D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS Appeal is directed against a judgment and decree dated 12th October, 1993 passed by the learned Judge, 10th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 128 of 1985. 1. 1 The suit for eviction was filed by the plaintiff on the ground of reasonable requirement for her own use and occupation. In the plaint, she had pointed out that she is the owner of the premises by virtue of a deed of gift executed by her father, since been duly accepted by her. That the defendant had recognized her father as the landlord and had also subsequently paid rent to her as well. She had made out a case that she needs the premises for her own use and occupation and that she is leaving in a rented house, which is not a suitably reasonable accommodation. 1. 2. The defendant, however, denied the title of the plaintiff on the ground that the deed of gift was executed by her father only for the purpose of seeking eviction of the defendant. She does not reasonably require the suit premises for her use and occupation. The assertion with regard to the number of members in the family was also disputed. It was also contended that the plaintiff had reasonably suitable alternative accommodation, since she is not under threat of eviction in the present rented accommodation. On this ground, he contended that the only ground of reasonable requirement under section 13 (1) (ff), which has since been decreed, cannot be sustained and the judgment and decree appealed against should be set aside. The question: ( 2 ) WE have heard respective counsel for the parties. Our attention was drawn to the materials on record, namely, the plaint, the Written Statement, the Depositions and the various documents including the deed-of-gift as well as the Judgment and Decree appealed against. The moot question that falls for consideration in this case as to whether the plaintiff has been able to establish the three ingredients to support the decree under section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Ownership : ( 3 ) AFTER having gone through the materials on record, we find that the plaintiff had got the property by virtue of the deed of gift executed by her father on 30th July, 1979 since been registered. Ownership : ( 3 ) AFTER having gone through the materials on record, we find that the plaintiff had got the property by virtue of the deed of gift executed by her father on 30th July, 1979 since been registered. From the evidence of the defendant, it is apparent that the defendant had attorned the tenancy in favour of the father of the plaintiff. In his deposition, the defendant No. 1, as it appears from page 73 of the Paper Book, had admitted that the father of the plaintiff collected rents since June 1977 till 1979. He had also admitted that Panchananda made a gift of the said property to his daughter Maya Mukherjee by the registered deed of gift and thereafter she became landlord. At page 76, he had stated that Aloke Mukherjee, the husband of the plaintiff collected rents for one year and thereafter he deposited rent in Court. Thus by reason of section 116 of the Evidence Act, the defendant No. 1 is precluded from challenging the title of his landlord. Thus, we find the first ingredient of ownership required under section 13 (1) (ff) of the said Act has since been established. The finding of the learned trial Judge to that effect appears to be supported by the evidence of DW1, being the defendant himself. Alternative suitable accommodation : ( 4 ) THE other ground that was pleaded is that the plaintiff had alternative suitable accommodation at Premises No. 7a, Star Lane. The evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff through her husband being PW3 and her father PW4, concurs with each other. It is apparent that 7a, Star Lane was a tenancy taken by Panchanan Roychowdhury, father of the plaintiff, in his own name where he had allowed the plaintiff along with her family to reside. The accommodation therein consists of only two rooms, kitchen and a small tin shed. Apart from the accommodation, no other accommodation has been shown to be possessed or occupied by the plaintiff. Whether this accommodation could be said to be sufficient or alternative suitably reasonable accommodation can be assessed only after assessing the requirement of the plaintiff. Therefore, we propose to revert back to this question after we come to a finding with regard to the requirement of the plaintiff. Whether this accommodation could be said to be sufficient or alternative suitably reasonable accommodation can be assessed only after assessing the requirement of the plaintiff. Therefore, we propose to revert back to this question after we come to a finding with regard to the requirement of the plaintiff. The requirement of the plaintiff : ( 5 ) THE defendant did dispute the composition of the plaintiff's family by contending that the unmarried sister of the husband of the plaintiff cannot be included in the family of the plaintiff and that one of the son's requirement cannot be included within the requirement of the plaintiff. However, the defendant did not dispute the composition of the family, as have been pleaded in the plaint and the evidence adduced by the respective witness of the plaintiff. Admittedly, the plaintiff and her husband together with their two sons definitely compose a family. This cannot be disputed and is also not in dispute as such. Though it is contended that one of the son's requirement cannot be included within the requirement of the plaintiff. But nothing tangible has been shown to the Court that the said son is not living with the plaintiff or he is occupying any other suitable alternative accommodation. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of the defendant with regard to the exclusion of the requirement of one of the sons of the plaintiff from the requirement of the plaintiff. Can husband's sister be included : ( 6 ) SO far as the inclusion of the husband's sister is concerned, it appears from the evidence adduced by the respective witness of the plaintiff, namely, her husband, her father and the said unmarried sister of her husband, that the sister of the husband is aged about 48 years and is unmarried. This fact is also not denied by the defendant. On the other hand, the defendant had contended that she has come to the plaintiff's house only to help the plaintiff obtaining a decree on reasonable requirement. Otherwise the sister used to live at Chandernagore with her other brother. But all the three witnesses of the plaintiff categorically and specifically stated that this sister of the husband of the plaintiff had all along been residing with the plaintiff and that she has no independent income and is dependant on her brother. Otherwise the sister used to live at Chandernagore with her other brother. But all the three witnesses of the plaintiff categorically and specifically stated that this sister of the husband of the plaintiff had all along been residing with the plaintiff and that she has no independent income and is dependant on her brother. Though, it is contended on behalf of the defendant that she is a primary teacher, but no proof thereof has since been produced, on the basis whereof, the Court can accept such a contention. The sister of the husband of the plaintiff is unmarried and is without any income. In our Indian families, sister dependent on the brother becomes a part and parcel of the same family. The evidence, as it appears, is sufficient to conclude that the sister lives with the brother, namely, the husband of the plaintiff and is part of the plaintiff's family and her requirement also can be included within the requirement of the plaintiff. Thus, we do not find any infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge in the judgment under appeal. The members of the family: ( 7 ) THUS, it appears that the plaintiff's family, as rightly held by the learned trial Judge, consists of four units, viz: the plaintiff and her husband, the eldest son, the youngest son and the husband's sister. It was rightly found by the learned trial Judge that all these four units required one bedroom each. Thus, the plaintiff is in requirement of four living rooms. A common drawing room or parlour or sitting room is also necessary for such a family. The need of a sitting or drawing room is neither insignificant nor can be overlooked. Thus, it appears that the learned trial Court had rightly found that the plaintiff is in requirement of at least five rooms apart from kitchen, bath, store etc. Extent of occupation by the parties : ( 8 ) THE defendant is in possession of two rooms and a space from which the eviction is sought for. It is also found that one of the rooms in the suit premises is in occupation of the plaintiff. If the defendant is evicted, the plaintiff will be getting three bedrooms and a space, which may partly satisfy her requirement. Still then she would be in need of further accommodation to satisfy her requirement. It is also found that one of the rooms in the suit premises is in occupation of the plaintiff. If the defendant is evicted, the plaintiff will be getting three bedrooms and a space, which may partly satisfy her requirement. Still then she would be in need of further accommodation to satisfy her requirement. It is also on record that against another tenant an eviction suit is pending. The said tenant is in occupation of one room. Therefore, at the moment there having been no offer for partial eviction and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, no case of partial eviction could ever be made out, we find that the plaintiff, as have been found by the learned trial Judge, requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation. Is the tenanted accommodation reasonably suitable alternative accommodation : ( 9 ) THE plaintiff's occupation of the tenanted room at 7a, Star Lane and one room in the suit premises cannot be treated to be alternative suitably reasonable accommodation. One room at one premises and two room in other premises cannot be combined together to satisfy the requirement of the plaintiff which she would be getting by reason of eviction of the defendant in the suit premises. At the same time, a rented accommodation, even if not under threat of eviction, cannot constitute a ground for defeating the reasonable requirement under section 13 (1) (ff) of a premises owned by the plaintiff herself. Therefore, we concur with the finding of the learned trial Judge to the extent that the plaintiff does not have alternative reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. Inasmuch as the accommodation of the plaintiff at 7a, Star Lane and occupation of one room in suit premises are not reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. Is object of transfer a factor denying relief under section 13 (1) (ff): ( 10 ) MR. Tandon had pointed out that the father of the plaintiff had purchased another house at 11a, Khudiram Bose Road, where he along with his son lives. Therefrom after purchase of the house comprising the suit premises, the father of the plaintiff could not have succeeded in an attempt for eviction on grounds under section 13 (1) (ff) of the 1956 Act. Therefore, in order to achieve the object, he had transferred the property in the name of his daughter. Therefrom after purchase of the house comprising the suit premises, the father of the plaintiff could not have succeeded in an attempt for eviction on grounds under section 13 (1) (ff) of the 1956 Act. Therefore, in order to achieve the object, he had transferred the property in the name of his daughter. He further points out that the accommodation in 11a, Khudiram bose Road, where the father of the plaintiff resides, had sufficient space or accommodation to accommodate the plaintiff. Instead the father of the plaintiff had devised the means through which the eviction of the defendant has been sought for. Therefore, the transfer, being a clandestine one with a mala fide intention, will not enure to the benefit of the plaintiff to secure eviction on the ground under section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 10. 1. He has relied on a decision in the case of V. N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Polai and Another reported in AIR 1966 SC 432 to support the contention that the Court cannot come in aid of a transferee claiming through a clandestine transfer created only for the purpose of seeking eviction of a tenant, which the transferor otherwise could not have achieved. 10. 2. The contention raised by Mr. Tandon does not seem to be of any substance. Inasmuch as, the Court is not supposed to examine the object of the transfer beyond sub-section 3a of section 13 of 1956 Act that prohibits initiation of a suit for eviction on the ground of 13 (1) (ff) within three years from acquisition of interest in the property. A provision pari materia same provided in section 14 (6) of the Dehli Rent Control Act for seeking eviction under section 14 (1) (e), namely, for reasonable requirement for own use and occupation. In the Delhi Act, the embargo is for five years. While dealing with the said question, the Apex Court had held as follows:-before construing section 14 (6), it may be permissible to enquire what may be the policy underlying the section and the object intended to be achieved by it. It seems plain that the object, which this provision is intended to achieve, is to prevent transfers by landlords as a device to enable the purchasers to evict the tenants, from the premises let out to them. It seems plain that the object, which this provision is intended to achieve, is to prevent transfers by landlords as a device to enable the purchasers to evict the tenants, from the premises let out to them. If a landlord was unable to make out a case for evicting his tenant under section 14 (1) (e), it was not unlikely that he may think of transferring the premises to a purchaser, who would be able to make out such a case on his own behalf; and the legislature thought that if such a course was allowed to be adopted, it would defeat the purpose of section 14 (1 ). In other words, where the right to evict a tenant could not be claimed by a landlord under section 14 (1) (e), the legislature thought that the landlord should not be permitted to create such a right by adopting the devise of transferring the premises to a purchaser who may be able to prove his own individual case under section 14 (1) (e ). It is possible that this provision may, in some cases, work hardship, because of a transfer is made by a landlord who could have proved his case under section 14 (1) (e), the transferee would be precluded from making a claim for the eviction of the tenant within five years even though, he, in his turn, would also have proved his case under section 14 (1) (e ). Apparently, the legislature thought that the possible mischief, which may be caused to the tenants by transfers, made by landlords to circumvent the provisions of section 14 (1) (e) required that an unqualified and absolute provision should be made as prescribed by section 14 (6 ). That, in our opinion appears to be the object intended to be achieved by this provision and the policy underlying it. 10. 3. In case it is shown that the proceeding was mala fide only for achieving the purpose, which the transferor could not achieve, through the transfer, then this question may arise. The said case was related to a case of partition. Partition, admittedly, is not transfer. In the said case, it was alleged that such partition was brought about only to avoid the mischief of section 14 (6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, similar to the provision of section 13 (3a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The said case was related to a case of partition. Partition, admittedly, is not transfer. In the said case, it was alleged that such partition was brought about only to avoid the mischief of section 14 (6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, similar to the provision of section 13 (3a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. In fact, five years embargo provided in section 14 (6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The suit was said to be hit and in that context it was held that the mischief of five years embargo could not be obviated by resorting to a partition on the principle that what the transferor could not have achieved before five years, had been sought to be achieved through partition obviating the embargo of five years. 10. 4. But this proposition has nothing to do with a proceeding by way of gift which equally attracts the mischief of section 13 (3a) of the 1956 Act. It is also not a case of the defendant that the suit is hit by section 13 (3a) of 1956 Act. The proposition laid down in the case of V. N. Sarin (supra) does not lead us to hold that the same ratio would apply in a case where the right is acquired through a valid transfer and suit is not hit by the mischief of section 13 (3a) of the 1956 Act. It is not for the Court to test the object of transfer in a suit for eviction unless it is a device to avoid application of a mischief provided in the Act. It is not a case where the mischief is being avoided. A transferee might have his own requirement. A transferor has his own right, to bequeath the property to anyone he likes for any purpose he intends. That he would not be able to evict would not be a ground to prevent transfer by way of gift or otherwise to someone else. 10. 5. Mr. Tandon has also drew our attention to the contents of the deed of gift to contend that the purpose was to donate the house the plaintiff by her father for her own use. 10. 5. Mr. Tandon has also drew our attention to the contents of the deed of gift to contend that the purpose was to donate the house the plaintiff by her father for her own use. Admittedly, the house was a tenanted one and, therefore, it was not possible to occupy the house for his own use, and, therefore this was a device to achieve the object of reasonable requirement by the transferor. There is no embargo in making a gift of a tenanted house for the purpose of accommodating one of the children. There is nothing in the Transfer of Property Act or any other Act, which can prevent a transferor from transferring the property, which is occupied by tenant for any purpose. Whether the purpose can be achieved at a later point of time is not a question or cannot be an embargo to frustrate a transfer. One may propose and God may dispose. But that is not a ground for questioning the validity of a transfer and discover mala fide in it or to call it a clandestine transfer or otherwise. Even if the purpose is to evict the tenant, still then, the transfer cannot be said to be invalid. The Transfer of Property Act does not recognize any such provision, which may frustrate a transfer validly made. Therefore, we are unable to accede to the contention raised by Mr. Tandon as contended above. 10. 6. Every person has his own right to hold property and enjoy it. Article 300a of Constitution of India ensures that one cannot be deprived of it except as provided by law. There cannot be any embargo, unless provided by law, in the enjoyment of one's property in any manner, permissible is law, he likes. Similarly, he has every right to acquire or dispose of property. There cannot be any embargo or restriction in acquisition or disposal of property, unless expressly prohibited by law. If one cannot enjoy a property in the manner he desires, he had every right to dispose it of. Any person acquiring such property has his own right to enjoy or utilize such property for his own purpose. It is not for the Court, in an action for eviction, to discover intention of transfer. If one cannot enjoy a property in the manner he desires, he had every right to dispose it of. Any person acquiring such property has his own right to enjoy or utilize such property for his own purpose. It is not for the Court, in an action for eviction, to discover intention of transfer. Sub-section 3a of section 13 of the 1956 Act prohibits suits for eviction for a period prescribed on the ground contemplated under section 13 (1) (ff) of the said Act. It is not the intention, it is the prohibited period that restricts the right. The intention may have been a factor that might have weighed with the legislature, but unless the law prohibits, Court cannot enter into such examination of intention behind the transfer by private individual. Intention is an abstract idea, which is not possible to determine in a Court of law dealing with facts. But then the intention or no intention suit of eviction under section 13 (1) (ff) by transferee is forbidden only to extent of section 13 (3a) and not beyond. There is nothing in the scheme of the Act, which would permit the Court to recognize a situation beyond that. Conclusion: ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, it appears that the plaintiff has been able to prove her reasonable requirement, since been rightly found by the learned trial judge. We are in agreement with the finding of the learned trial Judge. We do not find any reason to differ with the same having regard to the materials placed before us, through which we have been led by the respective learned counsel. Order : ( 12 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 12th October, 1993 passed by the learned Judge, 10th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 128 of 1985, appealed against, is hereby affirmed. 12. 1. There will be no order as to costs. 12. 2. After the judgment is delivered, Mr. Mukherjee submits that the tenant has already left and the premises is under lock and key. But this is a submission made at the Bar. There is nothing on record to accept the said contention. If it is so, it would be open to the plaintiff/respondent to take appropriate steps as she may be advised. J Banerjee, J.- I agree. Appeal dismissed.