N. C. SIL, J. ( 1 ) THIS is to consider an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arising out of the order dated 27. 03. 2002 passed by Sri Udayan Mukherjee, learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Durgapur in connection with Miscellaneous Case No. 3 of 2001. ( 2 ) MR. Dipak Basu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits before me that on consent of both the parties arbitration proceeding was extended from time to time upto 7. 12. 2000. But thereafter the petitioner did not participate in the arbitral proceeding as the term of arbitration had since expired. Mr. Basu has also argued before me that after filing the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner obtained an order of stay of all further proceedings of the case pending before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Durgapur. Mr. Basu has also drawn my attention to the prayers in the Miscellaneous Case before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Durgapur. In the said case the declaration that the mandate of the Arbitrator stood terminated on 7. 12. 2000 alternatively the mandate of the Arbitrator ought to be terminated because of gross delay and/or neglect to proceed with the said reference and failure to discharge the functions as Arbitrator was prayed for. It is pointed out by Mr. Basu that the learned Civil Judge was pleased to dismiss the suit by the order impugned. Mr. Basu then argues before me that as there was no provision for appeal against the impugned order, the petitioner has preferred the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is also pointed out by him that by the impugned order the learned Civil Judge directed the Arbitrator to complete the proceeding within three months which was beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Durgapur. In this connection Mr. Basu has referred to the ratio decided in the case of K. H. G. Rasool v. B. I. Mehsania and Ors. (AIR 2000 Bombay 424 ). I shall discuss this case at the appropriate point of time. ( 3 ) MR. In this connection Mr. Basu has referred to the ratio decided in the case of K. H. G. Rasool v. B. I. Mehsania and Ors. (AIR 2000 Bombay 424 ). I shall discuss this case at the appropriate point of time. ( 3 ) MR. S. S. Singha Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O. P. submits before me that even after the Miscellaneous Case was dismissed with the direction upon the Arbitrator to complete the proceeding within a stipulated period the petitioner had participated in the reconciliation and at that time at the instance of the petitioner the venue of arbitration was changed. It is also pointed out by the learned advocate for the O. P. That the present petitioner was the respondent before the Arbitrator. As regards the Bombay case cited by the learned advocate for the petitioner, the learned advocate for the O. P. submits before me that the decision of that case was made on the ground of undue delay at the instance of the Arbitrator himself. Mr. Singha Roy has also cited some case laws in this connection which I shall discuss later on. ( 4 ) I shall now take up the decision made by the Bombay High Court as referred to by the learned advocate for the petitioner. In the said case in pursuance of the consent terms, it was agreed between the parties that the three persons be appointed as Arbitrators in order to arbitrate the dispute between the parties and the Arbitrators were directed to make and publish the award within a period of four months from the date of order i. e. with effect from 27th March, 1998 and thus the said period which was to expire after four months had actually expired on 27. 7. 1998. But within that period the Arbitrators could not publish the award and as such the jurisdiction of the High Court section 14 and 15 read with section 9 of the Arbitration and Reconciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as Act for brevity) was invoked. It further appears from he said case that earlier the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 14 and 15 of the said Act was involved and the said petition was disposed of by another consent order dated 9. 11. It further appears from he said case that earlier the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 14 and 15 of the said Act was involved and the said petition was disposed of by another consent order dated 9. 11. 1998 whereby the time was further extended by two months to enable Arbitrators to make and publish their award. But inspite of grant to two months time to enable the Arbitrators to complete the proceedings and to publish their award, the Arbitrators could not complete the arbitration proceedings and also cold not publish their award in terms of the order of the Court dated 9. 11. 1998 and in such circumstances again the petition was filed before the High Court at Bombay to seek declaration that the mandate of the Arbitrators stood terminated and that the arbitration proceedings came to an end with the expiry of the period of two months granted in order dated 9. 11. 98 i. e. on 9. 1. 1999. In such background the learned single Judge of the High Court at Bombay held that the mandate of the Arbitrators stood terminated on the said date by afflux of time. ( 5 ) BUT the facts of the instant case are absolutely different from the facts of the Bombay case as stated above. In the instant case on the application filed by the present petitioner before the learned single Judge, Senior Division, Durgapur a direction was made upon the sole Arbitrator to complete the arbitral proceeding within a stipulated time and the present petitioner had also participated in the said proceedings. It appears from the record that in the 36th sittings held on 12. 4. 2002 by the Arbitrator the present petitioner as respondent expressed their difficulties in the matter of holding further arbitration proceeding at the venue and after considering their difficulties the venue changed. The said 36th sitting was held in pursuance to the order impugned and from the conduct of the present petitioner as respondent before the Arbitrator it is very much candid that they had accepted the order impugned passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Durgapur. Furthermore it appears from the papers filed with the present application that on the consent both the parties the arbitration proceeding was extended from time to time. Furthermore it appears from the papers filed with the present application that on the consent both the parties the arbitration proceeding was extended from time to time. In such view of the matters I am unable to accept the decision made by the High Court at Bombay in the case of K. H. G. Rasool (supra) as cited by the learned advocate for the petitioner for the purpose of this case. ( 6 ) THE learned advocate for the O. P. has referred to the ratio decided in the case of Prasun Roy v. Calcutta M. D. Authority ( AIR 1988 SC 205 . In the said case both the parties got extension of arbitration proceedings at least for 14 times. The Arbitrator held 74 sittings which were attended by both the parties and their counsel and in such circumstances it was held that in view of the acquiescence of the parties one of them could not be allowed to challenge the arbitration proceedings on the ground that because of some disability the matter could not have been referred to arbitration. The similar decision was made in the case of M/s. Neel Kantan and Bros. Construction v. Superintendent Engineer National Highways, Salem ( AIR 1988 SC 2045 ). The above two case laws rather appear to be squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Here in the instant case the arbitration proceeding was extended from time to time on consent of both the parties and sometimes on the prayer of the present petitioner/respondent and the present petitioner after having accepted the impugned order which was again passed on the application filed by the present petitioner before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Durgapur, participated in the arbitral proceedings and in course of such proceeding the venue was changed on the prayer of the present petitioner. That being the position I do not find any merits of the present revisional application for which the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) ACCORDINGLY, the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is dismissed on contest. The stay order passed in the present revisional application is hereby vacated. The petitioner is directed to pay 100 G. Ms. to the opposite party as costs within seven days from the dated. ( 7 ) ACCORDINGLY, the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is dismissed on contest. The stay order passed in the present revisional application is hereby vacated. The petitioner is directed to pay 100 G. Ms. to the opposite party as costs within seven days from the dated. A copy of this order be sent down to the learned lower Court. Urgent xeroxed certified copies be given to the learned advocates for both the parties. Application dismissed