act is being applied retrospectively. All that we hold is (a) that a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinary law may not necessarily be transmuted into a substantive right in the defendant, (b) that rights of a statutory tenant created under a temporary statute, as in this case, go to the extent of merely preventing the eviction so long as the temporary statute lasts, (c) that the provisions of S.43 do not preserve, subsequent to repeal, any right to rebuff the plaintiff's claim for eviction, and (d) that S.6 of the General Clauses Act does not justify anything larger or for any time longer than S.2 of the Act confers or lasts. It is appropriate for a court to do justice between parties to the litigation and in moulding the relief in the light of the subsequent developments, to take note of legislative changes. A court of justice should, if it could, adjudicate finally and not leave the door ajar for parties to litigate again. In the present case, it is not seriously disputed that if the plaintiff were to sue for recovery of possession today, the Rent Control Law does not stand in the way. Therefore, it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and ending litigation, which has seen two decades pass, to conclude it here by taking cognizance and adjusting the relief in the light of the later Act and repeal of the earlier Act. Therefore, it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and ending litigation, which has seen two decades pass, to conclude it here by taking cognizance and adjusting the relief in the light of the later Act and repeal of the earlier Act. Nevertheless, it is contended that the present suit cannot be decreed in view of the provisions of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972.'- 25. In arriving at the above view, their lordships relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, 1956 AIR SC 77 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that 'what in effect, learned counsel for the appellant contends for is not the "previous operation of the repealed law' but the future operation of the previous law'- and also referred to other authorities, including the decision of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal, 1941 AIR F.C. 5. 26. From the above, it is seen that unless the repealing statute provides saving clause protecting the rights accrued under the repealed Act, in this case disability has to be considered as if the statute, so repealed, has never existed. 27. In India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore 1975 AIR SC 155, their lordships of the Supreme Court considered the effect of repeal of an Act in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the judgment as under: 'The general rule of construction is that the repeal of repealing Act does not revive anything repealed thereby. But the Operation of this rule is not absolute. It is subject to the appearance of a 'different intention'- in the repealing Statute. Again such intention may be explicit or implicit. But the Operation of this rule is not absolute. It is subject to the appearance of a 'different intention'- in the repealing Statute. Again such intention may be explicit or implicit. The questions, therefore, that arise for determination are: Whether in relation to cigarettes, the 1941 Act was repealed by the 1954 Act and the latter by the 1958 Act- Whether the 1954 Act and 1958 Act were repealing enactments- Whether there is anything in the 1954 Act and the 1958 Act indicating a revival of the 1941 Act in relation to cigarettes-It is now well settled that 'repeal'- connotes abrogation or obliteration of one Statute by another, from the Statute book as completely as if it had never been passed'-; when an Act is repealed,'- it must be considered (except as to transactions past and closed) as if it had never existed'-. (Per Tindal, C.J. in Kay v. Goodwin and Lord Tenterdon in Surtees v. Ellison cited with approval in State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co.).Repeal is not a matter of mere form but one of substance, depending upon the intention of the Legislature. If the intention indicated expressly or by necessary implication in the subsequent Statute was to abrogate or wipe off the former enactment, wholly or in part, then it would be a case of total or pro tanto repeal. If the intention was merely to modify the former enactment by engrafting an exception of granting an exemption, or by super-adding conditions, or by restricting, intercepting or by suspending its operation, such modification would not amount to a repeal (see Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. pp. 349, 353, 373, 374 and 375; Maxwell's Interpretation of statutes, 11th Edn. pp 164 , 390 based on Mount v. Toylor; Southerland's Statutory Construction 3rd Edn. Vol. I, Paragraphs 2014 and 2022, pp. 468 and 490). Broadly speaking, the principal object of a repealing and amending act is to "excise dead matter, prune off superfluities and reject clearly inconsistent enactments' see Mohinder Singh v. Mst. Harbhajan Kaur.'- 28. From the above it is seen that when once an Act is repealed, it does not revive anything thereby and it amounts as if it had never been passed, unless an intention is expressly or impliedly provided in the Act repealing the earlier Act. The intention is to be gathered from the subsequent statute. Harbhajan Kaur.'- 28. From the above it is seen that when once an Act is repealed, it does not revive anything thereby and it amounts as if it had never been passed, unless an intention is expressly or impliedly provided in the Act repealing the earlier Act. The intention is to be gathered from the subsequent statute. In the absence of any intention, the subsequent statute is to abrogate or wipe of, the former enactment wholly or in part in which case; it is a pro tanto repeal. 29. In this case, the repeal is simpliciter without preserving prohibition incorporated in Section 47 any longer and it amounts to a total repeal. In other words, the statute as if was not in existence. If we examine the facts of the case, though the alienation is at a time when Section 47 and Section 50-B were on the statute the possession could not be delivered because of the litigation pending in the Civil Court. By the time the proceedings in the Civil Court and Revenue Court came to an end and rights of the parties crystallized not only Sec. 47 was deleted from the statute but also the procedure contemplated for getting the transfer validated expired. 30. We have referred to the decision in Parvathamma (20 infra) wherein their lordships considering the effect of confirmation of sale in the auction conducted by Court without obtaining prior sanction of the Tahsildar and having taken note of the repeal of the Section, their lordships observed: 'Section 47 and other connected provisions of the main Act have been omitted with the result that no sanction is at all necessary before confirming the sale in favour of the auction purchaser'-. 31. In a well considered judgment in S.A. Gaffar, 1974 A.P.L.J. 316 (30 infra), his lordships Justice Venkatarama Sastry after considering various decisions held that 'confirmation already made should be deemed to be valid in the same way as possession given under such agreement when Section 47 was in force, which was held to be unauthorised by various decisions is now held by their lordships to be valid possession. On the same parity of reasoning, the confirmation of sale without the necessary sanction under Section 47 should also be held to be valid even after the deletion of Section 47 from the statute book'-. 32. On the same parity of reasoning, the confirmation of sale without the necessary sanction under Section 47 should also be held to be valid even after the deletion of Section 47 from the statute book'-. 32. In S. Rafiuddin v. S. Asaduddin, 1984 A.P.L.J. 75 a Division Bench of this Court held that even if a prohibition as contained in Section 47 of the Act is there at the time when unregistered sale deed (Ex.B-1) was obtained, no sanction for finalisation of registration of Ex.B-1 was necessary since Section 47 was deleted by the time the suit was instituted. 33. In G.V.K. Rama Rao (26 infra), a learned single Judge of this Court having referred to Full Bench judgment in K.Parvathamma (20 infra) held: 'I carefully perused the above cases and I am of the view that the ratio laid down by this Court in all judgments including that of Full Bench is that in view of repeal of Section 47 of Tenancy Act with effect from 18-3-1969 all previous transactions are in no way effected (sic., affected). Ex.A-1 sale deed dated 20-3-1967 is, therefore, a valid transaction. Question No.2 is thus held in favour of the plaintiffs.'- 34. But the very learned Judge while considering the case of a protected tenant in B. Jangaiah (25 infra) held that the view taken by him in the above case was not correct. But we have seen the facts ;in the cases of Jangaiah (25 infra) and G.V.K. Rama Rao (26 infra). Admittedly, the Jangaiah's case (25 infra) relates to the rights of a protected tenant and as observed from the preamble of the Act, it is clear that Section 47 is intended mainly (i) to see that agrarian reforms that are in the offing are not defeated by unscrupulous landlords, (ii) to protect the interests of the protected tenants and (iii) to see that unscrupulous protected tenants may not knock away the properties of landlords by dubious methods. This is evident from the guidelines laid down in Section 48 of the Act for grant of sanction for effecting alienations by the landlords. Hence, even if the learned Judge feels that the decision in G.V.K. Rama Rao (26 infra) is wrong, the overwhelming view of this Court coupled with the decision of the Supreme Court on the effect of repeal of a statute could not be ignored. 35. Hence, even if the learned Judge feels that the decision in G.V.K. Rama Rao (26 infra) is wrong, the overwhelming view of this Court coupled with the decision of the Supreme Court on the effect of repeal of a statute could not be ignored. 35. Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar countering the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Kristo Mandal v. Dhankisto Manda, 1969 AIR SC 204 wherein the lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the repeal of Section 27 of the Sonthal Parganas Regulation, 1972, which prohibited any transfer of holding by a ryoth either by sale, gift, mortgage or lease or by any other contract or agreement, observed:'It is true, that Ss.27 and 28 of the Regulation were repealed by the Santal Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 14 of 1949. But Sec. 27 was in force when the said transaction of exchange was made and governed the transaction made by Nilmoni Dasi and Premmoyee, Dasi. That transaction being invalid and void, the fact that Sec. 27 was subsequently repealed made no difference as the repeal could not have, the effect of rendering an invalid and void transaction a valid and binding transaction.'- 36. The cases referred to supra are later in point of time and in Ram Kristo (27 supra), their lordships except holding that the invalid and void transaction cannot be a binding transaction did not consider the effect of repeal of a provision as was done in the cases of State of Punjab v. M.S. Pratap Singh, 1955 AIR SC 84. Qudrat Ullah (2 Supra) and India Tobbacco Co. (5 supra). Hence, we are inclined to follow the view taken by the Supreme Court in those three decisions than the view expressed in Ram Kristo Mandal (7 supra), more so without any discussion on the effect of repeal of a provision. 37. The next question to be considered is whether the defendant, who was declared as a trespasser in the earlier proceedings in S.A.No. 320 of 1966 in the Civil Court and the proceedings before Revenue Court wherein his request for recording his name in the Tenancy Register was rejected, can resist the suit on the ground that the alienation in favour of the plaintiff is hit by Section 47 of the Act. As stated supra, while the suit filed by the defendant for injunction against the owner of the property was pending, the owner sold the property to the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the owner herself filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition before this Court to bring the plaintiffs as additional appellant in the second appeal pending before this Court by stating that she sold the land in favour of the Plaintiff. At the point of time, the defendant did not raise any objection that the transaction being hit by Section 47 of the Act and in fact the plaintiffs were impleaded as additional appellants in the Second Appeal. In the presence of plaintiffs, the defendant was declared as trespasser. When the defendant approached the Revenue Divisional Officer seeking entry of his name in the protected tenancy register, the plaintiffs got themselves impleaded and pleaded that the property was purchased by them. Even at that stage, he did not raise this issue. Ultimately, in both the Courts, the defendant lost his case. Now the law is well settled with regard to the position of a trespasser. The trespasser can maintain his possession against the entire world, except the real owner. In this case when once the earlier proceedings have taken place in the presence of plaintiffs and the defendant was declared as trespasser, necessary inference to be drawn is that the court below recognised the sale in favour of the plaintiffs herein and held that the defendant is a trespasser. From that moment, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's are strangers to the property as the right of the defendant over the property was recognised by a competent court. 38. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the judgments in S.A.No.320 of 1966 and the Revenue Court operate as res judicata, and the defendant cannot raise this issue in the third round of litigation. 39. Mr. Suresh Kumar cited the following decisions also for the proposition that there cannot be any estoppel against the statute and no Court can enforce a transaction as valid which, according to law, is invalid. 40. In Surajmull v. Triton Insurance Co.9, the owner of the steamer filed a suit claiming damages for breach of an alleged contract to 'issue policies of insurance covering war risks on goods'- shipped or to be shipped. 40. In Surajmull v. Triton Insurance Co.9, the owner of the steamer filed a suit claiming damages for breach of an alleged contract to 'issue policies of insurance covering war risks on goods'- shipped or to be shipped. In this case after some oral discussion between the appellant firm and the Insurance Company, the company refused to issue policy and on that the appellant insured the goods else where at higher premium and claimed excess premium paid by the company as damages. Adverting to the situation as no insurance policy was issued, Justice Lord Summer held as follows:-'No Court can enforce as valid, that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from which a Court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties, or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset.'-. 41. We feel this ratio decidendi of this case is not of much help, since in the peculiar circumstances of this case; we have to consider the effect of Sec.50-B read with Section 47 when both Sections are on the statute book. 42. The learned counsel cited yet another judgment in Dinbai v. The Dominion of India, 1951 AIR Bombay 72 for the proposition that there can be no estoppel against law and no person can be precluded from contending that certain orders are invalid as the orders are valid or not is a pure question of law. This proposition is unexceptionable. But we have to consider the effect the deletion of Sec.47 in the case on hand and the time limit fixed under Section 50-B for validation of the alienation expired by the time the suit was laid. 43. The counsel relied on the judgment in Mannalal v. Kedar Nath, 1977 AIR SC 536 for the proposition that whether a contract, expressly or by implication, is forbidden by State, no court can give its assistance to give effect. In other words what is done in contravention of the provisions of an Act of the legislature cannot be made subject of an action. Again application of this principle will depend upon the view we are going to take on the fact of deletion of Sec.47 at the time when the suit is instituted. 44. In other words what is done in contravention of the provisions of an Act of the legislature cannot be made subject of an action. Again application of this principle will depend upon the view we are going to take on the fact of deletion of Sec.47 at the time when the suit is instituted. 44. He also placed reliance on two judgments of the Madras High Court in Koneridous v. N. Subbaiah Naidu, 1975 AIR Madras 124 and Zalim v. Babu Tirlochan Prasad Singh, 1937 AIR Oudh 220 (F.B.), for the proposition that it is always open to a party to question the correctness of any order of competent court passed in earlier proceedings by bringing the legal representatives on record in subsequent proceedings. In this case, the facts as stated supra are altogether different and hence we are not referring to these judgments, as they cannot come to the aid of the defendants. 45. On the other hand, in Vijayabai v. Shriram Tukaram, (1999) 1 SCC 693 their lordships of the Supreme Court held:' It would be impermissible to permit any party to raise an issue, inter se, where such an issue under the very Act has been decided in an early proceeding. Even if res judicata in its strict sense may not apply but its principle would be applicable. Parties who are disputing now, if they were parties in an early proceeding under this very Act raising the sa me issue, would be stopped from raising such an issue both on the principle of estoppel and constructive res judicata'-. 46. Hence, we are of the view that the defendant cannot be permitted to raise the issue that the alienation is hit by Section 47 of the Act at this belated stage. 47. Nextly, Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in M.M.B. Catholicos v. M.P. Athanasius, 1954 AIR SC 526 for the proposition that the plaintiff has to succeed or fall on the strength of his own title than trying to destroy the title of the defendant. Absolutely we are in full agreement with the proposition. When once we hold that the alienation in favour of the plaintiff is not hit by Section 47, perhaps the defendant has no case as he was already declared by a competent Court that he was in unauthorised possession of the property, which has become final. Absolutely we are in full agreement with the proposition. When once we hold that the alienation in favour of the plaintiff is not hit by Section 47, perhaps the defendant has no case as he was already declared by a competent Court that he was in unauthorised possession of the property, which has become final. 48. In the earlier round of litigation in Second Appeal No. 320 of 1966 dated 5-3-1999, this Court having taken note of the alienation made by the first appellant in favour of appellants 2 and 3, who were brought on record as per orders in C.M.P. No. 3179 of 1966 dated 26-9-1966, categorically recorded a finding:'This appeal is filed by the first defendant, originally appellants 2 and 3 were added in this Court. The plaintiff filed the suit for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession alleging that he has the status of protected tenant and that he continued in possession as a tenant after the death of his father. It is admitted that the defendants are owners of this property'-. 49. Since the plaintiffs were already brought on record in the earlier proceedings as owners of the property, the defendant herein cannot contend that they are strangers and he could protect his possession against them, who are admittedly true owners as recorded in the above appeal. 50. Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar cited another judgment in Tatoba Ganu v. Tara Bai, 1957 AIR Bombay 280 for the proposition that the plaintiff has to prove his title and the Court is not concerned with the weakness of the title of the defendant in a suit for ejectment and that the defendant may be a trespasser but the defendant in possession is entitled to ask the plaintiff to prove strictly his title. Admittedly that was a suit filed for ejectment of the defendant therein. Here, the suit was filed for recovery of possession and injunction by the plaintiffs and their title to the property was already recognised in earlier proceeding itself and hence the defendant cannot resist the suit for recovery of possession and injunction. 51. Nextly, Mr. Admittedly that was a suit filed for ejectment of the defendant therein. Here, the suit was filed for recovery of possession and injunction by the plaintiffs and their title to the property was already recognised in earlier proceeding itself and hence the defendant cannot resist the suit for recovery of possession and injunction. 51. Nextly, Mr. Suresh Kumar brought to our notice the passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexander, 1968 AIR SC 1165 which was borrowed from Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73 which is to the following effect:' It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.'- 52. In the light of the above principle, as already stated, if the rightful owner comes forward and asserts his title within the prescribed period of limitation, the person in possession of the property and exercising the ordinary rights of ownership has to give way to the rightful owner. 53. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Suresh Kumar, contended that on the day when Smt. Ummatul Basheera Begum sold the property in favour of one Muneera Sultana, the first plaintiff herein viz., on 28-7-1964, she had no title to the property and as such it cannot be said that she conveyed the property validly. On that ground also, the learned counsel contends, the alienation cannot be given effect to. But the fact remains that the defendant filed a suit in O.S.No. 38 of 1963 against Basharat Ahmed and his wife Ummatul Basheera Begum for permanent injunction in 1963. If Ummatul Basheera Begum was not having a right over the property, it is not known as to why the defendant made her as party defendant in the suit. But the fact remains that the defendant filed a suit in O.S.No. 38 of 1963 against Basharat Ahmed and his wife Ummatul Basheera Begum for permanent injunction in 1963. If Ummatul Basheera Begum was not having a right over the property, it is not known as to why the defendant made her as party defendant in the suit. Even assuming for the sake of argument that she was not having ownership right over the property that was sold by her in 1964, during the pendency of the suit and after disposal of A.S.No. 320 of 1966 and before filing S.A.No.320 of 1966, Basharat Ahmed died and his wife Ummatul Basheera Begum, who sold the property to the plaintiffs, succeeded to the property of Basharat Ahmed as they had no issues. In fact no other legal heir of Basharat Ahmed after his death claimed any right over the suit schedule property all these years i.e., from 5-10-1965, the day on which Basharat Ahmed died. The contention raised by the counsel is squarely answered by Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, which reads as under:'Where a person fraudently erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists.Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option.'- 54. Even assuming for the sake of arguments, Ummatul Basheera Begum has no right of ownership over the property, after the death of her husband, Basharat Ahmed, on 5-101965, she has not only acquired the ownership rights over the suit schedule property but also in the second appeal she filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition to bring the plaintiffs as appellants 2 and 3 on record by stating that she sold the property to them, which petition was ordered by this Court. Hence, it could be seen that she not only acquired ownership rights over the property subsequent to the alienation but also filed an application stating that she has transferred the right over the property in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence, the defendant cannot contend that the plaintiffs have no right of ownership over the property. Hence, it could be seen that she not only acquired ownership rights over the property subsequent to the alienation but also filed an application stating that she has transferred the right over the property in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence, the defendant cannot contend that the plaintiffs have no right of ownership over the property. Accordingly, this contention is also rejected. 55. Their lordships of the Supreme Court had considered the effect of alienation pendente lite in Gangubai v. B. Shama Rao1956 AIR SC 593. In that case, after Keshavananda was adjudged as insolvent and the estate vested in the official receiver, plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property in execution of a decree in O.S.No.100/99-20. The defendant raised a contention that the transaction is void and no title was conferred on her because the official receiver, in whom the estate of Keshavananda vested, was not made a party to the proceedings. In paragraph-25 of the judgment, their lordships held as under: But it is argued for the appellants that having regard to the words of S.52 that pendente lite 'the property cannot be transferred'-, such a transfer must, when it falls within the mischief of that section, be deemed to be non est, that in consequence Keshavananda must, for purposes of lis pendens, be regarded as the owner of the properties, notwithstanding that he had transferred them, and that the Official Receiver who succeeded to his rights had a right to be impleaded in the action.This contention gives no effect to the words 'so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein'-, which make it clear that the transfer is good except to the extent that it might conflict with rights decreed under the decree or order. It is in this view that transfers pendente lite have been held to be valid and operative as between the parties thereto'-.56 From the above decision, it is seen that the transfer is good between the parties except to the extent that it might conflict with the rights decreed under the decree or order. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. A purchaser who purchased the property in dispute will get no better title than what the real vendor was having in the property. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. A purchaser who purchased the property in dispute will get no better title than what the real vendor was having in the property. When once such a party gets himself impleaded in the proceedings by contending that he purchased the property pendente lite, it has to be presumed that he steps into the shoes of the owner of the property and if the owner's right to property is upheld it amounts to upholding the title in favour of his vendee. 57. Assuming for a moment that the principle of res judicata is not applicable, we would like to refer to the case-law cited by the learned counsel on both sides with regard to the validity of the transaction. 58. Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar relied on a Full Bench judgment of this court in K. Parvathamma v. The Commissioner of Excise,. It is true that in this case the Full Bench observed that in the case of private alienations the rule is well settled that prior sanction should be obtained before the registration of the document, i.e., at the stage where the title to the property passes on to the purchaser. Like wise in the case of involuntary sale, sanction should be obtained before sale is confirmed, i.e., the stage at which there is transfer of the property by operation of law. Their Lordship having placed reliance on another Full Bench judgment of this court in P.E. Ramakistaiah v. Pochaiah21 observed that after the sale is held and the purchaser is ascertained, he should then apply to the Tahsildar for sanction under Sec.47 of the Tenancy Act and on the strength of such prior sanction alone, the sale will be confirmed under Section 139 of the Land Revenue Act which represents the final stage at which transfer by operation of law takes place. This judgment is rendered in a writ petition filed by the petitioner, the daughter of the landholder, seeking writ of mandamus directing the Collector to hold fresh auction of the suit schedule properties as prior permission was not obtained as required under Section 47 of the Tenancy Act before bringing the properties of her father to sale for recovery of excise arrears. 59. 59. Admittedly, the party who complained against the illegality in the transfer is no other than the daughter of excise contractor who fell in excise arrears and whose properties were brought to sale in revenue auction. While considering the plea, the learned Judges made a passing observation that 'in private sales, the rule is well settled that prior sanction should be obtained before the registration of the document'-. But to our mind that in the light of Sec.50-B of the Tenancy Act even if no prior permission is obtained before sale transaction is completed the alienee is given the opportunity to approach the Tahsildar for obtaining the certificate. When once the conditions laid down in Sections 48 and 50-B are complied with, the Tahsildar cannot refuse to grant permission. It is pertinent to note that the learned Judges having held that prior sanction is required before confirmation of sale observed as under:' The result of their decision is that prior sanction under Sec.47 is required only before the sale is confirmed under Sec.138 of the Revenue Act. By virtue of the order of stay passed the revenue sale in favour of the purchaser has not yet been confirmed. But it has to be noted that in view of the recent legislation viz., Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (Third Amendment) (Act 12 of 1969 which came into force on 18-03-1969, Sec. 47 and the other connected provisions of the main Act have been omitted with the result that no sanction is at all necessary before confirming the sale in favour of the 5th respondent'-. 60. From this view of the learned Judges it is clear that when once the section prohibiting alienations of the immovable property is deleted from the statute, no sanction is required for confirmation of the sale in favour of the 5th respondent since the title passes on to the purchaser only after registration. 61. Coming to the case on hand, to our mind though the sale took place on 28-7-1964 when both Sections 47 and 50-B are on the statute book, the plaintiffs were not put in possession of the land since the proceedings initiated in the Civil Court by the defendant were pending at that point of time and the same came to an end only in 1969. Subsequently, the defendant approached the Revenue Divisional Officer to enter his name in the official record. That litigation came to an end on 6-6-1974 by which time S.47 is deleted from the statute book. It is also to be seen that time limit prescribed under Sec.50-B of the Act to obtain prior permission was not available as the extended time came to an end on 31-3-1972. 62. The next decision relied on by the learned counsel is that of this Court in Lachamma v. K. Chinna Venkata Reddy, 1972 A.P.L.J. 46 (SN) : 1974 ILR (A.P.) 119 wherein the Division Bench held as follows: 'A plain reading of Sec.50-B would clearly indicate that it is prospective in operation and not retrospective. Mere deletion of Sec.47 or introduction of Sec.50-B does not by itself validate all the transfers which were valid; such invalid transfers do not become legally enforceable unless a seal of approbation is put up by the Tahsildar by granting a certificate a certificate validating the sale.'- 63. From the above, it is seen that their lordships were dealing with the alienations that have taken place prior to introduction of Section 50-B. Nextly, the facts and circumstances in this case are not known as only a Short Note of the judgment was placed before us. Even in this judgment their Lordships observed that invalid transfers do not become legally enforceable unless a seal of approbation is put up by the Tahsildar by granting a certificate validating the sale. But there was no indication at what stage the certificate has to be obtained. But in any of the cases cited before us, none the alienations have taken place when both the Secs.47 and 50-B are on the statute book. In the absence of Sec.50-B perhaps the counsel may be justified in contending that this being an illegal alienation it cannot be validated by mere introduction of Sec.50-B without the seal of the approval by the Tahsildar. But when both the sections are on the statute book, keeping in view the scheme of the Act we have already taken the view that it is only a voidable alienation but not a void alienation. But when both the sections are on the statute book, keeping in view the scheme of the Act we have already taken the view that it is only a voidable alienation but not a void alienation. When once it is voidable alienation it can be validated by any of the parties involved in the transaction i.e., the vendor, vendee and in this case it is the Tahsilldar who has to give the seal of approbation. 64. The very fact that the vendor or her successors did not question the alienation or the Tahsildar who is competent authority under the Act have not raised any dispute with regard to the validity of the transaction though it was brought to the notice of the Tahsildar by the defendant by necessary implication, it has to be held that the Tahsildar has given his seal of approval to the transaction. Nextly, the principle laid down in this case may not come to the aid of the defendant, since the transaction is not hit by Section 47 of the Act as no possession was delivered to the plaintiff at the time of the transaction as held by the Court in the decision referred to hereunder and the alienation is subject to the result of the proceedings pending in Civil Court. 65. The next decision relied on by the learned counsel is M. Seeta Devi v. M.R.O. 1990 A.P.L.J. 219 for the proposition that the registered sale deed obtained without obtaining permission under Sec.47 is void. This judgment is again rendered in a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the petitioners questioned the orders passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer refusing to cancel mutation of the lands in favour of the 3rd respondent who is no other than one of the sons of original land holder. The contention of the petitioners was that the 3rd respondent and his two sons sold an extent of Ac.14.12 guntas of land by a registered sale deed to one Pochamma without obtaining prior sanction and the Mandal Revenue Officer erred in mutating the lands in favour of the 3rd respondent. While considering the case of the petitioner, the learned Judge observed that 'prior sanction by the Tahsildar was not obtained as required under Sec. 47 of the Act and hence the sale is to be considered as void'-. While considering the case of the petitioner, the learned Judge observed that 'prior sanction by the Tahsildar was not obtained as required under Sec. 47 of the Act and hence the sale is to be considered as void'-. The learned Judge in arriving at the above decision relied upon a judgment of this Court in Ushanna v. Sambhu Gond, 1985 A.P.L.J. 32 wherein this Court held that 'if the transferee or alienee did not avail himself of this opportunity of getting his alienation and possession validated under Section 53-B, he should suffer the consequences, since the transfer and delivery of possession in his favour remained invalid and unlawful'-. 66. In this case, it is seen that the petitioner purchased the land from one Hanumantha Rao after deletion of Sec.47 who in turn purchased the same from the first son of the landholder i.e., Kesavulu after obtaining prior permission as required under Sec. 47 of the Act and was questioning the alienations made by the 3rd respondent and his two brothers without obtaining prior sanction while alienating the land to Pochamma. From this, it is evident that if possession is delivered at the time of the transaction and if the alienee failed to avail the opportunity of getting his possession validated, he has to suffer the consequences. Further, to our mind this judgment may not be of much help to the appellant for the reason that the effect of deletion of Sec.47 on the transaction had not been considered and that at the time when the 3rd respondent sold the land to Pochamma, who in turn sold the property to third parties on 30-11-1971, the procedure for getting the alienation validated was very much available. 67. But in the instant case the litigation between the parties in the earlier round was still going on by the time Sec.47 was deleted from the Act and also the time limit prescribed under Section 50-B for getting the sale validated had expired. 68. The next decision relied on by the learned counsel is B. Jangaiah v. G. Laxmamma, 1970 (2) ALT 186 (F.B.). In this case the protected tenant questioned the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer directing his eviction from the land on the ground that he committed willful default in payment of rent for three years as confirmed by the appellate authority. In this case the protected tenant questioned the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer directing his eviction from the land on the ground that he committed willful default in payment of rent for three years as confirmed by the appellate authority. The main contention of the petitioner therein seemed to be that as the landholder sold the petition schedule land to the respondent on 13-06-1950, it is hit by Sec.47 of the Act and the above sale is void. This argument was found favour with the learned Judge who held that the sale being a private sale mere deletion of Sec.47 would not have any effect whatsoever and that the transaction is hit by Sec.47 and is abintio void. The learned Judge observed that his decision in G.V.K. Rama Rao v. B.H.E.C.H.B. Society, 1970 AIR A.P. 19 wherein contrary view was taken by him has to be ignored. 69. Admittedly, in this case, firstly the main complainant about the alienation is no other than the protected tenant. Secondly, alienation has taken place on 13-6-1950 after promulgation of Tenancy Act. Unfortunately the factual position was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. On the day the sale has taken place, Sec.47 was not on the statute book. For the first time it was introduced only in 1951 and the learned Judge proceeded on a wrong assumption that Sec. 47 was on the statute book on the date of execution of sale deed Ex.A-2, dated 13-6-1950. Nextly, the learned Judge did not consider the fact of deletion of Sec. 47 from the statute book and non-availability of the procedure contemplated under Section 50-B for getting the sale validated by the time the suit is filed. 70. In M. Pochamma v. Agent, State Government, Adilabad, the question that fell for consideration of the Division Bench of this Court was whether a person who obtained possession of immovable property pursuant to Sec.53-A of Transfer of Property Act without obtaining prior sanction as required under Sec.47 of the Act and without securing validation certificate under Section 50-B, can claim protection under Sec.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act after A.P. Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulations 1959 were extended to Telangana Area on and from 1-12-1963. In this case the non-tribals entered into a contract of sale in respect of the land held by tribals in the schedule areas before 1-12-1962 and after extending the Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulations to Telangana Area, the vendors i.e., tribals challenged the validity of the sales under the provisions of the Regulation 1959. In this case, the learned Judges extensively considered the effect of various provisions of the Tenancy Act. It is pertinent to know that in paragraph 8 of the judgment their Lordships observed as follows:-'....Sec.47 and 50-B are co-existed from 1964 to 1969. In 1969 Sec.47 and certain other provisions were deleted and only Sec.50-B is on the statute book. The benefit of validation was extended up to 31-03-1972. The purpose behind these changes is not far to seek. Section we have already noticed, one of the purposes of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act is to regulate the alienation of lands. In pursuance of that purpose, Chapter V was made imposing certain restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands. Section 47 was the very first provision in that Chapter. It laid down that no permanent alienation or no other transfer of agricultural land shall be valid unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Tahsildar. This declaration is very clear and specific. If there is any permanent alienation or transfer of agricultural land without the previous sanction of the Tahsildar, that would be invalid. However, the Legislature obviously took note of the fact that there had been very many permanent alienations or other transfers of agricultural lands which had taken place without the previous sanction of the Tahsildar. In order to obviate the confusion and injustice that might result therefrom the Legislature introduced Sec.50-B in the year 1964 for validation of certain alienations and other transfers of agricultural lands. Till 1969 until Sec.47 was deleted both the Section Community Certificate-existed. The position then was that the prohibition against alienations without previous sanction of the Tahsildar continued and at the same time transferees after 10th June, 1950 but before 21st February, 1961 who had also obtained possession, were given an opportunity to get the alienations in their favour validated within one year from the prescribed date. The position then was that the prohibition against alienations without previous sanction of the Tahsildar continued and at the same time transferees after 10th June, 1950 but before 21st February, 1961 who had also obtained possession, were given an opportunity to get the alienations in their favour validated within one year from the prescribed date. In 1969 S.47 was altogether omitted; only Sec.50-B with the changes above mentioned was retained.'-Their Lordships at paragraph 9 further observed as follows:-'The position which emerged from the amendment of Sec.50-B was that alienees of agricultural lands, who had obtained possession between 10th June, 1950 and before the Ceiling Act of 1961 and also after the Ceilings Act of 1961 but before the Hyderabad Tenancy Act (Third Amendment 1969, were enabled to secure validation of their alienations. It is important to note that the facility of validation would be available only to those transferees who had obtained possession of the land. If all the requirements of Sec.50-B are satisfied, the alienee or transferee may apply to the Tahsildar for a certificate declaring that his alienation or transfer was valid.'- 71. Their Lordships having considered the effect of Sec.50-B and the procedure prescribed for obtaining validation certificate held in the same paragraph as follows: 'It must necessary follow from this that if there is no validation certificate, the alienation or transfer, through accompanied by possession, would not be treated as valid'-. 72. Having stated so their lordships referred to the subsequent deletion of Section 47 in paragraph 19 of the judgment and held as follows:-'Whether the subsequent deletion of Sec. 47 of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act would have the effect of automatically validating the alienations and transfers, though they were invalid on account of lack of sanction of the Tahsildar under that Section. If there was deletion of Sec. 47 simpliciter without anything more, possibly two views might have been possible. On the one hand, probably it could have been said that what had been the cause of invalidity of an alienation or transfer has been removed by the deletion of Sec.47 and therefore it must be deemed that the original defect in the alienation or transfer must be deemed to have been cured or removed. On the one hand, probably it could have been said that what had been the cause of invalidity of an alienation or transfer has been removed by the deletion of Sec.47 and therefore it must be deemed that the original defect in the alienation or transfer must be deemed to have been cured or removed. On the other hand it could be argued that what was invalid to start with could not be validated unless there is a special proclamation by the Legislature or a provision under which such invalid alienations or transfers could be validated. However, in our view, this possibility of the existence of two views does not exist in so far as the Hyderabad Tenancy Act is concerned, particularly so in these writ petitions. Why we say that such situation does not exist in these cases particularly is that Sec. 47 was deleted in 1969 and the Regulation relating to the prohibition or alienations of lands in the Scheduled Areas by tribals came to be applied to the Telangana Area on 1-12-1963 which was long before Sec.47 was removed from the statute book. Even if it were to be argued that the removal of Sec.47 would automatically validate the invalid alienations and transfers, the insurmountable hurdle in the way of the petitioners would arise in the form of the regulation which came to be applied to their lands even on 1-12-1963. By virtue of the regulation the invalidity, which was inhibiting.