JUDGMENT - A.S. AGUIAR, J.:---By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner detenu has impugned the order dated 31st December, 2001 passed by the first respondent Mr. M.N. Singh, Commissioner of Police for Greater Mumbai, Mumbai detaining him under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "M.P.D.A. Act"). The detention order along with grounds of the detention dated 31st December, 2001 was served on the petitioner detenu on 31st December, 2001 itself and true copies thereof are annexed as Exh. 'A', 'B' and 'C' to the petition. 2. A perusal of the grounds of detention discloses that the impugned order is founded on one C.R., namely, C.R. No. 30/2001 registered by Versova Police Station for offences under sections 392, 394, 452 and 34 of Indian Penal Code ("I.P.C." for short), (subsequently, sections 397 and 411 of I.P.C. were also added) on the basis of the complaint lodged at the Versova Police Station, Mumbai by one Smt. Valancia D'Souza and also on the basis of in-camera statements of two witnesses, namely, 'A' and 'B' both recorded on 23rd November, 2001. 3. Though petitioners has raised several grounds, he only presses Ground No. 5 (vi), which in short, is that though the Detaining Authority has shown awareness of the fact that the petitioner detenu was in judicial custody at the time of making detention, the Detaining Authority has failed to bring on record any cogent material nor furnished any cogent ground in support of its contention that the petitioner, if released on bail is likely to revert to similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That there are no compelling reasons justifying such detention since the petitioner was already in detention and in absence of cogent material before the Detaining Authority to arrive at such conclusion that the petitioner would avail of bail and revert to similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is contended that the Detaining Authority has not applied its mind while issuing detention order against the petitioner. It is contended that the Detaining Authority has not applied its mind while issuing detention order against the petitioner. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has pointed out that the Detaining Authority/respondent No. 1 the Commissioner of Police in his affidavit in paragraph 15 has admitted that when he issued the detention order he was aware that the detenu was in judicial custody, as the same was brought to his notice by the Sponsoring Authority and further that the co-accused of the detenu viz. Varun Virendra Vyas and Shakil Ahmed Isarar Ansari were granted bail by the Sessions Court and that they had availed of bail. It is contended that the role of the co-accused Varun Virendra Vyas and Shakil Ahmed Isarar Ansari was more serious than that of the detenu since both the co-accused had at the point of deadly weapon forced the complainant to open the safe of the cupboard and that the said associates thereafter committed robbery of gold ornaments and cash of Rs. 80,000/- while the role of the detenu was only to keep watch on Rajeshri (friend of the complainant) and Meena (main servant of the complainant). He is alleged to have robbed the gold ring, earrings, wrist watch, cash of Rs. 230/- and mobile phone from the said witnesses. Necessary documents i.e. the bail orders were not submitted to the detenu and, therefore, the detenu was prejudiced in making effective representation and further that the said documents not having been furnished to the detenu the order of detention has been passed on extraneous material and therefore vitiated. 4. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in (Rajesh Bishamkumar Khanna @ Sagar v. Commissioner of Police)1, 2002(Cri. Supp.) Bom.C.R. 450, wherein, Division Bench of this Court has explained the expression "cogent material" as used in (Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1198 : 1990 Criminal Law Journal 1232 to mean that there should be tangible material or plausible material with the Detaining Authority to believe that a person in custody is likely to be released on bail in near future. The Supreme Court in the said case of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India (supra) has laid down the prerequisites which have to be satisfied before the detention order is issued against a person in custody. The Supreme Court in the said case of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India (supra) has laid down the prerequisites which have to be satisfied before the detention order is issued against a person in custody. It was observed as under: "The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there was compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reason" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implied that there must be cogent material before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities." It is contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the observations of the Commissioner/respondent No. 1 that the belief of the Detaining Authority that there was cogent material to show that the detenu was likely to be released on bail in the said C.R. No. 30/2001 is misconceived as, in fact, no such material placed before the detenu to enable him to make effective representation. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner placed reliance on the affidavit of the Commissioner/respondent No. 1, at page 28, wherein, he has stated that though the detenu was in custody, since the co-accused in C.R. No. 30/2001 were already granted bail and had availed bail before issuing the order of detention, the possibility of the detenu being released on bail could not be ruled out. It is stated that this is the cogent material on the basis of which the Detaining Authority concluded that if the detenu prefers an application for bail he would be granted bail under the normal law of the land either on the ground of parity or on merits or on any other grounds. It is stated that this is the cogent material on the basis of which the Detaining Authority concluded that if the detenu prefers an application for bail he would be granted bail under the normal law of the land either on the ground of parity or on merits or on any other grounds. Emphasis has been placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on the word "this" indicating that the Detaining Authority has considered the bail granted in favour of the co-detenu as the cogent material forming the basis for the Detaining Authority to have acquired the belief that the detenu, if he applied for bail, would also get bail and that since copies of the bail orders of the co-detenus have not been placed before the detenu, the Detaining Authority/respondent No. 1 has passed the order of detention on extraneous material and the said order is, therefore, vitiated. 6. To repel the petitioner's aforesaid contention the learned A.P.P. has placed reliance on the case of (Kamarunnisa v. Union of India)3, 1991(1) Bom.C.R. 410 : 1991 S.C.C.(Cri.) 88, wherein, the Supreme Court on the facts of the case held that the detenu would be entitled to any document which has been taken into consideration while formulating the ground of detention but mere mention of the fact that certain searches were carried out in the course of investigation, which have no relevance to the detention of the detenu, cannot cast an obligation on the Detaining Authority to supply copies of that document. The Supreme Court in the said case referred with approval to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case in (Gurdip Singh v. Union of India)4, 1989 Cri.L.J. (NOC) 41, wherein, it has been observed as under: "........that all the document relied upon for the purpose of ordering detention ought to be supplied pari passu with the ground of detention to the detenu and documents not relied upon but casually referred to for the purpose of narration of facts were also to be supplied to the detenu if demanded. Where documents of the latter category are supplied after the meeting of the Advisory Board is over it was held that that would seriously impair the detenu's right to make an effective and purposeful representation which would vitiate the detention. Where documents of the latter category are supplied after the meeting of the Advisory Board is over it was held that that would seriously impair the detenu's right to make an effective and purposeful representation which would vitiate the detention. Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, submitted that in the present case also since the search authorisations were supplied after the meeting of the Advisory Board, the detention orders stood vitiated. But in order to succeed it must be shown that the search authorisations had a bearing on the detention orders. If, merely an incidental reference is made to some part of the investigation concerning a co-accused in the grounds of detention which has no relevance to the case set up against the detenus it is difficult to understand how the detenus could contend that they were denied the right to make an effective representation. It is not sufficient to say that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time on demand but it must further be shown that the non-supply has impaired the detenu's right to make an effective and purposeful representation. Demand of any or every document, however irrelevant it may be for the concerned detenu, merely on the ground that there is a reference thereto in the grounds of detention, cannot vitiate an otherwise legal detention order. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf but what is essential is that the detenu must show that the failure to supply the documents before the meeting of the Advisory Board had impaired or prejudiced his right, however slight or insignificant it may be." The reference to the above case though not strictly relevant or material to the determination of the issue at hand, would go to show that where in the grounds the Detaining Authority has referred to some material essential for forming its opinion and has also referred to some other material which may or may not have been considered by the Detaining Authority, the non-supply of documents pertaining to that other material would not necessarily vitiate the order of detention if otherwise, there is cogent material for arriving at its satisfaction. 7. 7. From the affidavit of the Commissioner itself it is seen that reliance has been placed not only on the bail orders granted in respect of the accused in C.R. No. 30/2001 but also to the fact that the offences under sections 392, 397, 452, 114, read with sections 34, 397 and 411, though non-bailable, bail may be granted in the normal course under the normal law. The affidavit of the commissioner shows that it is not just the fact of bail having been granted to the co-accused of the detenu but also awareness of the fact that bail would in normal course be available to the detenu, not just on the basis of parity but also on merits of the case of the detenu (de hors the grant of bail to the co-accused of the detenu) that he arrived at the satisfaction. Therefore, there was independent cogent material for the Detaining Authority to believe that the detenu would be granted bail if applied. Thus the affidavit of the Commissioner discloses that there was sufficient material to pass the detention order. In our view, considering the normal law on the land and the role of the detenu in the incident pertaining to the said C.R. which is on a better footing than that of the co-accused, it is rightly concluded that there was cogent material for the Detaining Authority believing that in the event of the detenu preferring a bail application in the said C.R. No. 30/2001, he was likely to be released on bail. 8. In our view, all the prerequisites which have to be satisfied in law before the detention order is issued against the person in custody have been satisfied. According to Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India (supra) the said prerequisite are: (i) Detaining Authority should show its awareness in the grounds of detention that the person sought to be preventively detained was in custody and (ii) that there were compelling reasons for his detention. The expression "compelling reasons" has two facets, namely, there should be cogent material that the detenu was likely to be released from custody in near future and that in the event of his being released from custody he was likely to revert to prejudicial activities similar to those contained in the grounds of detention and hence it was imperative to preventively detain him. 9. 9. We have perused the affidavit of the Detaining Authority and find that the prerequisites have been satisfied in the instant case. Perusal of paragraph (6) of the ground of detention would show that the Detaining Authority has shown its awareness that detenu was in custody in C.R. No. 30/2001. It would also show that despite that the Detaining Authority felt that there were compelling reasons for detaining him. The two facets of compelling reasons, referred to above, are clearly seen in the instant case. As stated above, there was cogent material for the Detaining Authority to conclude that in the event of the detenu preferring bail application in C.R. No. 30/2001 he was likely to be released on bail in the near future. The inference of the Detaining Authority that in the event of the detenu being released from custody he was likely to revert to committing prejudicial activities similar to those mentioned in the grounds of detention is also well-founded because in the grounds of detention itself the Detaining Authority has referred to C.R. No. 30/2001 and in-camera statement of two witnesses, namely, 'A' and 'B', wherein, the detenu's involvement is reflected. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in Ground No. 5 (vi). In the result, we dismiss the writ petition. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed. -----