JUDGMENT Chandresh Bhushan, J. This is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent preferred by the petitioner against an order dated 24-7-1996 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing his writ petition for quashing the orders dated 16-12-1994, 30-5-1992, 9-5-1991 and 25-8-1987 passed by the Revenue Board, the Additional Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Assistant Collector, and the Tahsildar, respectively. The facts in brief are that the respondent No. 1 was a public trust under the M.P. Public Trust Act, 1962. The Management Committee of the said trust after obtaining permission from the Registrar of Public Trusts granted lease for 99 years of a piece of land measuring five Bighas and three Biswas and bearing survey No. 975 of village Mahalgaon in Gwalior (probably wrongly mentioned as survey No. 593 by the petitioner in the petition) vide a registered lease dated 30-9-1974 to the petitioner/ Society registered as a Co-operative Society under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act. Thereafter the petitioner moved an application before the Tahsildar for mutation of its name in respect to that piece of land in the revenue records. This application was rejected by the learned Tahsildar vide it's order dated 25-8-1987. An appeal against the order of Tahsildar was dismissed by the Assistant Collector vide its order dated 9-5-1991. A second appeal against that order was also dismissed by the Additional Commissioner, Gwalior Division, vide its order dated 30-5-1992. A revision against that order of Additional Commissioner was preferred by the petitioner/society in the Revenue Board which was also dismissed vide order dated 16-12-1994. Aggrieved by all these orders a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was moved by the petitioner in this Court, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 24-7-1996. While dismissing that writ petition it was observed by the learned Single Judge that he did not find any merit in the petition and if there was any dispute pertaining to the title of the said piece of land then it could not be adjudicated by this Court and the parties may approach competent court for getting the right to property declared. Aggrieved by that order of the learned Single Judge this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred. Aggrieved by that order of the learned Single Judge this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred. According to the petitioner, once the said piece of land was entered as trust property in the Register of Public Trusts and permission was granted by the Registrar of Public Trusts for grant of lease and accordingly a lease was granted by the trust in favour of the petitioner, then the Tahsildar i.e. the Revenue Authority was bound to mutate its name and had no jurisdiction to order otherwise. No question of any dispute regarding title was involved in the case and the learned Single Judge has erred in holding that there was no merit in its case and that if there was any dispute about the title to the property then it should approach competent court for its determination. In its impugned order dated 25-8-1987 (Para 5) the Tahsildar had found that no right has been acquired by the petitioner under the said lease deed dated 50-9-1974 and, therefore, its application for mutation in its favour could not be allowed. It was also observed by the Tahsildar that the said piece of land was of the Deity and, therefore, he ordered that the entry in revenue records be accordingly corrected mentioning that the said Deity was the swami and Collector, Gwalior, was the manager and managed by the respondent No. 1/trust. During the course of arguments the learned counsel of petitioner himself pointed out that mutation was ordered by Tahsildar u/s 110 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. Section 110 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code provides the mode for mutation of acquisition of right in field book and other relevant records. It was more than apparent from the language of this section read with section 109 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, that mutation was to be made in the field book and other revenue land records only in favour of persons who lawfully acquired any right or interest in a land. According to Tahsildar, the petitioner on the basis of the said lease deed dated 30-9-1974 had not acquired any right or interest in the said piece of land and this finding of his has been confirmed by the three authorities superior to him. According to Tahsildar, the petitioner on the basis of the said lease deed dated 30-9-1974 had not acquired any right or interest in the said piece of land and this finding of his has been confirmed by the three authorities superior to him. The reason given by the learned Tahsildar for his said finding was that it was the Deity of the said Ram Janki Mandir, Gangadas Ki Badi Shala, which was the Bhumiswami of that piece of land and the Collector, Gwalior, was its manager and the trust in its management committee could not lease it out without the prior approval of the Collector. It was also observed by the learned Tahsildar that the permission granted by the learned Registrar of Public Trusts was a misconceived one. In this respect it was vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, supported by respondent No. 1, that once the said piece of land was recorded as the trust property, it could be leased out with the permission of Registrar of Public Trusts and once that permission was granted and lease was made according to it then the Tahsildar had no option but to permit mutation. It was further argued that the permission by the Registrar of Public Trusts could not at all be called as misconceived one. In this respect a perusal of Annexure A/8 shows that above 78 Bighas and 17 Biswas of land of village Mahalgaon adjacent to the boundary of the Temple along with some other property was said to be the property registered as a public trust. It nowhere shows as to what were the survey numbers etc. of that land nor does it show the types of right or interest in that land i.e. whether the interest in that land was as a owner, as a Bhumi swami or as a lease holder or in any other capacity, not does it show to whom did the said land belong. Perusal of Annexure A/1 clarifies that the land in all measuring 95 Bighas and 8 Biswas of village Mahalgaon was the Muafi Bhumi under "Kamil Sanad" and was agricultural land and as such Muafi should be in the name of temple of Deity, "Pujari or Mujawar" of which would be "Muafidar". Perusal of Annexure A/1 clarifies that the land in all measuring 95 Bighas and 8 Biswas of village Mahalgaon was the Muafi Bhumi under "Kamil Sanad" and was agricultural land and as such Muafi should be in the name of temple of Deity, "Pujari or Mujawar" of which would be "Muafidar". In the khasra for the year 1950 in column No. 3 the name of the owner has been shown as Muafi Atiya Sarkar and in Column No. 5 the name of farmer is shown as Mandir Shri Ram - Janki Deh haja Avam Ahatnama Ramraghunandandas Bairagi. On perusal of Annexure - A/6 it appears that it was the 15th Mahant, the disciple of Late Ramraghunandandas who got the Respondent No. / Trust registered. In the above circumstances, even if it was to be considered as trust property, it could not be said that it was land of which the trust was Bhumi swami and the trust had a right to lease it out. The question remains as to what kind of property or as to what kind of rights, if any, did the trust had in that piece of land? Unless the trust had any such interest which could be leased to the petitioner, the ultimate finding of the Tahsildar that the petitioner had not acquired any kind of right could not be considered as wrong and, therefore, it called for no interference. In this respect it may be mentioned here that the said piece of land was admittedly located in village Mahalgaon of Gwalior district wherein enactment called as Quawaid Muafidaran Jujbe Arazi, Samvat 1991 (Gwalior) was applicable. In case of such lands where it was also recorded as Milakiyat Sarkar and was held by a person for the upkeep of a temple as is in the present case, it was held by a Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Panchamsingh vs. Mahant Ramkrishna Das and others. 1971 MPLJ 745 : 1971 RN 359 that the person holding that land has no other status than that on a manager of the land, that he could get the land cultivated either himself or through his servants but he had no right to alienate the land in any manner. The Muafi land all the while belongs to the Government. In the case of State of M.P. vs. Ghanshyamdas and others. The Muafi land all the while belongs to the Government. In the case of State of M.P. vs. Ghanshyamdas and others. 1999 RN 25 it was held by another Division Bench of this very High Court that the person holding such a land held the land either on behalf of the Aukaf Department or on behalf of the Deity and had no right to alienate the property of the temple. They had a right only to either cultivate the land or get it cultivated through servants. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Mst. Kanchaniya and others Vs. Shiv Ram and others, where the person holding a land which was given by way of muafi, for the temple, though in that case later on the muafi grant had been revoked and the land was taken over by the Aukaf Department and was given to Pujari for management but that Pujari was having rights of even a Kashtkar Mourushi, has held that the person holding had a status only that of a manager functioning under the control of Aukaf Department and the trust or trustees had no right to transfer it either by way of sale or mortgage or by lease. Thus, to summarise, as enunciated in above referred decisions, the law with respect to rights of holders of such lands whether being on 'Sanad Nakis' and thus having fallen in the hands of Aukaf Department or being on 'Sanad Kamil' in the name of temple of its Deity, in either case is that the holder held it merely as a manager and had no right to transfer it even by lease. Therefore, the final order of the Tahsildar that no right could be considered to have been acquired by the petitioner under the said lease deed was correct and called for no interference because the trust or trustees, whosoever executed the lease deed, had no right to transfer that land by lease. At the most it may be said that the Tahsildar was wrong in mentioning that Collector or Government's prior permission was required but that makes no difference as far as the final finding is concerned. The decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the cases of Vallabharaya Swami Varu (Deity) of Swarna, represented by its Executive Officer Vs. Deevi Hanumancharyulu and Others, and The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. The decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the cases of Vallabharaya Swami Varu (Deity) of Swarna, represented by its Executive Officer Vs. Deevi Hanumancharyulu and Others, and The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt., dealt with the nature of rights in respect of properties of different kind. In the present case the properties covered by the said enactments were different in kind than the properties dealt with in those cases. In view of the position as discussed before, the impugned order of the learned Tahsildar and the orders of higher revenue authorities called for no interference and, therefore, the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that there was no merit in the petition was perfectly correct and called for no interference. The observation of the learned Single Judge regarding approach to competent Court by the parties as mentioned in para 4 of his order, was made in case the parties or any of them felt that there is any dispute pertaining to the title of the property in question. It was in that respect that the learned Single Judge observed that such a dispute cannot be adjudicated by this Court but the parties were free to approach appropriate Court. Thus, this Letters Patent Appeal has to substance and is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. OPINION R.B. Dixit J. I have gone through the draft judgment prepared by esteemed brother (Hon'ble Justice Shri Chandresh Bhushan) and I agree with the ultimate result of the decision, that the Writ Petition, in the present case, involves certain disputed questions of facts, for which an effective alternate remedy is available by way of Civil Suit, however, of course, with certain different reasons, I would like to add few words of my own. Respondent No. 1, Shri Ram Janki Mandir Gangaram (Gangadas)-Ki-Badi Shala's Public Trust, (in short 'Trust') was created by Shri Jagannath Das Ji, who was 15th Mahant in his line of descendants, claiming their origin from great Hindu reformist Saint Jagadguru Swami Ramanandacharya. Respondent No. 1, Shri Ram Janki Mandir Gangaram (Gangadas)-Ki-Badi Shala's Public Trust, (in short 'Trust') was created by Shri Jagannath Das Ji, who was 15th Mahant in his line of descendants, claiming their origin from great Hindu reformist Saint Jagadguru Swami Ramanandacharya. It appears from detailed report of the Additional Collector, (A.6) which contains the brief history of Ganga Das - Ki - Badi Shala based on History Muntziam Jagirdaran, Gwalior State (page 258 to 264), that Emperor Akbar influenced by Mysterious spiritual powers of a wandering sanyasi of this place, had made certain grants to him, and it is said that subsequently Alamgir Aurangzeb, attracted and astonished by Yogic feats of another Sanyasi of the same place, had sent certain royal presents, which are still displayed in the archives of this popularly known "Badi Shala". It appears that branches with temples of the Math are spread throughout north eastern region of the country. It is historical fact that Rani of Jhansi, Laxmibai, who had revolted against British Rule in 1857 laid her life, fighting to the British troops, in this holy shrine and breathed her last in the lap of Swami Gangadas, one of the founding father of "Badi Shala". Later history tells us that royal princess of Scindia dynasty had also patronized Sandhus/Mahants of the "Badi Shala", and from time to time elevated them to the royal status with certain royal symbols, titles and grants. However, as the time passed, Gangadas-Ki-badi Shala, which had once stood like a princely State was subsequently reduced to a helpless litigant struggling for survival of its existence and buckled to a vicious circle formed in nexus with corrupt officials and Land Mafias. Of course, degeneration of the Sadhus/Mahants of the place, also contributed to some extent, to the loss of its past glory. Now coming to the controversy involved in the present case, the Tahsildar, Gwalior who by its order dated 25-8-1987, rejected the application of mutation by petitioner on the ground that in Khasra Bandobast of Samvat 1997 this land had been recorded as "Maufi Atiya Sarkar Mandir Ram janki" and, therefore, the land belonged to the deity of the temple. The land in the circumstances, cannot be held to belong to the Public Trust. The Trust in turn, had no right to lease out the same to any one without permission of the Collector. The land in the circumstances, cannot be held to belong to the Public Trust. The Trust in turn, had no right to lease out the same to any one without permission of the Collector. It was further held by Tahsildar that even the land cannot be mutated in the name of Public Trust and, accordingly, it was ordered that it be mutated in bhumiswami rights of the deity of the temple through Prabandhak (manager) Collector, Gwalior. The learned counsel of the appellant/petitioner as well as the learned Senior Advocate, Shri R.D. Jain, appearing for respondent No. 1 Gangadas Ki Badi Shala, have contended before us that the earliest law regarding the grants made by erstwhile Rulers of the State, as envisaged under the provisions of "Kawaid Maufidaran Jujve Arazi Va Naqdi, Riasat Gwalior (State) Samvat 1991" (in short Kawaid Maufidaran) provides two categories of grants (i) Sanad Naquis (defective grants) and (ii) Sanad Qamil (Perfect grants). Sanad Naquis has been defined u/s 13 of the Qawaid Maufidaran as such Maufi land if found to be based on defective grant at the time of mutation it's grant is liable to be cancelled and the land would stand entrusted to Aukaf Department for the upkeep of the temple while "Sanad Qamil" was governed by provisions of section 12 of the Kawaid Maufidaran. "Maufidars of Sanad Qamil" were also recognized under sections 2(34), 2(35) of Qanoon Mal Gwalior, to include only those which were exempted from payment of land revenue. After merger of Gwalior State in Madhya Bharat region a Maufidar was further recognized u/s 95(4) of Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and tenancy Act as an "assignee of propriety rights". After creation of present State of Madhya Pradesh, the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code revoked "Maufi" and land revenue was assessed on such lands and the land was to be recorded in the name of "Sanad Holder". After registration of the Public Trust, in this case, the property of Maufidar stood transferred in the name of Public Trust. Thereafter it is to be governed by the provisions of M.P. Public Trusts Act. After registration of the Public Trust, in this case, the property of Maufidar stood transferred in the name of Public Trust. Thereafter it is to be governed by the provisions of M.P. Public Trusts Act. Since the lease deed in favour of appellant/petitioner has been executed with due sanction of Registrar of the Public Trust accorded u/s 14 of the M.P. Public Trusts Act, the Tahsildar had no authority to reject the application for mutation of its name and much less, suo motu make a direction to record the name of Collector as Prabandhak of the land and temple. It has been vehemently argued that authorities cited by learned Govt. Advocate in cases of Pancham Singh Kanchaniya and Ghanshyam Das (Supra) pertains to the provisions u/s 13 of Kawaid Maufidaran which defines Sanad Maquis i.e. defective grants, while the case of petitioner/appellant comes u/s 12 of Sanad Qamil, i.e. perfect grant, which creates an inheritable right. In my view although, the decision in case of Ghanshyam Das (Supra), also makes a passing reference to section 12 of the Kawaid Maufidaran, what has been unequivocally held in aforementioned cases is that a Maufidar cannot transfer the land by way of lease mortgage or sale, however, the fact remains that insofar as respondent Trust is concerned, all this depends upon the nature of grant and status of the Mafidar and subsequent investment of the powers to a Public Trust. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its larger Bench decision in case of the The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt., , had annunciated the conception of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are blended together and neither can be detached from the other. The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his large powers of disposal and administration and his right to create derivative tenures in respect to endowed properties; and these and other rights of a similar character invest the office of the Mahant with the character of proprietary right which, though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right. A Mathadhipati is not a corporate body; he is the head of a spiritual fraternity and by virtue of his office has to perform the duties of a religious teacher. A Mathadhipati is not a corporate body; he is the head of a spiritual fraternity and by virtue of his office has to perform the duties of a religious teacher. It is his duty to practise and propagate the religious tenets, of which he is an adherent and if any provision of law prevents him from propagating his doctrines, that would certainly affect the religious freedom which is guaranteed to every person under Article 25 of the Constitution. It is further urged that respondent Public Trust in present case had inherited the legacy and liabilities of the Mahant who had created the trust. In order to ascertain the nature of the right passed to the appellant/petitioner through the lease deed executed in his favour by a trust the previous record of the land in question is of paramount importance. Since the law on the point is already well settled it does not involve any question or disputed facts which requires to be investigated upon. Now, In the present case, the nature of the disputed property cannot be correctly appreciated without going through the documents relating to its original grant and subsequent yearwise entries in the record of rights. The powers of Mahant/Pujari in regard to the land can further be ascertained only from Sanad or deed of grant. Trust deed has also not been produced in absence of which it cannot be ascertained as to what sort of powers of Mahant had passed to it. The properties were transferred in the name of deity or since none of these facts are expressly or impliedly admitted on behalf of the respondent State. They are, therefore, purely questions of disputed facts and cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition. However, I am afraid that when the Court comes to the conclusion, in a writ petition that no interference is warranted due to disputed questions of facts, the Court should refrain from declaring the order of Tahsildar, under challenge, as perfectly valid or legal, in all respect. Where, it is open to the parties to challenge the order of Tahsildar, u/s 111 of the M.P. land Revenue Code, for redressal of it's grievances in a Civil Court, no final seal of approval can be placed on it, at least insofar as powers and status of Public Trust is concerned. Where, it is open to the parties to challenge the order of Tahsildar, u/s 111 of the M.P. land Revenue Code, for redressal of it's grievances in a Civil Court, no final seal of approval can be placed on it, at least insofar as powers and status of Public Trust is concerned. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its recent decision, in case of Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. M/s Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr. reported in J.T. 2002(1) SC 482 has observed that the Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. Similar views are found expressed in another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Padmasundara Rao and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, . For the aforesaid reasons, in my opinion, it has to be made clear that no correct interpretation of law can be made without going through the relevant documents which are not available on record, and, therefore, it cannot be said that the order of Tahsildar under challenge in the present case is perfectly legal or valid. However, it is left to the parties to approach the appropriate forum and in case if any suit or proceeding are initiated, the Authority or the Court is free to decide the case uninfluenced by any of the observations made hereinabove. By the Court:-- In view of our conclusions, this Letters Patent Appeal fails and is dismissed. Order accordingly. Final Result : Dismissed