S. R. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the add 1. Subordinate Judge, Kurnool, in o. S. No. 14/1980 on 24-9-1992. ( 2 ) THE facts that arise for consideration can be briefly stated as follows: defendants 2 to 5 are the appellants herein and they are the sons of 1st defendant. 1st Respondent is the plaintiff in the suit. The plaintiff has filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,04,386-04 ps. against the defendants alleging that there was a due for an amount of Rs. 1,04,386-04 ps. from the defendants towards arrears from 1/77 to 12/79 which includes additional charges (surcharges) for the delay in payment after adjustment of consumption deposit etc. It is further alleged that the first defendant as Manager of Hindu Joint family executed an agreement for and on behalf of sri Sivaramakrishna Oil Mills on 20-2-1976 for a contract of 80 KV for the supply of electrical energy and the supply was released on 26-5-1976. It is further alleged that the service connection was disconnected due to non-payment of consumption charges for 9/76 on 7-11-1976. It is further alleged by the plaintiff that the first defendant is the father of defendants 2 to 5 and they constitute members of a Joint hindu family doing family business of sri Sivaramakrishna Oil Mills and an agreement was executed on 20-2-1976 in proprietary capacity and they were liable to pay the amount due as per the agreement. The defendants 2 to 5 are bound to discharge the debt due by their father first defendant under theory of pious obligation. It is further alleged that they have filed o. S. No. 112/76 and obtained a collusive decree. It is further alleged that the agreement is for a minimum period of five years from the date of supply. The said agreement could be determined by the defendants by giving in writing one year s notice expressing such intention at any time after a period of four years. Therefore, the defendants are liable to pay the minimum charges as per the agreement. The said agreement could be determined by the defendants by giving in writing one year s notice expressing such intention at any time after a period of four years. Therefore, the defendants are liable to pay the minimum charges as per the agreement. The first defendant having admitted that defendants 2 to 5 are his sons and they constitute members of Joint Hindu family contends that the agreement was not executed by him as a Manager of Joint Hindu family and it was executed in his individual capacity as the Proprietor of Sri Sivaramakrishna Oil mills. He has also contended that there was a disruption of joint family status which led to filing O. S. 112/76. It is further contended that the terms of the agreement entered into by the 1st defendant with the plaintiff are one sided, onerous and the consent of the 1st defendant has been obtained on account of the dominant position of the plaintiff as the sole supplier of electricity. The defendant has informed the plaintiff by way of notice dated 12-5-77 the fact of stopping of electrical energy from 7-11-1976 by addressing the Superintending Engineer, operation, Ananthapur and also requested to cancel the service connection to the factory and refund the security deposit of rs. 9,200/- and return the loan contribution of Rs. 6,300. 00 to him. It is further contended that he has also requested the department to remove all the meters, equipment and cubical fixtures fixed for the supply of electricity to the factory. The unilateral adjustment of the amount is disputed. It is also contended that demanding the defendants to pay the minimum charges for his inability to run the industry in spite of his informing the department immediately that he is not in need of current is illegal, inequitable and unenforceable and opposed to the principles laid down under Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further alleged that the agreement was obtained by the plaintiff by undue influence and that the clauses 32. 2. 1 or terms and conditions of supply under B. P. Ms. No. 690/- dated 17-5-1975 are illegal. It is further alleged that the agreement dated 20-2-1976 is not complete and valid because it lacks of formal proposal and accepted by the electricity Department. 2. 1 or terms and conditions of supply under B. P. Ms. No. 690/- dated 17-5-1975 are illegal. It is further alleged that the agreement dated 20-2-1976 is not complete and valid because it lacks of formal proposal and accepted by the electricity Department. In addition to the contentions of 1st defendant, defendants 2 to 5 have contended that the agreement was executed by the 1st defendant in his individual capacity as Proprietor of sri Sivaramakrishna Oil Mills and not in the capacity of Manager of a joint Hindu family. They have denied about the continuation of a Hindu joint family status and sought for dismissal of the suit. ( 3 ) AFTER trial, the lower Court decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the matter has been carried in A. S. No. 889 of 1982 before this Court. While setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court in O. S. 14/80 my learned brother Justice Ranga Reddy disposed of the matter with the following direction:"so. I feel that it would be just and proper to set aside the order of the trial court and remand the matter for disposal with a direction to examine sri K. Ramakrishna Rao and to receive such other evidence as may be relevant to prove or disprove the exchange of notices Exs. B-4 and B-5. I set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court land remand the matter for fresh disposal in the light of the above observation. Under the circumstances, i have deliberately refrained myself from discussing the other grounds urged by the appellants as the matter is remanded. In the circumstances, the appellants shall pay the costs of this appeal to the first respondent. The learned Subordinate Judge shall dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible preferably by the end of june, 1991. The court fee paid on the memo of Appeal shall be refunded to the appellant. The documents sought to be received as additional evidence shall be forwarded to the trial court. "the matter once again disposed of by the addl. Subordinate Judge, Kurnool, in terms of the directions issued by this Court in a. S. No. 889/82 and decreed the suit. ( 4 ) AGGRIEVED by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by D2 to D5. "the matter once again disposed of by the addl. Subordinate Judge, Kurnool, in terms of the directions issued by this Court in a. S. No. 889/82 and decreed the suit. ( 4 ) AGGRIEVED by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by D2 to D5. ( 5 ) THE points that arise for consideration are: (1) Whether there is joint family by the date of entering into Ex. A-1 agreement dated 20-2-1976 with the electricity Department? (2) Whether the appellants are liable to pay the suit amount which includes additional charges (surcharges ). ? ( 6 ) POINTS: The learned Counsel for the appellants contends regarding the constitutional validity of Electricity provisions on the ground of dominant role over the persons seeking electricity and it is in violation of Art. 14 of Constitution of india. Obviously, the lower Court has no right to decide about the constitutional validity of the provisions. It is for the High court to decide the matter regarding the constitutional validity of the electricity provisions. An agreement has been entered into by the father with the Electricity department knowing fully of the conditions and the payment of the minimum charges. This is not a case where the consumer is not made aware of the conditions of the agreement under which the electricity will be supplied. Except such condition, there is no other condition in Ex. A-1 agreement. Therefore, the question of dominant role by the department with the consumers does not arise. Even if he is not clearly aware of the conditions stipulated and the statutory rules, the same rules are applicable to one and all who seek for electricity. Since the same conditions are applied for all the consumers, I am of the opinion that those conditions mentioned in Ex. A-1 agreement are not opposed to the principles laid down under Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The entire case depends upon the finding to be given regarding the division of status of the sons. My attention is drawn by the learned Counsel for the appellants that ex. B-4 notice was issued to the 1st defendant by Defendants 2 to 5 through their Counsel. In fact, this Court has remanded the matter for examination of the Senior Counsel who issued the notice under Ex. B-4. Sri K. Ramakrishna Rao, Senior Counsel was examined on remand, as D. W. 4. B-4 notice was issued to the 1st defendant by Defendants 2 to 5 through their Counsel. In fact, this Court has remanded the matter for examination of the Senior Counsel who issued the notice under Ex. B-4. Sri K. Ramakrishna Rao, Senior Counsel was examined on remand, as D. W. 4. He has categorically stated that he issued notice on 5-12-1975 and the division in status commences from 3-12-1975. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision reported in Venkatesh Dhonddev deshpande v. Sou. Kusum Dattatraya Kulkarni and others1. The relevant portion reads as follows:"where father is the Karta of a joint hindu family and the debts are contracted by the father in his capacity as manager and head of the family for family purposes, the sons as members of the joint family are bound to pay the debts to the extent of their interest in the coparcenery property. Further, where the sons are joint with their father and the debts have been contracted by the father for his own personal benefit, the sons are liable to pay the debts provided they were not incurred for illegal or immoral purposes. This liability arises from an obligation of religion and piety which is placed upon the sons under the mitakshara to discharge the father s debts, where the debts are not tainted with immorality. This liability of the sons to pay the father s debts exists whether the father be alive or dead. A further requirement is that for an effective partition of a Mitakshara joint hindu family a provision for the joint family debts should be made. In order to determine what property is available for partition, provision must first be made for joint family debts which are payable out of the joint family property, personal debts of the father not tainted with immorality, maintenance of dependant female members and of disqualified heirs, and for the marriage expenses of unmarried daughter. This must be so because partition is of a joint family property and if joint family debts are repaid before the partition only the residue would be available for partition. Therefore, if partition is effected before paying the debts, provision to pay the debts should be made so as to determine the residue available for partition. This must be so because partition is of a joint family property and if joint family debts are repaid before the partition only the residue would be available for partition. Therefore, if partition is effected before paying the debts, provision to pay the debts should be made so as to determine the residue available for partition. Where the tagai loan was borrowed by the father (Karta) for the purpose of improving the joint family lands and the partition amongst the members of the family was effected while the debt was outstanding without making provision for the repayment of the debt, the lands in the hands of the coparceners acquired on partition would also be liable for the debt despite partition. In such a case, the creditor (Govt. in this case) was not required to make the sons parties to the suit for recovery of the debt and could proceed against the properties in the hands of coparceners and put the auction purchaser of such properties in possession of the same. As the loan was borrowed for the purpose of improving the joint family lands, the loan would ipso facto be for legal necessity and it would be joint family debt for which all the joint family property would be liable. In such a case the only effect of partition was that after the disruption of joint family status by partition the father had no right to deal with the property by sale or mortgage even to discharge an antecedent debt nor was the son under a legal obligation to discharge the post- partition debts of the father. Even assuming that the debt was not for the benefit of the estate of the joint family land, therefore, a joint family debt and assuming that it was the personal debt of the father yet the doctrine of pious obligation of the son to pay the father s debt would still permit the creditor to bring the whole joint family property to auction for recovery of such debts. The learned Counsel for the appellants also relied on a decision reported in Kalyani (dead) by Lrs. v. Narayanan and others2. The relevant portion reads as follows:"to constitute a partition all that is necessary is a definite and unequivocal indication of intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family. The learned Counsel for the appellants also relied on a decision reported in Kalyani (dead) by Lrs. v. Narayanan and others2. The relevant portion reads as follows:"to constitute a partition all that is necessary is a definite and unequivocal indication of intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family. What form such intimation, indication or representation of such interest should take would depend upon the circumstances of each case. A further requirement is that this unequivocal indication of intention to separate must be to the knowledge of the persons affected by such declaration. A review of the decisions shows that this intention to separate may be manifested in diverse ways. It may be by notice or by filing a suit. Undoubtedly, indication or intimation must be to members of the joint family likely to be affected by such a declaration. Partition is a word of technical import in Hindu Law. Partition in one sense is a severance of joint status and coparcener of a coparcenary is entitled to claim it as a matter of his individual volition. In this narrow sense all that is necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. Such an unequivocal intention to separate brings about a disruption of joint family status, at any rate, in respect of separating member or members and thereby puts an end to the coparcenary with right of survivorship and such separated member holds from the time of disruption of joint family as tenant in-common. Such partition has an impact on devolution of share of such member. It goes to his heirs displacing survivorship. Such partition irrespective of whether it is accompanied or followed by division of properties by metes and bounds covers both a division of right and division of property. A disruption of joint family status by a definite and unequivocal indication to separate implies separation in interest and in right, although not immediately followed by a de facto actual division of the subject matter. This may at any time, be claimed by virtue of the separate right. A physical and actual division of property by metes and bounds follows from disruption of status and would be termed partition in a broader sense. This may at any time, be claimed by virtue of the separate right. A physical and actual division of property by metes and bounds follows from disruption of status and would be termed partition in a broader sense. It is clear from the above, the division or disruption of joint family commences from the date of notice i. e. , making the unequivocal intention to separate from the joint family status. The notice, in fact, under ex. B-4 clearly refers that they do not want to continue in the joint family status and wanted the division. The father also gave a reply under Ex. B-5 stating that he does not want to divide the properties and asked them to wait till the performance of marriage of his 4th son. The recitals mentioned in Ex. B4 that they do not want to continue in the joint family status clearly expresses their intention to separate from the joint family. Applying the principles laid down by the apex Court, I have no hesitation to say that the disruption of joint family status takes place from the date of issuing notice. The said notice has been received by the 1st defendant on 5-12-1975 as can be seen from the acknowledgments. In pursuance of the notice, they have also filed O. S. No. 112/76 which has ended in passing of preliminary decree and thereafter a final decree has also been passed. The finding of lower Court that it is a collusive decree has no legs to stand. The executant himself stated that the agreement was executed in his individual capacity. He never executed on behalf of the joint family. A close scrutiny of Ex. A-1 agreement shows that he executed the agreement in his individual capacity as sole proprietor. I also find that the evidence of D. W. 4 is reliable and trustworthy. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence or doubt his veracity. In view of the division in status, there is no joint family. The joint family is disrupted by the date of execution of the agreement. It is clear from Ex. A-1 that it was being executed in the capacity as proprietor and not in his individual capacity. The plaintiff has come with a specific case that it is executed in the capacity of Manager of a joint family. The joint family is disrupted by the date of execution of the agreement. It is clear from Ex. A-1 that it was being executed in the capacity as proprietor and not in his individual capacity. The plaintiff has come with a specific case that it is executed in the capacity of Manager of a joint family. There is no iota of evidence to show that the agreement was executed in the capacity of Manager of joint family. In so far as the sons are concerned, I have already found that there is disruption of joint family by the date of receiving of Ex. B-4 notice. Therefore, they are not certainly liable to pay the electricity charges much less the minimum charges. The 1st defendant is liable to pay all the charges. Defendants 2 to 5 are not liable to pay the charges under the theory of pious obligation, as there is disruption of joint family. Therefore, I answer the points 1 and 2 in favour of the appellants by disagreeing with the contentions canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondents. ( 7 ) IN the result, the judgment and decree in so far as the appellants are concerned, is liable to be set aside. I accordingly set aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court passed against the appellants. In so far as the 1st defendant is concerned, the judgment and decree of the lower Court shall stand. A modified decree is passed against the 1st defendant for the suit amount with future interest thereon at 12% p. a. from the date of plaint till the date of realization. This appeal is allowed accordingly with costs against R-1.