Judgment : 1. Thedefendants 1 and 2 who suffered decree, have filed this Second appeal. 2. The suit properties, namely, plaint 'A' schedule properties, originally belonged to one Perumal Kunjirayumman. He died and his entire rights devolved on his 3 sons, namely, defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, he is entitled to one third share in the 'A' schedule property. Item No.1 in 'A' schedule properties was the subject matter of a prior mortgage with the 1st defendant. Subsequently, the same was renewed under the mortgage deed dated 29.1.1951 marked as Ex.A1. Even item No.2 which is also described as 'B' schedule property, was the subject matter of prior mortgage in favour of a stranger. The said mortgage was executed by Perumal Kunjirayumman and his brother Chidambaranathan on 29.10.1912. Under Ex.A1, it is stated that that mortgage has to be redeemed from the prior mortgagee, as the mortgagee subsequently assigned his entire mortgage right in respect of plaint 'B' schedule property in favour of one Sevithiyan Nadar, son of Anthony. The said Sevithiyan Nadar again assigned his mortgaged right in favour of the 2nd defendant in the suit. The 2nd defendant released one half of the mortgaged right which he got under the mortgage, as stated above, in favour of one Devasahayam Nadar on 9.6.1971, marked as Ex.A6. So the 2nd defendant has got subsisting mortgage right only in respect of the right in plaint 'B' schedule property, i.e., in item No.2 of 'A' schedule property. The 2nd defendant is none other than the husband of the 1st defendant. Item No.3 of 'A' schedule property was also mortgaged under Ex.A1 in favour of 1st defendant. 3. From the above it is clear that the 1st defendant is in possession of the 'A' schedule property, namely, item Nos.1 and 3 on the basis of Ex.A1, and defendants 1 and 2 are in possession of item No.2 of 'A' schedule property, under the mortgage deed dated 29.1.51. Since the plaintiff is entitled to redeem ?3 share of the suit properties, he filed the suit. He also claimed that he is an agriculturist and also a debtor as defined under Act 4 of 1938 and Act 40 of 1979. On that basis the plaintiff claimed that he is entitled to redeem possession without payment of any mortgage amount. 4. The defendants 1 and 2 filed written statement. He also claimed that he is an agriculturist and also a debtor as defined under Act 4 of 1938 and Act 40 of 1979. On that basis the plaintiff claimed that he is entitled to redeem possession without payment of any mortgage amount. 4. The defendants 1 and 2 filed written statement. According to the 1st defendant she has taken possession of item No.1 of 'A' schedule properties. According to the 1st defendant, she did not take any mortgage deed dated 29.1.1951. The mortgage was brought into existence behind her back. According to her, no possession or right was passed under the said mortgage to the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant claims that she got possession of item No.1 of 'A' schedule property and other properties under mortgage deed dated 5.10.1118, i.e., marked as Ex.A2, and so the said mortgage got time barred, and the 1st defendant got title in the said property. The mortgage right with respect to 'B' schedule property had devolved on the 2nd defendant by subsequent devolution and the said mortgage has become time barred and thereby the 2nd defendant got absolute title due to the same. The 1st defendant claims that she is not in possession over 'B' schedule property. Ultimately it was stated that the suit is barred by limitation, as there was no acknowledgment in the documents of the years 1118 and 1121, and in the release deed dated 9.6.1971. The recitals in those documents do not constitute the acknowledgment. It is stated that since the plaintiff has no right to recover the property, the question of application of Act 14 of 1938 and Act 40 of 1979 does not arise for consideration. On the basis of the above pleadings defendants 1 and 2 prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. The trial court passed a preliminary decree as prayed for. The defendants 1 and 2 filed Appeal in A.S.No.26 of 1990 on the file of Sub-Court, Kuzhithurai. Learned Sub-Judge also confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Hence this Second Appeal. 6. Thesubstantial questions of law that were framed in this Second Appeal are:- 1)Whether the lower appellate court is correct in holding that the suit for redemption filed by the plaintiff is barred by time? Learned Sub-Judge also confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Hence this Second Appeal. 6. Thesubstantial questions of law that were framed in this Second Appeal are:- 1)Whether the lower appellate court is correct in holding that the suit for redemption filed by the plaintiff is barred by time? 2)Whether the lower appellate court is not correct in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the suit property in view of Act IV of 1938and Act 40 of 1979? 8 Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the defendants have not taken possession of the suit properties on the basis of Ex.A1, but they have been in possession only under Ex.A2, dated 5.10.1118 M.E.,and so on the basis of Ex.A1, the plaintiff cannot redeem the mortgage and take possession from the defendants. On the other hand, it is the case of the plaintiff that Ex.A1 is the renewal of Ex.A2, and since Ex.A2 has been renewed under Ex.A1, the question of redeeming the mortgage under Ex.A2 would not arise and so the suit to redeem the mortgage under Ex.A1 is sustainable in law. 7. Both the courts below concurrently found that Ex.A1 is renewal of Ex.A2 and so the suit on the basis of Ex.A1 to redeem the mortgage is sustainable. Exs.A1 and A7 were executed and registered on the same date, and the scribe was also one and the same person, and the attestors also the same persons. In another suit in O.S.No.20 of 198l,the plaint was marked as Ex.A5, and the written statement as Ex.B13. While defending the said suit, the appellants admitted the execution of Ex.A7. But, as D.W.2 in the present case, he denied the said fact. The Courts below found that since the scribe and attestors are not alive, the plaintiff could not examine them. Appreciating the evidence of D.W.1, the 2nd defendant, the courts below found that he has come forward with the plea that he does not know about Ex.A1 and he has not deposed that he had been enjoying the property only on the basis of Ex.A2. The courts below also found that for the notice issued by the plaintiff for the purpose of redeeming the mortgage, the defendants did not give any reply. The courts below also found that for the notice issued by the plaintiff for the purpose of redeeming the mortgage, the defendants did not give any reply. On the basis of these reasonings, the courts below concurrently held that Ex.A1 is renewal of Ex.A2,and the case of the appellants that they are in possession of the property as mortgagees only under Ex.A2 and not under Ex.A1 has to be rejected. 8. So wehave to conclude that the possession of items 1 & 3 in 'A' schedule property by the appellants is only under Ex.A1 and so the plaintiff is entitled to sustain the suit for redemption of mortgage with respect to his share. 9. With respect to 'B' schedule property, learned counsel has submitted that the suit is barred by limitation. Ex.A3 was executed on (13.3.1088 M.E.) 29.10.1912. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the suit should have been filed on or before 2.1.1971, and since it was filed in 1981, it is time barred. To defend the said averment, the plaintiff sought to rely on the assignments under Exs.A4 and A5, dated 24.6.1943 and 1.7.1946 respectively to contend that defendants have acknowledged the mortgage under Ex.A3, in the said documents and so from the date of Ex.A5, 30 years period has to be extended, and before the expiry of that period, Act 4/1938 was extended to Kanyakumari District with effect from 18.1.1973, and another 30 years period has to be added. If it is so, the suit filed in 1981 was well within time. 10. To support the said contention on the basis that the Act 4 of 1938 came into effect and so limitation has to be extended, learned counsel for the respondents relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Gnanakan Nadar v. Gnanammal, 1980 T.L.N.J. 217. If it is so, the suit filed in 1981 was well within time. 10. To support the said contention on the basis that the Act 4 of 1938 came into effect and so limitation has to be extended, learned counsel for the respondents relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Gnanakan Nadar v. Gnanammal, 1980 T.L.N.J. 217. The learned Judges in the said decision has held that by virtue of Sec.9(A) of the Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1938, the amended Act XXIV of 1950,the debts shall be deemed to have been fully discharged in view of the fact that the mortgagee has been in possession for an aggregate period of 30 years, and in view of Article 148 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, the right to redeem or recover possession of the mortgaged property accrued, and from that date, 30 years period was available to file a suit for recovery of possession of the property. 11. Though the plaintiff claimed benefits under the Act IV of 1938, the same has not been denied in the written statement. D.W.1 had admitted that the plaintiff is an agriculturist. So, the courts below concurrently found that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of Act IV of 1938. So if the recitals under Exs.A4 and A5 could be construed as acknowledgment of the mortgage under Ex.A3, the case of the plaintiff that the suit is barred by limitation cannot be countenanced. But, if the recitals could not be construed as acknowledgment, the suit has to be dismissed insofar as the mortgage under Ex.A3 is concerned,as it is time barred. 12. So, we have to decide about the scope of Exs.A4 and A5. From the translated copy of Ex.A5 submitted by learned counsel for respondents, I am able to see that there is a reference about the document No. 1145 of the year 1088 M.E., and it is further stated that they took assignment of the said kuzhikkanam under the document of the year 1188 and they are in possession of the property. Under the said document, they have assigned the rights so enjoyed by them till the date of execution of Ex.A1. It is not in dispute that similar recitals are in Ex.A4. On the basis of the above said recitals, now we have to appreciate the scope of the same. 13. Under the said document, they have assigned the rights so enjoyed by them till the date of execution of Ex.A1. It is not in dispute that similar recitals are in Ex.A4. On the basis of the above said recitals, now we have to appreciate the scope of the same. 13. In the decision in Veerabahu Pattar v. P.Eswara Pillai, 1975 (1) M.L.J. 31 , the learned Judge of this Court while dealing with the scope of Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, has held as follows:- "Though the document now under consideration specifically referred to the original mortgage executed by Subramonia Nambiar, the recitals about the fact of purchase of the mortgagee's rights in Court-auction by the vendor under that document and the reference to the assignment by way of sale of the vendor's othi right of 5,000 Rs. would only be descriptive of the interest assigned and would not amount to an acknowledgment of the liability of the subsisting mortgage to be redeemed. More transfer of the right in the mortgage is not enough to conclude that it would amount to an acknowledgment of liability. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the legal consequences of the statement of the vendor that she has got only an othi right will be that she has the right to redeem,and this legal consequence need not be stated in express words in the document itself. But the learned Counsel was unable to show as to how the document would have recited if the parties deliberately did not want to make it an acknowledgment of liability, but wanted to convey only that much of a right which the vendor had. In all assignments of mortgages,the mortgagee could only convey the right, title and interest which he had. If the argument of the learned Counsel is to be accepted, all cases of assignment of mortgage, if they had been made before the expiry of the period of limitation, would amount to an acknowledgment of the liability though there was no intention on the part of the parties to admit the jural relationship in that regard. The decision of the Supreme Court is clearly against this proposition of the leaned Counsel." 14. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Tilak Ram v. Nathu, AIR 1967 S.C. 935 . The decision of the Supreme Court is clearly against this proposition of the leaned Counsel." 14. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Tilak Ram v. Nathu, AIR 1967 S.C. 935 . In the said decision, to defend the suit for redemption and possession, the defendant took the plea that as 60 years already expired since the date of the said mortgages, the suit was barred by limitation and the plaintiffs were not entitled to redeem the said loss. To save limitation and to say that they are entitled to redeem the land, the plaintiffs relied on certain documents in which,according to the plaintiffs, the respondents acknowledged the said mortgages. Though the trial court and lower appellate court decreed the suit,the High Court reversed the same and allowed the Appeal holding that the said judgments delivered in those documents were not sufficient to constitute acknowledgment and so the suit was barred by limitation. The Apex Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court holding as follows:- "6.Section 19(1) provides as under:- "Where,before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed." Explanation 1 to the section inter alia provides that "For the purposes of this section an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the property or right." (7) The section requires (i) an admission or acknowledgment (ii)that such acknowledgment must be in respect of a liability in respect of a property or right, (iii) that it must be made before the expiry of the period of limitation, and (iv)that it should be in writing and signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed. Under the Explanation such an acknowledgment need not specify the exact nature of the property or the right claimed. Under the Explanation such an acknowledgment need not specify the exact nature of the property or the right claimed. It is manifest that the statement relied on must amount to an admission or acknowledgment and that acknowledgment must be in respect of the property or right claimed by the party relying on such a statement. (8)A large number of decisions were cited at the bar in support of the rival contentions. One line of these decisions lays down that an admission by a mortgagee in a pleading or a subsequent transaction that he holds the property as a mortgagee is a sufficient acknowledgment that the maker of the statement thinks and believes that he is liable to be redeemed at the date of the statement. On the basis of this principle an application by a judgment-debtor during execution proceedings under a mortgage-decree, claiming that a letter by the decree-holder granting extension of time for payment of the decretal amount was an acknowledgment was upheld. Similarly, a statement by the Zarpeshgidar that the property was his Zarpeshgi property in two sub-mortgages executed by him was held to be an acknowledgment. A statement in a sale-deed by the mortgagee that he was selling his mortgage rights was also held to be an acknowledgment of a subsisting mortgage and of the subsisting rights which he was competent to transfer and consequently it was held that he was estopped from setting up a defence inconsistent with his rights as the mortgagee. (ef. Sidhasri Ram v. Gargi Din, AIR 1924 All 458, Chhedalal v. Gulam Abbas, AIR 1929 All 242, Adya Prasad v. Lal Girjish Bahadur Pal, ILR 55 All 393 : AIR 1933 All 364, Ralla Ram v. Bhama, AIR 1933 Lah 33, Arjan v. Gurdial, AIR 1951 Pepsu 52,Ram Jatan Singh v. Lagandeo Singh, AIR 1961 Pat 290 and Padmanabha Pillai v. Lakshmi, AIR 1953 Trav.Co 244. on the other hand there is another line of decisions where it was held that mere admission of jural relationship is not sufficient, that a statement to constitute an acknowledgment must be in relation to the liability or the right or the property claimed and that such a statement must be shown to have been made with a consciousness and an intention of admitting such a right or liability. Hence in considering whether certain words amount to an acknowledgment of liability or right it has to be seen whether at the time of writing them the writer had in his mind the question as to his liability or whether he was thinking of and referring to some other matter. Nanak Prasad v. Suraj Baksh, AIR 1943 Oudh 425, Sham Devi v. Bhagwant, AIR 1925 All 353, Shvakashi MatchExporting Co. v. Ramanlal Mohanlal, ILR (1963) Mad. 1204: AIR 1963 Mad 403 , Gur Saran v. Shib Singh, AIR 1943 All 393 (FB),Parasram v. Bindeshari Pande, AIR 1953 All 33, Ramdin v. Ramparichan, AIR 1942 Pat 170, Kandasami v. Suppammal, ILR 45 Mad 443 AIR 1922 Mad 104 and Sambasiva Ayyar v. Subramania Pillai, ILR 59 Mad 312: AIR 1936 Mad 70. In AIR 1942 Pat 170(supra) the High Court of Patna held that an admission or acknowledgment of a liability must be one which can be implied from the facts and surrounding circumstances and is not one which is implied as a matter of law, that the intention of the law is to make an admission in writing of an existing jural relationship equivalent to, for the purpose of limitation, to a new contract and that for this purpose the consciousness and intention must be as clear as they would be in a contract itself. In ILR 59 Mad 312: (AIR 1936 Mad 70) (Supra) the High Court held that when circumstances are such that the person making a statement has his mind directed to the question of the existence of the debt and he represents that the debt exists or represents facts consistent only with the inference that he admits the existence of the debt such a representation would be deemed to be a sufficient acknowledgment. The statement in question in that case was by a purchaser of equity of redemption in Court proceedings taken against the mortgagor, viz., that the purchaser had; bought properties described as subject to a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff. In Maniram v. Rupchand, 1906 ILR (88) Cal 1047 (PC),it was held that S.19 required a definite admission of liability, that the section did not lay down that an acknowledgment would be available from a mere admission of jural relationship and that such a result depended upon the language of the document and the surrounding circumstances in which it is made. There is thus a clear divergence of opinion not only amongst the different High Courts but also sometimes in the same High Court. (9) It is not, however, necessary to go into the details of these decisions or to decide which of the two views is correct as this Court in Shapur Fredoom Mazda v. Durga Prosad, 1962 (1) SCR 140 : AIR 1961 SC 1236 , has examined the contents and the scope of S.19. After first stating the ingredients of the section,this Court stated that an acknowledgment may be sufficient by reason of Explanation I even if it omits to specify the exact nature of the right. Nevertheless, the statement on which a plea of acknowledgment is based must relate to a subsisting liability. The words used in the acknowledgment must indicate the jural relationship between the parties and it must appear that such a statement is made with the intention of admitting that jural relationship. Such an intention, no doubt, can be inferred by impleading from the nature of the admission and need not be in express words. It was then observed:- "If the statement is fairly clear that the intention to admit the jural relationship may be implied from it. The admission in question need not be express but must be made in circumstances and in words from which the Court can reasonably infer that the person making the admission intended to refer to a subsisting liability as at the date of the statement." The Court also observed that stated generally the Courts leaned in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though that would not mean that where no admission was made one should be inferred or where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such an intention would be fastened on the maker of the statement by an involved or a far-fetched process of reasoning. Similarly, while dealing with an admission of a debt, Fry L.J. In Greer v. Humphreys, 1884 (25) Ch D 474 at p.481 observed that an acknowledgment would be an admission by the writer that there was a debt owing by him either to the receiver of the letter or to some other person on whose behalf the letter was received but that it was not enough that he referred to a debt as being due from somebody. In order to take the case out of the statute there must, upon a fair construction of the letter read by the light of the surrounding circumstances, be an admission that the writer owed the debt. (10)The right of redemption no doubt is of the essence of and inherent in a transaction of mortgage. But the statement in question must relate to the subsisting liability or the right claimed. Where the statement is relied on as expressing jural relationship it must show that it was made with the intention of admitting such jural relationship subsisting at the time when it was made. It follows that where a statement setting out jural relationship is made clearly without intending to admit its existence an intention to admit cannot be imposed on its maker by an involved or a far-fetched process of reasoning." 15. So, from the above, it is clear that the period of limitation cannot be extended by mere passing recitals regarding the factum of the mortgage, but that statement on which the plea of acknowledgment is based must relate to subsisting liability and it could indicate the jural relationship between the parties, and such statement should be made with the intention of admitting such jural relationship. 16. If on the basis of the said decision, Exs.A4 and A5 are taken into consideration, I am of the opinion that the recitals in the said documents have to be considered as acknowledgment as contemplated under Sec. 19 of the Limitation Act. Referring to the rights got under Ex.A3 with reference to the mortgaged amount, they have assigned the said right so enjoyed by them got under othi and kuzhikkanam till date of execution of Exs.A4 and A5, to the assignee. From the said recitals, it is clear that they are acknowledging their rights got under othi and kuzhikkanam and they are assigning only that right and not the rights independent of the same. Since the defendants acknowledge the rights got under othi and kuzhikkanam, it has to be taken that they are accepting the jural relationship and got only the othi and kuzhikkanam right even on the date of execution of the said documents. So it cannot be said that it is mere narration of fact, regarding the earlier transaction, but it is an acknowledgment of their rights given to them under othi kuzhikkanam in the said documents. 17. So it cannot be said that it is mere narration of fact, regarding the earlier transaction, but it is an acknowledgment of their rights given to them under othi kuzhikkanam in the said documents. 17. In view of the above discussion, it has to be construed that it is only an acknowledgment as contemplated under Sec. 19 of the Limitation Act and so the limitation has to be extended as contended by the plaintiff. If it is so, the case of the defendants that it is barred by limitation cannot be accepted. Since the suit is sustainable, the Courts below are correct in decreeing the suit. 18. For all the reasons stated above, this Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs.