Srinivasa Aiyengar and others v. Indrani and others
2002-06-04
P.D.DINAKARAN
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT: The unsuccessful plaintiffs in O.S.No.503 of 1980 are the appellants in the above second appeal. 2. The appellants/ plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S. No.503 of 1980 for redemption of the mortgage under the conditional sale deed dated 11.6.1969 and for recovery of possession, with future mesne profits. 3. According to the plaintiffs, they executed a usufructuary mortgage deed dated 8.7.1957, which is marked as Ex.B-6, in favour of one N.Rajakumar Naidu, for a sum of Rs.1,500 and the said mortgage was assigned in favour of the second defendant under Ex.B-7 - assignment deed dated 15.4.1964, for the benefit of her father Ramasami Naidu. Thereafter, the first plaintiff and others, by a conditional sale deed dated 11.6.1969, marked as Ex.A-1 (a certified copy of which is also marked as Ex.B-8, dated 11.6.1969), sold the mortgaged properties in favour of Ramasami Naidu, which is now held by the legal representatives of Ramasami Naidu. 4. Contending that the said sale deed dated 11.6.1969 marked as Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8) is a mortgage by conditional sale within the meaning of Sec.58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act executed by the first plaintiff and others, and that the plaintiffs were ready to redeem the said mortgage as per the notice dated 6.2.1979 sent by the plaintiffs to the defendants marked as Ex.A-2, the plaintiffs have filed the above suit for redemption of the mortgage under the sale deed dated 11.6.1969 and for recovery of possession, with future mesne profits. 5. The suit was resisted by the second defendant, who is the only contesting respondent, contending that the conveyance under the sale deed marked as Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969 is an outright sale with an option to the plaintiffs for re-conveyance within a period of four years from the date of execution of the sale deed i.e., 11.6.1969, and since the plaintiffs have failed to exercise their option within the stipulated period, they have no right to seek redemption of the mortgage, placing reliance on Sec.58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. 6.
6. On the above rival contentions, the Courts below have concurrently held that even though on the date of the conditional sale, viz., on 11.6.1969, there was a mortgage of the suit property in favour of one N.Rajakumar Naidu under Ex.B-6, which was subsequently assigned in favour of the second defendant for the benefit of her father Ramasami Naidu under the assignment deed dated 15.4.1964 marked as Ex.B-7, and the plaintiffs undertook to discharge the same within a period of four years from the date of execution of Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969, the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the said condition, and therefore, the said sale has become absolute, and on that ground, dismissed the plea of the appellants herein. 7. Against this, the above second appeal was entertained on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Why Ex.A-1 is a mortgage by conditional sale? (ii) Whether oral evidence is admissible to prove the character of the document surrounding circumstances can be taken into consideration? 7.
7. Against this, the above second appeal was entertained on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Why Ex.A-1 is a mortgage by conditional sale? (ii) Whether oral evidence is admissible to prove the character of the document surrounding circumstances can be taken into consideration? 7. Mr.Y.K.Rajagopal, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that on the date of conditional sale by way of sale deed marked as Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969, there was admittedly a usufructuary mortgage executed by the first plaintiff and others in favour of N.Rajakumar Naidu by way of a mortgage deed dated 8.7.1957 which is marked as Ex.B-6, which was subsequently assigned in favour of the second defendant for the benefit of her father Ramasami Naidu, which is now held by the legal representatives of Ramasami Naidu under Ex.B-7, dated 15.4.1964, which was referred to in the conditional sale deed marked as Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969, with a clause of undertaking that the entire sale consideration, including the mortgage amount, shall be repaid within a period of four years from the date of execution of Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969, and therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to get their statutory benefit under Sec.58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, which reads as follows: “Mortgage by conditional sale: Where the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property- on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale: Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale.” 8.
From a reading of the pleadings as well as the evidence on record, it is apparent that there is absolutely no dispute that the conditional sale under the sale deed dated 11.6.1969 marked as Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8) refers to the usufructuary mortgage deed dated 8.7.1957 which is marked as Ex.B-6, which was subsequently assigned in favour of the second defendant for the benefit of her father Ramasami Naidu, which is now held by the legal representatives of Ramasami Naidu under Ex.B-7, dated 15.4.1964, which was referred to in the conditional sale deed dated 11.6.1969, marked as Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8). 9. Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969 also refers to the mortgage as well as the undertaking executed by the plaintiffs to discharge the entire sale consideration, including the mortgage amount within a period of four years. 10. No doubt, the surrounding circumstances satisfy the conditions that render Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969 as a mortgage by conditional sale. But admittedly, the plaintiffs have not discharged the entire sale consideration including the mortgage amount within the stipulated time, viz., four years from the date of execution of Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969. Once the same is not disputed by the plaintiffs, on the same condition relied on by the plaintiffs themselves, the sale deed dated 11.6.1969, marked as Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), becomes absolute. Once the sale under Ex.A-1 (Ex.B-8), dated 11.6.1969 becomes absolute, the question of redemption of mortgage does not arise, attracting Sec.58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, as has been rightly held by the Courts below. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.