CHANDRASHEKARAIAH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is the owner of the land measuring 10 acres in Survey No. 193 and 3 acres 34 guntas in Survey No. 207 situated at Kengeri Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. The said lands were proposed for acquisition in the preliminary notification dated nil, gazetted on 31-8-1989 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, along with other lands. This notification was followed by a final notification dated 12-10-1990 issued under Section 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition act. These two notifications were questioned by the petitioner in W. P. No. 1704 of 1997 before this Court. ( 2 ) THE learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by an order dated 10-10-1998. This order was again challenged by the petitioner in W. A. No. 4412 of 1998. The Division Bench by its order dated 16-10-1998 quashed the final notification issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act, reserving liberty to the authorities to proceed with the acquisition proceedings by passing fresh orders after compliance with Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Pursuant to this order, of the Division Bench again the Deputy Commissioner/land Acquisition Officer proceeded with the enquiry and issued a final notification dated 22-10-1999, gazetted on 4-11-1999 declaring that the said land are required for public purpose. This declaration has been questioned by the petitioner in this petition. ( 3 ) SRI K. S. Nagaraja Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned notifications are liable to be quashed as it has been issued beyond the period specified in Section 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition act. In support of this submission he submits that under proviso to section 6 (1) of the Act, the Government is required to issue notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act, within one year from the date of the preliminary notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act. In support of this submission he submits that under proviso to section 6 (1) of the Act, the Government is required to issue notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act, within one year from the date of the preliminary notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the State and the learned counsel appearing for the Housing Board submits that the impugned notification has been issued by virtue of the order of this Court reserving liberty to proceed with the acquisition proceedings and therefore the time so specified in Section 6 (1) of the Act, is to be computed not from the date of the preliminary notification but from the date of the receipt of the order of this Court quashing the final notification. ( 4 ) IN order to ascertain the rival contentions urged by the learned counsels for the parties, it is just and necessary to state few facts. The government in the first instance, issued the final notification on 22-10- 1999 pursuant to the preliminary notification dated 31-8-1989. This notification is well-within the period of limitation as per proviso (ii) to section 6 (1) of the Act. This notification was quashed by this Court in the writ appeal on the ground that there is no compliance of Section 5-A of the Act reserving liberty to proceed with the acquisition by an order dated 16-10-1998. According to the learned Counsel for the Housing board, the said order was received by the Deputy Commissioner/land acquisition Officer, on 4-11-1998. After the receipt of the order, the deputy Commissioner/land Acquisition Officer issued final notification on 22-10-1999, Gazetted on 4-11-1999. From these facts it is seen that both the preliminary and final notifications in the instant case have been issued subsequent to Act 68 of 1984 came into force. If that is so, the second proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act, is applicable. Further, the period to be excluded for the purpose of counting the period is also provided for in Explanation 1 to Section 6 (1) of the Act. Section 6 (1) of the Act, reads as follows:"6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. Further, the period to be excluded for the purpose of counting the period is also provided for in Explanation 1 to Section 6 (1) of the Act. Section 6 (1) of the Act, reads as follows:"6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), that any particu- lar land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such government or of some officer duly authorised tocertify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made wherever required under Section 5-A, sub-section (2): provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1 ). (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Explanation 1. In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, subsection (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded". In order to compute the period as per Explanation 1 the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act, is stayed by an order of the court is to be excluded. In order to compute the period as per Explanation 1 the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act, is stayed by an order of the court is to be excluded. ( 5 ) IN the instant case, there is no order staying the proceedings till the issuance of declaration under Section 6 (1) pursuant to the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act. Therefore, as per this explanation no period is required to be excluded for the purpose of computing one year as provided under proviso (ii) read with Explanation 1 to Section 6 (1) of the Act. Under the proviso, no declaration in respect of a particular land covered by a notification under Section 4 shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification. In the instant case the preliminary notification is dated 31-8-1989 whereas, the final notification is dated 22-10-1999 published in the Official Gazette, dated 4-11-1999. From this it is seen that the final notification has been made after one year from the date of the preliminary notification. ( 6 ) THIS Court in the case of Union of India v Muniswamappa and others, has held that time schedule prescribed under Section 6 (1) of the act, for the purpose of publication of 6 (1) notification, has no application if the final notification has been issued pursuant to the order of the court by quashing the 6 (1) notification. But, this decision is no longer a good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N. Narasimhaiah and Others v State of Karnataka and Others. In this decision the Supreme Court has held that where there is an intervention of Court in a proceedings, the date of the order of the Court quashing the final notification would be the date for the purpose of counting the period of limitation to 6 (1) notification. In this decision the Supreme Court has held that where there is an intervention of Court in a proceedings, the date of the order of the Court quashing the final notification would be the date for the purpose of counting the period of limitation to 6 (1) notification. ( 7 ) IN the case of State of Karnataka and Others v D. C. Nanjundaiah and Others, the Supreme Court has taken the view that the period of limitation for publication start running from the order of the High Court and not from the date of the notification under Section 4 (1) in the event if the proceedings have been continued pursuant to the order of the court by quashing final notification. These two decisions were considered by the Constitution Bench in the case of Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Others v State of Tamil Nadu and Others. In this decision the Supreme Court has taken a different view than the view taken by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to supra. The Constitution bench is of the view that once the time schedule has been provided under Section 6 (1) of the Act, for the purpose of issuing notification the same shall be adhered to after excluding the time as provided under explanation 1 to Section 6 (1) of the Act. ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Oxford English School v Government of Tamil Nadu, has held as follows:"6. In the present case the notification under Section 4 (1) was published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 but after the commencement of the Land acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967. In view of the above proviso the declaration cannot be made under section 6, in respect of any land covered by the said notification after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the said notification. In the present case Section 4 (1) notification was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 8-9- 1982. Undoubtedly, the notification under Section 6, dated 19-12- 1983 has been made and published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette within the period of three years prescribed under the proviso. This declaration, however, has been quashed in the present proceedings. In the present case Section 4 (1) notification was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 8-9- 1982. Undoubtedly, the notification under Section 6, dated 19-12- 1983 has been made and published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette within the period of three years prescribed under the proviso. This declaration, however, has been quashed in the present proceedings. The question is whether a fresh declaration under Section 6 of the said Act can be made in respect of any land notified under section 4 (1) by the notification of 24-8-1982 after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of the notification under section 4 (1 ). The answer is clearly in the negative. 7. The respondents have relied upon Explanation 1 to the proviso which pr ovides that in computing the period of three years the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken pursuant to the notification under Section 4 (1) is stayed by an order of court shall be excluded. In the case of the appellant such a stay was obtained by them from the High Court of Madras on 20-4- 1987. This was long after the expiry of the period of three years provided under the proviso to Section 6. Even if one excludes the period during which the subsequent stay operated, the issuance of a fresh declaration under Section 6, would be clearly beyond the period of three years prescribed under the proviso to Section 6. Since the prohibition on issuance of a declaration under Section 6, after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) is absolute, the High Court could not have given any direction permitting issuance of the declaration under Section 6, within six months from the date of its judgment". In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, it is clear whatever the time schedule specified under Section 6 (1) of the Act, it should be adhered to after excluding the time as provided under explanation 1 to Section 6 (1) of the Act. Therefore, if there is any period that is required to be excluded as provided under Explanation 1 to section 6 (1) of the Act, after excluding the same period the final notification has to be within one year from the date of the preliminary notification. Therefore, if there is any period that is required to be excluded as provided under Explanation 1 to section 6 (1) of the Act, after excluding the same period the final notification has to be within one year from the date of the preliminary notification. Admittedly, in the instant case the final notification is dated 22-10-1999 published in the Official Gazette, dated 4-11-1999, i. e. , almost about 10 years from the date of the preliminary notification. If that is so, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court referred to above, the entire acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed. For the reasons stated above, writ petition is allowed. The impugned notifications dated 31-8-1989 and 22-10-1999 (An- nexures-A and C respectively) are quashed. --- *** --- .