Judgment :- All the above revisions are being disposed of by the following common order as the issue and the parties are one and the same. The petitioners, A-3, A-4, A-6 and A-7 filed applications before the trial Court praying for the dropping of the proceedings arising out of different private complaints filed by the respondent for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Since those petitions were dismissed, the petitioners have filed the above revision petitions. The only point urged in these revision petitions is that there are no required and sufficient averments in the complaints so as to attract the offence under the Act and as such, the proceedings as against the petitioners are bound to be dropped. Repudiating the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, on the side of the respondent, it is argued that there are averments in the complaints as against the petitioners which would attract Section 141(2) of the Act, though not there are allegations as contained in Section 141(1) of the Act. It is further contended that on the basis of the similar allegations this Court in Natesha Singh v. Klen and Marshalls of Manufacturers and Exporters Pvt. Ltd., 1999 Cri. LJ 2693, dismissed the revision petitions filed by the accused observing that when there are allegations in the complaint that the petitioners-directors are responsible for the failure to make the payment of the cheque amounts, despite the service of notice, those allegations, though would not attract Section 141(1) of the Act, would certainly cover Section 141(2) of the Act. I have carefully considered the submission made by the counsel for the parties and have also gone through the impugned common order and other records. According to the complaints, in settlement of the Bill of Exchange, which was drawn by the company the first accused in the case, the second accused, the authorised signatory, issued several cheques for various sums in favour of the company. When the same were presented, they were dishonoured with the remarks 'Insufficient Funds'. Statutory notice was sent on 27-11-96 to all the accused calling upon them the to make the payment. Since there was no reply and no payment, the complainant filed the separate complaints against the company, the first accused, the authorised signatory, the second accused and other directors, namely accused Nos. 3 and 7. Statutory notice was sent on 27-11-96 to all the accused calling upon them the to make the payment. Since there was no reply and no payment, the complainant filed the separate complaints against the company, the first accused, the authorised signatory, the second accused and other directors, namely accused Nos. 3 and 7. The petitioners are accused Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 7. According to the complainant, the accused Nos. 3 to 7 are responsible for the failure to make the payment of the sums claimed under the notices and are guilty of the commission of offence under Section 138 of the Act. It is true that this Court held in 1999 Cri. LJ 2693 (supra) that though these allegations may not attract Section 141(1) of the Act as there are no averments that the directors are in charge and responsible for the conduct and affairs of the company, it may attract Section 141(2) of the Act since the averments mentioned in the complaint would cover Section 141(2) of the Act. On the basis of this observation, the counsel for the respondent/complainant would submit that the observation made by this Court in the said decision would squarely apply to this case also and as such, the petitioners cannot claim that the proceedings against them are liable to be dropped. Though this submission, at the first blush, is quite attractive, the reading of the entire judgment in 1999 Cri. LJ 2693 (supra) would not be of any use for the respondent in view of the fact that in that case, this Court found some materials to conclude that the accused petitioners were parties to the offence since the same must have been committed with the consent and connivance of the petitioners-directors. The material available in that case was that the accused-petitioners, during the relevant period, have issued different cheques to the complainant though they were not the signatories in the cheques in question in that case. Therefore, this Court was constrained to hold that there must be consent or connivance of the accused with reference to the offence. In the instant case, it is not pointed out that the petitioners-directors have issued similar cheques during the relevant period and as such, the consent or connivance cannot be inferred. Therefore, this Court was constrained to hold that there must be consent or connivance of the accused with reference to the offence. In the instant case, it is not pointed out that the petitioners-directors have issued similar cheques during the relevant period and as such, the consent or connivance cannot be inferred. Further more in a similar allegation, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the applications filed to quash the proceedings, in K. P. G. Nair v. M/s. Jindal Menthol India, Ltd. 2000 (6) Scale 578 , would hold that there must be some material with the allegations in the complaint constituting the offence under Section 138 of the Act with reference to the company as contemplated under Section 141 of the Act and quashed the proceedings observing that the mere allegation that all the accused persons are responsible for the dishonourment of the cheques and have failed to make the payment of the dishonoured cheques, despite the receipt of notice, would not suffice to hold that it would cover Section 141 of the Act. The allegations referred in the said complaint, which was dealt with by the Supreme Court is as follows :- "All the accused persons are also responsible for the dishonourment of the cheques under the Negotiable Instruments Act and all are liable to be punished for the offences committed under Section 138 NIA. All the accused persons have failed to make the payment of the dishonoured cheques despite the legal notice which was sent by registered post." When it was argued before the Supreme Court by the complainant party that the words in Section 141(1) of the Act need not be incorporated in a complaint as magic words, the Supreme Court would reject the argument by stating it cannot be disputed that substance of the allegations read as a whole should answer and fulfil the requirements of the ingredients of Section 141(1) of the Act or otherwise, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. In this context, it is argued by the counsel for the complainant, the respondents herein, that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the decision supra, did deal with only in respect of Section 141(1) of the Act and not Section 141(2) of the Act and as such, the decision rendered by this Court in 1999 Cri. LJ 2693 would apply to the present facts of the case in all force. LJ 2693 would apply to the present facts of the case in all force. The above submission of the counsel for the respondent, in my view, as indicated above, would not deserve acceptance in view of the fact that apart from the allegation that the accused persons were responsible for the failure to make the payment of the cheque amounts, there was a material to show that the petitioners-directors have issued cheques during the relevant period on behalf of the first accused company. That apart. Section 141(2) of the Act provides that where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officers of the company, such persons shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence. The wordings contained in Section 141(1) of the Act are slightly different from the wordings contained in Section 141(2) of the Act with reference to the presumption. It is mentioned under Section 141(1) of the Act that when a company has committed the offence, every person, who was in charge and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty. But under Section 141(2) of the Act, the presumption would arise against the director manager, etc., only when it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of those persons. Therefore, mere words that the petitioner-directors are responsible for the failure to make the payment of the cheque amounts without any further material would not be sufficient to conclude that it would cover Section 141(2) of the Act. For these reasons mentioned above, I am of the view that the proceedings as against the petitioners, namely, A-3, A-4, A-6 and A-7 are liable to be dropped and accordingly dropped. The revisions are allowed. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the trial as against the other accused as expeditiously as possible. Order accordingly.