JUDGMENT : S. Muralidhar, J. The appeal raises the question whether a sitting Judge of the High Court can accept office of another regular post under the control of the Executive and continue to discharge functions of a High Court Judge while holding such office. 2. The Petitioners submit that such functioning is impermissible under the Constitutional Scheme of separation of Powers and Independence of Judiciary, which is a basic structure of the Constitution, as is demonstrated below. 3. The question in this case arose in the context of a Judge of the Madras High Court, who after having accepted the post of President of the Pondicherry State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission continued to function 15th as a High Court Judge and as President of the Consumer Commission. The post of President of the State Consumer Commission was to be held from 21.5.1999 for a period of five years up to 21.5.2004. The learned Judge was appointed as Judge of the Madras High Court on 19.12.1996 and was due to retire on 15.12.2003 on attaining the age of 62 years. Thus the office of President of the Consumer Commission was not a temporary one, but a regular one with a long tenure and with all the attendant trappings of a regular post. It is submitted that reference has been made to the facts relating to the Learned Judge only to give the background to the issue in this case. 4. The consequence of such an appointment to a Statutory Judicial post is that while functioning as a Judge of the High Court, the Judge concerned is also subject to controls by the State Government under the relevant statute, i.e., the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Not only is the appointment made by the State Government as per Section 16 of the Act, he is also removable by the Government under Section 10(2) read with Rule 3(5) of the Pondicherry Consumer Protection Rules, 1987 on grounds of conviction, incapacity or abuse of position as to render his continuance in office prejudicial to public interest. Further, such removal has to be on an enquiry by the Government. 5. Further, such removal has to be on an enquiry by the Government. 5. It is submitted that such removability by the Government is wholly antithetical to the concept of independence of judiciary, to preserve which this Hon'ble Court has held in the Judges' case ( 1993 (4) SCC 441 & 1998 (7) SCC 739 ) that the entire control over appointment/transfer and other such terms during the tenure of a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court vests only with the Judiciary and not with the Executive. 6. The contention of the 1st respondent that such removal is a necessary concomitant of any office, is no answer. The consequence of such removal by the 181 Executive on the ground of being unfit to hold a statutory office "as being against public interest" would be to undermine the authority of the judge in the eyes of the public and erode his legitimacy as judge of the High Court, which has been so zealously sought to be preserved by insulating the judiciary from executive pressures and providing Constitutional safeguards. The eventuality of such a removal may not be there in any particular case is not a relevant factor to determine the correctness of the action under the Constitutional scheme, for the interpretation cannot vary from individual to individual. 7. This Hon'ble Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, ( 1997 (3) SCC 261 ) upheld the contention that the various Tribunals under Articles 323-A & 323-B cannot be to the exclusion of the High Court. The main reasons was that the Tribunals were no substitute for the High Court on various grounds. This Hon'ble Court noted that while the practical difficulty of mounting arrears in courts necessitated the continuance of the Tribunals, the reality also was that the Tribunals were subject to executive Interference as the members were subject to executive controls & proximity. Most importantly, this Hon'ble Court noticed the fact that Executive retained the power to remove the members or even to abolish the Tribunals. The Court observed that the very legitimacy of the Court's power was derived from its independence from the Executive, which was sadly lacking in the Tribunals. Most importantly, this Hon'ble Court noticed the fact that Executive retained the power to remove the members or even to abolish the Tribunals. The Court observed that the very legitimacy of the Court's power was derived from its independence from the Executive, which was sadly lacking in the Tribunals. Hence, the court came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the High Courts cannot be excluded and that the Tribunals should function subject to the High Court's powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. These very reasons apply to the post of President of a State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. It is immaterial that the commission is not a Tribunal under Articles 323-A & 323-B of the Constitution. 8. This Hon'ble Court in order to strengthen the functioning of such Tribunals and to avoid the criticism of poor quality justice also emphasised in Chandrakumar's case that the opinion of the Judicial member in such Tribunals will have to be given precedents and their orders cannot be over riden by administrative members. Unfortunately the Consumer Protection Act in the context of which the present issue arises states in Section 14 (2-A) read with Section 18, that the opinion of the majority shall be the order of the Commission, which means the non judicial members can override the decision of the judicial member, thus eroding the credibility of the decision. 9. In the Second Judges' Case, (1993(4)SCC 441) this Hon'ble Court has observed that Article 50 on Separation of Judiciary from executive is the conscience of the Constitution and that is why it is provided not only for the High Court and the Supreme Court but also in Article 235 for the subordinate Judiciary. It is to preserve such independence that this Hon'ble Court interpreted Articles 124 & 217 to mean that the judiciary will have to decide on the appointment/transfer, etc., of the Judges and not the Government (see paras 74, 77 & 81, 322 to 335 of 1993 (4) SCC 441 ). 10. In doing so, this Hon'ble Court also relied upon the 'conventions' set by the Constitutional functionaries while exercising their powers in the context of the aforesaid Articles. It has been stated that the Constitution should be interpreted historically and purposively and the conventions followed by the Constitutional functionaries constitute binding precedents and are enforceable. 10. In doing so, this Hon'ble Court also relied upon the 'conventions' set by the Constitutional functionaries while exercising their powers in the context of the aforesaid Articles. It has been stated that the Constitution should be interpreted historically and purposively and the conventions followed by the Constitutional functionaries constitute binding precedents and are enforceable. (see paras 337 to 346, 351 to 357, 429, 433 & 477 of 1993 (4) SCC 441 ). The concept of Independence of Judiciary and the interpretation of the Constitution in that perspective has been reiterated by this Hon'ble Court in the Special Reference case reported in 1998 (7) SCC 739 . 11. The conventions set by Constitutional functionaries on the present issue is that whenever a Judge of a High Court accepts any other office, he does not continue to function as a Judge. There has been no case of a sitting Judge of the Madras High Court, who after accepting the post of Chairman/ President, etc. of another Tribunal has continued to discharge the functions of a Judge or has reverted to the High court after the expiry of the tenure. On the contrary every judge has taken up such office without returning back to the High court. The petitioners understand that similar is the practice in all other High Courts. The instance of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mack of the Madras High Court who was appointed to preside over the Industrial Tribunal, Madras in 1953 is inappropriate. The Hon'ble Judge was given a specific assignment to decide 'an' industrial dispute by an order cit. 4.9.53 and he completed the work on 8.2.1954. The assignment can certainly not be compared with that of a regular post, as that of President of a Consumer Disputes Commission for five long years. Similar is the notification of some judges of the High Court as special Tribunals under the T.N. Estates Abolition Act, where they are only 'Persona designata' without any separate office. 12. It is submitted that tribunalisation of justice is a recent phenomenon under Articles 323-A & B (introduced in 1976) and one cannot go by practices adopted prior to the various historical developments in this regard. In this context, the historical review of the functioning of such tribunals and the lack of their independence as noted by this Hon'ble Court in L. Chandrakumar's case ( 1997 (3) SCC 261 ) becomes relevant. 13. In this context, the historical review of the functioning of such tribunals and the lack of their independence as noted by this Hon'ble Court in L. Chandrakumar's case ( 1997 (3) SCC 261 ) becomes relevant. 13. Even as early as in 1968, this Hon'ble Court observed in Alok Kr. Roy's case, ( AIR 1968 SC 453 @ para 6) in the context of Commissions of Inquiry Act that: "These Commissions are temporary affairs ....... A Judge of the High Court when he is appointed to head a Commission of this kind does not demit his office as a Judge and when the commission is not actually sitting, he is entitled to sit as a Judge of the High Court. It is only where a Judge of the High Court is appointed to another post, which is a whole time post that it may be said that on such appointment he can no longer work as a Judge of the High Court for the time being, though even in such a case, when the work is over, he reverts as a Judge of the High Court, without fresh appointment". (emphasis added) It may also be noted that a Commission of Inquiry does not adjudicate a lis unlike a Judicial Tribunal. 14. It is submitted that para 11 (b) (i) of part-D of the second schedule to the Constitution of India does not sanction the simultaneous discharge of functions of a Judge of the High Court and of any other office. If so, there was no necessity to define 'actual service' to include "time spent by a Judge in the performance of such other functions". The provision itself implies that when the Judge performs other functions, he does not function as a Judge and hence, but for the definition, such period would not be treated as on duty as a Judge. Hence, the sanction given by the President for the purpose of Section 2(1) (c)(i) of the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 cannot support the position that the judge can hold both the posts at the same time. 15. The Constituent Assembly Debates on 24th May 1949 on Article 103, 103-A in the Draft Constitution equal to the final Article 124 are relevant in this context. Dr. 15. The Constituent Assembly Debates on 24th May 1949 on Article 103, 103-A in the Draft Constitution equal to the final Article 124 are relevant in this context. Dr. Ambedkar specifically mentioned the case of J edges being assigned other duties with the right of reverting back to function as a Judge as an issue to be considered. Ultimately the prohibition not "to plead or act in any Court or before any authority" as incorporated Article 124 (7) and 220 alone remained. 16. However, at that time the large-scale tribunalisation of justice and their functioning under the control of the Government was never envisaged. Hence, one has to look to the Constitutional conventions set and the historical developments to decide the issue. If that is noted, it is clear that the functioning of a Judge of High Court in a post under the control of the Government is wholly inconsistent with the concept of the independence of judiciary. 17. The Petitioners submit that the difference in the phraseology of Section 4 of the Inter-state Water Disputes Act, 1956 at its inception and after the amendment in 1968 is relevant. The Act initially said: "Section 4(2) The Tribunal shall consist of one person only nominated in this behalf by the Chief Justice of India from among persons who are, or have been, Judges of the Supreme Court or are Judges of a High Court." After the Amendment Act of 1968: "Section 4(2): The Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman and two other persons nominated in this behalf by the Chief Justice of India from among persons who at the time of such nomination are Judges of the Supreme Court or of a High Court". (emphasis added) 18. Thus, the requirement that the nominees for the post are judges of the High Court/ Supreme Court is only a prescription of qualification and cannot sanction their continuance as a High Court Judge, even after accepting the statutory post. This is the practice adopted under the various statutes like Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, Customs & Excise Revenues Appellate Tribunal Act, 1986, The Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, The Special Court (Trial of offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, The Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal Act, 1992, The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, etc. 19. This is the practice adopted under the various statutes like Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, Customs & Excise Revenues Appellate Tribunal Act, 1986, The Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, The Special Court (Trial of offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, The Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal Act, 1992, The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, etc. 19. It is to be noted that in L.Chandrakumar's case, the powers of the High Court over judicial Tribunals have been emphasised by this Hon'ble Court, as otherwise their exclusion would be unconstitutional as offending the basic structure of judicial review & independence of judiciary. Hence, apart from the above, if simultaneous holding of charge as Judge of the High Court is permitted with holding post of a Tribunal, it will result in a position where a Judge will be holding both the post in a subordinate judicial post along with his constitutional post in the High Court. The fact that members of Judicial Tribunals do not enjoy the status, powers or the Constitutional protections afforded to Judges of High Courts and Supreme Courts has been noted by this Hon'ble Court in the judgments in R.K.Jain v. Union of India ( 1993 (4) SCC 119 ) and Pratibha Banerjee v. Union of India ( 1995 (6) SCC 765 ). Hence holding both the posts at the same time will result in an anomalous position and will lower the image of the judiciary. In these circumstances, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to accept the Petitioners' contentions and allow their Prayers. It is also reiterated that the Petitioners have filed this litigation only in public interest in order to maintain the purity of judicial administration and the high principle of independence of judiciary.