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2002 DIGILAW 455 (JHR)

Lal Babu Singh v. Coal India Limited

2002-04-04

HARI SHANKAR PRASAD, M.Y.EQBAL

body2002
JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment dated 23.4.1992 passed in CWJC No. 1389/91 (R), whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant. 2. The writ petition was filed by the petitioner-appellant for quashing the letter dated 26.7.1990 issued by the concerned respondent whereby petitioner was informed that the departmental proceeding against him would continue and further for quashing entire departmental proceeding against the petitioner. The petitioner by filing amendment application in the writ petition also prayed infer alia for a declaration that Rule 34.2 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules framed by respondent No. 1, Coal India Limited is unconstitutional. 3. Petitioner was Chief Mining Engineer under the respondent. On 13.10.1989, he was given a notice intimating him that he would superannuate with effect from 31.1.1990. The petitioner availed the benefit of leave travel concessions from 25.12.1989 to 24.1.1990. The petitioner on or about 23.1.1990 allegedly applied for extension of leave upto 31.1.1990. The said application was received on 30.1.1990 and was rejected on the same day. Petitioner admittedly superannuated with effect from 31.1.1990. Petitioner contended that on or about 15.2.1990, he was served with a charge-sheet dated 3.1.1990 in pursuance whereof he submitted his show-cause on 10.3.1990. An enquiry officer was appointed by the respondent who proceeded with departmental proceeding. Petitioner thereafter lodged a protest against the continuation of the disciplinary proceeding on the ground that it could not have been initiated after superannuation, the said objection was rejected by order dated 26.7.1990, which was impugned in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge formulated the following questions for consideration: 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the departmental proceeding can be said to have been instituted against the petitioner before 31.1.1990. 2. Whether the charges contained in the charge-sheet dated 3.1.1990 as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application constitute any misconduct within the meaning of the provisions of the said Rules; 3. Whether Rule 34.2 of the said Rules is unconstitutional and, thus, continuance of the departmental proceedings as against the petitioner, as has been directed by reasons of letter dated 26.7.1990 as contained in Annexure-7 is vitiated in law." 4. Whether Rule 34.2 of the said Rules is unconstitutional and, thus, continuance of the departmental proceedings as against the petitioner, as has been directed by reasons of letter dated 26.7.1990 as contained in Annexure-7 is vitiated in law." 4. Learned Single Judge after considering the entire facts of the case and the law decided all the questions against the petitioner and dismissed the writ petition. 5. This appeal was admitted on 23.2.1993 only on the question whether departmental proceeding was initiated while the employee was in the service in view of Rule 34.2 of the Rules governing the petitioners service condition. 6. Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner- appellant assailed the judgment of the learned Single Judge as being contrary to law and against the admitted facts of the case. Learned counsel firstly submitted that departmental inquiry commences only after charge-sheet is served upon the delinquent and not from the date when the charges are drawn up by the employer. Learned counsel submitted that learned Single Judge has not correctly appreciated the ratio decided by the Supreme Court in the case of "The Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Ors. v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee" AIR 1980 SC 840 . 7. Rule 34.2 of the said Rules reads as under: "Departmental proceeding if instituted while the employee was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment shall after the final retirement of the employee, be deemed to be proceeding and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which it was commenced in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service." 8. In the counter-affidavit, it was categorically stated by the respondents that charge-sheet was issued on 3.1.1990 and it was sent under registered post on 27.1.1990. It was further contented that the charge-sheet could not be served upon the petitioner till 24.1.1990 as the petitioner was out of station. However, the Office copy of the charge-sheet dated 3.1.1990 was affixed in the house premises of the petitioner on 31.1.1990 by two officers of the respondent. The contention of the petitioner was that charge-sheet was not served on the petitioner till 15.2.1990, departmental proceeding cannot be said to have been initiated while He was in service. However, the Office copy of the charge-sheet dated 3.1.1990 was affixed in the house premises of the petitioner on 31.1.1990 by two officers of the respondent. The contention of the petitioner was that charge-sheet was not served on the petitioner till 15.2.1990, departmental proceeding cannot be said to have been initiated while He was in service. In our opinion the contention of the petitioner has no leg to stand, admittedly, before superannuation petitioner proceeded on leave for availing benefit of leave travel concession from 25.12.1989 to 24.1.1990. Petitioner on or about 23,1.1990 allegedly applied for extension of leave upto 31.1.1990 but the same was not allowed. Since petitioner was out of station from the date when charge-sheet was drawn up till the date of his superannuation and in such circumstances it was not possible for the respondents to effect personal service of charge-sheet upon him. The charge-sheet was admittedly drawn up on 3.1.1990 and was sent by registered post on 27.1.1990 and it was affixed in the house premises of the petitioner on 31.1.1990 in presence of two officers of the respondents. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the charge-sheet having been drawn up before superannuation of the petitioner and it was served in the manner stated herein before. In the case of "The Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Ors. v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, 1980 SC 840, the Supreme Court while considering a case where respondent was dismissed summarily upon perusal of his explanation without any charge-sheet having been drawn up and served upon the delinquent and in the facts of the case it was observed that regular departmental proceeding takes place only after the charge-sheet drawn up and served upon the delinquent and latters explanation is obtained. 9. In the impugned judgment, while dismissing the writ petition, learned Single Judge issued a direction upon the respondents to conclude the departmental proceeding within a specified time. In course of argument, Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that pursuant to the direction of the learned Single Judge, the respondents concluded the departmental proceeding by issuing an order of punishment. The said order of punishment was challenged by the appellant in CWJC No. 208/1993 [R). The said writ application was allowed in terms of judgment dated 21.5.1993 and the order of punishment was quashed. The said order of punishment was challenged by the appellant in CWJC No. 208/1993 [R). The said writ application was allowed in terms of judgment dated 21.5.1993 and the order of punishment was quashed. The Disciplinary Authority was directed to pass fresh order taking into consideration the representation of the petitioner which shall be filed by him against the Inquiry Report. Mr. Prasad contended that departmental proceeding is still pending. 10. So far, instant appeal is concerned, having regard to the facts of the case and the law discussed herein above, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 11. This appeal has, therefore, no merit which is accordingly dismissed.