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2002 DIGILAW 47 (HP)

NUPUR v. SANDEEP SUD

2002-03-08

A.K.GOEL

body2002
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Applicant has filed a petition under Order 33 of the CPC for permitting her to sue as an indigent person. Relief claimed in the petition is for the grant of maintenance under the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Alongwith this petition an application for grant of interim maintenance during the pendency of these proceedings, as well as the suit in the event of permission being allowed, has also been filed. 2. According to the petitioner marriage between the parties was solemnised in the year 1999. Averments made by her are that she was maltreated, harassed and cruelty was perpetuated at her. She also has made allegations of dowry being demanded from her. On this ground FIR No. 88 was lodged at Police Station, Dhali in April, 2001. 3. Thus it was under compelling circumstances which is the creation of respondent and his family members, that she was forced to leave her matrimonial home on 9.3.2001. In this background, it is further alleged that respondent has not cared to look after her after she was forced to leave her home. Petitioner claims to be not keeping good health and undergoing treatment at Delhi. Thus she has claimed maintenance to the tune of Rs. 22,000 p.m. besides costs of the case. 4. The claim of the petitioner has been seriously contested and resisted by the respondent-husband. He claims that it is the petitioner who is at fault. Despite best efforts made by him as a caring husband who did everything within his power to keep her happy it was she who because of her own acts left the house. He also alleged that father and uncle of the petitioner, (latter happens to be Judicial Officers in the State of H.R) threatened them at Chennai with dire consequences. 5. Leaving the matter here only, preliminary question that needs consideration in this petition is; Whether the petitioner is an indigent person and is entitled to sue as a pauper. Notice was issued to the Collector as required under law. Reply has been filed by Mr. RC. Katooh, District Magistrate, Shimla who has stated that the petitioner is residing with her parents and she is not employed in Government service and it has been reported by SDM (Urban), Shimla that she has no source of income. 6. Notice was issued to the Collector as required under law. Reply has been filed by Mr. RC. Katooh, District Magistrate, Shimla who has stated that the petitioner is residing with her parents and she is not employed in Government service and it has been reported by SDM (Urban), Shimla that she has no source of income. 6. Respondent-husband while controverting all the averments made in the application has attached Double Benefit Deposit Certificate, issued by Bank of India, Shimla Branch, showing that the petitioner is possessed of sufficient means. This is in her name. Its maturity value is Rs. 71,427 on 18.9.2002. Thus by way of preliminary objection a serious contention was raised, that unless the petitioner pays the court fees present application is liable to be rejected. While advancing this line of argument, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that fact of her having above certificate has been withheld by the petitioner, may be that she was not in possession of the same while filing the petition under Order 33 CPC. But in any case, she should have made of mention of it. Thus she cannot be permitted to feign ignorance about its existence. 7. On the other hand Mr. Singh learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that mere possession of this certificate is of no consequence. His client will be put to substantial loss if she is asked to encash the same before the date of maturity. 8. For this submission he placed reliance on a decision of Delhi High Court reported in Mrs. Vrinda Anand v. Dr. (Maj.) Arun Anand and others, AIR 1987 Delhi 97, Great emphasis was laid by him on observations made in paragraphs 7 and 8 which are as under : "7. This Explanation states that if any property is acquired by a person, he or she will have more means and, therefore, cease to be an indigent person. That is the legal effect of this Explanation. As it happens, these Certificates were already belonging to the petitioner; they were only in the possession of the first respondent and the suit is for recovering them. That is the legal effect of this Explanation. As it happens, these Certificates were already belonging to the petitioner; they were only in the possession of the first respondent and the suit is for recovering them. She has actually not acquired any new property but, if we assume that she has, nevertheless, that property is realisable after seven years and a sale at this stage would merely cause a substantial loss to the petitioner for which reason we do not think this explanation to be applicable. 9. In any event, we think that these certificates have to he excluded altogether from consideration for the purpose of determining whether the applicant, now appellant, should be considered to be or not to be an indigent person." 10. On the other hand Shri Sood pointed out that once it has come to the notice of the Court regarding petitioner being in possession of means to pay the court fee, as such she is not an indigent person who can be allowed to sue as such. Reference was made by him to a number of decisions including one of this court reported in Gehru v. Charan Dass Dogra, 1981 Sim. L.C. 422, wherein a Division Bench while up-setting the order of learned Single Judge, who had ordered payment of Court fees by the appellant because he was possessed of sufficient immovable property, drew distinction between person being not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the court fee prescribed by law and held that possession of sufficient means does not amount "possession of sufficient property" and thus allowed the appellant to sue as an indigent person. 11. After having considered respective submissions, what needs to be determined first is whether this application for grant of interim maintenance can be taken up for consideration or not before decision of indegency of the petitioner. 12. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter the answer would be in the affirmative, thus holding that the application can be taken into consideration while examining the claim of a litigant like petitioner, whether to be allowed to sue as an indigent person or not. 13. For taking this view reference can be made to a Division Bench decision in case Manab alias Manabendra Barman v. Suvadra alias Szvati Burtnan and others, 1990 (2)^HLR 541. "4. 13. For taking this view reference can be made to a Division Bench decision in case Manab alias Manabendra Barman v. Suvadra alias Szvati Burtnan and others, 1990 (2)^HLR 541. "4. By this order dated April 1, 1989 the learned trial Judge disposed of the application under Section 151 of the Code filed by the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 herein in the aforesaid Misc. Case No. 38 of 1985. By the said order which is under challenge, the learned trial Judge granted ad-interim maintenance at the rate of Rs. 250 per month for each of the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 subject to the conditions that under no circumstances the total maintenance on such basis including any other maintenance awarded in other proceedings shall exceed Rs. 500 per month for both until further orders for enhancement of such rate, if warranted. The learned trial Judge further directed that the orders so made shall continue depending on the fate of the proceedings in the Misc. Case. The learned trial Judge directed the petitioner to pay and remit to the opposite party No. 1 direct by money order or deposit in Court a sum of Rs. 22,500 being the arrears of maintenance from June 5, 1985 till February, 1989 with a direction that it would be open to the petitioner to pray for instalments to pay such arrears if he found it difficult to pay the above arrears at a time. The learned trial Judge further directed the petitioner to pay to the opposite party No. 1 or deposit in Court maintenance from March, 1989, month by month, as indicated above such maintenance for each month being payable by the 15th of the succeeding month. 5. Mr. Dalip Kumar Mondal, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has contended, that as the application of the opposite party No. 1 to sue in forma pauperis is pending and no leave to sue in forma pauperis has been granted to her as yet and as the plaint of the intended suit has not yet been registered as a suit, the application under Section 151 of the Code is not maintainable. 6. Mr. Dilip Seth, the learned Advocate appearing for the opposite parties Nos. 6. Mr. Dilip Seth, the learned Advocate appearing for the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 on the other hand, submits that such an application for maintenance pendente lite is maintainable and in support of his contention he has relied upon the decision reported hi AIR 1975 Cal. 260 (Jyoti Prakash v. Chameli). In the said case during the pendency of an application under Order 33 praying for leave to sue in forma pauperis for an intended suit under Sections 18 and 20 of the Act, an application was made for maintenance pendente lite. A Division Bench of this Court held in that case that the suit commences from the moment an application is made to sue in forma pauperis and that, therefore, an application for maintenance pendente lite is maintainable during the pendency of the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis. We respectfully agree with the decision referred to above and, accordingly, the contention made by Mr. Mondal that the application for maintenance pendente lite is not maintainable cannot be sustained. 7. Mr. Mondal has next submitted that there is no provision in the Act for grant of maintenance pendente lite. It is pointed out by Mr. Mondal that Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 expressly provides for maintenance pendente lite. It is submitted that since there is no express provision for grant of maintenance pendente lite in the Act, the application under Section 151 of the Code is not maintainable and as such there is no scope for grant of maintenance pendente lite under the provision of the Act. Mr. Mondal has further submitted that since maintenance pendente lite was already granted for the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 on an application made by the opposite party No.l under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 in the Matrimonial Suit filed by the petitioner for divorce, the instant application under Section 151 of the Code for maintenance pendente lite under the provision of the Act is not maintainable. The contentions made by Mr. Mondal are untenable. The contentions made by Mr. Mondal are untenable. In the decision reported in AIR 1975 Calcutta at page 260 already referred to, it has been held that the right to interim maintenance is a part of the right conferred by Section 18 and Section 20 of the Act and the right to interim maintenance can be enforced by an application in aid of the suit and an order can be validly made by the Court on such an application in exercise of its inherent power which has been saved by Section 151 of the Code. In the decisions reported in AIR 1968 Calcutta at page 305, (Gouri Gupta v. Tarani Gupta), AIR 1968 Cal. 405 (Nermal Chand Jain v. Lila Jain), AIR 1968 Cal. 567 (Tarani Gupta v. Gauri Gupta) this Court has taken the consistent view that the Court has power to grant maintenance pendente lite in a suit for maintenance under Section 18 of the Act. In our view, the Court in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code, can in appropriate case grant maintenance pendente lite in a suit under Sections 18 and 20 of the Act even though there is no express provision in that behalf in the Act." 13. To similar effects is another D.B. decision of Calcutta High Court as reported in Jyoti Prakash Banerjee v. Chameli Banerjee and another, AIR 1975 Calcutta 260. It was held as under: In this judgment: "4. Although the application is not to be regarded as a plaint before it is granted, can it be said that a suit is instituted by presenting the application? Rule 1 of Order 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to-the Court. Therefore, in the contemplation of Rule 1 an application for leave to sue as a pauper will not be a suit before leave is granted because at that stage the application is not to be treated as a plaint. Order 4 Rule 1 however does not stand in isolation. Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code says: "Subject to the following provisions, any suit may be instituted by a pauper." To institute is to initiate. On examination of all the provisions of Order 33 it will be perfectly clear that a suit by a pauper is initiated by an application alone. Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code says: "Subject to the following provisions, any suit may be instituted by a pauper." To institute is to initiate. On examination of all the provisions of Order 33 it will be perfectly clear that a suit by a pauper is initiated by an application alone. The suit comes into existence as soon as the application is presented under Rule 3. That this is so, is supported by Rule 8 which provides that where the application is granted the suit shall proceed in all other respects as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner. If the suit has not come into existence before the application is granted it can hardly be said that the suit shall proceed thereafter as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner. The use of the word proceed indicates that the suit is in existence before the application is granted. The suit is of course instituted not in the ordinary manner, that is to say, in the manner contemplated by Order 1 Rule 4 but in the extraordinary manner or out of the ordinary manner. The legal position therefore appears to be that by the presentation of an application under Order 33, Rule 3, a suit is instituted although the application is not to be treated as a plaint until leave is granted. Moreover, Order 33 Rule 8 provides that if the application is granted it shall be deemed the plaint in the suit, meaning thereby that a suit is already in existence although there is no plaint in the suit until leave is granted. 6. In so far as it was held by those Bench decisions that an application for leave to sue as a pauper is not a suit until the application is granted those decisions must be regarded as unsound having regard to the provisions of Order 33. At all events, those decisions must be regarded as having been overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijai Pratap v. Dukh Haran Nath, AIR 1962 SC 941, where in connection with an application under Order 1, Rule 10 by a defendant to be transposed to the position of a plaintiff in an application for permission to sue as a pauper, the Court held that the application under Order 1, Rule 10 was maintainable. At page 945 of the Report, Shah, J. speaking for the Court observed: "An application to sue in form pauperis is but a method prescribed by the Court for institution of a suit by a pauper without payment of fee prescribed by Court Fees Act. If the claim made by the applicant that he is a pauper is not established the application must fail. But there is nothing personal in such an application. The suit commences from the moment an application for permission to sue in form pauperis as required by Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure is presented and Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be as such applicable in such a suit as in a suit in which court fees had been duly paid." 14. Thus it is held that this Court can look into the matter relating to grant of interim maintenance even during the pendency of the proceedings under Order 33 CPC. So far matter relating to court fees is concerned, looking to the circumstances of this and on the basis of materials on record, I am satisfied that petitioner is in a position to pay the court fees having sufficient means to pay the same. Accordingly, it is ordered that let the petitioner affix the court fees on the petition on or before 30.4.2002. In the; event of court fees being affixed Registry is directed to register the petition as a Civil Suit. 15. Now coming to the question of payment of interim maintenance. With a view to support his claim of interim maintenance as projected in the application for the grant of interim maintenance, Mr. Singh pointed out that interim maintenance may be allowed to the Extent of Rs. 22,000 as prayed for. He referred to paras 3(1) to 3(VI) of his^ petition under Order 33 CPC. 16. On the other hand when a reference is made to the pleadings of the respondent, it is admitted by him that besides his gross monthly salary of Rs. 18,400 he has got rental income from his flat, as also income from another flat which he jointly owns with his parents and sister. It has also been pleaded by him that he has to pay income tax and compulsory deductions. 18,400 he has got rental income from his flat, as also income from another flat which he jointly owns with his parents and sister. It has also been pleaded by him that he has to pay income tax and compulsory deductions. He has to repay the loan instalments of his own flat, as well as of the flat which he jointly owns. In addition to these compulsory deductions expenses, he has also to maintain himself and for that purpose he has to incur substantial expense of more than Rs. 10,000 p.m. Thus after meeting all expenses a meagre sum of Rs. 5,000 is left in his hand. 17. While considering the claim of interim maintenance some guess work is involved particularly when there is no specific provision in law regarding the quantum. Thus the court has to look to the social status of the parties, the way of life they are used to, besides how they were placed before and after the marriage also and at present. After taking note of all these circumstances and other factor, maintenance whether interim or otherwise is to be assessed. 18. Looking to the over all circumstances of this case it is felt that interest of justice will be well served if a sum of Rs. 5,000 p.m. is allowed by way of interim maintenance. This amount shall be payable with effect .from 1.10.2001 till 30.4.2002 or as may be ordered by this Court in future. Thus applications CMP No. 461 of 2001 and CMP No. 62 of 2002 are disposed of accordingly. Respondent shall deposit the arrears of maintenance upto 30.4.2002 by this date in the Registry which on deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. List this case on 3.5.2002 in court. Petition allowed.