JUDGMENT : Since all these appeals arise out of O.S.No. 856 of 1985, they are being disposed of by a common Judgment. For the sake of convenience I would refer to the parties as they are arrayed in the suit. 2. Initially three plaintiffs filed the suit against five defendants for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 5-10-1982 said to have been executed by the 1st defendant in their favour, in respect of malgies bearing Municipal Nos. 21-2-172, 21-2-173 and 21-2-174, which are in their possession as tenants of the 1st defendant, and a right of pre-emption of the first floor portion over the said malgies, alleging that 1st defendant initially entered into an oral agreement to sell the aforesaid three malgies and the residential portion in the first floor of the said malgies to them on 16-8-1977, and that thereafter had on 5-10-1982 executed an agreement of sale in their favour in respect of the said three malgies for a total consideration of Rs.3,06,000/- at the rate of Rs. 1,02,000/- per each malgi after having received Rs. 1,000/- towards part of the sale consideration and also agreed to sell the residential portion on the first floor of the malgies to them only in case he intends to sell the same, at the prevailing market rate, and had on 1-4-1983 received Rs.11,000/- and Rs.19,000/- on 31-1-1983, and thereafter agreed to sell the residential portion in the first floor of the malgies for a consideration of Rs.1,50,000/-, which was the prevailing market rate at that time, but went on postponing execution of the sale deed on the ground that litigation is pending in connection therewith with defendants 9 and 10, and when 1st defendant was intending to sell the malgies to third parties, plaintiffs got made paper publication in "Milap'- dated26-3-1984 and the Deccan Chronicle dated 28-3-1984 informing the public about the agreement in their favour and had also sent a registered notice dated 7-4-1984 to the 1st defendant demanding execution of the sale deed in their favour, but 1st defendant on the pretext that the litigation in which he was involved at that time with defendants 9 and 10 would shortly be settled, postponed execution of the sale deed in their favour. Since the property agreed to be sold to them by the 1st defendant is the joint family property of defendants 1 to 5, defendants 2 to 5 also are bound to execute the sale deed in their favour. 3. As per the orders in I.A.No.3258 of 1989, filed by defendants 6 to 8 to implead them as party-defendants to the suit on the ground that the 2nd plaintiff, who is their eldest brother, entered into the agreement with the plaintiffs for benefit of their joint family, defendants 6 to 8 were added as parties to the suit. 4. Plaintiffs filed I.A.No. 662 of 1989 to implead defendants 9 and 10 as parties to the suit on the ground that 1st defendant, with a view to defeat their claim in the suit entered into a collusive compromise in O.S.No.130 of 1983, filed by defendants 9 and 10 against him and others for partition of their allegedly joint family properties including the property covered by the agreement of sale in their favour, and got allotted the property covered by the agreement of sale to defendants 9 and 10 towards their share, and that their petition to be added as parties to that suit to prevent the collusive decree being was passed dismissed by the trial Court and was confirmed in revision, with an observation that they can work out their (plaintiffs) rights separately. That petition was allowed and defendants 9 and 10 were added as parties to the suit. 5. Defendants 11 to 13, who are the alienees from defendants 9 and 10 of the property covered by the agreement, were impleaded as parties to the suit as per the orders in I.A.No. 3872 of 1989. 6. That petition was allowed and defendants 9 and 10 were added as parties to the suit. 5. Defendants 11 to 13, who are the alienees from defendants 9 and 10 of the property covered by the agreement, were impleaded as parties to the suit as per the orders in I.A.No. 3872 of 1989. 6. 1st defendant filed his written statement denying execution of the agreement and receipt of payments thereunder as alleged in the plaint, and contending that since he was undergoing medical treatment from several years and since there was litigation and disputes between him and the members of the various branches of his joint family, he could not send a reply to the notice got issued by the plaintiffs and that a relative of his by name Om Prakash Gupta, promising to look after the litigation pending in Courts and also the suit O.S.No. 130 of 1983 filed by defendants 9 and 10 for partition of the joint family, and other affairs on his behalf, obtained his and his family members signatures on several papers, and that the plaintiffs, who are very close with Om Prakash Gupta, might have created the suit agreement of sale and other documents to gain unlawfully at his expense, and since the malgies covered by the agreement of sale relied on by the plaintiff were allotted to the share of defendants 9 and 10 in the final decree in O.S.No. 130 of 1983, he ceased to have interest in the property covered by agreement of sale relied on by the plaintiff. 7. 2nd defendant filed his written statement alleging that since the malgies covered by the alleged agreement of sale relied on by the plaintiffs, and the residential portion on the first floor thereof are the joint family properties of himself, defendants 1, 3 to 5 and defendants 9 and 10, 1st defendant has no right to alienate the malgies and the residential portion thereon and hence the agreement of sale allegedly executed by the 1st defendant is not binding on him and the other members of joint family. 8. Defendants 3 to 5 filed a Memo adopting the written statement of the 2nd defendant. 9. 9th and 10th defendants filed a written statement contending that their father Laxminarayana Gupta and 1st defendant had several joint family properties and during partition, as per registered Deed dated 24-8-1972, properties bearing Nos. 8. Defendants 3 to 5 filed a Memo adopting the written statement of the 2nd defendant. 9. 9th and 10th defendants filed a written statement contending that their father Laxminarayana Gupta and 1st defendant had several joint family properties and during partition, as per registered Deed dated 24-8-1972, properties bearing Nos. 21-2-166, to 21-2-170 and 21-2-171 to21-2-174 were kept joint between them i.e., the members of the joint family and so they, who are the surviving heirs in the branch of Laxminarayana Gupta, filed O.S.No. 130 of 1983 for partition of the properties which were kept joint with 1st defendant, and in the final decree passed therein on 22-2-1989, properties bearing Nos.21-2-166 to 21-2-170 were allotted to the share of defendants 1 to 5 and properties bearing Nos. 21-2-171 to 21-2-174 were allotted to them and so the suit for specific performance against them in respect of the properties allotted to them is not maintainable. 10. Defendants 11 to 13 filed a Memo adopting the written statement filed by defendants 9 and 10. 11. 2nd plaintiff and defendants 6 to 8 filed a Memo on 11-2-1991 that they have adjusted the matter inter se among themselves and are not interested in prosecuting the suit and so they, i.e., plaintiff No.2 and defendants 6 to 8 are withdrawing their claim to the extent of their interest in the agreement in respect of premises No. 21-2-173 and so the suit may be dismissed in respect of that part of the property. 12. 1st plaintiff also filed a Memo that he settled the matter out of Court with the defendants with regard to claim for specific performance in respect of malgi No.21-2-172 and so the suit in respect of that part of the property may be dismissed as not pressed. Therefore, effectively, the suit is only in respect of malgi 21-2-174 and the residential portion on the 1st floor of the malgies. 13. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court settled five issue and three additional issues for trial. The suit O.S. No. 856 of 1985 and another suit O.S.No. 307 of 1983 filed by plaintiffs 2 and 3 against defendants 9 and 10 were clubbed and tried together by the trial Court. In support of their case, plaintiffs examined four witnesses as P.Ws. 1 to 4 including the 3rd plaintiff as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A-1 toA-30. The suit O.S. No. 856 of 1985 and another suit O.S.No. 307 of 1983 filed by plaintiffs 2 and 3 against defendants 9 and 10 were clubbed and tried together by the trial Court. In support of their case, plaintiffs examined four witnesses as P.Ws. 1 to 4 including the 3rd plaintiff as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A-1 toA-30. In support of their case, defendants 1 to 5, 9 to 13 examined four witnesses as D.Ws. 1 to 4 and marked Exs.B-1 to B-20 and Exs.XI and X2. The trial Court decreed the suit for specific performance in favour of 3rd plaintiff in respect of malgi No.21-2-174 and in respect of first floor portion thereof by directing him to pay Rs.1,02,000/- minus Rs.10,330.33 ps towards the value of the malgi and the market value of the residential portion thereon in the first floor as on the date of Ex.A-3. 14. Aggrieved by the said decree, defendants 11 to 13 preferred C.C.C.A. No.39 of 1994, defendants 3 and 5 filed CCCA No.41 of 1994. Since 1st defendant died after passing of the decree, his wife, as his legal representative, filed CCCA.No. 47 of 1994. Defendants 2 and 4 filed CCCA. No.49 of 1994 and defendants 9 and 10 have filed CCCA.No. 174 of 1994. 15. The point for consideration in these appeals is whether the 3rd plaintiff is entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement of sale (Ex.A-3) dated 5-10-1982 in respect of the malgi No. 21-2-174 and the residential portion in the first floor thereof- 16. Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the different appellants raised separate contentions attacking the decree and Judgment of the trial Court granting specific performance of the agreement of sale in favour of 3rd plaintiff. Different counsel appearing for the 3rd plaintiff in the appeals addressed separate arguments, supporting the decree and judgment of the trial Court. Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the different appellants raised separate contentions attacking the decree and Judgment of the trial Court granting specific performance of the agreement of sale in favour of 3rd plaintiff. Different counsel appearing for the 3rd plaintiff in the appeals addressed separate arguments, supporting the decree and judgment of the trial Court. The main thrust of the arguments on behalf of the defendants 1 to 5, 9 to 13 (appellants) is that even a plain reading of Ex.A-3 agreement of sale shows that it was brought into existence subsequent to the filing of O.S.No. 130 of 1983, because the evidence of D.W.4 shows that the stamp paper on which Ex.A-3 agreement was engrossed was in fact sold to one G. Srinivasa Rao, S/o Srihari, on behalf of one M. Kamalamma, as disclosed by the entry in Ex.X-2, but not on behalf of Madanlal Gupta (1st defendant) as found in Ex.A-3 and so it is clear that in order to facilitate ante dating the document, a stamp paper purchased for the benefit of another person was used, by tampering with the name of the person for whose benefit the stamp was purchased i.e., M.Kamalamma, and was engrossed on a tampered stamp paper only to satisfy the requirement of Rule 6(2) of the Indian Stamp Rules, and the use of the words "suit malgies' in clause (2) of Ex.A-3 also clearly shows that pendency of O.S.No. 130 of 1983 filed by defendants 9 and 10 against 1st defendant for partition was lingering in the minds of the plaintiffs while creating Ex.A-3, and since in para 2 of the plaint it is clearly alleged that 1st defendant executed Ex.A-3 as Karta of the joint family, the contention that the property covered by Ex.A-3 was the exclusive property of 1st defendant cannot be true, and in any event since Ex.B-16 clearly establishes that the property covered by the suit was the joint family property of the 1st defendant and Lakshminarayana Gupta, father of defendants 9 and 10, and it is not the exclusive property of the 1st defendant, for him to enter into an agreement of sale without reference to defendants 2 to 5, and since the proposed sale, in any event, is not for the benefit of the estate or for legal necessity, and since establishment of legal necessity is the sine qua non for the sale made by a father manager binding the share of his sons, who are majors, as held in Radha Krishna Das v. Kaluram : 1967 AIR SC 574, in any event Ex.A-3 does not bind the share of defendants 2 to 5; and that the alleged oral agreement of sale of the residential portion in the first floor of the Malgies is void for uncertainity, and in any event, since the property covered by Ex.A-3 was allotted to the share of defendants 9 and 10 as per the final decree in O.S.No. 130 of 1983, and since partition does not give, grant or create a title in a coparcener, but enables him to obtain what is his own in a definite and specific form for purposes of disposition, independent of the wishes of his former co-sharers as held in Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundi Raj : 43 I.A 151 (at page 161) referred to and relied on in V.N. Sarin v. Major Ajit Kumar Popla : 1966 (1) SCR 349 (at page 354), and since as per Hindu Law, an alienee from a coparcener in certain specific family property does not acquire any interest in the property, but only gets an equity to enforce his right in a suit for partition and to have the property alienated set apart for the alienor's share if possible, as held in Manjaya Mudalai v. Shanmuga Mudalai : 38 ILR Mad. Madras 684, and since the concept of joint family property is that each of the coparcener is entitled to same right as the other and all the coparceners hold together the coparcenary property, and when a partition is effected all that happens is not a transfer of interest from one to other, but only a release of interest of one coparcener in favour of the other, in specific immovable property allotted to later as and for his share, and since a sharer, on partition, does not derive title to his share from any one else, the final decree passed in O.S.No. 130 of 1983 on the basis of a compromise, cannot be said to be collusive, more so because there is no averment in the plaint that that decree is a collusive decree, and since Section 17(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does not cover cases of allotment of a property, covered by an agreement of sale to the share of another coparcener during partition, as held inK. Appa Rao v. P. Bala Subramanaya Gramani : 1976 AIR Madras 70, decree for specific performance cannot be passed against defendants 9 and 10, who are not parties to the agreement and who did not acquire right through or from the 1st defendant, and as held in Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Misra : (1995) 3 SCC 147 defendants 9 and 10 are not-necessary parties to the suit and since an agreement of sale, or a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale does give or create a right or title in favour of the agreement holder, or the holder of a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale, and since the right and title in the property agreed to be purchased passes to him only on the execution of a deed of sale either by the judgment-debtor or by Court, as held in Babulal v. Hazarilal Kishorilal (1982) 1 SCC 525 (at page 537), plaintiffs cannot question the allotment of the property covered by Ex.A-3 agreement and the residential portion on the first floor thereof to the share of defendants 9 and 10 as per compromise decree in O.S.No. 130 of 1983. 17. 17. The contention of the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 3rd plaintiff is that since the 1st defendant did not dispute the passing of Exs.A-4 to A-6 receipts and Ex.A-3 agreement by sending a reply to the notice got issued by the plaintiffs seeking specific performance of Ex.A-3 agreement, nor publish a rejoinder to Exs.A-1 and A-2 public notices and since the 1st defendant did not go into the witness box to deny the Ex.A-3 agreement and Exs.A-4 to A-6 receipts, and since the evidence of D.W.1, a power of attorney 1st defendant, cannot be a substitute for the evidence of 1st defendant, as held in Kanakapati Bharathi v. Authority under Sec. 50 of A.P.S.E. Act : 1956 An.W.R. An.W.R, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the 1st defendant as held in Eswar Bhai C. Patel v. Harihar Behara : 1999 AIR SC 1341. Relying on Dattatreya v. Raganath Gopal Rao : 1971 AIR SC 2548, Pavan Kumar Gupta v. Ruchiram Namdev : 1999 AIR SC 1823, Alapati Sivarama Krishniah v. Alapati Kasi Viswanadham 12 and H. Venkatachala Iyyengar v.B.N. Timmajamma : 1959 AIR SC 443 it is contended that since the 1st defendant admitted his signatures on Ex.A-3, but took a stand that he affixed his signatures on blank papers, the burden of proof to establish that Ex.A-3 was brought into existence on a blank paper containing his signature is on the 1st defendant, and since neither the defendant nor his wife, who signed as an attestor, go into the witness box to explain the circumstances in which they had to affix their signatures on blank paper(s), an adverse inference was rightly drawn against 1st defendant. It is further contended that since the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants does not clearly establish the pedigree of defendants 1 to 5, 9 and 10, in view the principles laid down in State of Bihar v. Radhakrishna Singh : 1965 (1) ALT 149 : 1983 AIR SC 684 and Dolgobinda v. Nimai Charan : 1959 AIR SC 914, it cannot be said that 1st defendant and defendants 9 and 10 constituted members of a joint family at some point of time, enabling defendants 9 and 10 filing a suit for partition in O.S.No. 130 of 1983 including the property covered by Ex.A-3 and the residential portion thereon also, as the joint family property between them and 1st defendant, when there is ample evidence on record to show that 1st defendant has been dealing with the property covered by Ex.A-3 agreement as his self acquired property. It is contended that recitals in Exs.A-10 to A-12, if carefully read, establish that the property covered by Ex.A-3 is the separate property of 1st defendant and since in Ex.A-3 agreement also 1st defendant described himself as the absolute owner of the property agreed to be sold thereunder, and since there is no presumption that the joint family has joint family property as held in V. Venkata Swamy v. V. RadhaKrishna Reddy16, K. Obul Reddy v. B.Venkata Narayan Reddy : 1984 AIR SC 1171 and Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan : 1960 AIR SC 335, Narendranath v. W.T. Commr., A.P. : 1970 AIR SC 14 State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao : 1985 AIR SC 716, State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram : 1969 AIR SC 1330, Bhagwan Dayal v. Reoti Devi : 1962 AIR SC 287 and P. Govind Reddy v. G. Obulamma23and since admissions do not confer title to immovable property as held in Ambika Prasad Ram v. Iqbal Roy ; 1966 AIR SC 605 at page 612 (towards the end of para 13), it has to be held that the property covered by Ex.A-3 agreement is the absolute property of the 1st defendant. It is contended that since the document under which the property covered by Ex.A-3 was purchased is not produced, necessary inference has to be drawn for its non-production as held in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and others 1968 AIR SC 1413 : and the contention that the property covered by Ex.A-3 is the joint family property of defendants 1 to 5, 9 and 10 cannot be accepted. Relying on the observations in Bai Dosabai v. Mathurdas : 1980 AIR SC 1334, (at pages 1337 and 1338) reading. '-But the ultimate and penultimate paragraphs of Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act make it clear that such a contract creates an obligation annexed to the ownership of immoveable property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but which obligation may be enforced against a transferee with notice of the contract or a gratuitous transferee of the property. Thus, the Equitable ownership in property recognized in Equity in England is translated into Indian law as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but an obligation which may be enforced against a transferee with notice or a gratuitous transferee'-. and the observation Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh : 1990 AIR SC 854, (at page 857 para 4) that when the property is owned jointly, unless it is shown to the contrary, it has to be held that each one of the joint owners owns a moiety of the property, and if the property agreed to be sold is distinguishable by the shares of the respective vendors, the agreement for sale can be enforced against the vendor, who had signed it, and it is contended that since Ex.A-3 clearly recites that a separate sale deed in favour of the three plaintiffs separately in respect of the three malgies, would be executed by the 1st defendant, though plaintiffs 1 and 2 have not been taking interest in the case, third plaintiff is entitled to seek enforcement of Ex.A-3 agreement in respect of the malgiNo.21-2-173 in his possession and the upstair residential portion. Relying on M. Venkata Rao v. K.A. Mangatayaramma28at page 125 it is contended that 1st defendant cannot plead that since his title is defective, Ex.A-3 cannot be enforced againsthim. Relying on M. Venkata Rao v. K.A. Mangatayaramma28at page 125 it is contended that 1st defendant cannot plead that since his title is defective, Ex.A-3 cannot be enforced againsthim. Relying on S. Bano v. Sanwal Das : 1976 AIR SC 2073, S.V.R. Mudaliar v. Rajabu F. Buhari : 1995 AIR SC 1607, Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal : 1979 AIR SC 1241, and Ch. Ranganadha Chetty v. M. Chinnamma and another 1985 ALT 114 (NRC): , it is contended that the decree for specific performance passed by the trial Court needs no interference. Relying on Katragadda Chinna Ramayya and another v. Kattragadda China Ramayya and others33and Ramayya v. Venkanraju : 1954 AIR Madras 864 (F.B.), it is contended that since there is nothing on record to show that the property covered by Ex.A-3 agreement ever formed part of the joint family property between 1st defendant and defendants 9 and 10 or their ancestors, basing on Ex.B-16, only which is merely marked but not proved, it cannot be said that defendants 9 and 10 have any interest in the suit property coveredby Ex.A-3 agreement, by relying onV.A.A. Nainar v. A. Chettiar : 1972 AIR Madras 154 and Mangathayammal v. Tuthirasami Naicker : (1976) 89 MadLW 405, where it is held that mere marking of a document does not amount to proof it is contended that Ex.B-16 cannot be taken into consideration. Relying on Ganga Charan v. Bans Bahadur Singh and another : 1975 AIR Allahabad 25 it is contended that since the transfer in favour of defendants 11 to 13 was during the pendency of the suit the same is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Relying on sub-rule (5) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII C.P.C., and Mt. Ram Dei v.Mt. Bahu Rani : 1922 AIR Patna 489, it is contended that merely because plaintiffs 1 and 2 had withdrawn from prosecuting the suit without the consent of 3rd plaintiff, the right of the plaintiff to claim specific performance in respect of the Malgi No.21-2-174 and the residential portion on its first floor is not affected. 18. Ram Dei v.Mt. Bahu Rani : 1922 AIR Patna 489, it is contended that merely because plaintiffs 1 and 2 had withdrawn from prosecuting the suit without the consent of 3rd plaintiff, the right of the plaintiff to claim specific performance in respect of the Malgi No.21-2-174 and the residential portion on its first floor is not affected. 18. It is true that merely because plaintiffs 1 and 2 have filed Memos that they have no interest in the subject matter of the suit, when 3rd plaintiff did not consent for withdrawal of the suit, the entire suit claim cannot be dismissed, because as per sub- rule (5) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII C.P.C. a suit can be withdrawn only when all the plaintiffs have given consent for such withdrawal. Therefore the claim of the 3rd plaintiff has to be determined without being influenced by the fact that 1st and 2nd plaintiffs have withdrawn their claim in respect of two, out of the three malgies, covered by Ex.A-3. 19. It is no doubt true as held in V.A.A.Nainar (35supra) and Mangathayammal (36 supra) mere making of a document does not amount to proof thereof. That principle does not apply to Ex.B-16 because D.W.1, who is the power of attorney holder of the 1st defendant, is also an attestor to Ex.B-16, and was also present at the time of registration of Ex.B-16 as an identifying witness, as seen from Ex.B-16. A document can be proved in several ways and not merely by examining the executant only. Therefore merely because 1st defendant is not examined, it cannot be said that Ex.B-16 is not proved, when it is marked through D.W.1, who attested it, and identified executants before the registering authority. During the course of cross-examination of D.W.1 significantly 3rd plaintiff got marked Ex.A-16, copy of the plaint in O.S.No. 1601 of 1982, filed by the 1st defendant against one Ram Niwas, on 31-12-1982, seeking an injunction restraining the said Ram Niwas from interfering with his possession and enjoyment over the upstair portion of the shops bearing Nos. 21-2-171 to 174, Charkaman, Hyderabad, i.e., the malgies covered by Ex.A-3 and another malgi, Ex.A-19, a copy of the plaint in O.S.No.130 of 1983 filed by the defendants 9 and 10 against defendants 1 to 5 for partition of the properties covered by Ex.A-3 agreement and other properties. 21-2-171 to 174, Charkaman, Hyderabad, i.e., the malgies covered by Ex.A-3 and another malgi, Ex.A-19, a copy of the plaint in O.S.No.130 of 1983 filed by the defendants 9 and 10 against defendants 1 to 5 for partition of the properties covered by Ex.A-3 agreement and other properties. In para 5 of Ex.A-16 1st defendant clearly averred that he and Prem Prakash Gupta are the co-owners of the premises Nos.21-2-166 to 174, (which includes the properties covered by Ex.A-3 agreement) and that during March, 1981 his co-owner Prem Prakash Gupta agreedto sell his half portion in the premisesNos. 21-2-166 to 174 to him, but later got issued a notice dated 28-7-1981 (wrongly typed as 28-7-1982 in para 5 of Ex.A-16) for partition and separate possession and that he sent a reply thereto. The reply notice dated 19-8-1981 given by the 1st defendant, to the notice dated 28-7-1981 got issued by the 9th defendant, is shown as document No.2 in the list of documents filed along with Ex.A-16 (plaint in O.S.No. 1601 of 1982) and is marked as Ex.A-17, where there is a clear averment that during the middle of March, 1981 there was an agreement between him (1st defendant) and Prem Prakash Gupta (9th defendant) for sale of his (9th defendant) half share in the properties kept by them jointly. In Ex.A-19 (plaint in O.S.No. 130 of 1983) filed by defendants 9 and 10 for partition on 3-2-1983), there is a reference to Ex.B-16, and in para 6 thereof it is alleged that there was demandfor partition of the property bearingNos. 21-2-166 to 174, and other properties and that the 1st defendant having admitted their status as co-owners set up an agreement of sale. So, even from the documents got exhibited by the 3rd plaintiff, it is clear that even before Ex.A-3 agreement dated 5-10-1982, 9th defendant made a demand for partition of the properties that were kept joint between him and the 1st defendant, and in 1981 also the 1st defendant admitted that he and the 9th defendant are joint owners of the property covered by Ex.A-3 agreement and other properties. Voluminous documentary evidence adduced by 3rd plaintiff himself shows that even long prior to Ex.A-3, 1st defendant admitted that he and 9th defendant are co-owners of the property covered by Ex.A-3 and other properties. Voluminous documentary evidence adduced by 3rd plaintiff himself shows that even long prior to Ex.A-3, 1st defendant admitted that he and 9th defendant are co-owners of the property covered by Ex.A-3 and other properties. If the plaintiffs were diligent enough, they would not have failed to know that 1st defendant prior to Ex.A-3 did not ever claim that the property covered thereby exclusively belonged to him, and that it is not joint family property. Moreover since Ex. B-16 is a registered document of the year 1972, i.e., several years prior even to the alleged oral agreement dated 15-8-1977, referred to in Ex.A-3, and Ex.A-3 also, it is not open to the 3rd plaintiff to contend that the recitals in Ex.B-16 are not true, because he has no locus to question Ex.B-16. Since the maxim is Caveat Emptor, 3rd plaintiff, and plaintiffs 1 and 2, ought to have made enquiries regarding the nature of the property intended to be purchased by them, instead of blindly believing the representation said to have been made by 1st defendant that it is his self-acquired property. In view of all the above, the non-production of the document of title relating to the property covered by Ex.A-3 has no relevance, and so no inference, much less adverse inference, need be drawn against the 1st defendant for non production of the document of title under which the property covered by Ex.A-3 was acquired by the family of 1st defendant. If I may say so 3rd plaintiff ought to have taken care to peruse the said document before he thought it fit to enter into Ex.A-3 transaction. He cannot be heard to say that since the document of title of the property covered by Ex.A-3 is not produced it has to be presumed that the property covered by Ex.A-3 is the self-acquired property of the 1st defendant, by ignoring Ex.B-16. He cannot be heard to say that since the document of title of the property covered by Ex.A-3 is not produced it has to be presumed that the property covered by Ex.A-3 is the self-acquired property of the 1st defendant, by ignoring Ex.B-16. The recitals in Ex.B-16, a deed of release, show that Laxminarayan Gupta and his two sons Prem Prakash Gupta and Kantivarma Gupta i.e., defendants 9 and 10 (the releasors), and 1st defendant, (the releasee), are the members of a joint family consisting of several immovable properties in the city of Hyderabad, and that property bearing Nos.21-2-141 and 142 at Charkaman was the residential house of their ancestors, in which the realeasor and the realesee are entitled to equal share, and as the releasee, who is residing in and is using a major portion of said the house bearing No. 21-2-141 and 142 for residential purpose, was intending to make repairs or construct a new house in place of existing old house, the releasors agreed to relinquish their right therein, by accepting Rs.40,000/- offered by the releasee. It is specifically mentioned therein that the property bearing Nos.21-2-141 and 142 and the double storied building consisting of shops in the ground floor being municipal Nos.21-2-166 to 174 and the first floor consisting of residential accommodation thereon, would continue to be the joint family property between the releasors and the releasee. 19-A. One of the contentions on behalfof 3rd plaintiff is that from the recitals in Exs.A-10 to A-12 it is easy to see that the property covered by the suit is the exclusive property of 1st defendant. Ex.A-10 is a copy of the sale deed dated 7-6-1972 executed by the 1st defendant in respect of property bearing old municipal Nos.1122 and 1203 corresponding to new No.21-2-177 and21-2-232. in the road leading from Gulzar House to Charkaman, Hyderabad. Ex.A-11 is the copy of the sale deed dated 28-11-1973 in respect of property bearing old municipal Nos.1121 and 1204 corresponding to new No.21-2-176 and 21-2-232/1. Ex.A-12 is the copy of the sale deed dated 19-6-1974 in respect of old municipal Nos.1120 and 1205 corresponding to new No.21-2-175 and21-2-232/2. in the road leading from Gulzar House to Charkaman, Hyderabad. Ex.A-11 is the copy of the sale deed dated 28-11-1973 in respect of property bearing old municipal Nos.1121 and 1204 corresponding to new No.21-2-176 and 21-2-232/1. Ex.A-12 is the copy of the sale deed dated 19-6-1974 in respect of old municipal Nos.1120 and 1205 corresponding to new No.21-2-175 and21-2-232/2. The recitals therein show that the 1st defendant and his brother Maniklal Gupta, as proprietors of the firm 'Raj Bahadur Motilal Heeralal'- had purchased the said properties from Vallabhdas,S/o Seth Bhagwan Das, through J. Moosa, auctioneer, under a sale deed dated 18 Isfandar, 1358 Fasli, and that after the death of Maniklal Gupta in December, 1951, 1st defendant became the absolute owner of the said properties, as the sole surviving partner of the firm "'Raj Bahadur Motilal Heeralal'-. This suit is filed in respect of properties bearing Nos.21-2-172, 173 and 174, which are different from the properties covered by Exs.A-10 to A-12. There is no presumption that properties bearing Nos.21-2-172 to 174 were also purchased along with, or under the same sale deed under which the properties sold under Exs.A-10 to A-12 were purchased. Merely because the 1st defendant described the adjacent boundary of the building sold under Exs.A-10 to A-12, especially the northern boundary inEx.A-11, as 'Vendor's building'-, the building to the north of the building sold under Ex.A-11 does not become the absolute property of 1st defendant, if really it is not his self-acquired property. It is well known that some members of joint family can carry on business in their individual capacity as partners, without reference to the joint family members, as their own business, and acquire properties. Such property would be their self-acquired property but not the joint family property. It is also well known that members of a joint family, which has joint-family property, can also have, or acquire, property individually. Such property would be their self-acquired property. So members of Joint family apart from having joint family property can also have separate property. Even assuming that the recital in Ex.A-11 amounts to an admission, as contended by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of 3rd plaintiff, in view of Ambika Prasad Ram case (24 supra), since admission does not confer title, joint family property would not become a self-acquired property of 1st defendant by his "admission'. Even assuming that the recital in Ex.A-11 amounts to an admission, as contended by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of 3rd plaintiff, in view of Ambika Prasad Ram case (24 supra), since admission does not confer title, joint family property would not become a self-acquired property of 1st defendant by his "admission'. Therefore, Exs.A-10 to A-12 have no relevance for a decision in the suit. 21. The fact that in Ex.A-3 agreement the property agreed to be sold was described as the absolute property of the 1st defendant does not have relevance in finding out the nature of the said property i.e., whether it is the joint family property or self-acquired property of 1st defendant. In many a case the Vendor by himself, or in collusion with the vendee, would describe the property sold by him, as his self-acquired property, either to defraud the other joint family members or for some other reasons. That recital does not prevent the other joint family members from establishing that the property sold in fact is not the self-acquired property of the vendor, and is a joint family property. 22. There can be no two opinions for the proposition that a vendor cannot, in a suit for specific performance by the vendee, take a defence that since he has no title to the property agreed to be sold by him, the promisee cannot seek specific performance of the agreement executed by him. But if really the vendor has no marketable title to the property agreed to be sold by him, and the purchaser files a suit for specific performance of the agreement, making the real owner of the property also a party to the suit, and seeks a decree for specific performance against the real owner also along with the promisor, the real owner can defend the sit on the ground that the promisor has no title to the property agreed to be sold by him, and no decree can be passed against him. In this case since 3rd plaintiff is seeking the relief of specific performance against defendants 1 to 5 and 9 to 13, Defendants 2 to 5 and 9 to 13 can defend the suit on the ground that since 1st defendant is not the absolute owner of the property, the agreement entered into by him cannot be enforced against them who are strangers to the contract between the plaintiffs and 1st defendant. 23. As stated earlier 3rd plaintiff, who is relying on Ex.A-3 agreement, should have satisfied himself that 1st defendant has absolute title to the property agreed to be sold by him, before entering into Ex.A-3 agreement of sale. During cross-examination on 21-10-1992 3rd plaintiff as P.W.1 admitted that he has not seen the document of title of 1st defendant in respect of the property covered by Ex.A-3, and as a tenant of one of the malgies he has been paying rent to the 1st defendant. Merely because a property is let out by a person, he cannot be presumed to be the owner of the demised premises, because it is well known that a "landlord' of a demised premises need not necessarily be the "owner thereof. It is also well known that a co-owner or co-sharer, acting on behalf of the other co-owners or co-sharers, can let out the joint property to others without disclosing that he is only a co-owner or a co-sharer. During cross-examination on 22-10-1992 P.W.1 clearly stated that 1st defendant is the head of the family and also admitted that defendants 9 and 10 belong to the family of Laxminarayan Gupta, and that the ownership of the suit malgies vests in the families of 1st defendant and Laxminarayana Gupta. On behalf of 3rd plaintiff it is contended that a mistake must have crept in while recording the said statement of P.W.1, and, obviously, the word "not' must have been omitted between the words "is' and "true' in the sentence 'it is true that the ownership of the suit malgies vests in the families of 1st defendant and Laxminarayan Gupta'-. On behalf of 3rd plaintiff it is contended that a mistake must have crept in while recording the said statement of P.W.1, and, obviously, the word "not' must have been omitted between the words "is' and "true' in the sentence 'it is true that the ownership of the suit malgies vests in the families of 1st defendant and Laxminarayan Gupta'-. That contention does not appear to be correct because during further cross-examination on the same day, he (P.W.1) clearly stated that neither he nor 1st defendant know English, and that 1st defendant informed him that because of the pending litigation between him and the branch of Laxminarayan Gupta, he would execute the sale deed only after that litigation came to an end, and that that is the reason why he did not file the suit till 1985. When 1st defendant informed the plaintiffs that there is a litigation pending between him and Laxminarayana Gupta's branch in respect of the property agreed to be sold under Ex.A-3, as an ordinary prudent purchaser, 3rd plaintiff can be presumed to have made enquiries with regard to the litigation pending between 1st defendant and the branch of Lakshminarayana Gupta, and the property covered therein and pleas taken by the 1st defendant in that litigation, and must have voluntarily or involuntarily made the above admission. 24. P.W.2 is the brother of the third plaintiff and one of the attestors to Ex.A-3. During cross-examination he stated that at the time of Ex.A-3 1st defendant did not disclose that the property covered byEx.A-3 belongs to joint family of himself and his brother and that defendants 1 to 5 are residing together as members of joint family. P.W.3 is one of the tenants of the 1st defendant, and is the 1st defendant in O.S.No. 1365 of 1981, filed by his own brother for recovery of premises bearing No.21-2-168, Charkaman, from him (P.W.3), by impleading the 1st defendant as 2nd defendant in that suit. During chief-examination he stated that the 1st defendant is the Kartha of his joint family, and that 3rd plaintiff gave a paper publication about his entering into agreement with 1st defendant. During chief-examination he stated that the 1st defendant is the Kartha of his joint family, and that 3rd plaintiff gave a paper publication about his entering into agreement with 1st defendant. During cross-examination he stated that he is not personally aware of the agreement of sale between 1st defendant and the plaintiffs, and that he knows that O.S. No. 130 of 1983 was filed for partition of the properties covered by Ex.A-3 and other properties, including the Malgi in his occupation. The evidence of P.W.3 who is examined mainly to speak that a paper publication was made by the plaintiffs alleging that they have an agreement of sale in their favour, is not of much help to the 3rd plaintiff. P.W.4 is examined to translate in Urdu words in the stamp paper used in Ex.A-13, a rent deed filed in O.S.No.1365 of 1981 i.e., the suit filed by P.W.3, against his brother and 1st defendant. Since P.W.4 was examined on 3-11-1993 while utilising the opportunity to adduce rebuttal evidence, it can be inferred that he is examined more with a view to dilute the evidence of D.W.4, who was examined on 11-10-1993 on behalf of the contesting defendants. The evidence of P.W.4, which I would consider while considering the genuineness of Ex.A-3, is not of help in deciding this suit. 25. The evidence of D.W.1, the General Power of Attorney of the 1st defendant is that he has been looking after the affairs of the 1st defendant from several years, and that Ex.A-3 was not executed by the 1st defendant and that the property covered by Ex.A-3 was the joint family property of Laxminarayan Gupta and 1st defendant, and that in 1972 some joint family properties were released in favour of 1st defendant by Laxminarayan Gupta, under Ex.B-16, and that the branch of Laxminarayan Gupta filed O.S.No. 130 of 1983 seeking partition of the property covered by Ex.A-3 and other properties against 1st defendant. The evidence of D.W.2, the 11th defendant is that after final decree was passed in O.S.No. 130 of 1983, he and defendants 12 and 13 have purchased the property covered by this suit and that they have no notice of Ex.A-3 agreement in favour of the plaintiffs. The evidence of D.W.3, the 4th defendant, isthat the branch of Laxminarayan Gupta released their share in property bearing H.Nos. 21-2-141 and 142 for cash consideration of Rs. The evidence of D.W.3, the 4th defendant, isthat the branch of Laxminarayan Gupta released their share in property bearing H.Nos. 21-2-141 and 142 for cash consideration of Rs. 40,000/- in their favour and the remaining joint properties bearing Nos. 21-2-166 to 174 were kept joint and O.S.No. 130 of 1983 filed for partition by defendants 9 and 10 ended in compromise and as per the compromise petition filed into Court on 15-7-1985 their branch (i.e., defendants 1 to 5), was allotted properties bearing Nos.21-2-166 to 170 and that defendants 9 and 10 were allotted the property covered by this suit, and that Exs.A-3 to A-6 do not contain the signatures of his parents and that he made an application to the Inspector General of Registration and Stamps to verify whether the stamp used in Ex.A-3 is a genuine one or not, and received a reply that the stamp was sold by Smt. Zafarunnisa Begum, a licensed vendor of Stamps, to one G. Srinivasa Rao, s/o Srihari on behalf of Smt. K.Kamalamma, wife of Papaiah. During cross-examination he denied the suggestion that they obtained a collusive decree in O.S.No. 130 of 1983, only with a view to nullify Ex.A-3. The evidence of D.W.4 is that on Ex.B-18 application filed by D.W.3, they gaveEx.B-19 reply and as per Ex.X-2 entry in the Register maintained by the stamp vendor, sent to his office, stamp bearing Sl.No. 8276 dated 4-10-1982 was sold to Srinivas Rao, son of Srihari for use of K.Kamalamma wife of Papaiah. This is the oral evidence on record. 26. I would now consider the question if from the evidence on record it can be said that 3rd plaintiff is able to establish the execution of Ex.A-3 by the 1st defendant. The evidence of D.W.4 read with Ex.X-2 establishes that the stamp used for Ex.A-3 was in fact sold to one Srinivas Rao for and on behalf of M.Kamalamma wife of Papaiah, but not for the use of 1st defendant, as found in Ex.A-3. No doubt as contended bySri S.V. Reddy, on behalf of some of the defendants (appellants), as per Rule 6(2) of Indian Stamp Rules, 1925, as amended by G.O.Ms. No. 340, Revenue, dated 15-4-1967 a stamp paper purchased by or for the use of a person, can be used by that person or his legal representatives of his duly authorised agent only. No. 340, Revenue, dated 15-4-1967 a stamp paper purchased by or for the use of a person, can be used by that person or his legal representatives of his duly authorised agent only. It impliedly means others cannot make use of that stamp paper purchased for the use of a person. But neither the said Rule, or the Stamp Rules nor the Stamp Act, lay down the consequences for breach of that Rule. Therefore, I am not able to agree with his contention that for breach of the aforesaid Rule 6(2), Ex.A-3 becomes unenforceable. If contrary to Rule 6(2) of the Stamp Rules, a deed is engrossed on a stamp paper not purchased by or for the benefit of any of the parties to that deed, such deed would become an improperly or insufficiently stamped deed, and the consequences contemplated by Section 35 of the Stamp Act would follow. Therefore, if such a deed is produced before any public officer, it has to be impounded and cannot be acted upon or registered or received in evidence. If Stamp duty and penalty payable thereon are paid, such deed would attain the status of a duly stamped document, and can be acted upon by public officers and registered and received in evidence. In this case since Ex.A-3 was admitted in evidence, in view of Section 36 of Stamp Act, it cannot now be contended that it is an improperly stamped document. Since the object of the Stamp Act is to raise revenue for the State, but not to arm the litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet the claim of opponent, as held in Hindustan Steel Limited v. Dalit Construction Company : 1969 AIR SC 1238, it cannot now be said that Ex.A-3 is invalid, since it was executed on a stamp paper purchased for use of another person who is not a party to the document. The evidence of D.W.4, read with Ex.X-2, establishes that the stamp paper purchased for use of one M.Kamalamma was tampered with, and the name of 1st defendant was incorporated in the place of the said Kamalamma, which, prima facie, is a ground for holding that Ex.A-3 could or must have been ante dated. The evidence of D.W.4, read with Ex.X-2, establishes that the stamp paper purchased for use of one M.Kamalamma was tampered with, and the name of 1st defendant was incorporated in the place of the said Kamalamma, which, prima facie, is a ground for holding that Ex.A-3 could or must have been ante dated. Significantly 3rd plaintiff, who had utilised the opportunity to adduce rebuttal evidence after the defendants closed their evidence, instead of trying to establish that the stamp paper used for Ex.A-3 was purchased on behalf of 1st defendant himself but not on behalf of Kamalamma, chose to contend that 1st defendant was in the habit of making use of the stamp papers purchased by others, by putting suggestions to D.W.3 during cross-examination and by adducing the evidence of P.W.4 and relying on Ex.A-13 lease deed, which was the subject matter of O.S. No. 1365 of 1981. In fact Ex.A-13, which has no relevance for a decision in this case, is a lease deed executed by the lessee of 1st defendant in favour of the 1st defendant, the lessor. Therefore, as per Section 29(c) of the Stamp Act, unless there is an agreement to the contrary, the stamp for Ex.A-13 should be purchased by the lessee, but not the 1st defendant, the lessor. Since as per Section 62 of the Stamp Act, the executant of an insufficiently stamped document would be liable for penalties as prescribed therein, the onus to establish an agreement contrary to Section 29 of the Stamp Act, is on the person claiming that "contrary agreement'. There is nothing on record to show that there was such an agreement between the lessor and lessee in respect of Ex.A-13. So, if Ex.A-13 is an insufficiently stamped instrument in view of its being engrossed on a stamp paper not purchased by a party thereto as disclosed the evidence of P.W.4, the transaction covered by Ex.A-13 is not affected. The genuineness and enforceability of Ex.A-3, does not depend on Ex.A-13. Therefore the evidence of P.W.4 and Ex.A-13 are redundant. 27. So, if Ex.A-13 is an insufficiently stamped instrument in view of its being engrossed on a stamp paper not purchased by a party thereto as disclosed the evidence of P.W.4, the transaction covered by Ex.A-13 is not affected. The genuineness and enforceability of Ex.A-3, does not depend on Ex.A-13. Therefore the evidence of P.W.4 and Ex.A-13 are redundant. 27. The contention of Sri N.V. Surya-narayana Murthy, learned senior Counsel appearing for 3rd plaintiff in one of the appeals, is that the evidence adduced on behalf of the contesting defendants is inconsistent with the plea taken in their written statements and since the suggestion put to P.W.1 during the cross-examination on 10-4-1992 on behalf of 1st defendant is that he and Om Prakash Gupta by misrepresenting the facts, obtained the signatures of 1st defendant on Ex.A-3 agreement, it is clear that 1st defendant admitted his signatures in Ex.A-3, and since D.W.1 during chief examination, stated that the signatures in Exs.A-3, to A-6 look like the signatures of the 1st defendant, and since 1st defendant did not even send a reply to Ex.A-7 notice got issued by the plaintiffs and did not go into the witness box, the genuineness of Ex.A-3 cannot be doubted in view of Dattatreya (10 supra), Alapati Sivarama Krishna (12 supra), Pawan Kumar Gupta (11 supra) and H. Venkatachala(13 supra). In Dattatreya case (10 supra) it is held that if the only plea taken is that the executant has not signed the document and that the document is a forgery, party seeking to prove the execution of the document need not adduce evidence to show that the party who signed the document knew the contents of the document, as ordinarily no one is expected to sign a document without knowing its contents, but if it is pleaded that the party who signed the document without knowing its contents, it may in certain circumstances be necessary for the party seeking to prove the document to place material before the Court to satisfy it that the party who signed the document had knowledge of its contents. (emphasis supplied). (emphasis supplied). In Alapati Sivarama Krishna case (12 supra) it is held that if a person denies that he has written a letter which contains his signature, he must prove what he alleges, i.e., the letter was got up on a blank piece of paper containing his signature, as also the circumstances in which he happened to put his signatures on such a piece of paper. In Pawan Kumar Gupta case (11 supra) it is held that burden of proof cannot be cast on a plaintiff to prove that the transaction was consistent with the apparent tenor of the document, and so when the sale deed recites that the sale consideration was paid to the transferor, placing burden of proof to substantiate that recital in the document on the purchaser is redundant. In H. Venkatachala case (13 supra) observation in Williams on "Executors and Administrators' reading 'generally speaking where there is proof of signature everything else is implied till the contrary is proved is relied upon. Since Ex.A-3 is not a letter but is an agreement of sale, Alapati Sivarama Krishnaiah case (12 supra) has no application to the facts of this case. The specific case of the 1st defendant in his written statement is that he did not agree to sell the malgies or the residential portions on the first floor of the malgies to the plaintiffs and since he was under going medical treatment from several years and since there is litigation and difference of opinion between him and the members of the various branch of the joint family, Om Prakash Gupta, his relative and a "Pairavikar' in Court affairs, with a mala fide motive approached and promised help to him, and the plaintiffs in collusion with the said Om Prakash Gupta fraudulently obtained his and his family members signatures on a number of papers and have fabricated the suit agreement. Thus, case of the 1st defendant is that Ex.A-3 was brought into existence on the papers conta.