JUDGMENT: The wife filed the suit for recovery of the amounts due to her under the head of marital expenses, maintenance etc., it was dismissed by the trial Court below. The appellant relied on an agreement between the parties to prove her case wherein the respondent had agreed to provide for her security since he was normally resident in Burma. Soon after the execution of the above agreement which is Ex.A-2, dated 8.3.1974, the respondent had divorced her by pronouncing triple talaq and the document in evidence of this is Ex.B-1. The appellant admits that she is now remarried. Her claim for maintenance is restricted to the period during which she was married, since the respondent had left her behind her mother’s house and without taking care of her. The Trial Court held that Ex.A-2 was a concocted document and that the wife was not entitled to any maintenance beyond the iddat period and that even this claim was time barred. The judgment was delivered on 27.3.1982 and before delivering the judgement, an additional issue was framed on that date regarding limitation and finally the suit was also dismissed. 2. Mr.S.K.Raghunathan, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that this question of limitation was never put in issue during the course of trial and the trial Court took the appellant by surprise by framing that issue on the date of pronouncement of judgment and had also held against her on this question. According to the learned counsel, since there were no materials to show that the respondent was normally resident in India, the appellant was entitled to take advantage of Sec.15(5) of the Limitation Act which permits the exclusion of the time during which the defendant has been absent from India while computing the period of limitation for any suit. The judgment reported in Rajamani v. Meenakshisundaram, (1999)3 M.L.J. 327 : (1999)3 C.T.C. 309 and Muthukkanni Mudaliar v. Andappa Pillai, (1954)2 M.L.J. 731 Full Bench were relied on. 3. The learned counsel also pointed out that the Court below erred in accepting the case of the respondent that he had left India for Burma on 2.3.1974 when his own document Ex.B-1 purported to have been sent from Madras to the Pallivasal at Koothanallur intimating the factum of talaq is dated 14.3.1974. Therefore the respondent could not have left the Indian shores on 2.3.1974. Therefore the respondent could not have left the Indian shores on 2.3.1974. The learned counsel also submitted that it was not correct to have rejected Ex.A-2 by comparing the signatures of the respondent in Ex.A-2 with post suit signatures. The appellant had examined P.W.3 Mohamed Yasim, who had stated that his brother is one Abdul Rahim Ravoother, S/o.Mohammed Meeran Sahib who had signed Ex.A-2 as a witness but is now dead. Though he (P.W.3) had not attested Ex.A-2 he was present on that occasion. The execution was in the house of the respondent; he saw the respondent signing Ex.A-2 and he saw his brother attest Ex.A-2. He had also stated that Ex.A-2 was executed sometime in 1974. The brother-in-law of this witness has also attested Ex.A-2 and the evidence is that he is in Dubai and the witness is familiar with his signature. 4. The learned counsel would submit that from the above, it could be seen that the appellant had done everything within her power to prove the genuineness of Ex.A-2 and the same was wrongly rejected by the trial Court. The learned counsel also relied on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001)7 S.C.C. 740 , where the five Judges Bench had considered the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. According to the learned Counsel, this decision would clinch the issue. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the respondent is dead and his legal representatives have been brought on record. Even assuming without admitting the respondent is liable to pay maintenance, the liability to pay the maintenance alone will devolve on the legal representatives. The other amounts alleged to be due from the respondent, being the marriage expenses are personal in nature and liability to repay the amount got extinguished with the death of the respondent and the legal representatives cannot be mulcted with the liability to pay the sum. 6. The learned counsel also submitted that unless there was evidence to show that the respondent was not prepared to take care of the appellant, the appellant cannot claim maintenance for the period during which she has been married to the respondent. The marriage took place on 5.12.1971 and the divorce was pronounced on 14.3.1974 and the maintenance is claimed for this period viz., 5.12.1971 to 14.3.1974. The marriage took place on 5.12.1971 and the divorce was pronounced on 14.3.1974 and the maintenance is claimed for this period viz., 5.12.1971 to 14.3.1974. When there is no evidence to show that the respondent had refused to maintain her, this amount is also not claimable. As regards the marriage expenses of Rs.10,000, the learned counsel pointed out to the oral evidence of D.W.1, the respondent wherein he had stated that he had spent Rs.5,000 for the wedding and he had also incurred Valima expenses. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to claim any amounts under the head of marriage expenses, when the respondent had shared the same. As regards Ex.A-2, the counsel would submit that this is a concocted document and no reliance can be placed on the same. So there was no merit in the appeal. 7.Limitation: As regards the payment of arrears of maintenance, the Trial Court while dealing with this issue held that even though the Art.105 is restricted to Hindus alone, the fact remains that Ex.A-2 assuming it is a genuine document, is dated 8.3.1977 and the suit was filed on 23.4.1977, and Arts.68 and 69 of the Limitation Act would apply and since the suit should be laid within three years from the date when the right accrued this suit is time barred. Even if the date of talaq 14.3.1977 is reckoned as starting point the suit is out of time. According to the learned Judge, the notice Ex.A-3 cannot be relied on to extend the period of limitation, because neither the returned notice nor the acknowledgment has been filed and therefore without proof of acknowledgment of liability, the suit is barred by limitation. It was also observed that since limitation is a point of law, the plaintiff cannot agitate that she was not given any opportunity to adduce evidence. This observation may not be correct in view of Sec.15(5) of the Limitation Act. If the appellant had known that this would be put against her, she might have called upon the respondent to produce his passport to show the period during which he was absent from India. But even this question becomes academic in view of the judgment in Danial Latifi’s case, (2001)7 S.C.C. 740 . If the appellant had known that this would be put against her, she might have called upon the respondent to produce his passport to show the period during which he was absent from India. But even this question becomes academic in view of the judgment in Danial Latifi’s case, (2001)7 S.C.C. 740 . The relevant extract is: "While upholding the validity of the Act, we may sum up our conclusions: (1) A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Sec.3(1)(a) of the Act. (2) Liability of a Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Sec.3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to the iddat period. (3) A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after the iddat period can proceed as provided under Sec.4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim law from such divorced woman including her children and parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance. (4) The provisions of the Act do not offend Arts.14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India". Therefore the Muslim husband is liable to make a reasonable and fair provision within the iddat period and the provision which includes maintenance is for the period beyond the iddat period too. The Court below erred in holding Arts.68 and 69 of Limitation Act applies, on the contrary since no specific provision is made, it is correct to apply Art.113. And a suit will have to be filed within three years from the date when the right to sue accrued. According to the Supreme Court’s ruling referred to above, the cause of action with regard to the claim for maintenance etc. would arise only when the husband fails to make the payment within the iddat period. The divorce was on 14.3.1974, the iddat period for ninety days thereafter which would come to an end on 13.6.1974. According to the Supreme Court’s ruling referred to above, the cause of action with regard to the claim for maintenance etc. would arise only when the husband fails to make the payment within the iddat period. The divorce was on 14.3.1974, the iddat period for ninety days thereafter which would come to an end on 13.6.1974. Therefore the suit filed on 23.4.1977 is well in time. 8.The liability to pay maintenance: The claim for maintenance is for the period during which they were married. According to P.W.1, the parties lived together only for thirty days in all. According to her, when he married it was on the assurance that he would stay in India but twenty days after the marriage, he had gone to Mecca. After his return, he stayed only for ten days. She was all the time in her mother’s house and he promised to take her but he never did. Instead he issued the talaq letter. P.W.2, the mother also supports this case and nothing has been elicited to the contrary. D.W.1 himself has admitted that they were together for about thirty days, and that he had gone to Mecca after the wedding and he has also stated that after his return, he stayed for fifteen days and went away. Therefore, it is clear that though they were married for three years, they did not lived together for most part of the time and the wife was all the time staying with her mother’s house. Therefore she is entitled to maintenance and the claim is made at the rate of Rs.200 per month and this the amount the respondent is bound to pay. 9.Validity of Ex.A-2: As regards, Ex.A-2, much is made of the fact that there is a correction in the date, a perusal of the original shows that the correction is not put an interpolation. Not only has the date been corrected but the words have been corrected too. As already stated, the witnesses who were present at the time of execution have been examined. It has to be seen whether the denial of Ex.A-2 by the respondent is acceptable. D.W.1’s evidence clearly shows that the witness is capable of prevarication. In chief examination, he has stated that This is clearly not true in view of Ex.B-1 which is the talaq letter and it is dated 14.3.1974. It has to be seen whether the denial of Ex.A-2 by the respondent is acceptable. D.W.1’s evidence clearly shows that the witness is capable of prevarication. In chief examination, he has stated that This is clearly not true in view of Ex.B-1 which is the talaq letter and it is dated 14.3.1974. In cross-examination also he reiterates that he left on 2.3.1974. The plaint as originally filed did not mention Ex.A-2, it was subsequently amended. A reply statement was filed referring to Ex.A-2. The respondent had appointed a power of attorney to conduct the case on his behalf. An additional written statement was filed by the power of attorney denying Ex.A-2. The evidence of P.W.1 is that he is not aware of the reply statement and he did not file any additional statement. It is clear therefore that the denial in the additional statement has been made by the power of attorney without even verifying from the respondent whether or not he executed Ex.A-2. Curiously, this witness has also stated that 10. It is therefore very clear that the respondent in his anxiety to resist the suit claim, has chosen to make irresponsible statements referring to thirty days in the month of February. If the signature of the respondent in Ex.A-2 was denied, the Court below ought to have compared it with admitted signatures, or enlisted the aid of an expert if necessary. Comparing it with post suit signatures will be of no use. The oral evidence of P.W.3, supports the case regarding Ex.A-2 and the prevaricating statements of D.W.1 himself do not help him. It is no doubt true that in the plaint that was originally filed no mention was made but the reply statement has stated clearly about the circumstances under which Ex.A-2 was executed and the appellant has taken all efforts to establish that it was executed by the respondent himself. Therefore Ex.A-2 has been proved to be valid. 11.Quantum: Though the suit was filed for recovery of value of jewels and vessels at Rs.25,000 marital expenses paid at Rs.10,000, cash paid at the time of marriage for Rs.7,000 and maintenance at the rate of Rs.5,400, there is no satisfactory evidence to show that the appellant is entitled to recover the value of jewels and vessels. Even as regards the marital expenses, the appellant claims to have spent Rs.10,000 for marital expenses. Even as regards the marital expenses, the appellant claims to have spent Rs.10,000 for marital expenses. In this regard, the evidence of D.W.1 is that he had spent Rs.5,000, there is nothing in the cross examination to show that this statement is wrong. Therefore as regards marital expenses, the appellant will only be entitled to a sum of Rs.5,000. As regards the cash of Rs.7,000 paid at the time of marriage, this is spoken to in Ex.A-2 which has already been found to be a genuine document and therefore the appellant will be entitled to Rs.7,000 (as per Ex.A-2) plus Rs.5,000 (half share in marriage expenses) plus a sum of Rs.5,400 being the maintenance at the rate of Rs.200 from 5.12.1971 to 14.3.1974 aggregating to Rs.17,400. Though the appeal has been filed for Rs.20,000, the appellant shall be entitled only to the aforesaid sum which is Rs.17,400 together with interest from this date till the date of realisation. 12. The appeal is partly allowed. No costs.