1. This motion of revision is aimed at revising the order of learned Addl. District Judge, Srinagar dated: 21-10-1999 in Civil Misc. Appeal filed against the order of learned Munsiff, Sub-Registrar, Srinagar dated: 11-12-1998 confirming the said order. It stems out of those circumstances which are summarized as: 2. The respondent namely Neelam Koul came to institute a suit for declaration before the learned trial court to the effect that order of her termination dated: 04-07-1998 passed by the petitioner No. 2, appellant is null and void and the plaintiff- respondent is entitled to the salary from June, 1998 till disposal of the suit with a consequential relief of perpetual injunction that the defendant-petitioners be restrained to terminate her services. It is inter-alia maintained in the plaint that the petitioner-defendant No. 1-Society stands recognized by the State Government as a Government Educational Institution; that the plaintiff-petitioner came to be appointed as a Dispensary Assistant in the same Institution on adhoc basis on 04-03-1988 and after a period of eight years working on adhoc basis she was confirmed on the said post in the month of April, 1996;thaton29-05-1998 the plaintiff came to be visited with a suspension order which reads as under: Mrs. Neelam Koul This is to inform you that owing to your extremely obnoxious behaviour in school, your service is hereby suspended with immediate effect. An Enquiry is being instituted regarding your behaviour both moral and also with officials of the school. You shall not attend school till further orders. You will be required to present yourself in front of the Enquiry Committee which will be intimated to you in due course of time.� 3. That the perusal of the said suspension order reveals that the plaintiff is being suspended on the ground of her obnoxious and immoral behaviour; that the charge is very serious, highly illegal and defamatory; that without holding inquiry whatsoever the defendants-petitioner came to terminate the services of the plaintiff-petitioner on 04-07-1998, after paying her three months salary in lieu of the notice; that the said termination order is highly illegal, unconstitutional and malafide; that the cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff-respondent on 04-07-1998 when she was visited by the termination order and is subsisting one. Alongside, this suit, the plaintiff-petitioner came to file motion for issuance of temporary injunction. Alongside, this suit, the plaintiff-petitioner came to file motion for issuance of temporary injunction. The trial court after recording his satisfaction that the issuance of notice to the respondent-defendants shall render the suit in fructuous came to record on 03-08-1998 order of ex-parte temporary injunction restraining the defendants-petitioners from giving effect to the order impugned dated: 09-07-1998 with a further direction to maintain status qua anti as on 28-05-1998. The ex-parte order of grant of injunction came to be assailed by the defendant-petitioners before the first appellant court and the first appellate court, the second Addl. District Judge, by virtue of its order dated: 29-08-1998 came to dismiss the appeal as premature, remanded the case back to the trial court with a direction to dispose of the petition on merits after considering the objections if any, and after hearing the parties. 4. The learned trial court thereafter came to consider the whole matter afresh after hearing the parties and by virtue of its order dated: 11-12-1998 came to accept the application and made the order absolute. This order of trial court dated: 11-12-1998 came to be challenged by the defendants-petitioners in appeal before the learned appellate court, learned District Judge, Srinagar, who came to confirm the said order in appeal by virtue of his order dated: 21-10-1999. 5. Heard Mr. Z.A. Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. A. Amin, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. The stand of learned counsel for the petitioners-defendants is that trial court has no jurisdiction to try the suit as the matter relates to the dispute inter-se Master and Servant involving personal contract of service. Even if the contract of personal service was wrongly terminated by the petitioner-defendants, the remedy to the plaintiff feeling aggrieved by the said order of termination lies some-where-else in an action for damages because under section 21 of the J&K Specific Relief Act, the Civil Court has no power to direct specific performance of contract of services. That since the matter in dispute is in between the Master and servant, the plaintiff-respondent has already chosen the forum under the Industrial Disputes Act by approaching the Conciliation Officer, Assistant Commissioner Labour. On this count also the suit is not maintainable because two parallel proceedings cannot run concurrently. That since the matter in dispute is in between the Master and servant, the plaintiff-respondent has already chosen the forum under the Industrial Disputes Act by approaching the Conciliation Officer, Assistant Commissioner Labour. On this count also the suit is not maintainable because two parallel proceedings cannot run concurrently. The further stand of the petitioner is that he plaintiff-respondent is working on adhoc basis as Dispensary Assistant in the School, therefore, her services under the Service Rules of Tyndale Biscoe and Mallinson Girls School Srinagar can be terminated by the Principal of the School by giving 24 hours notice, but in this case the plaintiff-respondent was found guilty of the misconduct by the management committee. In this behalf the said Committee relied upon the statements of the teaching staff and the students of the School. Besides this that when the impugned order of termination of services of the plaintiff was passed. the plaintiff-respondent was paid Rs. 13634/-by cheque which was her salary for three months and the said money has been received by her therefore she is estopped to turn around and to assail her termination order. 7. On the other hand the stand of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the suit of the plaintiff-respondent is not one for specific performance of contract but one for the declaration, wherein, she has sought decree to the effect that the termination order recorded on 04-07-1998 is null and void with a consequential relief that the defendant-respondent be permanently restrained to terminate her services. His further stand is that the plaintiff was working as Dispensary Assistant from last several years and her services were confirmed after eight years in the month of April, 1996 as such the order of termination without notice is bad in law and that the defendant No. 1 is an educational Institution having its own constitution and the service rules which is binding upon them. Under the said Service Rules, the services of any employee of the Institution cannot be done away with without inquiry into his or her alleged misconduct. 8. Under the said Service Rules, the services of any employee of the Institution cannot be done away with without inquiry into his or her alleged misconduct. 8. At this stage of the case when the suit file is at its preliminary stage of production of documents and issues are yet to be framed, it is not proper for this court to comment upon the rival contentions of the parties or on the merits of the case because that may prejudice the rights of either of the parties. The pleas and the counter pleas as to whether the civil court has jurisdiction to try the suit; whether the plaintiff-respondent is a confirmed employee of the defendant-society whether no inquiry as contemplated under the service rules of 1988 of Tyndale Biscoe and Mallinson Girls School, Srinagar was conducted before the termination order impugned in the suit are all triable issues shall be decided by the trial court at its proper stage after framing issues in the suit. 9. It is well settled that in deciding the grant or refusal of temporary injunction, the court must be satisfied that whether or not the petitioner seeking the relief has a strong prima facie case; whether direction is necessary from the species of injuries known as irreparable before the legal right is established and whether the mischief of inconvenience likely to be caused from with holding of an ad interim injunction is greater than granting it. If any of these conditions are lacking, an order of temporary injunction is to be refused by the court. Having regard to these principles it is not disputed that the defendant-appellant No.1 is an educational agency permitted to run and maintain Biscoe and Mallinson Girls School, Srinagar Kashmir under the Jammu and Kashmir Education Act, 1984; it has a joint committee of management and said joint Committee by its meeting held on 28-07-1988 adopted the service Rules of 1988 known as Service Rules of Tyndale Biscoe and Mallinson Girls School, Srinagar, 1988 (for short Rules). These rules govern the service conditions of the employees both teaching and non-teaching, physical training, Library, clerical and class IV Staff of these School. These rules provide for one manner and method for taking disciplinary action against its employees in case of misconduct of such employees and also these rules specify the authorities in this behalf. These rules govern the service conditions of the employees both teaching and non-teaching, physical training, Library, clerical and class IV Staff of these School. These rules provide for one manner and method for taking disciplinary action against its employees in case of misconduct of such employees and also these rules specify the authorities in this behalf. These rules are mandatory in character and the defendant-appellant No. 1 has created for itself also to regulate the service conditions of its employees; therefore are binding upon it and cannot afford to part with these rules in accordance to its convenience, Rule 24 of the Rules provide "Conduct Rules" to be strictly maintained by its employees. Rule 25 of the Rule provide "Superintendence, Control, Discipline". It inter-alia reveals that in case of misconduct of any employee whose services have been confirmed by the J.C.M. comes to the notice of the Principal of the School, who after seeking a written explanation from such employee within the stipulated time which shall not be less than one week comes to the conclusion that after misconduct is committed, he, the principal, may issue a censure/warning, order with holding of one increment, impose a fine not exceeding one weeks pay, and recover from the pay part or whole of any pecuniary loss caused to the School through the misconduct, but if Principal comes to the conclusion that a grave act of misconduct has been committed by such employee, which warrants reduction of rank or pay or dismissal from service of such employee, in that case the Principal shall refer the matter to the Disciplinary Committee where the delinquent shall be given all opportunity to present his defence. 10. In para 3 of her plaint, the plaintiff-respondent has averred inter-alia that she was appointed on adhoc basis as Dispensary Assistant on 04-03-1998 and was confirmed in April, 1996 after eight years of her adhoc service. The reply of defendant-appellants to this para of the plaint is not that of a specific denial but evasive one. Besides this, in para 8 of the plaint it is averred by the plaintiff-respondent that no enquiry as disclosed in suspension order was ever conducted or that she was given any opportunity of being heard. The reply of defendant-appellants to this para of the plaint is not that of a specific denial but evasive one. Besides this, in para 8 of the plaint it is averred by the plaintiff-respondent that no enquiry as disclosed in suspension order was ever conducted or that she was given any opportunity of being heard. To this in reply the appellants-defendants have nowhere stated that the inquiry as contemplated under Rules was instituted into the alleged misconduct of the plaintiff-respondent where she was given an opportunity to present her defence. From the bare glance of the pleadings of the parties it is manifest that the plaintiff-respondent has a strong prima facie case. The courts interference is also necessary to protect the plaintiff-respondent from the species of irreparable injury before she can establish her right on trial because the order of suspension dated: 29-05-1998 has resulted into the impugned termination order dated: 04-07-1998 opens with the words that "this is to inform you that owing to your extremely obnoxious behaviour in the School, your services is hereby suspended with immediate effect. 11. What is obnoxious, it is not disclosed in the said order. However the word "obnoxious" as per Oxford Dictionary means, "extremely unpleasant, exposed to harm, thus is stigmatic. The termination of service of the plaintiff-respondent from the School after labeling her, a lady of obnoxious character will leave her both high and dry in as much as it will likely down grade her in the Indian traditional of society, above all she belongs to fare sex shall be treated with disdain in the society, will be looked down by every member of society, she cannot get good match for her children nor even she get re-employment. This way her future career and life will get spoiled and in turn will suffer an irreparable injury. Therefore protection is necessary to her from the species of irreparable injury before she establishes her right in the suit instituted by her before the trial court. This way her future career and life will get spoiled and in turn will suffer an irreparable injury. Therefore protection is necessary to her from the species of irreparable injury before she establishes her right in the suit instituted by her before the trial court. Balance of convenience also tilts in her favour because with holding of ad interim injunction sought by her in the suit shall cause greater inconvenience to her as compared to defendants-petitioners if the same is granted because she has been serving in the School from last more than eight years and all of a sudden her behaviour cannot be said to have changed to such an extent of labelling her as an obnoxious person. The learned trial court as well as the learned appellate court appear to have recorded the impugned order after bearing in mind the aforesaid principles governing the grant of refusal of ad interim injunction. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do no find any jurisdictional error in the impugned order nor is it suffering with any irregularity if allowed to stand shall cause injustice to the petitioner/defendant. The motion of revision is accordingly dismissed. The record of the case together with the copy of this order be sent to the courts below. The learned counsel for the parties are directed to cause the appearance of their clients before the trial court on 16-03-2002.