Judgment 1. This is a petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (referred to as "the Code", in short) for quashing order dated 7.2.1997 recorded by Sri D.N. Barai, Special Judge, Bhagalpur under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in Complaint Case No. 1 of 1997 whereby the learned Judge had directed the officer-in-charge of Harijan Police Station to register an F.I.R., investigate the case and to submit a report under the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code, as well to quash the entire criminal proceeding against the petitioners in pursuance thereto including order recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur dated 7.6.2000 in Protest-cum-Complaint Case No. 240 of 2000 whereby and whereunder the learned Court had ordered, after enquiry, for issuance of summons against the petitioners for various offences under the Indian Penal Code as well under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 2. Opposite Party No. 2, Ganga Rajak, the complainant, also appeared and filed counter-affidavit. In this case learned counsel for the petitioners, for Opposite Party No. 2 and learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State of Bihar have been heard, hence this petition is being disposed of at this stage. 3. Since only law points have been argued, this Court is not dealing with the facts as contained under the allegations in the Complaint dated 6.2.1997. 4. The relevant facts are that Opposite Party No. 2 Ganga Rajak filed a complaint on 6.2.1997 before Special Judge, Bhagalpur against the petitioners including the Subdivisional Officer, Kahalgaon for having committed offences as alleged in the complaint. That was registered as Complaint Case No. 1 of 1997 and that was ordered to be sent to the Police for registration of a case and for investigation, under section 156(3) of the Code, by order dated 7.2.1997. 5. On receipt of a copy of the complaint the Officer-in-charge of Harijan Police Station, Bhagalpur drew up a formal F.I.R. and registered a case bearing No. 10 of 1997, dated 16.2.1997. A copy of the F.I.R. was received by the Special Judge on 17.2.1997 whereupon he directed for merger of the records of Complaint Case No. 1 of 1997 with the F.I.R. 6. A copy of the F.I.R. was received by the Special Judge on 17.2.1997 whereupon he directed for merger of the records of Complaint Case No. 1 of 1997 with the F.I.R. 6. On 22.3.1997 the complainant filed Protest petition before the Special Judge against alleged improper investigation of the case apprehending that in the case the police would not submit charge-sheet (Annexure-3). Again another protest petition was filed on 15.5.1997 in the Court, which is Annexure-4. 7. However, by order dated 1.5.1998 the learned Special Judge transferred the entire case record to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur. Learned counsel for the parties have admitted that this was done when it was held in judicial decisions that in case under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the cognizance of the offence would be taken by the Magistrate concerned, not by the Special Judge. 8. After investigation the Police submitted final report No. 5 of 1998 dated 29.10.1998 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur holding the case to be true only under section 427 of the Indian Penal Code which was a non-cognizable offence, against six of the accused but accused Chandrashekhar Choudhary and Niranjan Kumar Choudhary were not sent up for trial who are petitioner Nos. 3 and 5. That final report is Annexure-5. 9. On receipt of the aforesaid report the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dated 21.12.1999 directed to register the said protest petition dated 22.3.1997 as complaint which was registered as Complaint Case No. 240 of 2000, examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and conducted enquiry into the complaint after which by order dated 7.6.2000, which also has been impugned, all the accused persons, the present petitioners, were ordered to be summoned to face trial. 10. 10. Sri Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, has raised following law points : (i) The complaint dated 6.2.1997 that was filed before the Special Judge under law could not have been filed before him and he could not have exercised powers of a Magistrate by ordering the police to register a case under section 156(3) of the Code and to investigate the case, (ii) Police submitted final report since the case was found to be established only under section 427 of the Penal Code against six of the accused, hence under section 2(d) of the Code which defines a complaint, that report itself had to be treated as complaint and since that was so, another document, namely, the protest petition, could not have been treated as complaint, (iii) Protest petition that was treated to be a complaint could not have been so treated because that was just a petition of the complainant against the investigation of the case, without mentioning name of any accused or describing as to what acts they had indulged into, without specifically seeking the Court to take any legal action against those persons, and (iv) petitioners No. 3 and 4 were public servant having been posted as Project Officer, Adult Education and Subdivisional Officer, respectively, against whom cognizance of offence could not have been taken without proper sanction granted by the proper authority as provided under section 197 of the Code. 11. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned orders. 12. Learned counsel for Opposite Party No. 2 has argued that even after the complaint was sent to the police for registration of case, on submission of final report it was open to the Magistrate to act upon that very complaint and to proceed in accordance with law which was done by the learned Magistrate, hence his order summoning the petitioners as accused does not suffer from any iegal infirmity. 13. 13. In so far as the first point raised by Sri Singh, appearing for the petitioners, is concerned, it appears that learned Special Judge had entertained the complaint and had sent the same to the police for registration of a case and for investigation when by decisions the law point was not established or when the learned Court was not aware, that notwithstanding constitution of Special Courts under the provision of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the power of takinig cognizance was to continue to be exercised by the Magistrate concerned. However, that order was passed by the learned Special Judge on 7.2.1997 and throughout investigation of which the petitioners should have been aware, and till final report was submitted and action was taken thereupon by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur the petitioners did not seek any legal recourse against that order. It is now too late to raise this point in the instant petition filed in October, 2000. Otherwise also, as will be seen, the order of the Special Judge would not affect the order dated 7.6.2000 recorded by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur. 14. In so far as the second and third points raised by Sri Singh are concerned, section 2(d) of the Code defines a complaint as follows : "Section 2(d) : "Complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Explanation.A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the Police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant." 15. Explanation.A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the Police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant." 15. In view of aforesaid definition of complaint, it was argued that since in this case the Police Officer after investigation had found that the facts collected disclosed commission of an offence punishable under section 427 of the Penal Code which was a non-cognizable offence, that report was a complaint on its own and in such circumstance, the Magistrate should have prxeeded accordingly, as the protest petition, even if could be treated as a valid complaint, must be considered to be a second complaint on which the Magistrate could not have proceeded ignoring the final report submitted by the police. 16. However, in this case investigation started after receipt of a complaint. That complaint which was filed in the first instance did not lose its character as complaint simply because that had formed basis of the F.I.R. I find this argument of learned counsel for Opposite Party No. 2 to be acceptable in view of a decision of the apex Court in the case of Tula Ram V/s. Kishore Singh; (1977) 4 SCC 459 . In that case an F.I.R. was filed with the police alleging a murder in which, on submission of charge-sheet, the Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, but in the meantime a counter complaint was filed in the Court of the Magistrate who ordered the Police to investigate the case under provision of section 156(3) of the Code. The police after investigation submitted final report holding that no case was made out against the accused. Having considered that report the Magistrate ordered for issuance of a notice to the complainant to appear before him which the complainant did and appeared with his witnesses whose statements were recorded, whereafter the Magistrate ordered for issuance of non-bailable warrants of arrest against the accused. A petition filed by the accused/appellants before the High Court for quashing the order of the learned Magistrate on the ground that the Magistrate once having ordered investigation by Police, was not competent to review the complaint and to issue process against them which argument, however, did not find favour with the High Court. A petition filed by the accused/appellants before the High Court for quashing the order of the learned Magistrate on the ground that the Magistrate once having ordered investigation by Police, was not competent to review the complaint and to issue process against them which argument, however, did not find favour with the High Court. Their lordships of Supreme Court distinguished the provisions under Chapter 14 and Chapter 12 of the Code pointing out that Chapter 14 under which section 190 falls, deals with post-cognizance stage whereas Chapter 12, under which section 156 falls, deals with pre-cognizance stage, further holding that sections 190 and 156(2) of the Code are mutually exclusive and work in totally different spheres. It was held that where a Magistrate ordered investigation by police under section 156(3) of the Code before taking cognizance and received the report thereupon, he could act on the report and discharge the accused, or straightway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under section 190 of the Code. 17. In the instant case complaint was filed before the Special Judge. Learned Special Judge taking recourse to section 156(3) of the Code directed the police to register the case and to investigate the same. If the argument of Sri Singh is considered that the learned Special Judge could not have done that and the order was without jurisdiction and non-est, even then the complaint filed by the complainant had to be taken as pending on the record. On the other hand, if the Court directed the police to register a case, cognizance of offence not having been taken, then on the submission of the report it was open to the Magistrate to proceed on the original complaint filed by the complainant and to dispose it of in accordance with law, under the provisions of sections 190, 200 and 202 of the Code. 18. In so far as the argument of treating the final report to be a complaint is concerned, in the aforesaid circumstances when the original complaint filed by the complainant was available for taking action, the learned Magistrate could not be faulted for ignoring the final report which though could have been acted upon considering the same to be a complaint, was not the first petition of complaint on record. When two documents could be treated as complaint for the purpose of taking further action, it is always permissible to proceed on a complaint which was filed earlier. 19. In so far as the argument of learned counsel that it was the protest petition that was registered as a complaint which did not fultil the requirement of a complaint, is concerned, various orders of the learned Magistrate have been annexed as Annexure-9 with the supplementary affidavit. Order dated 22.10.1999 would show that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate having noticed the final report also noted that in the case a protest petition was also filed by the complainant and ordered issuances of notice upon the complainant. Order dated 21.12.1999 would show that the complainant had appeared with his witnesses and the learned Magistrate, noting that two protest petitions had been filed by the complainant and final report was also submitted by the police, ordered that the protest petition be registered in the complaint register and then statement on solemn affirmation of the complainant was recorded and a date was fixed for further enquiry. However, since the original complaint was available for taking action in the case that will be deemed to be the petition of complaint and the protest petition to be just a petition placed on the record. The impugned order dated 7.6.2000 only states that upon receipt of the final report notice was sent to the complainant who appeared in the court and three witnesses were examined on his behalf who had supported the prosecution version as made out in the written report. This "written report" would be deemed to be the complaint filed originally by the complainant as that was the document (a complaint) on which the Magistrate could have proceeded under section 200 of the Code. Just a mention by the Magistrate that the protest petition be registered in complaint register would not expel the original complaint from the record, rather the Magistrate would be deemed to have proceeded on that document. 20. Therefore, on these grounds I do not find any infirmity in the order directing issuance of processes against the petitioners for facing trial. 21. In so far as the last point urged by Shri Singh about petitioner Nos. 20. Therefore, on these grounds I do not find any infirmity in the order directing issuance of processes against the petitioners for facing trial. 21. In so far as the last point urged by Shri Singh about petitioner Nos. 3 and 5 being public servants claiming, by way of alternative argument on their behalf, that even if the allegations against them were taken at their face value, the acts alleged were committed in course of discharging their official duties, hence cognizance of offence against them could not have been taken without sanction of the appropriate authority under section 197 of the Code, is concerned, it is now well settled that the plea of want of sanction under section 197 of the Code can be raised by an accused at any stage of the trial, even at the initial stage. In this regard a decision of the apex Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikham Chand Jain V/s. Pandey Ajay Bhushan; (1998) 1 SCC 205 may be seen. These two petitioners would be free to raise this plea before the lower court and if this plea is so raised, these two petitioners will be permitted to file such documents in support of their plea which could be looked into by the Court without their formal proof and then to first decide this plea in accordance with law. However, if it appears to the learned Magistrate that apart from what have been submitted before it including aforesaid documents, further evidence is required to decide that point, a decision on this point can be postponed and this point can then be decided subsequently, even at the stage of judgment. Except what has been observed in relation to the last argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the other points raised by Sri Singh having no merit, cannot be accepted. 22. This petition, therefore, is dismissed.