P. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed by Gujarat State Financial Corporation challenging the award passed by the Labour Court, Junagadh dated 5. 1. 2000 in reference (LCJ) No. 709 of 1990 (Old No. 1890 of 1986 ). By the impugned award, the labour Court has passed an order of reinstatement in favour of the present respondent to his original post by setting aside the order of termination dated 3. 5. 1983. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioner Corporation that the respondent was appointed purely on temporary basis as a Chowkidar in order to guard the property of M/s. Popular Dyechem Industries, Porbander. He was appointed w. e. f. 15. 9. 1982 and ultimately, he was relieved from service w. e. f. 3. 5. 1993. The said order of termination by which his services were terminated w. e. f. 3. 5. 1983 was challenged by him by raising industrial dispute. Even though the services were terminated as back as in 1983, the dispute was raised in the year 1986 and same was ultimately referred to the concerned labour Court on 4. 9. 1986. It is the case of the concerned workman that even though he had put in more than 240 days of service, without following appropriate procedure prescribed by the Industrial Disputes Act and more particularly, without complying with the provisions of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, his services were illegally terminated by the Management. Under these circumstances, a demand was made to reinstate him in service with full back wages. The Labour Court, Junagadh, after considering the evidence of the parties, came to the conclusion that the order of termination was bad in law as the same was in contravention of Sec. 25-F of the industrial Disputes Act. Ultimately, the Labour Court partly allowed the said reference by passing an order of reinstatement without backwages. The aforesaid award is impugned at the instance of Gujarat State Financial Corporation by way of this petition. Even though the respondent workman is served, he has not appeared and contested this petition. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioner Corporation, it is argued by Mr. K. M. Patel, Ld. Advocate that the Labour Court has committed an apparent error in coming to the conclusion that the concerned workman had served for more than 240 days at the relevant time. Mr. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioner Corporation, it is argued by Mr. K. M. Patel, Ld. Advocate that the Labour Court has committed an apparent error in coming to the conclusion that the concerned workman had served for more than 240 days at the relevant time. Mr. Patel, Ld. Advocate has relied upon the oral evidence led by the management as well as by the respondent workman before the Labour Court. Mr. Patel has more particularly relied upon the evidence of one Chaganbhai Koradia who was serving at the relevant time as a Joint Manager with the petitioner- corporation. The said evidence is produced on record at Page 22 Annexure-D. The said witness has clearly stated in his evidence that the concerned workman was appointed as a Chowkidar and was appointed as a Chokidar for a company whose possession was required to be taken by the petitioner-Corporation on the ground of default in payment of the dues of the petitioner-Corporation. Such Chowkidar was required to perform his duty till the winding up procedures are concluded. It is also , stated in the evidence by the said witness that the aforesaid appointment is of a temporary nature. It is also stated that the petitioner at the relevant time was appointed as a Chowkidar and was discharging his duty at M/s. Popular Dyechem industries, Porbandar which was a defaulting company at the relevant time and whose possession was taken for the purpose of carrying out winding up procedures. Relying upon the said evidence, Mr. K. M. Patel has vehemently submitted that since the concerned workman was appointed only for the limited purpose for the aforesaid purpose wherein the amount of dues were required to be recovered by selling the assets of the defaulting company, on completion of the said work, the services of the respondent workman were no longer required. He has also further submitted that subsequently the Corporation decided to take the aforesaid work by appointing security contractor and that is how the service of the respondent workman was not required any further. Even the aforesaid witness has also stated the aforesaid aspect in his evidence. Mr. He has also further submitted that subsequently the Corporation decided to take the aforesaid work by appointing security contractor and that is how the service of the respondent workman was not required any further. Even the aforesaid witness has also stated the aforesaid aspect in his evidence. Mr. Patel has also further submitted that the concerned workman has never completed 240 days and even if his total service is taken into consideration as a Chowkidar, the total length of the service which he has rendered on temporary basis is hardly 232 days. It is submitted that in any case, he has not put in 240 days as observed by the Labour Court and that the Labour Court, therefore, has committed an apparent error by wrongly calculating the aforesaid number of days. At this stage, it is necessary to consider the evidence of the concerned workman and even the concerned workman has admitted in the evidence that he has served between 15. 9. 1982 and 3. 5. 1983. It is, therefore, clear that the respondent workman had served only for 232 days. ( 4 ) I have gone through the documents submitted with the petition as well as the award of the Labour Court. I have also heard Mr. Patel, Ld. Advocate for the petitioner- corporation. It is required to be appreciated that the respondent was employed as a chowkidar by the petitioner Corporation as some proceedings for recovery under sec. 29 of the Gujarat State Financial Corporation Act were pending and in order to recover the amount, the possession was taken away by the petitioner company. At that stage, it was necessary for the petitioner to guard the aforesaid property. It is required to be noted that on completion of the aforesaid work i. e. , after realising the dues from the defaulting company i. e. , M/s. Popular Dyechem Industries, it was not necessary for the Corporation to continue the Chowkidar because the possession was not required to be kept further by the petitioner-Corporation. Considering the argument of Mr. Patel and considering the evidence on record I am of the opinion that the work in question was purely of a temporary nature and on completion of the said work, since the Corporation no longer required service of the respondent workman, his services were terminated. Considering the argument of Mr. Patel and considering the evidence on record I am of the opinion that the work in question was purely of a temporary nature and on completion of the said work, since the Corporation no longer required service of the respondent workman, his services were terminated. Even apart from the aforesaid aspect, it is clear, considering the number of days during which the respondent had served, that he has not put in continuous service of 240 days. The Labour Court has, therefore, obviously committed mistake in reaching the conclusion that the respondent workman had put in service for more than 240 days. The entire award proceeds on the footing that the concerned workman has put in more than 240 days service which is factually not found to be correct. The Labour Court has also observed in the award that the management has not led any evidence to justify their say that the concerned workman has not put in more than 240 days of service. In this connection, reference is required to be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Range Forest Officer vs. S. T. Hadimani, air 2002 SC 1147 . In the aforesaid decision, it has been found by the Apex Court in paragraph 3 as under:3. For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant is an "industry" or not, though reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat vs. Pratam Singh Narsinh Parmar, (JT 2001 (3) SC 326 ). In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the Management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 20 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. However, Mr. Hegde appearing for the department states that the State is really interested in getting the iaw settled and the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate grounds on the same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two months from today. " ( 5 ) AT this stage, it is also required to be noted that even though the cause of action arose on 3. 5. 1983 when the petitioner Corporation took the decision of terminating the service of the concerned workman, yet he raised the dispute after a period of about more than 3 years. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, in my view, the Labour Court has committed an error in passing the order of reinstating the concerned workman on his original post. It is also required to be noted that even otherwise, the Corporation decided to subsequently appoint security contractor for the very work which was temporarily taken from the respondent employee. Mr. Patel, ld. Advocate has stated that the Corporation has taken a policy decision to take the services of security contractor and even the witness of the Management has also clearly stated the same before the Labour Court. In my view, therefore, the labour court has not considered the aforesaid aspect at all. I also find substance in the arguments of Mr. Patel that since the concerned workman was appointed on a temporary basis for a particular work, on completion of the said work, his services were no longer required by the Management. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter as well as considering the fact that the respondent workman has failed to prove that he has served for more than 240 days, naturally he was not entitled to get benefit of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter as well as considering the fact that the respondent workman has failed to prove that he has served for more than 240 days, naturally he was not entitled to get benefit of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, in my view considering the evidence on record and considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as even considering the fact that the concerned workman ultimately raised his demand after considerable time, no relief was required to be granted in his favour. Mr. Patel, Ld. Advocate for the petitioner has further submitted that even otherwise the concerned workman was already gainfully employed at the relevant time and that in his evidence also, he has admitted the said fact. However, apart from the aforesaid aspect of the matter, considering the fact that the concerned workman at the relevant time had not put in more than 240 days of service and the award of the Labour Court proceeds mainly on the aforesaid presumption, in my view, the award of the Labour Court is required to be interfered with. In view of what is stated above, the order of the Labour Court, junagadh impugned in this petition is quashed and set aside and the petition is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .