ORDER: Smt.Padmavathi Ammal Charitable Trust, represented by its Managing Trustee, filed a suit against the respondent (as 2nd defendant and two others) in O.S. No.1793 of 1988 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee, praying the Court to grant a decree, (a) declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the suit property and entitled to get patta in respect of the suit property set out in the schedule; (b) for a permanent injunction, restraining the 2nd defendant (petitioner herein) from trespassing into the suit property; (c) for a permanent injunction, restraining the 2nd defendant from alienating or otherwise encumbering with the property; (d) and for a permanent injunction, restraining the 3rd defendant, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Tiruvannamalai from granting patta to the 2nd defendant. 2. The defendant resisted the suit on various grounds. On a particular hearing date, that was on 20.3.1990, the suit was dismissed for default. The plaintiff filed a petition to restore the suit and the same was not objected to by the defendants, with the result, the suit was restored. Subsequently, on 9.9.1992, the suit was decreed ex parte. The above facts are admitted. 3. The respondent/ 2nd defendant filed I.A. No.1939 of 1997 in O.S. No.1793 of 1988, on the file of the District Munsif, Alandur under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, praying the Court to condone the delay of 1632 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree dated 9.9.1992 and pass such further necessary orders. In the affidavit filed in support of the said petition, the respondent has stated that the Advocate, who appeared in that suit, sent a letter to the respondent’s old address, and naturally, the same was not received and that in those circumstances, they were not aware of the petition filed by the plaintiff to restore the suit to file and the subsequent ex parte decree passed on 9.9.1992. It is further contended that only on 28.02.1997, when the respondent contacted the Advocate to get a copy of the dismissal order dated 20.3.1990 for reference in connection with another suit then pending on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, it came to know about the ex parte decree passed on 9.9.1992. It is further stated that had the respondent known about the application filed by the plaintiff to restore the suit to file, it would have definitely contested the suit. It is further stated that had the respondent known about the application filed by the plaintiff to restore the suit to file, it would have definitely contested the suit. It is also pleaded that the respondent has got a very good case on merits and that further, the District Munsif Court, Alandur has no jurisdiction to try the suit of this nature and that further the respondent would be put to irreparable loss and serious hardship, if the delay is not condoned. 4. The petitioner herein in its counter filed in the said I.A. denied the various allegations made by the respondent and further contended that it is clear from the affidavit that the respondent’s advocate sent a letter to the respondent’s old address and that it having received the letter, has come forward with a new case that No.110, Coral Merchant Street, Chennai-600 001 is the old address. It is also pointed out in the counter affidavit that the respondent has not given details as to the date of shifting and to the place where it has shifted its office. It is specifically pleaded that the respondent is fully aware of the ex parte decree even on 9.9.1992 and that it has not shown any interest in the suit, because even as on 29.7.1991 itself, the Assistant Settlement Officer passed orders, granting patta in favour of the petitioner herein and the claim of the respondent was rejected. The revision filed by the respondent to the Commissioner, Land Administration was also dismissed on 24.5.1993. The petitioner having now obtained patta in its name and also in possession, would be put to irreparable loss, if the petition is allowed. The counter affidavit also points out that the respondent having kept quiet all along cannot now come forward and plead that it was not aware of the ex parte decree, when really the true position was otherwise. A reference is also made about the respondent filing a writ petition in W.P. No.3298 of 1998, questioning the order passed by the Commissioner, Land Administration. There is yet another pleading to the effect that the respondent having lost the battle in the first round by filing this application, is opening the gateway for the second round of litigation. 5. A reference is also made about the respondent filing a writ petition in W.P. No.3298 of 1998, questioning the order passed by the Commissioner, Land Administration. There is yet another pleading to the effect that the respondent having lost the battle in the first round by filing this application, is opening the gateway for the second round of litigation. 5. The trial Court, after elaborately considering the facts and circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion that the whole mistake had happened only because of the respondent’s counsel. Or in other words, the trial Court held that absence of the respondent on 9.9.1992 before Court was because, its counsel did not inform about posting of the case on that date. 6. As to how an application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act has to be considered and dealt with, has been laid down by the Supreme Court in a number of Rulings. Suffice to mention a few Rulings and set out the guidelines and principles laid down therein. The Rulings are as under: (i) Shakuntala Devi v. Kuntal Kumari, (1969)1 S.C.R. 1006 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 575; (ii) Balakrishnan, N. v. M.Krishnamurthy, (1999)1 L.W. 739; (iii) M.K.Prasad v. P.Arumugam, (2001)6 S.C.C. 176 ; (iv) Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002)3 S.C.C. 195 ; (v) G.P.Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada, (2000)3 S.C.C. 54 . 7. The guidelines and principles laid down are as under: (a) “Sufficient cause” within the meaning of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. (b) Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. (c) Explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates. (d) Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. (e) Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally, the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. (e) Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally, the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. (f) There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. (g) The Court should strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way. (h) Courts should consider whether by allowing the application, the same would defeat the valuable right of the other party and examine whether the other party can be compensated in terms of money. (i) Courts should consider the inconvenience caused to the respondent for the delay on account of the appellant being absent from the Court and can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary cost. 8. Coming to the case on hand, at the outset, it should be borne in mind that the trial Court accepted the explanation put forward by the respondent and came to the conclusion that the respondent did not appear in Court on 9.9.1992 as it was not aware about that hearing date. The Court also held that only its counsel who has to be blamed solely. The trial Court, having exercised its judicial discretion, this Court shall not interfere unless exercise of the judicial discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. 9. A perusal of the plaint in O.S. No.1793 of 1988 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee would show that the subject matter of the property is of an extent of 4.32 acres. According to the plaintiff, the property was leased out by the first defendant in 1350 fasli itself and since then Padmavathi Ammal has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and that she was also granted patta as a trustee as she was doing charitable works by the Adheena Karthar of the 1st defendant in 1370 fasli itself and that the 1st defendant alone was entitled to get patta as he was entitled to both warams of the suit property. This claim of the plaintiff has been emphatically denied by the defendant and the defence set up is to the effect that an extent of 4.23 acres was purchased by one Devaraja Mudaliar in revenue sale held on 4.3.1938 and thereafter, he sold the same to one Ayyasamy Iyer under a sale deed dated 1.10.1938 and registered as document No.1487 of 1938 on the file of S.R.O. Saidapet. Subsequently, the said Ayyasamy Iyer sold the said land to Arunachalam Chettiar under a sale deed dated 14.6.1941, registered as Document No.967 of 1941 and Arunachalam Chettiar in turn entered into an agreement of sale with S.Rm.M.Ct.M. Firm on 27.12.1943 for sale of the aforesaid properties purchased by him under the aforesaid documents of sale dated 31.5.1941 and 14.6.1941 and the said agreement was followed up by a sale deed in favour M.Ct.Muthiah and M.Ct.Pethachi. Both these persons created the plaintiff- Trust in the name of S.Rm.M.Ct.M. Thirupani Trust and they also executed a deed of declaration of Trust on 24.2.1970 in respect of the schedule mentioned properties mentioned under a document registered as document No.1845 of 1970 on the file of S.R.O., Saidapet, declaring that the properties be the properties of the plaintiff- Trust. 10. Considering the pleadings, two things are evident viz., (i) the stake involved is considerable, though not very high; (ii) and it cannot be said that the defence set up is totally frivolous, and on the face of it, the same has to be thrown out. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also contended that as a prudent litigant, the respondent should have approached his lawyer from time to time to verify the various stages of proceedings. It, having not done that, is guilty of negligence. As far as this submission is concerned, it has to be remembered, once the Court accepts the explanation that the respondent’s counsel did not inform the Trust, or the letter sent by the counsel did not reach the respondent/ Trust, no serious accusation can be made against the respondent/ Trust. 12. The learned counsel would contend that the patta has already been issued to it and hence the petitioner would be put to irreparable loss and hardship. Again, this Court does not find any substance in this submission. This is because only if in the suit the respondent succeeds, the revenue will take up action according to law. 12. The learned counsel would contend that the patta has already been issued to it and hence the petitioner would be put to irreparable loss and hardship. Again, this Court does not find any substance in this submission. This is because only if in the suit the respondent succeeds, the revenue will take up action according to law. Merely because the ex parte decree in the suit is set aside, the said authority is not going to make any order varying the order already passed. 13. A contention has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner filed as many as 8 documents before the trial Court, but at the end of the order in the Interlocutory Application, the list of exhibits has not been given and the same would show that there was non application of mind on the part of the trial Court. According to the learned counsel, since there is non application of mind, exercise of discretion without application of mind cannot be said to be a proper exercise of judicial discretion. This Court on examination find that the trial Court in fact has referred to those documents. Of course, one aspect of the matter has not been considered while appreciating the case, that is to say, in a subsequent suit in O.S. No. 6110 of 1996 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, in the plaint, the respondent has given only the old address. When the trial Court has considered every other aspect of the matter, simply because one circumstance has not been taken note of and considered, the order passed in I.A. No.1939 of 1997 cannot be branded as arbitrary or perverse or wholly untenable. 14. It is necessary to point out that there is no pleading in the counter affidavit of the petitioner in the I.A., attributing mala fides on the part of the respondent herein or complaining of wilful negligence. Equally, it has to be noted that the trial Court has not given a finding of any mala fide or wilful negligence on the part of the petitioner. Thus, this Court having not found that the trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction on wholly untenable grounds or that the order is arbitrary or perverse, necessarily, it has to follow that the revision has to fail. Thus, this Court having not found that the trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction on wholly untenable grounds or that the order is arbitrary or perverse, necessarily, it has to follow that the revision has to fail. Finally, it has to be also noted that the lower Court allowed the application on terms i.e., the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.5,000 by way of costs to the petitioner herein, which the respondent herein has also complied with. 15. Consequently, the civil revision petition is dismissed. Connected C.M.P. will also stand dismissed.