R. Gogoi, J.— All these writ petitions are being heard pursuant to the judgment and order dated 11.9.2002 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in writ Appeal No. 269 of 1999 and other connected cases remanding the matters for a de novo consideration in the light of the affidavit stated to have been filed by the State in Writ Appeal No. 269 of 1999. Writ Appeal No. 269 of 1999 arose out of the common judgment dated 29.6.99 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court disposing of all the present writ petitions along with Civil Rule No. 5282 of 1995. The affidavit filed by the State before the learned appellate Court has been duly noticed. The facts of Civil Rule No. 5282 of 1995 are somewhat different from the facts of the present cases. Consequently, the aforesaid Civil Rule No. 5282 of 1995 is delinked from the present cases to be heard separately. 2. The detailed facts on which the present writ petitions have been structured, the contentions advanced by the writ petitioners and the stand taken by the State in each of the cases have been stated in details in the earlier judgment and order dated 29.6.99. However, for the purpose of deciding the present writ applications, the facts of each of the cases are considered necessary to be recited, though in brief. In Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993, the petitioners have challenged the preliminary notification dated 13.6.85 and the final notification dated 3.8.89 issued under the previsions of Section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') in respect of the addition of the area mentioned in the schedule to the said notifications to the existing boundaries of the Kaziranga National Park. A notice dated 9.12.92 prohibiting the petitioner from proceeding with tea plantation in the area in their possession has also been questioned in the aforementioned Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993. The writ petitioners in Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993 contend that out of total area of the garden measuring 2538 bighas, 2189 bighas are periodic patta land and the remaining 349 bighas are Govt. land over which the writ petitioners have been cultivating tea for the last 60 years. The writ petitioners in Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993 contend that out of total area of the garden measuring 2538 bighas, 2189 bighas are periodic patta land and the remaining 349 bighas are Govt. land over which the writ petitioners have been cultivating tea for the last 60 years. According to the writ petitioners, the schedule to the impugned notification contains a fair amount of ambiguity with regard to the boundaries specified and though a reference is made to the tea estate in the said boundaries, the extent of the area of the tea estate within the said boundaries is not clear. Accordingly, an objection was filed by the tea company on 21.10.85 which according to the writ petitioners, has not been disposed of in the matter required under the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. There has been a failure to follow the mandate of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, the impugned final notification dated 3.8.89 is contrary to the provisions of the Act, it is contended. 3. In Civil Rule No. 3683 of 1994 and Civil Rule No. 3685 of 1994, the petitioners challenge two identical notices dated 15.3.94 issued by the Commissioner, North Assam Division directing the petitioners to show cause along with all papers and documents as to why right and title of the two schools involved in the writ petitions should not be declared illegal and the land vested in the school authorities should not be reverted to the State authority. The aforesaid notices have been purportedly issued under Section 20 of the Act on the ground that the aforesaid lands had been vested in the school authorities after the issuance of the preliminary notification extending the boundaries of the Kaziranga National Park. The writ petitioners in the aforementioned two civil rules contend that as they had no knowledge of the preliminary notification issued by the State Authority, they could not prefer their claims and objections before the competent authority as enjoined by the provisions of the Act. However, as soon as the notices dated 15.3.94 were served, they had filed objections in this regard and that the authority without answering the said objection, are seeking to evict them from the land in question. 4. However, as soon as the notices dated 15.3.94 were served, they had filed objections in this regard and that the authority without answering the said objection, are seeking to evict them from the land in question. 4. The writ petitioners in Civil Rule No. 3845 of 1994 have challenged the draft notification dated 10.9.85 by which the area of the existing National Park was sought to be extended as per the schedule appended to the said notification. The petitioners claim that they were holding annual pattas in respect of parts of the land covered by the said notification and though in a notice dated 11.1.94 it was intimated that the objections of the petitioners with regard to the proposed inclusion of the land in their possession will be heard by the competent authority, neither were they heard nor any order has been passed rejecting their claims and objections. Instead, the authorities have threatened the petitioners with eviction from the land which are stated to have been in their possession for long. 5. In Civil Rule No. 4167 of 1996, an association seeking to represent the five different villages details of which are mentioned in the writ application, has challenged the proposed second addition to the area of Kaziranga National Park by the draft notification dated 10.7.85. According to the writ petitioners, all members of the petitioner-association were originally patta holders in different villages in the erstwhile undivided Sibsagar district and that they are erosion affected persons. It is with a view to rehabilitate them that they were accommodated at the present site by the State authority in 1972 from which they are not sought to be evicted. 6. In Civil Rule No. 2397 of 1998, the writ petitioners claiming to be beneficiaries of certain grazing rights vested in them by the State authority have sought to challenge the proposed inclusion of the land in their possession within the extended area of the National Park by contending that though they had filed their claims and objections before the competent authority, the matter has not been finally disposed of and instead, the respondent authorities are threatening them with eviction. 7. The State has filed its affidavits in each of the cases contesting the claims advanced. Though the facts controverted in each of the affidavits are different, a common thread is discernible. 7. The State has filed its affidavits in each of the cases contesting the claims advanced. Though the facts controverted in each of the affidavits are different, a common thread is discernible. The petitioners have no right of occupation of the land in their possession, contends the State. Their occupation at best is permissive and does not confer any legal right that can be enforced through the machinery of the Court. The proposed increase of the area of the National Park sought to be made by several separate additions, each covered by a separate draft and final notification issued under the provisions of the Act, is in public interest and the manner and procedure enjoined by the provisions of the Act to effect such additions have been followed. Objections have not been filed by some of the writ petitioners and in those cases where objections had been filed, the same have been duly considered. The claims made in the writ petitions have been sought to be defeated on the aforesaid broad basis. 8. I have heard Mr A.C. Borbora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner in Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993. Mr S.K. Medhi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner in Civil Rule No. 3683 of 1994 and Civil Rule No. 3685 of 1994, Mr S.S. Dey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners in Civil Rule No. 3845 of 1994. Dr. Y.K. Phukan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner in Civil Rule No. 4167 of 1996 and Mr. S.N. Bhuyan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners in Civil Rule No. 2397 of 1998. Mrs Anima Hazarika, learned Govt. Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents in each of the cases has been heard. 9. The arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties on the basis of the averments made in the writ applications and the documents brought on record have several common features. Mrs Anima Hazarika, learned Govt. Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents in each of the cases has been heard. 9. The arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties on the basis of the averments made in the writ applications and the documents brought on record have several common features. It is contended by the learned counsels for the writ petitioners that long possession of the writ petitioners over the land in question and the present predicament faced by them due to the apprehended eviction enjoins upon the State an obligation to make available alternative plots to the writ petitioners so as to ensure their livelihood in accordance with the mandate prescribed by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. This argument however, has not been advanced by Mr A.C. Borbora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners in Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993 and the somewhat separate argument advanced by the learned counsel will be noticed separately in a later part of the judgment. The next common feature of the arguments in all the cases is that the provisions of the Act provides certain procedural safeguards which being mandated by a statutory enactment, is obligatory on the part of the State authority to follow. Claims and objections as regards the proposed addition to the existing boundaries have to be invited and such claims and objections on being raised, the authority empowered to deal with the said matter under the Act, must duly consider all such claims and objections received. The same has not been done in the instant cases thereby invalidating the proposed addition to the areas of the National Park. Learned counsels for the writ petitioners have unitedly tried to impress upon the Court that the mandatory provisions of Section 35(5) of the Act requiring approval of the State Legislature to any increase in the boundaries of the National Park have not been followed in the instant cases. The entire of the exercise is, therefore, redundant, the learned counsels for the petitioners contend. 10. In so far as Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993 is concerned, one feature of the case is not common to the others. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the claims and objections filed under the Act were at all received by the competent authority. 10. In so far as Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993 is concerned, one feature of the case is not common to the others. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the claims and objections filed under the Act were at all received by the competent authority. It will not be necessary for this Court to go into any detailed examination of the aforesaid question save and except to record that the materials on record do disclose that an objection dated 21.10.85 had been filed by the petitioner which does not appear to have been considered, perhaps, because it was addressed not to the Collector, competent under the Act but to the Forest authority who had issued the notice inviting claims and objections pursuant to the draft notification. 11. The arguments advanced on behalf of the writ petitioners as noticed above, has sought to be countered by the equally forceful arguments made on behalf of the State. The writ petitioners are rank encroachers, contends the learned counsel for the State and, therefore, no question of enforcement of any legal right can and does arise, in the facts of the present case. Learned State counsel has taken elaborate pairs to refer to the various affidavits filed by the State in all these cases to contend that whenever and wherever claims and objections were filed, the same were duly considered. The proposed increased in the areas of the Kaziranga National Park is in furtherance to the cause enshrined under Article 48A of the Constitution and, therefore, is in public interest. The petitioners, according to the learned State counsel, have no rights over the lands in their possession and ought not to be allowed to defeat the laudable efforts on the part of the State. Learned counsel for the State has also argued that the consent and approval of the State Legislature under Section 35(5) of the Act would be required only when there is a move to decrease the area of the National Park and not in a case of increase of the existing area. The word 'alteration' in Section 35(5) of the Act must be understood in that context, it is argued. 12. The facts as unfolded by the pleadings of the respective parties, the materials on record and the arguments advanced amply demonstrate that several complex issues, legal and human confronts the Court in the present cases. The word 'alteration' in Section 35(5) of the Act must be understood in that context, it is argued. 12. The facts as unfolded by the pleadings of the respective parties, the materials on record and the arguments advanced amply demonstrate that several complex issues, legal and human confronts the Court in the present cases. This Court being primarily concerned with the legal issues will, therefore, proceed to examine the merits of the legal contentions advanced leaving the question of the human difficulties to be considered by the authorities of the State, in the event any such consideration becomes necessary in the light of the conclusions that this Court may reach in the cases in hand. 13. A perusal of the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 would go to show that the procedure prescribed under Section 19 to 26 has to be followed before the final notification constituting a National Park is issued under Section 35 of the Act. The said provisions really provide a procedural safeguard before divesting any pre-existing right/claim to land. The provisions contained in Section 19 to 26 of the Act though applicable to the final constitution of a National Park must be held to be applicable to any increase of the area or boundaries of a National Park also. Section 25 of the Act makes the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 applicable to acquisition of land or rights under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. A person who has a claim in respect of such lands is given the status of person interested' within the meaning of Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. The procedural safeguards provided under Sections 19 to 26 of the Act leaves no doubt in the mind of the Court that the Collector who is required to determine the validity of the rights, claims and objections raised by 'persons interested' is a quasi-judicial authority and, therefore, has to follow all the norms and procedures applicable to a quasi-judicial proceeding. The determination of the validity of the rights and claims raised by a 'person interested' in respect of the proposed increase in the boundaries of a National Park has to be made, in the first instance, by the authority appointed under the Act i.e. the Collector. The determination of the validity of the rights and claims raised by a 'person interested' in respect of the proposed increase in the boundaries of a National Park has to be made, in the first instance, by the authority appointed under the Act i.e. the Collector. The role of the writ Court would be limited to ensuring that the procedure adopted has been a fair one and that the mandate of the statute has been followed by the authority. It would be highly undesirable that the writ Court should embark upon an examination of the tenability of the claims that a person may raise with regard to the land in his occupation which is proposed to be added to the boundaries on a National Park. In the instant case, while in Civil Rule No. 1923 of 1993, the claims and objections filed by the petitioner had not been considered at all, in the other cases, what transpires is that the claims, objections and/ or representations in one form or the other, were filed. Naturally, when claims and objections had been raised, the mandate of the law required such claims and objections to be enquired into and answered in consonance with the quasi-judicial character of the proceedings contemplated by the Act. The answer to the objections and claims raised, has to be made on the basis of reasons advanced. This is the manner in which the law enjoins upon the authority to deal with the rights of the citizens. Learned Govt. Advocate, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts made and elaborate and painstaking arguments advanced, has not been able to place before the Court any order/orders passed by the competent authority disposing of the claims and objections raised before it by the writ petitioners. The issue has been sought to be resolved by the learned Govt. Advocate by contending that the petitioners, admittedly, being encroachers, have no rights to claim. The claims/rights contemplated under Section 19 of the Act which are required to be enquired into must be understood to be a bonafide right of a citizen to claim an interest in the property in respect of which he has been sought to be divested. The extent to which such a right can be claimed and/or the validity thereof is a matter which is required to be decided by the authority competent under the statute. The extent to which such a right can be claimed and/or the validity thereof is a matter which is required to be decided by the authority competent under the statute. The materials on record do indicate that in each of these cases, the petitioners have sought to raise a claim to the lands in their possession on one basis or the other which has already been noticed in an earlier part of this order. As any adjudication of such claims would involve an examination of highly disputed questions of fact which can only be resolved by a consideration of evidence, oral and documentary, this Court does not consider it appropriate to undertake such an exercise in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court, therefore, for the reasons alluded is inclined to hold that the procedural safeguards and the requirements prescribed by the Act having been breached, the matter will now have to go back to the authority for a de novo determination. Such de novo determination, in the considered view of the Court, should not be made by the authority on the basis of the claims and objections raised almost a decade back and that in such de novo adjudication by the authority, the writ petitioners should be allowed to raise all such defences as may be available on date. It is noticed that the authority has not been able to bring the lands mentioned in the different notifications within the areas of the National Park perhaps due to pendency of this litigation. This Court, therefore, also considers it appropriate to hold that the authority would be the best judge of the time within which the claims and objections of the writ petitioners should be brought to its final conclusion. 14. Before parting with the record, this Court would like to observe that the second objection raised on behalf of the writ petitioners i.e. that the proposed additions to the areas of the National Park did not have the approval of the State Legislature as required under Section 35(5) of the Act is a question which need not be answered by this Court at this stage. Whether the writ petitioner would be entitled to raise the said point is a question that has to be decided only upon a final adjudication of their rights to the land in their possession. Whether the writ petitioner would be entitled to raise the said point is a question that has to be decided only upon a final adjudication of their rights to the land in their possession. If the petitioner have no rights over the land, it may be quite possible to hold that the petitioners would not be entitled to raise the said question. As the rights of the petitioners over the land in question are yet to be determined, this Court, therefore, expresses no opinion on the second question raised. The natural corollary of the conclusions recorded in the present order would be that the possession of the writ petitioners in each of the writ petitioners will not be disturbed until the directions contained in the present judgment are carried out by the respondents. 15. All the writ petitions shall stand closed in terms of the above directions.