S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THE short question that arises for decision in this C. R. P. filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution, is whether the Judgment and decree dated 20-9-1999 made in A. S. No. 4 of 1989 by the learned Senior Civil judge, Nuzvid, operates as res judicata within the meaning of Section 64-A of the a. P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short, the Act ). The question arises in the following factual background. ( 2 ) THE petitioner in this C. R. P. made an application to the Settlement Officer, Eluru under Section 56 (l) (c) of the Act. The plea of the petitioner is that he purchased 0-73 cents of land out of Ac. 3-63 cents of land comprised in S. No. 532/2 from one Gadi subba Reddy through a registered sale deed dated 18-1-1944 and since then he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same. The petitioner denied the right or title of the respondents to the said land. The settlement officer, finding that in re-settlement register, the name of the 1st respondent is shown as the pattadar, rejected the application of the petitioner by order dated 4-4-1997. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Settlement Officer, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 56 (2) of the Act to the Court of the District Judge- cum-Estates Abolition Tribunal (for short, the Tribunal), Krishna District at machilipatnam. Before the Tribunal, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner himself had filed a suit, o. S. No. 1355 of 1983, on the file of the ii Additional District Munsif, Vijayawada for declaration of title and injunction in respect of the same land and that suit was dismissed after due trial by Judgment and decree dated 28-10-1988. The certified copy of the plaint in O. S. No. 1355 of 1983 marked as Ex. B-2 was also produced before the tribunal to show that the plaint schedule property in the said suit is the same property for which the petitioner has filed the application under Section 56 (l) (c) of the act. The certified copy of the plaint in O. S. No. 1355 of 1983 marked as Ex. B-2 was also produced before the tribunal to show that the plaint schedule property in the said suit is the same property for which the petitioner has filed the application under Section 56 (l) (c) of the act. The learned Tribunal, taking into account the above undisputed fact and having regard to the fact that no appeal had been preferred against the decree passed in o. S. No. 1355 of 1983, which fact was not disclosed before the Estate Officer, dismissed the appeal by Judgment dated 29-4-1997 on the ground that the decree in o. S. NO. 1355 of 1983 passed by the learned ii Addl. District Munsif, Vijayawada, operates as res judicata. Hence this C. R. P. under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties. Sri G. Dharma Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the opinion of the learned Tribunal that the decree passed on 28-10-1988 in O. S. No. 1355 of 1983 operates as res judicata, is not well- founded inasmuch as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the petitioner and therefore, the Judgment and decree passed by the civil Court in the said suit does not operate as res judicata. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the Judgments of the Supreme court in M. Chaganna v. Karnam Narayana and another, and Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi v. Maman Chand Ratilal Agarwal. ( 4 ) MR. A. Rajender, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. O. Manohar reddy, learned counsel for the 4th respondent, on the other hand, placing reliance on the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 64-A of the Act, would maintain that the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge in A. S. No. 4 of 1989 dated 20-9-1999 would bind the petitioner and therefore, it would operate as res judicata and in that view of the matter, no exception can be taken to the opinion of the learned Tribunal. ( 5 ) BEFORE dealing with the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, relevant statutory provisions be noted. Section 56 reads as follows:"56. ( 5 ) BEFORE dealing with the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, relevant statutory provisions be noted. Section 56 reads as follows:"56. Decision of certain disputes arising after an estate is notified: (1) Where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the settlement Officer. (2) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the settlement Officer under sub-sec. (1) may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law. " section 64-A reads as follows:"64-A. Res judicata: (1) The decision of a Tribunal or a Special Tribunal in any proceeding under this Act, or of a judge of the High court hearing a case under Section 51 (2), on any matter falling within its or his jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them, in any suit or proceeding in a Civil Court in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such suit or proceeding. (2) The decision of the Civil Court (not being the Court of a District Munsif or a Court of Small Causes) on any matter falling within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under this Act before a tribunal or special Tribunal, or a judge of the High Court under sec. 51 (2), insofar as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such proceeding. " ( 6 ) IT is true that after the estate is notified, if a dispute arises on the question whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or what amount of rent is in arrear or who the lawful owner in respect of any holding is, such a dispute is required to be decided by the Settlement Officer as provided under sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the Act. Under sub-section (2) of Sec. 56, remedy of appeal is provided to the tribunal against the order of the Settlement officer, by an aggrieved party. Sub-section (1) of Section 64-A of the Act provides that in any suit or proceeding in a civil Court, the parties to such suit or proceedings are bound by the decision of the Court or Special Tribunal in any proceeding under the Act or of the High court under Section 51 (2) in respect of those matters which fall within their jurisdiction. At the same time, sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 64-A of the Act makes the decision of the Civil court, not being the Court of District munsif or the Court of Small Causes, binding on the parties. No doubt, in the instant case, initially O. S. No. 1355 of 1983 was instituted in the Court of II Addl. District Munsif, Vijayawada. If the decree and Judgment passed by the learned ii Addl. District Munsif, Vijayawada were allowed to become final, by force of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 64-A of the Act, that decree would not bind the petitioner or others who are parties to the suit. In the instant case, that decree was not allowed to become final and on the other hand, the validity of the same was assailed by way of appeal under Section 96 of C. P. C. , before the Court of Senior Civil judge, nuzivid, who in turn by Judgment and decree dated 20-9-1997 dismissed the appeal. In other words, the judgment and decree passed by the learned II ADM, vijayawada had merged with the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate judge, and the Judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Judge were allowed to become final. If this is the admitted factual position, the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 64-A of the Act squarely apply. The decision of the senior civil Judge, Nuzvid handed down in a. S. No. 4 of 1989, not being a decision of the district Munsif or the Court of Small causes, is binding on the parties to the proceedings. In other words, the petitioner is bound by the said Judgment and decree. Be that as it may, this precise question fell for consideration before a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in M. Suryanarayana v. V. Pydayya. In other words, the petitioner is bound by the said Judgment and decree. Be that as it may, this precise question fell for consideration before a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in M. Suryanarayana v. V. Pydayya. In that case, the appellant and the respondents filed applications under section 56 of the Act to the Assistant settlement Officer claiming to be lawful ryots entitled to a ryotwari patta under the act. The Assistant Settlement Officer held that the land in question is not a Darmila inam land and accordingly rejected the claim of the respondents. On appeal, the estates Abolition Tribunal (District Judge), visakhapatnam, allowed the appeals filed by the respondents and held that the land is a Darmila Inam land, and that, therefore, the respondents are the lawful ryots. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed two writ petitions before this Court (W. P. Nos. 3741 and 4494/1969), and this Court dismissed the said writ petitions. That led to the filing of the writ appeals by the appellant. Before the division Bench, it was contended that the land in question is not a Darmila Inam land, but a ryoti land and the appellant is the ryot in possession. On the other hand, the respondents contended that the land is a darmila Inam land, that the appellant is a darmila Inamdar and that they are the lawful ryots inducted into possession by him. The appellant, in support of his case that the land is a Darmila Inam land, apart from other pieces of evidence, produced the Judgment of the District Munsif, chodavaram in O. S. No. 208 of 1952 dated 15-10-1954, marked as Ex. P-2, which was a suit for ejectment and rent filed by the respondents. The learned District Munsif held that the land is a Darmila Inam land and that the suit should be filed before the revenue Court and not the Civil Court, visakhapatnam. But when the matter was taken up to this Court, this Court affirmed the opinion of the learned District Munsif that the land is a Darmila land. Therefore, it was contended that so far as the respondent in the writ appeal is concerned, the Judgment operates as res judicata in his favour. But when the matter was taken up to this Court, this Court affirmed the opinion of the learned District Munsif that the land is a Darmila land. Therefore, it was contended that so far as the respondent in the writ appeal is concerned, the Judgment operates as res judicata in his favour. However, on behalf of the appellant it was contended that the provisions of section 64-A (2) of the Act which lay down the principle of res judicata are not attracted in the case. The Division Bench, on consideration of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 64-A of the Act, held". . . . . . . . . . THE point raised by the appellant s learned Counsel is that the judgment Ex. P-2 was rendered only by a District Munsif and that though it was confirmed by the High Court, the provisions of Section 64-A (2) exclude the judgment of the District Munsif from consideration. We are unable to agree with this contention. Though for the purpose of determining the Court of first instance under Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code relating to the rule of res judicata the said principle cannot be incorporated into this section by way of analogy. The obvious intention of the Legislature is that the judgment of a District Munsif or a Court of Small Causes should be excluded if the decision became final only before the said Court. But if the decision was taken up to a higher court, it is the decision of the Higher court that governs the matter. This was also the view taken by Basi reddy, J. , in Lakshminarasimham v. Subbayya [ (1968) 2 ALT 315]. Hence we uphold the contention that the land is a Darmila Inam. The learned counsel for the appellant cited Ramayya v. Ramanna [ (1952) 2 MLJ 408 : AIR 1953 mad, 562], but we do not derive any assistance from the said Judgment. " ( 7 ) THE above opinion of the Division bench with which we respectfully agree squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The learned counsel for the appellant cited Ramayya v. Ramanna [ (1952) 2 MLJ 408 : AIR 1953 mad, 562], but we do not derive any assistance from the said Judgment. " ( 7 ) THE above opinion of the Division bench with which we respectfully agree squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Hence, we hold that the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Senior Civil judge, Nuzivid in A. S. No. 4 of 1987 dated 20-9-1999 bind the petitioner and therefore, it operates as res judicata and therefore, the learned Tribunal is justified in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner by applying the doctrine of res judicata. The two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to which reference is made above, in my considered opinion, are out of context and have no bearing on the decision-making in the present case and therefore, there is no necessity to deal with those decisions in detail. ( 8 ) IN the result and for the foregoing reasons, the C. R. P. is dismissed. No costs.