JUDGMENT : B. Panigrahi, J. - This appeal is directed against the order dated 12.06.1995 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Koraput at Jeypore, in Sessions Case No. 17 of 1994. whereby the Appellant has been convicted u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC") for committing the murder of his brother Samaru Putia and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The skeletal picture of the prosecution story as presented in course of trial is as follows: The Appellant was the son of the. step-mother of the deceased Samaru Putia. There was some dispute between the Appellant and the deceased relating to possession of a Mahua tree eight days preceding the date of incident. On the fateful day, i.e. 24.03.1994, Samaru Putia started for Limaguda on a cycle before sunrise to effect a compromise with his brOrs. . After a little while, his wife Tulsa Putia (P.W.1) proceeded to a Nala. which was situated at a little distance from their house, to fetch water. The road leading to Limaguda was near to the Nala. While proceeding to the Nala. P.W.1 heard the scream of her husband uttering "Marigali". So she rushed in that direction and found the Appellant running away holding a bow and an axe. On reaching the spot, she found her husband lying on the road. An arrow had stuck to the left side of his body and her husband was holding that arrow. She further noticed bleeding injuries on the left thigh of her husband. Another arrow was also lying at the spot. Her husband was lying dead with multiple injuries. She went to village Limaguda and informed the occurrence to the villagers. A Panchayati was convened as regards the incident in which the Appellant was also present and he confessed to have killed the deceased. Thereafter, the matter was reported at the police-station by P.W.1 on the basis of which a case was registered and investigation was taken up. During investigation, the Appellant was taken to custody where he allegedly gave discovery of the fact of concealing the bow and the axe, which were seized. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was placed against the Appellant. 3. The defence plea was one of complete denial of the occurrence. The Appellant also pleaded his innocence and his false implication in the case out of previous enmity. 4. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was placed against the Appellant. 3. The defence plea was one of complete denial of the occurrence. The Appellant also pleaded his innocence and his false implication in the case out of previous enmity. 4. Altogether, nine witnesses were examined by the prosecution to bring home the charge to the Appellant. P.W.1 was the informant and the wife of the deceased. P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 were the co-villagers of the Appellant before whom the Appellant is said to have made an extra-judicial confession about killing the deceased. P.Ws. 5 and 6 were the police officials who escorted the dead body to the morgue. P.Ws. 7 and 8 were the investigating officers and P.W.9 was the doctor who conducted post mortem, examination over the dead body of Samaru. The trial Court, on a careful cogitation of the evidence on record, was inclined to pass an order of conviction against the Appellant, which has been challenged in this appeal. 5. The trial Court has mainly relied on the evidence of P.W.1, who was the widow of the* deceased. It has also believed the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the Appellant before the villagers, P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4. The following circumstances weighed with the trial Court to record the order of conviction: (i) The Appellant was seen running away from the place of occurrence with the weapon of offence by P.W.1. (ii) Extra-judicial confession made by the Appellant in the Panchayat. (iii) Statement of discovery of fact made by the Appellant sequel to which the weapons were recovered. (iv) Seizure of the weapons of offence, namely, bow, arrows and axe. (v) Seizure of blood-stained garments of the Appellant and the deceased. 6. There has been no dispute that the deceased met a homicidal death on account of injuries on his person. The evidence of P.W.9 clarifies that the deceased had received nine external injuries. On dissection he found that the scalp was cut. parietal bone of right side was fractured, thoracic wall was cut. pleura was cut and pleural cavity contained haemorrhagic fluid, middle lobe of left lung was cut, pericardium was cut pericardial cavity contained clotted blood, left ventricle of the heart was cut thigh muscles were cut and there was depressed fracture of left maxillary bone. parietal bone of right side was fractured, thoracic wall was cut. pleura was cut and pleural cavity contained haemorrhagic fluid, middle lobe of left lung was cut, pericardium was cut pericardial cavity contained clotted blood, left ventricle of the heart was cut thigh muscles were cut and there was depressed fracture of left maxillary bone. According to P.W.9 all these injuries were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. Death was due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from the injuries. At the time of post mortem examination, an arrow, which had been stuck to the deceased, was taken out and handed over to the constable who had accompanied the dead body. 7. Now, let us turn to the evidence of P.W. 1. She has stated that the Appellant and his brothers were staying in village limaguda whereas her husband was living in village Katugada. There was bitter enmity between her husband on one hand and the Appellant and his brothers on the other. Her father-in-law had divided all the properties during his life time. Eight days prior to the incident, a dispute had arisen with regard to possession of a Mahua tree. On the date of occurrence, her husband proceeded to Limaguda on a cycle before sunrise to have a compromise with his brothers. She also went to the nearby Nala to fetch water. The road was passing on the flank of the Nala. When she heard the outcry of her husband "Mari Gali" and rushed in that direction, she found the Appellant running away holding a bow and an axe. Her husband was lying on the road with an arrow sticking to the left side of his body and her husband was holding that arrow. She also noticed some injuries on the left side of his body. Another arrow was lying at the spot. In the Pancnayati subsequently held, the Appellant confessed to have killed her husband. During cross-examination, it has been brought out from her that she had not seen her husband while proceeding to the Nala to fetch water. She failed to say the distance of the Nala from her house, but she took less than half an hour to cover the distance. The Nala was near a bushy area. When she was about to bring water, she heard the outcry raised by her husband. She failed to say the distance of the Nala from her house, but she took less than half an hour to cover the distance. The Nala was near a bushy area. When she was about to bring water, she heard the outcry raised by her husband. So she left the earthen pot there and went to the spot by walk. She noticed that her husband was lying on the road with face upward. She was unable to say what distance she could notice the Appellant running away from the spot, but she could mark him from the back side of his appearance. While appreciating the evidence of P.W.1. we have refer to the spot map prepared by the I.O. indicating the place Of occurrence, in the sketch map the distance between the Nala and the house of the deceased has been noted as 200 yards. After her husband left for village Limaguda, it is reasonably expected that P.W.I must have gone to fetch water. While she was about to fill up the earthen pot with water, she heard the outcry of her husband. The distance between the place wherefrom P.W.1 was fetching water and the place of occurrence has been indicated as 1/3 km. It is doubtful that P.W.1 was able to hear the sound from such a distance. Even assuming that she had heard the outcry, by the time she reached the spot, the Appellant must have left the place. Normally, it is. not expected that the Appellant would remain steadfast at the scene of occurrence for a long time by giving a chance to others so see him committing the crime. While P.W.1 covered a distance of about 1/3 km., he must have covered more than that distance, or at least the same distance. Therefore, the chance of P.W.1 seeing the Appellant fleeing away from the spot with a bow and an axe appears to be next to impossible. 8. From the evidence of P.W.1 it appears that the dead body was lying on the road which leads to village Limaguda now turning to the evidence of P.W.2. we notice that he found the dead body tying at Mohulpada by the side of the road. P.W. 3 claims to have seen the dead body on the road. 8. From the evidence of P.W.1 it appears that the dead body was lying on the road which leads to village Limaguda now turning to the evidence of P.W.2. we notice that he found the dead body tying at Mohulpada by the side of the road. P.W. 3 claims to have seen the dead body on the road. From the seizure list, it appears that the dead body was lying at Mahulpada field on the way to Limaguda from Kadaguda. P.W.7 has also stated that by the time he visited the spot and held inquest over the dead body, he found that the same was lying at Mahulpada field. Accordingly, he has shown the place where the dead body was lying as 'B' in the sketch map which is undisputedly a bushy area. Thus, the statement of P.W.1 that she had seen the Appellant going away from the spot with a bow and an axe does not appear to be above suspicion. Therefore, her evidence has to be examined with close circumspection. It is true that if the evidence of P.W.1 is trustworthy, credible and confidence inspiring, the conviction of the Appellant is bound to be maintained. But, in view of the above improbabilities as to her seeing the Appellant running away remaining at a distance of about 1/3 km. from the spot is shrouded with mystery and does not appear to be above board. 9. Now, turning to the evidence of P.W.2, we notice that he after learning about the incident from P.W.1 proceeded to the spot and found the dead body of the deceased lying by the side of the road. In the evening, the villagers convened a meeting and sent for the Appellant, who appeared before them and made an extrajudicial confession by stating that he had killed Sarnaru Putia. On a close scrutiny of the evidence of this witness it is seen that he has not stated the exact words uttered by the accused while making the so-called extra-judicial confession. In cross-examination. P.W.2 has stated that P.W.1 had told that she had seen the Appellant killing her husband. But, P.W.1 has not stated in her evidence to have seen the Appellant assaulting her husband. According to P.W.2, the Panchayati was convened at about 8.00 p.m. in which 10-15 persons of village Limaguda were present, and the Appellant made a disclosure that he had killed the deceased. But, P.W.1 has not stated in her evidence to have seen the Appellant assaulting her husband. According to P.W.2, the Panchayati was convened at about 8.00 p.m. in which 10-15 persons of village Limaguda were present, and the Appellant made a disclosure that he had killed the deceased. In the said meeting, the Grama Rakhi was also present. Therefore, even assuming that such a confessional statement was made, but it shall not be admissible in evidence inasmuch as that was extracted in presence of the Grama Rakhi. Since the confessional statement does not appear to be voluntary, we are not inclined to place any reliance on the said statement. 10. A strong contention has been raised as regards the extern-judicial confession said to have been made by the Appellant before the villagers in a meeting convened in the village. It is found from the evidence of P.W.3 that the accused was subjected to threatening and coercion, as a consequence of which he was obliged to give out such confession. Therefore, such confession being not out of his own volition is bound to be spurned. In his regard, reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmi Jani Vs. State of Orissa, wherein it has been held: The evidence led by the prosecution itself would give an indication that the Appellant, an unsophisticated and illiterate lady, had been threatened whereafter she had allegedly made a confessional statement. The evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 5 was that when asked as to why she had left the meeting place, the Appellant told them that she apprehended assault and ill-treatment at the hands of the villagers as would be evident from the cross-examination of P.W.3 of which no due notice had been taken by the trial Court. If a few moments ago, the Appellant had taken a plea that her husband was missing, it is not understood as to how she would blurt out an extra-judicial confession voluntarily some time thereafter admitting her guilt. The materials would not warrant a conclusion that the Appellant had made a statement out of repentance or remorse. 11. Learned Counsel appearing for the State has advanced Anr. limb of contention that since the Appellant while in custody gave recovery of the weapon of offence, that being a strong circumstance against him, it should weigh heavily against him while determining his culpability. 11. Learned Counsel appearing for the State has advanced Anr. limb of contention that since the Appellant while in custody gave recovery of the weapon of offence, that being a strong circumstance against him, it should weigh heavily against him while determining his culpability. While examining this contention, we are taken through the aforesaid decision, where the same point was also discussed, It has been observed that if all other links in the chain of events are missing, then the only circumstance of recovery of the weapon of offence, which was discovered as a result of the statement made by the accused would not necessarily lead to the conclusion of commission of the offence by him. It was highlighted by the learned Counsel for the State that since the iron portion of an arrow was recovered from the possession of the Appellant and it did contain human blood of B origin, which tallied with the blood group of the deceased, necessary inference must be drawn regarding the involvement of the accused Appellant. We notice, some disquieting features appearing in this case. From the evidence of P.W.7 the I.O. it has been established that he had seized one complete arrow and half broken arrow (bamboo portion) under the seizure list. Ext. 3. Another arrow stuck to the chest of the deceased was seized on production by P.W.6 under the seizure list. Ext. 11. From the evidence of P.W.7. it has further transpired that he had seized the iron portion of the broken arrow on the bank of the river flowing near the scene of occurrence It is quite unnatural to expect that the Appellant would keep concealed an arrow by providing chance to Ors. to recover the same. Be it noted here that all the arrows including the one which was stuck to the chest of the deceased were sent to the Chemical Analyst and Serologist. but it is quite amazing to notice that there was no sign of blood on the arrow which was allegedly stuck to the chest of the deceased, whereas an iron portion which is said to have been extracted from the thigh of the deceased contained human blood of 'B' origin. There has been no evidence placed before us that immediately after the incident, the weapon of offence had been separately seized and sent to the Serologist for his opinion. There has been no evidence placed before us that immediately after the incident, the weapon of offence had been separately seized and sent to the Serologist for his opinion. If all the materials were sent in one packet, there was every likelihood that the blood appearing on the clothes of the deceased must have come in contract with the other incriminating materials and, therefore, the report cannot be conclusively lead to the conclusion that such weapon was used in the crime. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the decision in Lakshmi Jam (supra), wherein it has been held: Another highly suspicious feature cannot be lost sight of. The occurrence had taken place, as alleged on or about the 26th December. 1980. The seizures of MOs. I & II and mud with suspected stains of blood had been effected on the 31st December. 1980 as per Ext. S and 9. There was no evidence that these articles had been kept separately in sealed packets in the presence of the witnesses to the seizures. It would be seen from the forwarding letter (Ext. 11) of the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate Jeypore that these articles with other articles had been sent for chemical examination in a sealed packet more than two-and-a-half months after the seizures on the 16th March, 1981. As observed and held by this Court in Nimai Murmu v. State, seized articles containing suspected stains of blood should invariably be sent for chemical examination immediately after their seizures. It is necessary and desirable that the police officer recovering articles with suspected stains of blood should immediately take steps to seal them and evidence should be produced that the seals were not tampered with till the articles were sent to the Chemical Examiner for analysis. If such precautions are not taken, the Court may not place the same reliance on the discovery of blood-stains on the seized articles as it would have done if necessary precautions had been taken. 12. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the opinion that there has been no unflinching evidence established by the prosecution so as to implicate the Appellant with the heinous offence of murder. On a broad conspectus of the evidence on record, we are not inclined to agree, with the observation and finding of the learned Sessions Judge. 12. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the opinion that there has been no unflinching evidence established by the prosecution so as to implicate the Appellant with the heinous offence of murder. On a broad conspectus of the evidence on record, we are not inclined to agree, with the observation and finding of the learned Sessions Judge. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against him. He be released from jail custody and set at liberty forthwith, if his presence in jail is not required in connection with any other case. P.K. Misra, J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Allowed