JUDGMENT Pradip Kumar Biswas, J. This is an application under section 401 read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed at the instance of Sri Nisapati Chattoraj, the petitioner herein seeking to quash the proceeding of C.R. Case No. 377/91 pending before the court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Durgapur under section 72[c][1][a] of the Mines Act, 1952 and also praying for setting aside the order dated 12.7.96 and 15.2.97 passed by the ld. S.D.J.M. Durgapur. 2. The short facts leading to the filing of the present revisional application are as follows:- 3. The aforesaid CR Case No. 377/91 was initiated on the basis of the petition of complaint filed by the O.P. No. 1, Sri D. Sengupta, Deputy Director of Mines Safety, Sitarampur Region No. 3 Sitarampur, Burdwan alleging therein commission of an offence punishable under section 12(c)(1)(a) of the Mines Act, 1952 [hereinafter referred to as the (Mines Act, 1952)]. 4. The precise allegation, levelled against the petitioner in the petition of complaint, was that while removing stowing pipe range from a bore hole at a stowing bunker of Kendra Colliery by a manually operated winch, the foundation anchorage rope got snapped suddenly and the winch overturned; the overturned winch hit two workers namely Mantu Bouri and Feeda Bouri who succumbed to injuries on the way to the hospital. It was further alleged that the present petitioner was a Colliery Engineer of the aforesaid Colliery and as such he was responsible and bound to conduct all installation and operations of the machineries in the mines and also to see that the same are conducted in accordance with the provisions of Mines Act 1952. It was further alleged that as the winch was not installed with proper foundation as per the provisions of Regulation 182 of Coal Mines Regulation, 1957, the present petitioner had violated the provision of Regulations 50(a) and 50(d) of the Coal Mines Regulation, 1957 and as such liable to be punished under section 72(c)(1)(a) of the Mines Act, 1952. 5. It was further alleged that as the winch was not installed with proper foundation as per the provisions of Regulation 182 of Coal Mines Regulation, 1957, the present petitioner had violated the provision of Regulations 50(a) and 50(d) of the Coal Mines Regulation, 1957 and as such liable to be punished under section 72(c)(1)(a) of the Mines Act, 1952. 5. From the side of the petitioner, it was further alleged that for proper functioning and running of the said business of Mines, two officials namely, Agent and Colliery Managers are appointed who are responsible for the overall functioning of the said Mines and the Group Engineers, who are subordinate to the Agent are responsible for any construction work and/or instalation work that are undertaken in the Collieries; the Colliery Engineers who are subordinate to Colliery Managers are responsible for day to day functioning and maintenance of the machineries which are required for the operation of mining in the said Colliery and as such the allegation that the petitioner was responsible for removing the stowing pipe is baseless inasmuch as Group Engineers are responsible for undertaking the same. It has further been alleged that the Officials of Kendra Colliery wrote to the Office of O.P. No. 1 specifically stating therein that the aforesaid work was undertaken by the employees of Contractor Hari Sadhan Pal and the said Contractor was entrusted with the job of removing the stowing pipe and to do all ancillary jobs like installation of winch and as such it is not legally permissible to hold this petitioner responsible for the aforesaid accident. 6. 6. It has further been alleged on behalf of the petitioner that after the aforesaid incident the Opposite Party No. 1 held an enquiry into the aforesaid incident and examined two persons namely R.K. Chatterjee, who was the then working as the Manager of the aforesaid Colliery and one S.B. Sharma who was working as Senior Executive Engineer of the aforesaid Colliery and those two officials in course of their statements have stated about the innocence of the petitioner and it has also been alleged that although in fact Contractor Hari Sadhan Pal and T.K. Mondal, the then Assistant Colliery Manager were responsible for the aforesaid Act, yet, surprisingly enough, the complainant in his complaint did not speak about their involvement, but solely levelled allegation against the present petitioner with ulterior motive, and moreover complainant in his petition intentionally omitted to mention the report of the Central Mining Research Station which falsified the allegation that the rope by which the winch was installed was of sub-standard quality. It has further been alleged that in course of the trial the aforesaid two persons namely, R.K. Chatterjee and S.B. Sharma were named as witnesses by the O.P. No. 1 in the petition of complaint, but for obvious reasons their examination as witnesses was withheld and the prosecution during the course of enquiry also resiled from the stand that the persons who are operating the winch were employees of Hari Sadhan Pal, a Contractor entrusted with the job of taking out the stowing pipe in the aforesaid colliery and came out with a different allegation involving the present petitioner. 7. The present petitioner during the course of the trial as the prosecution had not examined the aforesaid two persons, had filed an application praying for summoning the two persons for bringing in the real picture before the trial court and also had prayed for recalling P.W.1 for examining him on various points as earlier the ld. Defence Counsel of the present petitioner could not effectively cross-examine the aforesaid witness due to the paucity of the knowledge of the provisions of Mines Act, 1952 the Rules and Regulations therein, but unfortunately the learned Magistrate by his Order dated 12.7.96 was pleased to turn down the aforesaid prayer of the petitioner. 8. Defence Counsel of the present petitioner could not effectively cross-examine the aforesaid witness due to the paucity of the knowledge of the provisions of Mines Act, 1952 the Rules and Regulations therein, but unfortunately the learned Magistrate by his Order dated 12.7.96 was pleased to turn down the aforesaid prayer of the petitioner. 8. The petitioner subsequently had also prayed for his discharge from the aforesaid case, alleging therein that in view of the decision in the "Common Cause" case, the proceedings pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate ought not to be continued, and also alleging that the complaint filed by the O.P. No. 1 being filed beyond the period stipulated by the provisions of section 79(2) of the Mines Act, 1952 was not permissible and void ab initio, the proceeding should be dropped, but unfortunately the learned Magistrate by his Order dated 15.2.97 was pleased to turn down the aforesaid prayer of the petitioner. 9. So, being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the orders dated 12.7.96 and 15.2.97, the petitioner has filed this application before the Court seeking for the aforesaid relief alleging therein that the continuation of the present proceeding would be a gross abuse of the process of the court and in recording the aforesaid orders, the learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate the materials and the facts and circumstances of this case from their correct angle and as such there has been miscarriage of justice and as such the proceeding pending before the Court should be quashed and the impugned orders as above, should be set aside. Hence, this prayer. 10. Hence, this prayer. 10. This application has been opposed by State/opposite party alleging that the challenge regarding taking of cognizance in the instant case from the side of the petitioner is not available now inasmuch as the petitioner participated in the proceeding and allowed the same to be continued up to the stage of examination of the accused under section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code and the provisions of section 79(2) of the Mines Act also provides the inspector to satisfy himself upon enquiry and in the instant case, it is clear from the petition of complaint that the enquiry was conducted in the present case and after that complaint was drawn up on 26.12.91 and it was presented to the concerned Court on 30.12.91 and as such, the date of occurrence admittedly being on 2.7.91, the complaint was well within the period of 6 months and as such no objection can be taken with regard to the taking of cognizance alleging that the same is hit by the provisions of section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952. 11. Furthermore, the objection taken by the petitioner with regard to the maintainability of the proceeding for violation of the direction of 'common cause' case of the Supreme Court cannot also be accepted inasmuch it was the petitioner at whose instance the delay in the present proceeding and with the instant trial has been made and that being the position, it has been submitted that the petitioner cannot have any relief in the instant case with regard to the dropping of the present proceeding. 12. Again it has also been submitted on behalf of the O.P./State that the challenge in respect of the order-dated 12.7.96 by way of presenting this revisional application by the petitioner is also hopelessly barred by limitation as it was presented before the court beyond the prescribed period. 13. I have heard the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties at length. 14. In the instant case, the petitioner has come up with the prayer for the quashing of the proceeding mainly on the ground that in the instant case, the taking of cognizance by the court for the offences under section 72[c][1][a] of the Mines Act, 1952 is bad in law inasmuch as it is hit by law of limitation as it infringes the provision of section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952. 15. 15. In this connection, drawing my attention to the provision of section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952 it has been contended that in the instant case no court shall take cognizance of any offences under this Act, unless the complaint thereof has been made within a period of six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. Here, in this case the accident in question took place on 2.7.91 and the complaint petition was presented before this Court on 30-12-91 i.e., after lapse of 180 days for which there has been violation of the mandatory provisions of section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952 and it is more so, when before filing of such complaint petition, from the prosecution side, no petition praying for condonation of delay has been filed. 16. Referring to the ratio of the decision reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C 1054 in the case of State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh, it has been submitted that since specific bar was created in the Mines Act, 1952 in the matter of taking cognizance, it is clear from the ratio of the aforesaid decision that the object of the Act as mentioned above in putting a bar of limitation on the prosecution, was clearly to prevent the abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecution long after the date of offence. 17. So, here in this case, there being patently a violation of the period of limitation, no cognizance could have been taken by the learned court below in the connected matter. 18. Furthermore, it has also been contended that there being clear provisions regarding limitation in taking cognizance by the court, it cannot be said that delay in challenging the taking of cognizance by the court from the side of the petitioner should be regarded as a waiver and question of waiving any statutory right as envisaged in the law does not at all arise, and, therefore the jurisdiction of the courts, taken away by the specific provisions of limitation, cannot confer any amount of jurisdiction on the court for inaction of the parties. 19. 19. It has further been contended on behalf of the petitioner that there being also violation with the direction issued by the Apex Court in relation to the 'Common Cause' Second Judgement, the present proceeding cannot also be allowed to be continued and the continuation of the aforesaid proceeding should be regarded as a mere abuse of the process of the court. 20. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has further submitted that although the challenge in respect of the Order dated 12.7.96 by way of filing revisional application is apparently barred by limitation, yet, for granting appropriate relief to the petitioner, the said application allowing the petitioner to examine Mr. R.K. Chatterjee and Mr. S.B. Sharma as D.Ws. can be looked into in a different way to bring them as witnesses in this case to do proper justice in this case as prosecution in spite of showing them as their own witnesses did not choose to examine them in this case only with a view to avoid disclosure of truth in the connected matter. 21. Accordingly, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that taking of cognizance being bad and clearly barred by law of limitation as enjoined in section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952, the continuation of the present proceeding should be regarded as a mere abuse of the process of the court and as such the present proceeding should be quashed. 22. 22. In opposing the aforesaid prayer, it has been submitted on behalf of the prosecution/ opposite party that although in the instant case, admittedly, the accident in question took place on 2.7.91 and the complaint in the instant case under section 72 [c][1][a] of the Mines Act, 1952 was flied before the concerned court on 30.12.91 i.e., after the expiry of a period of 180 days and it is also true that as per the provisions of section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952, bar was imposed upon the courts in taking cognizance when complaint has not been made within 6 months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed or within 6 months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector, yet, here in this case, the computation of the period of six months as per provisions under section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952 should be made from the date of completion of enquiry by the Inspector in respect of any accident, but not from the date of accident. 23. Drawing my attention to the complaint petition, it has been submitted further by them that in the complaint petition itself, it has been made clear that the complainant Mr. D. Sengupta, Dy. Director of Mines Safety, an Inspector of Mines appointed under section 5 of the Mines Act, held enquiry on 3-7-91, 8-7-91 and 30-7-91 and after being satisfied that there has been some violation in contravention of the provisions of Regulation 182 of Coal Mines Regulation, 1957 as also the provisions of Regulations 50[a] and 50[d] of the Coal Mines Regulation, 1957, the aforesaid complaint under section 72[c][1][a]of the Mines Act was filed against the present accused on 26.12.91 which was eventually submitted before the concerned court on 30.12.91 and as per the provisions of section 79[II], the prosecution is authorised to file a complaint within six months from the date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector. 24. It has further been submitted on behalf of the prosecution that from the complaint petition itself, it has been clearly indicated that during the enquiry and inspection, the violations were found by the Inspector and only after that the present complaint has been lodged by him. 25. 24. It has further been submitted on behalf of the prosecution that from the complaint petition itself, it has been clearly indicated that during the enquiry and inspection, the violations were found by the Inspector and only after that the present complaint has been lodged by him. 25. In support of the above contention, they have also drawn their support from the decision reported in A.I.R. 1982 M.P. 97 in the case of State [Union of India] vs. V.L. Jain and Ors. 26. Sri Sudipto Moitra, ld. Addl. P.P. has submitted further that since in the instant case, the violations of the provisions of the Mines Act came to the knowledge of the Inspector during the enquiry held by him which was admittedly completed on 30.7.91, the complaint, even if lodged before the court on 30.12.91 is clearly within time of limitation. And as such it cannot be said that the filing of complaint in the instant case was beyond the period of 180 days. 27. I have looked into the aforesaid decision in A.I.R. 1982 (M.P.) 97 [supra] wherein it has been clearly laid down that section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952 only contemplates about the making of a complaint within 6 months and in a case filing under clause (II) it has to be made within six months from the date on which the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the inspector. The aforesaid decision has further indicated that "it is clear from the statements contained in the complaint that in the present case it came to the knowledge of the Inspector after the enquiry was completed on 14th April, 1973 and as the complaint was made to the Magistrate on 7th September, 1973, it was made clearly within time". 28. Applying the aforesaid ratio in connection with the present case in hand, I also find that the complaint petition has made it clear that the enquiry was conducted by the inspector lastly on 30.7.91 and during the enquiry and inspection, the violations were detected and only after that the complaint was drawn up on 26.12.91, which was ultimately presented before the concerned court on 30.12.91. That being the position, being in agreement with the views expressed by the learned Additional P.P., I hold that although apparently, the instant complaint petition was filed beyond the period of six months from the date of the accident, yet, the same was not at all barred by the provisions of section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952 inasmuch as the Inspector, who conducted the enquiry and filed complaint in connection with the case, came to notice the violation of the provisions of Regulation 182 of the Coal Mines Regulation, 1957 and the violation of the provisions of Regulations 50[a] and 50[d] of the Coal Mines Regulation, 1957 in course of his enquiry and inspection which were conducted on 3.7.91, 8.7.91 and 30.7.91. 29. In that view of that fact, I find no merit in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner with regard to the question of limitation vis-a-vis taking of cognizance by the court. 30. I have also looked into the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate in dealing with the question of dropping of the present proceeding in view of the directions issued by the Apex Court on the 'Common Cause' case. In the impugned order it has rightly been held by the learned Magistrate that in view of the modified observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there was no scope for stoppage of the proceeding in view of the fact that in this case dilatory tactics had been adopted by the accused petitioner in different manner and for which the proceeding has been delayed to some extent and the ld. Magistrate in the impugned order has given certain instances for which delay was caused in the trial at the instance of the accused/petitioner. 31. It is now quite settled position of law that when some dilatory tactics had been adopted by the accused petitioner in the matter of proceeding with the case before the criminal courts, no relief can be granted to such accused persons in view of the modified observation of the Supreme Court in the 'Common Cause' judgement. That being the position, in the instant case, I find no reason in dropping the proceeding on that ground also. 32. That being the position, in the instant case, I find no reason in dropping the proceeding on that ground also. 32. Now, turning to the impugned Order dated 12.7.96 in connection with the application filed by the petitioner under section 311 of the Cr.P.C., I find that the challenge made by the petitioner by way of filing the revisional application against the aforesaid order was definitely barred by the limitation as the same was presented beyond the prescribed time even after obtaining the certified copy which was made ready on 25.7.96. 33. But in this connection, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that by that application, they wanted to cross-examine P.W.1, Mr. D. Sengupta, the complainant in this case and by filing that application they also wanted to examine the two other witnesses namely P.K. Chatterjee, Manager/Agent and Mr. S.B. Sharma, Senior Executive Engineer of Kendra Colliery as court witnesses, but looking into the impugned order itself, I find that the learned Magistrate, by recording an elaborate reasoned order, has refused to exercise its discretionary power to grant such reliefs to the petitioner. No apparent illegality or infirmity could however be noticed by me in such impugned order necessitating interference by this court. 34. It is now quite also well settled that unless the impugned order is patently perverse, this court should not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary power exercised by the lower court. 35. In the present matter, the learned Magistrate, while dealing with the matter in question exercised his discretionary power by recording the aforesaid impugned order, which however, could not be said to be a perverse order necessitating interference by this court. 36. In view of the above position and also for the reason that the claim of the petitioner in respect of impugned order dated 12-7-96 being barred by limitation, I am rather inclined to hold that no relief as has been prayed for by the petitioner in connection with the aforesaid order can be granted in relation to the application filed by the accused/petitioner under section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 37. In view of what has been stated above, I hold clearly that in the instant case, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief as prayed for by filing the present petition. 38. The petition is, thus, disposed of accordingly. 38. 37. In view of what has been stated above, I hold clearly that in the instant case, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief as prayed for by filing the present petition. 38. The petition is, thus, disposed of accordingly. 38. Let a copy of the judgement be sent down to the lower court below for compliance and taking necessary action and to proceed in this case with utmost expedition. Petition disposed of with direction.