JUDGMENT: The plaintiff is the appellant. The plaintiff claimed 1/5th share in the suit schedule ‘A’ to ‘E’ and the entire ‘F’ schedule property. But subsequently, the properties described in ‘C’ and ‘D’, were deleted by order of this Court in C.R.P. No.3905 of 1983. The contest here is only with regard to the immovable properties described in ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedules. 2. The appellant is the daughter of the first respondent and the respondents 2 to 4 are the sister and brothers of the appellant. According to the appellant, her father Kodandaraman Pillai died intestate in 1966 at Madras, leaving behind the parties herein as his legal representatives and some properties. He did a lorry transport business and was earning a lot of money and an Insurance Policy for Rs.20,000 was taken by him, wherein the appellant and the second respondent were the nominees. 3. It is the case of the appellant that with the funds realised from the Insurance Policy, the ‘A’ schedule property was purchased and with the rent received from ‘A’ Schedule property, the ‘B’ Schedule property was purchased. Therefore according to the appellant, they must be treated as her father’s estate and she is entitled to a share. 4. The first respondent, who is the mother, denied the averments in the plaint and submitted that the lorry transport business was started in 1965 and since Kadhandaraman Pillai died soon after, there was no question of earning a lot of money from the said business. As regards the Insurance Policy, the first defendant has stated that this amount is not available, since it has been spent for the maintenance and education of the children. 5. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Against that the appeal has been filed. The question is whether the appellant is entitled to any share in the properties. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently argued that when the plaintiff had stated that the suit properties had been purchased from the policy amount, it is the duty of the respondent to demonstrate that the suit property was purchased with other funds. When the first respondent has been unable to do so, the presumption is that the source for consideration is the L.I.C. policy amount and therefore the appellant should be given a share. 7. When the first respondent has been unable to do so, the presumption is that the source for consideration is the L.I.C. policy amount and therefore the appellant should be given a share. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand would submit that the plaintiff seeking partition should first show what are the properties that form the estate of the deceased and referring them as “some property” will not really establish the plaintiff’s case. The mother had independent funds of her own and therefore there is no presumption that the suit properties were only purchased from the policy amount. 8. The learned counsel also submitted that even assuming that in the L.I.C. policy, the appellant and her sister the second respondent were showed as nominees. All that it means is they can represent the heirs of the deceased and realise the amount; but they are not exclusively entitled to the sum. Therefore at best, the appellant would be entitled to 1/5th share in the policy amount. When the appellant is not able to prove her case, she is not entitled to any relief and therefore the suit was rightly dismissed. Reliance was placed on Sitaji and others v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary and others, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 601 and Gogula Gurumurthy and others v. Kurimeti Ayyappa, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 702 to show that any property purchased by a Hindu widow out of the income generated from her husband’s estate cannot be presumed to be part of the estate of the deceased, in which the co-parcener can claim a share. Unless the co-parcener or the persons claiming the share are able to prove that this was treated to be a accretion to the estate, this property would be the Hindu window’s sole property. 9. The plaint states that after the death of father Kodhandaraman Pillai, the first defendant somehow or other realised the Insurance money and purchased the ‘A’ shcedule property and the ‘B’ Schedule property was purchased with the rental earnings of the ‘A’ schedule property. There is no documentary evidence to support this case. According to the appellant, this information was given to her by her paternal grand mother. There is nothing to show that ‘B’ schedule property was purchased from the rental income generated from the ‘A’ schedule property. There is no documentary evidence to support this case. According to the appellant, this information was given to her by her paternal grand mother. There is nothing to show that ‘B’ schedule property was purchased from the rental income generated from the ‘A’ schedule property. The appellant could have furnished acceptable evidence to show that the ‘B’ schedule property was only purchased out of the ‘A’ schedule property income. In the absence of satisfactory pleadings and acceptable proof, it is not possible to grant a decree in favour of the appellant in respect of the ‘B’ schedule property. 10. As regards ‘A’ schedule property, much reliance was placed on the fact that the recitals of Ex.B-2 would show the schedule of payment of consideration, wherein it is seen that Rs.19,100 was paid before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration of the deed. This document has been registered on 7.10.1968. The father of the appellant Kodhandaraman Pillai died in 1966. The evidence is that he left behind five young children and the young widow. The evidence of DW1 is that the Insurance Policy was received six months after the death of her father. The appellant would have us believe that the policy amount was retained by the young woman, who had to take care of five children for more than a year, anticipating that she would purchase a property in 1968. The appellant herself admits that her mother had carried on the lorry shed business. She also admits that in 1975, her mother was earnuing a lot. 1975 11. It is true that the reference to her mother’s earning is from the year 1975. ‘A’ schedule property was purchased in 1968. But yet it establishes that after the death of the husband, the first respondent had been independently carrying on business, managing a lorry shed and taking care of the family, which had lost the father. The first respondent had also denied that she has utilised the Rs.19,000 realised from the L.I.C. Policy for purchasing the suit property. On the contrary, she has clearly stated that out of this amount, Rs.11,000 was paid to clear the debts left by her husband. Corroborating this evidence, D.W.2 has been examined, who has stated that he had lend Rs.11,000 and the first respondent cleared the debt, after she received the insurance money. On the contrary, she has clearly stated that out of this amount, Rs.11,000 was paid to clear the debts left by her husband. Corroborating this evidence, D.W.2 has been examined, who has stated that he had lend Rs.11,000 and the first respondent cleared the debt, after she received the insurance money. D.W.2 claims to know the family of the appellant and the first respondent for the past 27 years, since the first respondent used to be his tenant. Nothing has been elicited from this witness to show why his evidence regarding the loan must be disbelieved. Further the appellant’s father had died very young, leaving behind 5 children, ranging from a infant of about 45 days and to a daughter who is about 7 years old. Therefore, it was submitted that from the evidence of DW1 she had spent the amounts for maintaining her children, was quite believable. 12. It was submitted that the written statement is totally silent regarding the manner in which the policy amount was spent, this Court should not accept any evidence without pleadings to support it. But the plaint itself cannot be said to be complete with details regarding the allegations that the appellant seeks to make. So this Court is left with no option but to balance the evidence adduced on both sides and arrive at a conclusion as to which is more believable and plausible. The first respondent has established her case that the policy amount was not utilised to purchase the ‘B’ schedule property and there is no evidence to show that the rental income generated from the ‘A’ schedule property was utilised to purchase ‘B’ schedule property and therefore the appellant cannot claim any share in the suit immovable property. Even as regards the L.I.C. policy amount, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, the nominees are not exclusively entitled to the policy amount. They can only receive it on behalf of the other legal heirs. In Vishin N.Khanchandani and another v. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani and another, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2747, it has been held that a nominee specified in a National Savings certificate does not on the death of the holder become entitled to the sum due to the exclusion of other heirs. They can only receive it on behalf of the other legal heirs. In Vishin N.Khanchandani and another v. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani and another, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2747, it has been held that a nominee specified in a National Savings certificate does not on the death of the holder become entitled to the sum due to the exclusion of other heirs. In that the Supreme Court held that a nominee cannot be treated as an heir or a legatee and any amount payable on the death of the holder becomes the estate of the deceased and devolves upon all the heirs who are entitled to succeed under law. So the appellant has no exclusive right. Further the evidence of D.W.1 as also her pleadings that she used it for the family expenses, cannot but be believed. It must be remembered that when Kodhandaraman Pillai died, he left behind a very young family. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent are as follows: Sitaji v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 601. Index Note (d) Hindu Law - Widows -Accretions - Acquisition - (Evidence Act (1872), Secs.101-103) There is no presumption that any particular property in the widow’s hand is part of her husband’s estate because a widow can have properties of her own. The fact that the widow purchased them out of the savings made by her from the income of her husband’s estate does not necessarily make it an accretion because a Hindu widow has an absolute right to the income and is not bound to save any of it for the reversioners. She can, if she so chooses, if she wants, keep it separate and deal with it as her own. The question is one of intention but it is also one of fact and must be decided as such. Case law relied on. The burden is upon the reversioner to establish that such property formed part of the estate of the propositus because he can claim only property which belonged to the propositus. And Gogula Gurumurthy v. Kurimeti Ayyappa, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 702. Index Note ( C ) Hindu Law - Widow - Accretions to husband’s estate - Presumption. Case law relied on. The burden is upon the reversioner to establish that such property formed part of the estate of the propositus because he can claim only property which belonged to the propositus. And Gogula Gurumurthy v. Kurimeti Ayyappa, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 702. Index Note ( C ) Hindu Law - Widow - Accretions to husband’s estate - Presumption. Brief Note: ( c) The acquirer of property presumably intends to retain dominion over it and in the case of a Hindu widow the presumption is none the less so when the fund with which the property is acquired is one which though derived from her husband’s property, was at her absolute disposal. Held on facts that in the instant case it could not be held that the widow intended to treat the income from the husband’s estate as an accretion to his estate (1902) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 351, relied on." These two decisions also only help the respondents and support the trial Court’s judgment that the appellant is not entitled to any share in the suit property. 13. For all these reasons, I am not inclined to interfere with the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The appeal is dismissed. Since the parties are related to each other, no costs.