JUDGMENT 1. A. K. Yog, J. Heard Sri Rajesh Tandon, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Som Nath Mishra, Advocate, on behalf of the petitioner-applicant on the review application No. 94115 of 2001. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri L. M. Singh, Advocate, on behalf of the contesting landlord opposite party (respondent in the petition). 2. SRI Rajesh Tandon, senior Advocate, has made following 4-submissions - (i) The writ petition was heard on 1-11-2001 and judgment was dictated in the open Court. Whatever arguments were raised the same find place in the said judgment apart from the ground taken in the memorandum of the review petition. The submission of SRI Rajesh Tandon, Senior Advocate, is that he was out of station on the date when the petition was taken up for hearing. Another Counsel, appearing along with him Mr. Ashok Srivastava had appeared and argued the case. The grievance raised in the review petition is that said learned Counsel SRI Ashok Srivastava could not make certain submissions. It may be noted that a Counsel had argued the case. It is irrelevant that other Counsel appearing for the same party was not available. Moreover the judgment once having been dictated and signed, question of granting indulgence for further hearing in the same matter did not arise. (ii) The learned Counsel for the tenant applicant, SRI Rajesh Tandon, Senior Advocate argued that under Rule 17 (1) of the Rules framed under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (for short called 'the Act') there ought to have been a finding that accommodation in question required demolition and it was not enough that the landlord required the building for demolition. The learned Counsel for the tenant applicant placed reliance on the decision in the case of Abdul Hai v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Basti and others, 2001 (2) JCLR 858 (All); 2001 (44) ALR 154 para 16. The aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable since the Court below specifically applied its mind to the essential ingredients of the Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act and, after considering relevant material on record, came to the conclusion that accommodation in question required demolition. The aforesaid argument of the learned Counsel is thus misplaced. The aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable since the Court below specifically applied its mind to the essential ingredients of the Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act and, after considering relevant material on record, came to the conclusion that accommodation in question required demolition. The aforesaid argument of the learned Counsel is thus misplaced. In fact no such ground was even taken in the writ petition, nor pressed and thus it does not provide good ground for reviewing my judgment. (iii) Learned Counsel for the tenant-applicant then referred to clause (iii) of Rule 17 which reads - "that a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority under any law. . . . . . . . . . . . . " and argued that there must be a sanctioned plan proposed construction. The argument is misconceived. In my judgment and order dated 1-11-2001 dismissing the petition, requirement of Rule 17, to the extent argument was made is already considered. The view taken in the judgment is based upon the Division Bench decision rendered in the case of Binda Prasad v. III Additional District Judge, Faizabad and others, 1984 (2) ARC page 306 (Para 9 ). For ready reference relevant portion of the said para is quoted - ". . . . . . . . . . . . . We are, however, not inclined to accept the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Of course, where only a plan has been prepared, but it is still to be sanctioned by the competent authority, then, no doubt, the Prescribed Authority must examine whether the plan conforms to the building bye-laws or regulations, has itself sanctioned the plan, it is not open to the Prescribed Authority or to the Appellate Court to sit in judgment over the decision of the said competent authority. The requirement of Rule 17, in this behalf, has to be reasonably interpreted and it cannot be so interpreted as to confer a part of appellate jurisdiction on the Prescribed Authority to sit in judgment over the decision of the local body or other competent authority on which the jurisdiction to examine the building plans has been conferred by the legislature. In view of learned Single Judge in Ram Aatar (supra) on this point is overruled. In view of learned Single Judge in Ram Aatar (supra) on this point is overruled. " The learned Counsel for the tenant-applicant does not dispute that there is any other contrary judgment on the point. SRI Tandon places reliance upon the case of Kandaswamy v. Board of Management, H. S. I. Said Mosque, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 1269 (Para 12 ). The aforesaid decision is based upon interpretation of certain provisions of Karnataka Rent Control Act (1961) wherein Section 21 (1) of the Act, in clear terms, required that for construction of building there was a approved plan or the competent authority had permitted the landlord to build on the land. The expression used in Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act is clearly distinguishable : (iv) The learned Counsel for the tenant-applicant in the last submitted that this Court is bound to give direction to the landlord for reconstructing the building within a specified time and thereafter let it out to the tenant applicant. In support of his aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the following decisions - (A) 1997 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases 173 (pr. 9) State of U. P. v. Additional District Judge, Special Judge, E. C. Act Dehradun and others, (B) AIR 1991 SC 455 (pr. 4) Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan v. Tuffail Mohammed. (C) 2000 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 589 (pr. 12), Manendra Kumar Gupta and others v. Special Judge Allahabad and others. At the very out set I may mention that when a Court issues directions as above, they cannot be treated as binding precedent, since such directions are issued in facts and circumstances of a particular case. 3. IN the case of State of U. P. (supra) learned Single Judge directed the tenant to hand over possession within a month from the date of sanction of the map by the appropriate authority and further direction to the landlord to construct the building, if possible, within six months and after reconstruction shall offer it to the petitioner. The said direction itself used the expression 'possibly'. 4. IN the case of Masjid Kacha Tank (supra) the Supreme Court directed - ". . . . . . . . . . . . . The said direction itself used the expression 'possibly'. 4. IN the case of Masjid Kacha Tank (supra) the Supreme Court directed - ". . . . . . . . . . . . . We however direct that landlord-appellant shall take effective steps for completing reconstruction of the building within a reasonable period i. e. six months from the date the tenant- respondent vacates the building. The tenant is, however, given time till 21st March, 1991 to vacate the premises. We further direct the landlord appellant to commence the construction work, if possible, the portion occupied by the tenant, immediately after his vacating the said premises. On completion of the construction the landlord will officer the said premises previously occupied by the tenant-respondent to occupy at the prevalent. . . . . . . . . . . . . " (Emphasis laid down by me) Supreme Court, in the above case, has in the facts and circumstances of that, used expression 'if possible'. It is to be noted that the directions contained in the relevant concerned Para 4 of the said judgment is not with reference to a provision of law under concerned Rent Control Act. 5. PARA 12 of the judgment, in the case of Manendra Kumar Gupta (supra), starts with words - "considering the facts and circumstances of the case the landlords. . . . . . . . . " (Emphasis laid down by me) Court did not fix any time for sanctioning of plan and rightly so because sanctioning of plan and rightly so because sanctioning of plan is not within the control of a landlord. 6. IN all the aforesaid cases, Courts had taken care not to pass order in absolute terms nor referred to any provision of law which may statutorily require issuance of a direction to reconstruct within the time provided by law. No doubt. Courts can always issue direction, if warranted and deemed appropriate but that by itself cannot be said to be a declaration of law or binding precedence. I find no provision in the Act or the Rules, which casts duty upon Court to give direction to the assuring landlord to reconstruct. The only relevant provision in this connection, if one has to search, is Section 24 of the Act. I find no provision in the Act or the Rules, which casts duty upon Court to give direction to the assuring landlord to reconstruct. The only relevant provision in this connection, if one has to search, is Section 24 of the Act. Once application for release under Section 21 is allowed right to option of entry, subject to the ingredients and conditions contemplated therein, has been conferred under Section 24 of the Act. Legislature, it is evident, deemed fit in its wisdom, not to provide for direction to reconstruct within specified time. Court, cannot ignore that human life has varied colours and situations are not static. A landlord may become pauper or funds be required for more urgent purposes like education or medical treatment- involving huge funds. 7. Review application has no merit. It is accordingly rejected. 8. AT this stage of the case, an affidavit of Tapan Karmakar son of Prahlad Chand-the petitioner has been filed. Para 8 of the said affidavit reads: "that the petitioner undertakes to vacate the shop in dispute within six months from the order of this Hon'ble Court. " In view of the undertaking given by the petitioner, as also contains in Para 8 of the affidavit of the son of the petitioner, I direct the landlord not to evict the petitioner for a period of six months i. e. upto October 31, 2002 subject to the compliance of the following terms and conditions: Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that undertaking shall be filed by the petitioner before Prescribed Authority on the terms and conditions imposed of this Court : (1) The tenant-petitioner shall file before the concerned Prescribed Authority, on or before 2nd May, 2002, an application along with his affidavit giving an unconditional undertaking to comply with all the conditions mentioned hereinafter. (2) Petitioner-tenant shall not be evicted from the accommodation in his tenancy for six months i. e. up to 31st October, 2002. Tenant-petitioner, his representative assignee, etc. (2) Petitioner-tenant shall not be evicted from the accommodation in his tenancy for six months i. e. up to 31st October, 2002. Tenant-petitioner, his representative assignee, etc. , claiming through him or otherwise, if any, shall vacate without objection and peacefully deliver vacant possession of the accommodation in question on or before 31st October, 2002 to the landlord or landlord's nominee/representative (if any, appointed and intimated by the landlord) by giving prior advance notice and notifying to the landlord by Registered A. D. post (on his last known address or as may be disclosed in advance by the landlord in writing before the concerned Prescribed Authority) time and date on which landlord is to take possession from the tenant. (3) Petitioner shall on or before 2nd May, 2002 deposit entire amount due towards rent etc. up to date i. e. entire arrears of the past, if any, as well as the rent for the period ending on the 31st October, 2002. (4) Petitioner and everyone claiming under him undertake not to 'change' or 'damage' or transfer, alienate, assign in any manner, the accommodation in question. (5) In case tenant-petitioner fails to comply with any of the conditions or directions contained in this order, landlord shall be entitled to evict the tenant-petitioner forthwith from the accommodation in question by seeking police force through concerned prescribed authority. (6) If there is violation of the under-taking of anyone or more of the conditions contained in this order, the defaulting party shall pay Rs. 25,000 (Rupees Twenty five thousand only) as damages to the other party besides rendering himself/herself liable to be prosecuted for committing grossest contempt of the Court. Review rejected.