JUDGMENT Malay Kumar Basu, J.: This Revisional Application is directed against the order dated 19th May, 1997 passed by the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta in Transferred Application No. 197/95 (Punjab National Bank vs. Rungmook and Ceders Tea Estate & Ors.) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This application is preferred by the petitioner, named, the Bloom Field Tea Co. Ltd. who was not a party to the case in question before the Tribunal below but filed the impugned application for being added as a party in the said case. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal discussing that petition under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC it has preferred the present revisional application challenging the impugned order as erroneous, illegal and unsustainable on the ground that impleadment of this petitioner as a party to the said proceeding is necessary. The case of the petitioner may be summarised as follows. 2. The petitioner which is a public limited company filed a suit on September 19, 1978 in this Court being Suit No. 692 of 1978 against one Geoffrey James Ower Johnston and the respondent No.2 claiming inter alia a decree for Rs. 16 lakhs and odd. This suit was ultimately decreed by consent of the parties on April 20, 1981 whereunder the said G.J.O. Johnston and the respondent No.2 were directed to pay a total sum of Rs. 17,50,000/- in full and final settlement of the petitioner's claims. It was also declared by this consent-decree that subject to pre-existing charges the petitioner decree-holder would have a charge over the Rungmook & Cedars Tea Estate at Darjeeling for petitioner's decretal dues until such time as decretal dues are cleared. But these dues having not been satisfied the petitioner filed an application for execution of the said decree on July 1, 1982. In that execution proceeding this Court by its order dt. August 20, 1982 appointed one Mr. T.P. Das as Receiver and directed him to perform certain acts towards realisation of the decretal dues. That execution petition is still pending. This Court granted leave to the respondent No.3 to intervene in the said execution proceeding. During the pendency of this execution application the respondent No.3 filed a Mortgage Suit against the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in May 1983 before the Asstt. Dist. Judge, Siliguri, claiming a decree for Rs. That execution petition is still pending. This Court granted leave to the respondent No.3 to intervene in the said execution proceeding. During the pendency of this execution application the respondent No.3 filed a Mortgage Suit against the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in May 1983 before the Asstt. Dist. Judge, Siliguri, claiming a decree for Rs. 1,08,98,340.40 p. and this suit was transferred to this High Court and was numbered as Extraordinary Suit No.12 of 1992. During the pendency of this suit a Division Bench of this Court passed an order dt. March 22, 1985 appointing Joint Receivers over the Tea Estate in dispute. The respondent No.5 preferred an appeal against that order before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which by its order dt. May 10, 1985 directed the respondent No.3 not to dispossess or take over the management of the estate from the respondent No.5 on condition that the respondent No.5 would deposit 75% of the net profits for the year 1984-85. Thereafter that Extraordinary Suit No. 12/1992 of this High Court was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal in view of the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 which came into force at that time and the suit was renumbered there as T.A. No. 197 of 1995. In this case the respondent No.3 claimed the sale of the entire hypothecated and mortgaged properties of the said G.J.O. Johnston and the respondent No.2 (They allegedly created an equitable mortgage in favour of respondent No.3 purportedly by the deposit of the original Title Deeds of the Rungmook & Cedars Tea Estate on September 21, 1978) being the crops and the estate of the respondent No.2. The order of this High Court, according to the applicant, in Suit No. 692/78 dt. 20.9.1978 and 26.9.1978 encumbering the property is bad in law and void ab initio. The order of this High Court, according to the applicant, in Suit No. 692/78 dt. 20.9.1978 and 26.9.1978 encumbering the property is bad in law and void ab initio. The respondent No.3 has not disclosed in its plaint that the Reserve Bank of India granted permission to the said deceased G.J.O. Johnston, a foreign national, to continue to canyon his business activities as the Proprietor of the Rungmook & Cedars Tea Estate subject to the following conditions: (1) The (defendant No.1) will not expand his existing business activities beyond the level reached during the year 31.12.1973, nor he will undertake any new trading or commercial activity without the prior approval of the R.B.I., and (2) he will not borrow any money or accept any deposits in India for carrying on the above activities without prior permission of the R.B.I. The Punjab National Bank having suppressed these material facts has rendered the present suit in question liable to be dismissed and such suppression has necessitated the filing of this petition by this petitioner for being joined in that suit for divulging such important circumstances and help the Court to come to a correct finding in that matter. Since this petitioner is vitally interested a party in the proceedings before the Tribunal, any order which may be passed by that Tribunal will ultimately affect the execution of the decree passed by this Court in the said suit No. 692/1978 filed by the petitioner and hence it is necessary on the part of the petitioner to intervene in the suit in question pending before the Tribunal by being added as a party defendant. In the execution proceeding pending before the High Court the Punjab National Bank has been allowed by virtue of an order of the Hon'ble Court to intervene and that execution proceeding may be taken up for hearing on any day and in order to avoid conflict of decisions the impugned proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal of Transferred Application No. 197/95 in question should be stayed till disposal of the said pending execution proceeding. In these premises the petitioner filed an application before the Tribunal below praying for leave to intervene in the said T.A. No. 197/95 as a party-defendant and also for the stay of proceeding therein till the disposal of the said execution application in the High Court in connection with suit No.692/78, but the ld. In these premises the petitioner filed an application before the Tribunal below praying for leave to intervene in the said T.A. No. 197/95 as a party-defendant and also for the stay of proceeding therein till the disposal of the said execution application in the High Court in connection with suit No.692/78, but the ld. Tribunal passed an order dt. May 19, 1997 rejecting that application of this petitioner on the ground that there had been no connection between the said suit pending in the Tribunal and the suit No. 692/78 or the decree passed therein and if any certificate in that suit be issued, then the debts due to respondent No.3 would be recoverable by sale of any property belonging to the respondent either mortgaged or not, or by arrest of the respondent and detention in prison. Being aggrieved by this order the petitioner has preferred this revisional application challenging the same as erroneous, illegal and unjustified and hence liable to be set aside. 3. Mr. Banerjee, ld. Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has argued that the petitioner is a necessary party, inasmuch as it is for this company to point out the facts which have not been disclosed by the respondent but the disclosure of which is essential to enable the Court to arrive at a correct finding on the issues under consideration. According to Mr. Banerjee if such facts are disclosed, if it is made known to the Court that this petitioner has obtained a decree which is pending execution before the Hon'ble Court, then the decision of the ld. Tribunal will be totally otherwise and the respondent No. 3 cannot expect a favourable order. Mr. Banerjee further contends that as per the order of the Hon'ble High Court in the said suit No. 692/78 the hypothecation of the Tea Garden in dispute was in respect of the year 1978 alone and the respondent No.3 could not go beyond that and this fact being not disclosed before the Tribunal by that respondent for obvious reasons it is urgently required that the present petitioner should be allowed to intervene in this matter by being joined as a party-defendant and to bring to the knowledge of the Court these vital facts without which the materials that will form the basis for the Tribunal's taking a decision will be incomplete. 4. Mr. Chakraborty, ld. 4. Mr. Chakraborty, ld. Advocate, appearing on behalf of the O.P. No.2 contends that the anxiety of Mr. Banerjee is unfounded, inasmuch as, the application of the Punjab National Bank (respondent No.3) in question is in the nature of a mortgage suit and in the event any decree is obtained by it in that suit, that may be at the most for mortgaging other properties of the Tea Estate and the sale proceeds lying in the hands of a receiver. 5. Mr. Kaushik Chowdhury, ld. Advocate, appearing on behalf of the Punjab National Bank argues that this revisional application is not legally maintainable in view of the provisions of section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the petitioner's remedy lay in preferring an appeal before the right forum, namely, the Appellate Tribunal as per the provisions of that law. Secondly, since the respondent No.3 has preferred an appeal against the order of the Single Bench of the Hon'ble High Court (Bhattacharyya, J.) and since that appeal is still pending, the verdict given in the said judgment of the Hon'ble Court cannot be taken as final. Thirdly, the High Court cannot go into the merits of this application under Article 227 and it can only set right any error which is apparent on the face of the record either on law or on fact. Lastly, according to Mr. Chowdhury, the High Court cannot enter into a question as to whether any person is a necessary party or proper party or not, because the High Court's duty under Article 227 is to only see if by passing the impugned order the Court below has committed any material irregularity regarding exercise of its jurisdiction and nothing else. 6. As to the question who may be joined as a party, Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code contains the relevant provisions. Sub-rule (2) of this Rule 10 of Order 1 provides that the Court may at any stage of any proceeding order that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit be added. In other words, this section provides for addition of (1) necessary parties and (2) proper parties. The well settled position is that necessary parties are parties who ought to have been joined, that is, parties who are necessary to the constitution of the suit and without whom no decree at all can be passed. This means that in case of a necessary party-defendant the conditions must be satisfied that there is a right to some relief against him in respect of the matter involved in the suit and secondly, his presence should be necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. So a necessary party is one without whom no decree can be made effectively. Whereas a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made, but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. In AIR 1991 Kerala 121 (H.M. Cashin vs. South Indian Bank) it has been held that a person may be impleaded as a defendant in a suit, though no relief may be claimed against him, if his presence is necessary for a complete and final adjudication of all the questions involved in the suit and questions involved in the suit mean those which arise between the parties to the suit. It has been held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 886 (Rezia Begum vs. Anwar Begam) that a person who has a direct interest in the subject-matter of litigation, whether it raises questions relating to movable or immovable property, can however be impleaded as a party. The question that arises, therefore, is what is meant by the expression 'direct interest'. In Re. I.G. Ferbenindustrie A.G. Agreement, (1943) All. E.R. 525 it has been held that in order that a party may be added as a defendant in the suit, he should have a legal interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, legal interest, not as distinguished from an equitable interest, but an interest which the law recognised. Later on, in Amon vs. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd., (1966) 1 All. Later on, in Amon vs. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd., (1966) 1 All. E.R. 275, the expression was further elucidated when it was held that it was not enough that the intervener was commercially or indirectly interested but he must have to be directly or legally interested in the question involved in the suit, that is to say, it must be shown that it would lead to a result that might affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his legal rights. In Mahadave Rice & Oil Mills vs. Chennimalai Goundar, reported in AIR 1968 Mad. 287 , it has been held that a proper party is one who has a definite, subsisting, direct and substantive interest in the issues arising in the litigation, an interest which will be cognizable in the Court of law, that is to say, an interest which the law recognised and which the Court will enforce and a person who is only indirectly or commercially interested in the proceeding, is not entitled to be added as a party. If he is a person who is not interested in the question which arises between the parties to the litigation, that is, a question with regard to the right set-up and the relief claimed by one side and withheld by the other, he cannot be impleaded as a party. It was further observed by the Court in the said ruling that the raison d'etre was that the trial of the suit would be embarrassed and considerable prejudice caused to the contesting parties, if irrelevant matters are allowed to be agitated or considered by adding a new party whose interest in the litigation has no nexus to the subject-matter of the suit. 7. In the present case the respondent No.3, namely the Punjab National Bank has filed a suit for recovery of debts against the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 which has been transferred from the High Court to the Debt Recovery Tribunal for disposal and which has been renumbered as Transferred Application No.197 of 1995. The present petitioner namely, The Bloom Field Tea Company Ltd. has preferred the petition in question praying for being added as a party defendant in that proceeding before the Tribunal on the ground that this petitioner filed a suit bearing No. 692/78 in this High Court against the erstwhile owner of the respondent No.2, namely, G.J.O. Johnston claiming a decree for Rs. 16,93,453.65 p. wherein this Court passed an order dt. 20th September, 1978 directing the said erstwhile owner from charging or alienating the Rungmook and Cedars Tea Estate and thereafter the said suit was settled out of Court and was decreed by consent of the parties on 28th April, 1981. The said decree having not been satisfied this petitioner put the same into execution before this High Court and in the said execution proceedings a Receiver was appointed by this Court on 28th August, 1982. In the aforementioned Transferred Application No. 197 of 1995 pending before the Tribunal the petitioner Punjab National Bank (respondent No.3 in this proceeding) has taken the plea that it has advanced a loan to the said respondent Mr. Johnston to the extent of Rs. 1,10,00,000/- (One crore ten lacs) on 3rd February, 1978, but the said respondent being a foreign national was not permitted by the Reserve Bank of India at that point of time to carryon any business or to grant any such loan since the Reserve Bank granted the approver to carryon business to the said respondent Mr. Johnston since deceased on certain conditions, namely, that such permission was subject to any decision or again which the Govt. authorities might take under the Foreigners Act regarding the extension of the stay in India and secondly, he would not expand his business activities beyond the level reached during the year ended on 31st December, 1973 nor would undertake any new trading or industrial activity without the prior approval of the Reserve Bank and thirdly, he would not borrow any money or accept any deposit in India for carrying on the activity without prior permission of the Reserve Bank. The Punjab National Bank in its application in the abovementioned suit, namely, T.A. No. 197 of 1995 has wrongly stated that the said foreign national received permission from the RBI to borrow money or to charge his assets for carrying on the business of caring, cultivating and manufacturing tea in India. The Punjab National Bank in its application in the abovementioned suit, namely, T.A. No. 197 of 1995 has wrongly stated that the said foreign national received permission from the RBI to borrow money or to charge his assets for carrying on the business of caring, cultivating and manufacturing tea in India. According to the present petitioner, the Punjab National Bank has made such a statement deliberately falsely, because it was to their knowledge that in October 1978 upon receipt of the COB the RBI could not be expected to grant approver to the foreign national to borrow money or to charge his assets when the Calcutta High Court had already injuncted him from doing so in an order dt. 20th September, 1978. In this way the Punjab National Bank and respondent Mr. Johnston flouted the statutory regulations and prohibitions and went on creating document which had no force in the eye of law. This petitioner approached the Chairman of the Punjab National Bank at New Delhi by its letter dt. 5th December, 1979 to bring to his notice about such irregularities being committed by his subordinates and requested him to comply with the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India and the orders passed by this High Court, but to no effect. Even after all this, if the Punjab National Bank granted any loan to the said respondent it was done illegally and without any authority or sanction and it could not claim any prior charge against the decree which this petitioner obtained from this High Court in the said Suit No. 692/78 which it has put into execution that is still pending. The petitioner's case is that the said execution case being still pending his interest will be adversely affected if the Punjab National Bank after getting a decree of recovery of debts from the Tribunal puts it into execution, while his execution case continues to be pending and for this reason it wants to get added as a party-defendant in the said Transferred Application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal in order to be in a position to point out such facts which the parties thereto have concealed from the Court, namely, that the said Bank had no authority to advance a credit facility to the extent of Rs. 1,10,00,000/- on 3rd Feb., 1978 in favour of the said respondent, nor the said Mr. 1,10,00,000/- on 3rd Feb., 1978 in favour of the said respondent, nor the said Mr. Johnston had obtained any authority from the RBI to carryon business in India and the Bank had no right to charge on any of the assets belonging to the respondent No.2. According to the petitioner, unless it is afforded the opportunity of being added as a defendant in that suit. it cannot bring such facts to the notice of the Tribunal and a decree might be passed in favour of the applicant Bank by that Tribunal as prayed for with the result that the adjudication of the execution case filed by this petitioner which is still pending will be affected thereby to the prejudice of this petitioner, because it will not be of any use for the petitioner to raise such points before the executing Court, since an Execution Court will pay a deaf ear to such pleas on the ground that it cannot go behind a decree. The further contention of the petitioner is that in the said Execution Case in connection with Suit No. 692/1978 it has been ordered by a Single Bench of this High Court (B. Bhattacharyya, J.) that apart from the immovable property of the judgment-debtor there was hypothecation of Tea Crops for the season 1978/79 only and since no material has been placed before the Court showing that there was any further hypothecation of tea after the said period, the Bank cannot have any claim over the sale proceeds over the tea garden sometimes in the year 1982-83 and onwards. Mr. Banerjee contends that unless such a finding of this Court in the Execution Case is made known to the Tribunal below. The order that may be passed by it in the concerned case in the absence of this petitioner may come into conflict with the findings of this Court. Against this, Mr. Chowdhury however submits that these findings of a Single Bench of this High Court cannot be said to have any finality at this stage since the order has been appealed against and that appeal is till pending before a Division Bench of this Court. 8. Against this, Mr. Chowdhury however submits that these findings of a Single Bench of this High Court cannot be said to have any finality at this stage since the order has been appealed against and that appeal is till pending before a Division Bench of this Court. 8. Be that as it may, this much cannot be denied that the case of the respondent No.3-Bank is that until and unless its dues are paid in full by the respondent-Tea-Estate, no part of the tea crops or sale proceeds of such crops belonging to that estate can be attached in execution of any decree or order, nor any unsecured creditor like the Bloom Field Tea Company Ltd. can claim to have any right, title or interest in respect of any part of the security of the Bank until full payment of its dues are made, inasmuch as, the tea crops or their sale proceeds produced from the said Tea Estate or the plant and machinery and all other movable property-assets of the same stood charged or mortgaged by way of first and paramount charge for payment of the Bank's dues and the Bank is exclusively entitled to the entire sale proceeds of the Tea Estate as alleged. So it is clear enough that the Punjab National Bank's case in the T.A. No. 197/95 is that it has got the first charge over the properties of the respondent No.2, Rungmook & Cedars Tea Estate to the exclusion of the Bloom Field Tea Company Ltd., and the present revisional applicant cannot have any claim to such properties of the Tea Estate before the dues of the Bank are fully paid off. Whereas the Bloom Field Tea Company's case is that such a claim of the Punjab National Bank is wrong and unjustified in view of the reasons already discussed above and its claim for hypothecation of the tea crops of the said Tea Estate has to be restricted to the year 1978-79 only and not beyond that. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner's presence will not be required for the purpose properly adjudicating upon the dispute which has been raised between the Bank and the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in the said T.A.No.197/95 of the Tribunal. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner's presence will not be required for the purpose properly adjudicating upon the dispute which has been raised between the Bank and the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in the said T.A.No.197/95 of the Tribunal. In other words, it cannot be said that the Court can not effectually or completely dispose of that matter without hearing the petitioner. The question which will be raised by the Bank in that suit before the Tribunal will be whether it has got the first and paramount charge over the properties of the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in question or, in other words, whether without the dues of the Bank being fully realised the dues all other parties cannot be paid off and when such a question is to be decided, the presence of the petitioner, Bloom Field Tea Company Ltd., appears to be essentially required to enable the Court to decide the same completely and effectually. Because, if the points raised by the petitioner to the effect that the advancement of the loans by the Bank in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 was unlawful and further that the Bank could not legally claim itself entitled to have the first and paramount charge over all the sale proceeds of the tea crops of the Tea Estate concerned are not taken into consideration by the Tribunal while disposing of the said T. A. No. 197/95, then the adjudication of the issues that are raised therein, in the absence of the petitioner, may remain incomplete and ineffectual. In other words, the intervenor/petitioner appears to have successfully shown that it is directly and legally interested in the question involved in the suit, that is to say, it has got a definite subsisting and substantive interest in the issues arising in the said T.A. No. 197/95, inasmuch as, if the matter is disposed of without impleading him then the result might affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his legal rights. In short, although in the said suit no relief has been claimed against this petitioner and although, therefore, the petitioner cannot be termed as a necessary party, the fact that the petitioner is a proper party in whose presence the controversies arising therein can be completely and effectually the adjudicated upon can hardly be denied or doubted. 9. Mr. In short, although in the said suit no relief has been claimed against this petitioner and although, therefore, the petitioner cannot be termed as a necessary party, the fact that the petitioner is a proper party in whose presence the controversies arising therein can be completely and effectually the adjudicated upon can hardly be denied or doubted. 9. Mr. Chowdhury argues that in view of section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 this application is not maintainable in law and of the petitioner at the most could only prefer an appeal against the impugned order. This contention is not acceptable. Section 20 of the said Act provides that any person aggrieved by an order made by a Tribunal under this Act may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. But that does not mean that the exercise of the High Court's power of general superintendence is barred. Section 18 of the Act specifically excepts the Supreme Court and the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India while imposing a general bar on the Courts and other authorities against exercising any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to any matter falling within the jurisdiction of a Debt Recovery Tribunal. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. In AIR 1970 SC 6 (Umarsaheb vs. Kadalaskar) the Apex Court has held that the power of general superintendence conferred by Article 227 involves a duty on the part of the High Court to keep all Courts within its territorial jurisdiction within the bounds of their authority to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. Here, as I have shown above, the petitioner, Bloom Field Tea Co. Ltd., has affirmed a case that it has a substantive interest in the issues which will arise in the litigation in question and its presence will be necessary there to enable the Court to make a proper determination of the suit or, in other words, such issues cannot be decided completely without hearing it as a party. Ltd., has affirmed a case that it has a substantive interest in the issues which will arise in the litigation in question and its presence will be necessary there to enable the Court to make a proper determination of the suit or, in other words, such issues cannot be decided completely without hearing it as a party. The Tribunal under such circumstances appears to have committed an error by not allowing its prayer for being added as a party-defendant and as a result of such arbitrary exercise of discretion by it the petitioner being deprived of an opportunity to be impleaded in that proceeding before the Tribunal and have its say there may suffer grave injustice. This is the reason why interference of this Court is needed to set right that wrong by means of exercising its power of general superintendence as conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution. So, I find the present petition quite maintainable in law. There is nothing in the Act to the effect that due to the enactment of the provisions of section 20 of the R.D.B. Act, one will be debarred from taking recourse to the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution, particularly when the petitioner is a third party and it is not clear whether the said provisions of section 20 are meant to cover an order of the Tribunal on such a petition for addition of parties. In this connection Mr. Banerjee has relied upon a decision of Single Bench of this Court reported in 1997(1) CHN 232 (M/s. Pratap Ch. Dey & Ors. vs. Allahabad Bank & Ors.) wherein while dealing with sections 20 & 22 of the D.R.T. Act vis-a-vis Order 14 of C.P.C. it has been held that even if an alternative remedy is available to a party, it is still open to an aggrieved party to move the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, if it is found that the order complained of is without jurisdiction or arbitrary or that the principles of natural justice have been denied. 10. The ld. 10. The ld. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, has observed that he does not find any reason why the proceeding before him should be linked with the suit No. 692/78 to which the present petitioner is a party and in the proceeding before him the point to be adjudged by him is to see if any debt due to the Bank is legally recoverable or not and in doing so he is not empowered to see the interest of any other person than the Bank or any financial institution. According to him any certificate being issued in the proceeding before him will be put into execution if the party fails to repay the debt by making a sale of the property belonging to the respondents either mortgaged or not or by arrest of the respondents and detention in prison. But the flaw in this finding lies in the fact that the ld. Presiding Officer fails to take into consideration the question raised by the petitioner in his application that in view of certain Circulars and Rules promulgated by Reserve Bank of India at that point of time the amount allegedly advanced by the Punjab National Bank could not be valid on recoverable and secondly, the Bank could claim its First Charge on the sale proceeds of tea crops belonging to the respondent Tea-estate only for the year 1978-79 and beyond that it could not go in realising its claim and unless such points are taken into consideration by the Tribunal during its adjudication of the issues raised in that proceeding (T.A.No. 197/1995) they cannot be taken up for determination by an Executing Court which cannot go behind a decree. From that point of view the proceeding in T. A. No. 197/95 pending before the Tribunal appears to have some nexus with the execution proceedings pending before this Court arising out of Suit No. 692/78 and the view taken by the ld. Presiding Officer of the Tribunal that the proceeding before it was unconnected with the Suit No. 692/1978 or the decree passed thereon cannot stand to reason. 11. In this connection Mr. Banerjee has rightly cited a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1992(II) CRN 158 (Narendra Nath Dalui & Anr. vs. Vivekananda Parui & Ors.). Presiding Officer of the Tribunal that the proceeding before it was unconnected with the Suit No. 692/1978 or the decree passed thereon cannot stand to reason. 11. In this connection Mr. Banerjee has rightly cited a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1992(II) CRN 158 (Narendra Nath Dalui & Anr. vs. Vivekananda Parui & Ors.). In this judgment it has been held that an order under Order 1, Rule 10(2), CPC passed by allowing a prayer for addition of the petitioner as a party is discretionary and where the petitioner was not a necessary party, but in the context of the defence raised it could be said to be very much a proper party in whose presence the lis ought to be decided, such discretion appears to have been appropriately exercised. In coming to such a decision Their Lordships of the Division Bench relied on a Privy Council decision reported in AIR 1935 P.C. 185 (Atma Ram vs. Beni Prasad) and a Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1958 SC 886 (Rezia Begum vs. Anwara Begum). It has been observed in this judgment that to make the adjudication complete and effective and to avoid any multiplicity of proceedings the addition of party that was allowed under the impugned order was found to be justified and proper. 12. The next observation of the Tribunal is that it is the option of the plaintiff-applicant as to whom he would implead and since the applicant-Bank has not chosen to make the petitioner a party, the presence of the petitioner in this proceeding should not be thrusted against his will. This reasoning also is unacceptable for the reason that when impleadment of any particular person as a party is found to be necessary for the complete and effectual adjudication of the issues arising in the concerned proceeding, the sweet will of the plaintiff cannot take the dominating role at the cost of the cardinal rule governing the joinder of parties. 13. In view of the entire discussion made above, I am to hold that the impugned order under which the prayer for being added as a party-defendant in the proceeding in question before the Tribunal has been rejected cannot be sustained. Accordingly the same be set aside. The said prayer of the petitioner stands allowed. 13. In view of the entire discussion made above, I am to hold that the impugned order under which the prayer for being added as a party-defendant in the proceeding in question before the Tribunal has been rejected cannot be sustained. Accordingly the same be set aside. The said prayer of the petitioner stands allowed. The Tribunal is directed to proceed with the hearing of the T.A. No. 197/95 pending before it after adding the name of the petitioner, the Bloom Field Tea Company Ltd., as a party defendant thereto. 14. The Revisional Application is allowed. Later: 15. Xerox certified copy of this order on urgent basis, if applied for, may be supplied to the parties as early as possible. Appeal allowed.