DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition filed against the order dated 26/10/1999, in I. A. No. 165 of 1994 in O. S. No. 212 of 1992 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge at Visakhapatnam. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff is the revision petitioner. He filed a suit in O. S. No. 212 of 1992 to recover about Rs. 2,50,000=00 from the defendant. Defendant entered his appearance before the court. On his behalf, vakalat was filed in the court by an advocate on 24. 9. 1993. Later in February, 1994, the defendant filed a petition in I. A. No. 165 of 1994 under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short the Act ) requesting the court to stay the proceedings in the suit. He pleaded in his petition that there is a clause in agreement of contract for reference all the disputes to sole arbitration in relation to the execution or failure to execute the work, etc. The existence of such a clause in the agreement between the parties is not disputed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff resisted the said application on the ground that on 27. 10. 1987 itself the contract was rescinded by the plaintiff and at that time the defendant did not choose to refer the matter to arbitration. It is also the plea of the plaintiff that after making appearance in the court, the defendant sought time for filing written statement and therefore the petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 3 ) ON a consideration of the contentions advanced by both the parties, the trial court opined that the written statement was not filed by the defendant, he did not seek time for filing written statement and the adjournments were granted by the trial court suo motu and not at the request of the defendant. According to the trial court, no steps were taken by the defendant in the suit and therefore the petition is maintainable. Accordingly he allowed the said petition by the order dated 26. 10. 1999. Aggrieved by that order, this revision petition is filed by the plaintiff. According to the trial court, no steps were taken by the defendant in the suit and therefore the petition is maintainable. Accordingly he allowed the said petition by the order dated 26. 10. 1999. Aggrieved by that order, this revision petition is filed by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) IT is the contention of the revision petitioner that the conduct of the defendant in seeking time to file the written statement amounts to taking a step in the suit and submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court and therefore the petition is not maintainable. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondent-defendant that he had not sought for time to file the written statement and therefore it amounts that he had not taken any step in the proceedings before the court and therefore his petition is maintainable. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on three decisions. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in RACHAPPA Vs. GURUSIDDAPPA, AIR 1989 SC 635 . In this decision it is held that in order that stay may be granted under Section 34 of the Act, the following conditions are to be fulfilled. The proceedings must have commenced by a party to an arbitration agreement against any other party to the agreement; The legal proceedings, in this case the suit, which is sought to be stayed must be in respect of a matter agreed to be referred; The applicant for stay must be a party to the legal proceedings, the suit in this case; The applicant must have taken no steps in the proceeding after appearance. It further held in the above decision that where the counsel appearing for the party to the suit had sought for an adjournment specifically for filing written statement and obtained time for more than one occasions for such purpose, subsequent application for stay of the suit would not be maintainable. It was further held that the party evinced an intention to have the matter adjudicated by the court if he seeks time for filing written statement. ( 6 ) I would now consider the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent. The Supreme Court in SADHU SINGH GHUMAN Vs. FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA, 1990 (1) Arb. It was further held that the party evinced an intention to have the matter adjudicated by the court if he seeks time for filing written statement. ( 6 ) I would now consider the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent. The Supreme Court in SADHU SINGH GHUMAN Vs. FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA, 1990 (1) Arb. L. R. (140) held that the expression " a step in the proceedings" which would disentitle the defendant from invoking Section 34 of the Act is not every step taken by him in the suit, should be a step in the aid of the progress of the suit and it must have been consciously taken with a view to submit to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of adjudicating the controversy on the merits. In that suit, after making appearance in court, the defendants filed an application in the trial court to direct the plaintiff to produce certain documents before the court. The trial court allowed the petition under Section 34 of the Act filed later. In appeal, the District Judge held that the application filed by the defendants to summon the documents amounted to seeking an adjournment to enable the defendants to file the written statement and it was a step in the proceedings and the trial court was not justified in staying the suit. The High Court confirmed the order of the District Judge. The Supreme Court held that in the application filed by the defendants to direct the plaintiff to produce the documents, they did not state that they would file the written statement and therefore the defendants never took any step submitting to the jurisdiction of the court to decide the case on merits. The above decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 6. Another decision relied upon is also a decision of the Supreme Court in GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. Vs. RENUSAGAR POWER CO. , (1987) 4 SCC 137 . In that case the Supreme Court held that preliminary objections raised in the applications filed by the defendant are designed to prevent the court from going into the merits of the controversy and it does not constitute written statement or other steps. The facts of that case are also not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case the Supreme Court held that preliminary objections raised in the applications filed by the defendant are designed to prevent the court from going into the merits of the controversy and it does not constitute written statement or other steps. The facts of that case are also not applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 7 ) THE last decision relied upon is a decision of a Division Bench of this court in A. RAMASWAMY (DIED) and OTHERS Vs. K. RAMA MURTHY (DIED) and OTHERS, (4) 1999 (2) ALD 13 . This court considered the various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts regarding the application of Section 34 of the Act. In that case the application filed by the defendants for stay under Section 34 of the Act was resisted on the ground that the defendants have taken a step to file a written statement. In para 40 of the order, this court extracted docket entries in the suit. On 25. 7. 1990 an advocate filed vakalat for D. 1 to D. 5. Some other defendants were not served by that date. On that day the Presiding Officer of the Court was also not present. The office posted the matter to 12. 9. 1990. On 12. 9. 1990 fresh summons to other defendants was ordered and the matter was posted to 31. 10. 1990. It was written on the docket for written statement of D. 1 to D. 5, call on 31. 10. 1990. On 31. 10. 1990 due to curfew no steps were ordered by the court. On 7. 12. 1990 fresh summons for other defendants and for written statement of D. 1 to D. 5, call on 14. 3. 1991. On subsequent dates also fresh summons to other defendants and for written statement of D. 1 to D. 5, the suit was being posted. ( 8 ) IN the present case, the facts are distinct. In the impugned order in para 9 the trial court stated that the defendant filed vakalat on 24. 9. 1993 and on that date the Presiding Officer was on leave and office posted the matter to 24. 11. 1993. On 24. 11. 1993 the suit was posted for written statement to 24. 1. 1994. The order further discloses distinctly that on 24. 1. 1994 the time was extended till 23. 2. 1994 for filing the written statement. 9. 1993 and on that date the Presiding Officer was on leave and office posted the matter to 24. 11. 1993. On 24. 11. 1993 the suit was posted for written statement to 24. 1. 1994. The order further discloses distinctly that on 24. 1. 1994 the time was extended till 23. 2. 1994 for filing the written statement. From 23. 2. 1994 the matter was posted again to 7. 3. 1994. On 7. 3. 1994 the Presiding Officer was not present and the office posted the matter to 18. 3. 1994. Meanwhile the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed by the defendant. According to the trial court the defendant did not seek time for filing written statement and the adjournments were made by the court and in the absence of the Officer. The said finding of the trial court is quite contra to the record. In the Division Bench judgment in A. Ramaswamy s case (4 supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, some other defendants were not served and while ordering summons to other defendants from time to time, the court was also ordering the step of filing of written statement by D. 1 to D. 5. In the docket order, it was nowhere mentioned that the time was extended for filing written statement. In the present case there is only one sole defendant. Therefore, after the defendant entered his appearance in the suit, there was no other step to be ordered except the step of filing the written statement. As clear from the impugned order itself, on 24. 1. 1994 the time was extended for filing written statement. Unless the defendant or his advocate ask for extension of time, there is no need for the court to extend the time for filing the written statement by the defendant. If the defendant has not filed the written statement, or if the defendant had not asked for extension of time for filing the written statement, the only step the trial court can order is to set the defendant ex parte, examine the plaintiff and pass an ex parte decree against the defendant. Therefore, from September, 1993, for about six months the suit is coming up before the court only regarding filing of the written statement of the defendant. Therefore, from September, 1993, for about six months the suit is coming up before the court only regarding filing of the written statement of the defendant. No other proceeding was pending before the court where the court has no alternative except to adjourn the suit from time to time. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the defendant had sought time for filing the written statement and the said act of the defendant amounts to taking a step in aid of the progress of the suit and it can be construed reasonably as submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. There is no need for the defendant in the present case to wait for about six months after making his appearance in the court and then decide to file the petition under Section 34 of the Act seeking stay of the proceedings in the suit. As the defendant had taken a step in the suit, his petition under Section 34 of the Act is not maintainable. Therefore, the order of the trial court is liable to be set aside. ( 9 ) IN the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The order of the trial court in I. A. No. 165 of 1994 is set aside. The said petition is dismissed without costs. No costs.