B. PRAKASH RAO, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANTS 2 and 3 are the appellants, who are aggrieved against the judgment and decree in A. S. No. 26 of 1987 dated 19-12-1989 on the file of the District Judge at kumool, reversing the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 12 of 1980 dated 18-7-1986 on the file of the Subordinate Judge at Adoni. ( 2 ) THE respondents 1 and 2-plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of mortgage debt in pursuance of mortgage deed dated 7-2-1968. According to the plaint allegations, the defendants borrowed an amount of rs. 13,000/- on 7-2-1968 and executed a simple mortgage to repay the same with interest at 12% per annum. However, no amounts were paid. Hence the suit. ( 3 ) IN defence, the execution of the deed was admitted. However, it was stated that there was partnership business between the plaintiffs and the defendants dealing in smuggling and black-marketing. When the defendant No. 1 came out of the partnership, this deed was executed as a security from revealing the said activities though without any consideration. Further, they claimed benefits as small farmers under Act VII of 1977. The defendant No. 3 who was minor at the relevant point of time raised a plea that the deed is not binding on him as no permission from the court was obtained. ( 4 ) AFTER regular enquiry, the trial court though holding that the mortgage deed ex. A-2 is with consideration but dismissed the suit on the ground that defendant No. 3 was a minor and hence the deed is not binding on him and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are small farmers. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the said judgment and decree were reversed on both the aspects and the suit was decreed against the defendants 2 and 3 and dismissed the same against the defendant No. l since he is a small farmer. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the counsel on either side and on a perusal of the record, it emerges that admittedly, Ex. A-2, the mortgage deed was executed by the defendants and the finding of both the courts is that the plea of the defendants that the said deed is not supported by consideration has not been established. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the counsel on either side and on a perusal of the record, it emerges that admittedly, Ex. A-2, the mortgage deed was executed by the defendants and the finding of both the courts is that the plea of the defendants that the said deed is not supported by consideration has not been established. There was no dispute as to the applicability of benefit as small farmer against the defendant No. l. As regards the defendant no. 2, it was found that he owns an extent of ac. 5-50 cents of dry land and as such is not a small farmer. Applying the provision under Section 8 (3) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, it was proceeded that the deed is viodable at the instance of the defendant No. 3, a minor, since the same was executed by the defendant No. l on behalf of defendant No. 3. However, since there being no material on record and the defendant No. 3 himself not entering the witness box, the avoidance of mortgage by him is not within time. Almost all these findings are purely that of fact, which are binding on this court. ( 6 ) THE main crux of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants is that the plea of avoidance of a transaction by minor is always available as defence even though he did not seek any remedy for cancellation of transaction and such suit is barred by limitation. ( 7 ) IN Vishwambhar and others v. Laxminarayana (Dead) through L. Rs. and another considering a case where the suit initially filed for a declaration that the sale is void and later amending the prayer to add cancellation of the deed/it was held:"since the claim for recovery of possession of the properties alienated could not have been made without setting aside the sale deeds the suit as initially filed was not maintainable. By the date the defect was rectified (December, 1985) by introducing such a prayer by amendment of the plaint the prescribed period of limitation for seeking such a relief had elapsed. In the circumstances, the amendment of the plaint could not come to the rescue of the plaintiff. By the date the defect was rectified (December, 1985) by introducing such a prayer by amendment of the plaint the prescribed period of limitation for seeking such a relief had elapsed. In the circumstances, the amendment of the plaint could not come to the rescue of the plaintiff. " ( 8 ) IN Sankaranarayana v. Kandasarhia, it was held:"there is no doubt whatever that a transaction entered into by a guardian relating to the minor s properties is not void and if the minor does not sue to set it aside within three years of his attaining majority, it becomes valid under Article 44 of the Limitation Act. In such a case, the minor is deemed to be a party to the transaction. " ( 9 ) IN Panchu v. Hrishikesh, it was held:"usually, no doubt, such alienations are said to be voidable and not void but they are not to be understood as valid until set aside by the reversioners in court proceedings. They are not void as they may acquire full validity and become binding on the estate by affirmance or assent of the reversioners and they are voidable in the sense that they may be disowned or repudiated by the reversioners within, of course, the relevant period of time and, on such timely repudiation, they cease to have effect. The choice lies with the reversioner and he has only to elect in time and exercise his option if he wants to avoid the alienation. " ( 10 ) IN Chaniram Sahu v. Samaru Nag, itwas held:". . . the father, the natural guardian sold the property of the minors without prior permission of the court. When one of the minors attained majority and within 3 years from such date he sold the property to another party, it was held that it was not compulsory for the minors to file a suit to set aside the sale by their father- guardian and they could do so by their unequivocal conduct like transferring the property to others. " ( 11 ) IN Ram Sarup v. Ram Chandar, it washeld:"as regards the effect of limitation, it is now well settled that the Limitation act only applies to suits or applications mentioned therein and does not debar a person from raising a plea in defence. " ( 11 ) IN Ram Sarup v. Ram Chandar, it washeld:"as regards the effect of limitation, it is now well settled that the Limitation act only applies to suits or applications mentioned therein and does not debar a person from raising a plea in defence. In the present case, the defendant has all along been in possession and even if it be supposed for one moment that if he wanted to avoid the sale it was his duty to bring a suit for the purpose, the only effect of his not doing so is that his remedy is barred; his right to avoid the sale still remains. The only case where a man loses not only the remedy but also the right by his failure to bring an action within time is the one which comes within the purview of Section 28 of the Limitation Act. " ( 12 ) IN Lakshmi Doss v. Roop Laul, it washeld:"as regards the question of limitation, even assuming that the facts entitling the defendant to have the deed set aside became known to him more than three years before this suit was brought against him, we are unable to agree with the view of Sir subrahmania Ayyar, J. , that Article 91 of the second schedule to the limitation Act applies in this case and that the defence of the defendant is time barred. We do not think it follows that because a party s remedy as plaintiff to have an instrument avoided is time barred, his right to say, by way of equitable defence if sued, that the instrument ought not to be enforced is equally time barred. Delay is, of course, an equitable reply to the equitable defence, but we do not think it can amount to a statutory bar. " ( 13 ) IN Venkatachalapathi Ayyar and another v. Robert Fischer, the decision in Lakshmi doss s case (6 supra) was followed. ( 14 ) FROM the above, it follows that either way viz. , to seek cancellation of a document or even to exercise the option given to a minor to repudiate the contract after attaining majority and during the period of limitation as prescribed by law, there has to be a specific exercise or act on the part of the minor without which, it cannot be said that he has avoided the transaction. Though there is no format in regard to such exercise but necessarily there has to be a voluntary, express and open exercise which can lead to a conclusion on resilence. Keeping long silence, he will not be permitted to raise such plea for the first time as defence in the written statement. In the absence of any such exercise or act by the minor within the period prescribed, it cannot be said that he did avoid the transaction and tried to avail the said defence in a suit filed by the other side. In the decisions referred to above, where the said plea was allowed in defence was only on facts where it was found that the said exercise was done whereas in this case, admittedly, there is nothing on record to show that the defendant No. 3 at any time avoided the transaction by way of an act within the said period. Above all, he himself having not come into the witness box to support his case, it is very difficult to believe the version in the absence of factual foundation. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY, I do not find any merits in the appeal and it has to be held that the transaction is binding on the defendant no. 3 and the lower appellate court has rightly decreed the suit against the defendants 2 and 3. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.