JUDGMENT - VISHNU SAHAI, J.:---Through this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-detenu Akhil Ahmed Khalil Ahmed Shaikh has impugned the order dated 11th August, 2001 passed by the first respondent Mr. M.N. Singh, Commissioner of Police Brihan Mumbai detaining him under sub-section (1) of section (3) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (No. IV of 1981) (hereinafter referred to as the MPDA Act). The detention order alongwith the grounds of detention, which are also dated 11th August, 2001, was served on the petitioner-detenu on 15th August, 2001 and their true copies are annexed as Annexures 'A' and 'B' respectively to this petition. 2. A perusal of the grounds of detention (Annexure 'B') would show that the impugned order is founded on three C.R.'s, namely, C.R. No. 43/2001, under sections 392, 34 of Indian Penal Code, registered on the basis of a complaint, dated 9-2-2001, lodged by Deepak Sobani at Nagpada Police Station; C.R. No. 85/2001, under sections 397, 342, 34 of Indian Penal Code read with sections 3, 25 of the Arms Act, registered on the basis of a complaint dated 24-3-2001, lodged by Mukesh Mohanlal Shah at V.P. Road Police Station; and C.R. No. 119/2001, under sections 384, 506(ii), 34, 387 of Indian Penal Code read with sections 3, 25 of the Arms Act, registered on the basis of a complaint dated 13-4-2001 lodged by Chandibhai at Nagapada Police Station; and in-camera statements of two witnesses, namely, 'A' and 'B', which were recorded on 17-6-2001 and 20-6-2001 respectively. Since in our view, a reference to the prejudicial activities of the petitioner-detenu contained in the aforesaid C.R.'s and in-camera statements, is not necessary for the disposal of this writ petition, we are not adverting to them. 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Although, in this writ petition Mr. U.N. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has pleaded large number of grounds, numbered as grounds 6(A) to 6(F) but he has pressed before us only two grounds, namely grounds 6(B) and 6(E). 4. We now propose considering grounds 6(B) and 6(C). 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Although, in this writ petition Mr. U.N. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has pleaded large number of grounds, numbered as grounds 6(A) to 6(F) but he has pressed before us only two grounds, namely grounds 6(B) and 6(E). 4. We now propose considering grounds 6(B) and 6(C). We begin with ground 6(B), which, in short is that since the petitioner-detenu was in custody in the C.R.'s referred to in the grounds of detention, namely, C.R. 43/2001 of Nagpada Police Station, C.R. 85/2001 of V.P. Road Police Station and C.R. 119/2001 of Nagpada Police Station; having been refused the bail in the said C.R.'s and there was no possibility of his being granted bail in the near future in said C.R.'s, the impugned detention order was uncalled for and, in the circumstances, was punitive in nature. Mr. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, strenuously urged that the petitioner-detenu had not applied for bail in any of the said C.R.'s and there was no cogent material for the Detaining Authority to reach the conclusion that he was likely to be released on bail in the aforesaid C.R.'s and, hence, the impugned detention order is in violation of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 19 of the oft quoted case of (Dharmanand Chelavat v. Union of India and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1196. 5. Ground 6(B) has been relied to in paragraph 12 of the return of the Detaining Authority. In short, the Detaining Authority has averred therein as under:--- It is denied that the detenu being in custody was prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and, therefore, the impugned order was unjustified and unwarranted. It is denied that there was no cogent material on record suggesting that the detenu was likely to be released on bail in the said C.R.'s. Considering the evidence against the detenu in each of the said C.R.'s and his role therein, there was possibility of the detenu being granted bail in the said C.R.'s, in case he applied for bail in them. In short the burden of the song of the Detaining Authority in paragraph 12 is that the requirements laid down before claiming a detention order against a person in custody have been satisfied in the instant case. 6. In short the burden of the song of the Detaining Authority in paragraph 12 is that the requirements laid down before claiming a detention order against a person in custody have been satisfied in the instant case. 6. We have perused the averments contained in ground 6(B) of the petition, those contained in paragraph 12 of the return of the Detaining Authority, wherein the said ground has been replied to and heard learned Counsel for the parties. We are constrained to observe that we do not find merit in ground 6(B). Supreme Court in paragraph 19 of the case reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1196 (supra) has observed thus:--- "The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities." 6-A. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph would show that detention order can be issued against a person in custody provided :--- (a) the Detaining Authority, in the grounds of detention shows his awareness that the person sought to be preventively detained is in custody; and (b) despite the person being in custody, there is compelling necessity to detain him. Compelling necessity has two facets namely, (i) there should be cogent material indicating the imminent possibility of the person being released from custody in near future; and (ii) of his reverting to prejudicial activities similar to those contained in the grounds of detention, after being released from custody. Compelling necessity has two facets namely, (i) there should be cogent material indicating the imminent possibility of the person being released from custody in near future; and (ii) of his reverting to prejudicial activities similar to those contained in the grounds of detention, after being released from custody. 6-B. In our judgment, the imperatives laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 19 of the Chelavat's case (supra), have been satisfied in the instant case. A perusal of paragraph 6 of the grounds of detention would show that the Detaining Authority has shown his awareness therein that the detenu was in custody in C.R. No. 43/2001 of Nagpada Police Station, C.R. 85/2001 of V.P. Road Police Station and C.R. 119/2001 of Nagpada Police Station. It would also show that despite that there was compelling necessity to detain him. 7. We make no bones in observing that we are not impressed by the submissions of Mr. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was no cogent material before the Detaining Authority, on the basis of which he could have concluded that the petitioner-detenu was likely to be released on bail in the said C.R.'s. It is true, as contended by Mr. Tripathi, that the petitioner-detenu had not preferred any bail application, in any Court, in the said C.R's. However, it should be borne in mind that two of the C.R.'s, namely C.R. 43/2001 (under sections 392, 34 of Indian Penal Code) and C.R. 119/2001 (under section 387 of I.P. Code read with 3, 25 of the Arms Act) pertain to the offences triable by a Magistrate. None of the aforesaid C.R.'s is punishable with sentence extending to imprisonment for life. In such a situation, in our view, the Detaining Authority was justified in thinking that if the petitioner-detenu applied for bail in the said C.R.'s, he could be granted bail. None of the aforesaid C.R.'s is punishable with sentence extending to imprisonment for life. In such a situation, in our view, the Detaining Authority was justified in thinking that if the petitioner-detenu applied for bail in the said C.R.'s, he could be granted bail. It is pertinent to mention that since the said C.R.'s were not punishable with imprisonment for life, the embargo contained in section 437(1)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not applicable and even a Magistrate could have granted bail to the petitioner-detenu in the said C.R.'s. It is true that the offence under section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, which was registered on the basis of C.R. No. 85/2001, is triable by the Court of Sessions and the Magistrate would have no power to grant bail in it, but in our view, the facts pertaining to the said C.R., which have been set out in paragraph 4(b)(ii) of the grounds of detention make it manifest that the petitioner-detenu has been attributed no specific overt act in the said C.R. In that view of the matter, the Detaining Authority was justified in thinking that if the detenu applied for the bail, in the said C.R. there was imminent likelihood of his being granted bail. For the aforesaid reasons we reject this submission of Mr. Tripathi. 8. We may also mention that the conclusion drawn by the Detaining Authority in paragraph 6 of the grounds of detention, in terms, that in the event of the detenu being released on bail in the said C.R.'s, he was likely to revert to committing prejudicial activities similar to those mentioned in the grounds of detention, is well founded. The said conclusion is based on the circumstance that in the grounds of detention there is a reference to three C.R.'s and two in-camera statements. We have seen that one of the C.R's pertains to the offence of robbery, simpliciter; one to the offence of robbery armed with deadly weapons; and one to the offence of extortion. We may also mention that the in-camera statements of witnesses 'A' and 'B' disclose the commission of offence of extortion by the detenu. Looking to the said offences, the above conclusion of the Detaining Authority, in our judgment, was perfectly justified. 9. For the aforesaid reasons ground 6(B) fails. 10. We now come to ground 6(F). We may also mention that the in-camera statements of witnesses 'A' and 'B' disclose the commission of offence of extortion by the detenu. Looking to the said offences, the above conclusion of the Detaining Authority, in our judgment, was perfectly justified. 9. For the aforesaid reasons ground 6(B) fails. 10. We now come to ground 6(F). Ground 6(E) in substance is that the Hindi translation of the grounds of detention furnished to the petitioner-detenu was not a true and faithful translation of the original grounds of detention which are in English and, therefore, the detenu's fundamental right to make an effective representation, guaranteed to him by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, was impaired. Several instances of wrong translation have been cited in ground 6(F). However, Mr. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has not pressed any of the said instances. He pointed out the infirmity in translation contained in paragraph 6 of the Hindi translation of the copy of grounds of detention furnished to the detenu. Since the Supreme Court in paragraph 2 of the decision reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1126 (Harish Pahava v. State of U.P. others)2, and in paragraph 4 of the decision reported in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983 (Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and others)3, has laid down that the principle of strict pleadings does not apply to habeas corpus petitions and a ground though not pleaded can be urged provided material for its adjudication is available and material for deciding the infirmity referred to by Mr. Tripathi, is available, we are examining the infirmity contained in paragraph 6 in the Hindi translation of the grounds of detention. The infirmity which is pointed out by Mr. Tripathi is as under:--- In paragraph 6 of the Hindi Translation of the grounds of detention, there is reference to C.R. No. 140/2001 of Antop Hill Police Station, to which C.R. there is no reference in paragraph 6 of the grounds of detention in English and in it there is no reference to C.R. No. 119/2001 to which there is reference in paragraph 6 of the grounds of detention in English. Mr. Tripathi urged that on account of this infirmity in translation, the detenu would have become confused in exercising his fundamental right of making an effective representation. 11. We have reflected over Mr. Mr. Tripathi urged that on account of this infirmity in translation, the detenu would have become confused in exercising his fundamental right of making an effective representation. 11. We have reflected over Mr. Tripathi's submission and are constrained to observe that we do not find merit it in it. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India reads thus:--- "When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." A perusal of the aforesaid Article would show that the Detaining Authority, as soon as may, shall furnish to the detenu the grounds on which the detention order has been made and shall afford him earliest opportunity of making representation against the order. In our judgment it is implicit in the language of Article 22(5) that apart from the grounds of detention, copy of the detention order has also to be furnished to the detenu. This is because of the detenu's fundamental right of making a representation at the earliest opportunity against the detention order. Again, it is implicit in Article 22(5) that if the detenu does not understand the language in which the detention order and the grounds of detention are formulated, their copies would have to be supplied to him in a language known to him. This is because then and then alone would he be able to exercise his fundamental right of making a representation at the earliest opportunity. 12. The aforesaid analysis of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, would show that the object of furnishing to the detenu copy of the detention order and the grounds of detention in a language of his choice is to enable him to make an effective representation at the earliest opportunity. In this view of the matter a mistake simpliciter in translation would not vitiate the detention order and a detention order would only be vitiated on the vice of infirmity in translation, if on account of the infirmity the detenu's fundamental right to make an effective and purposeful representation, guaranteed to him by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, would be impaired. 13. 13. It is, in this perspective, we have to examine the infirmity pointed out by Mr. Tripathi and we dare say, when we do so, we find the said infirmity to be inconsequential, as in our view, on account of it, the detenu's fundamental right to make an effective representation was not impaired. Mr. Tripathi, does not dispute that there is no infirmity in the Hindi translation of the detention order furnished to the detenu. He also does not dispute that there is no infirmity in the Hindi translation of paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention furnished to him. A perusal of paragraph 1 of the grounds of detention would show that the Detaining Authority has categorically stated that the ground on which the detention order has been made against the detenu are contained in paragraph 4 below. It is pertinent to mention that in paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention, there is a reference to all the aforesaid three C.R.'s, and the two in-camera statements, on which the said detention order is founded and in the said paragraph the details pertaining to the said C.R's and in-camera statements have also been mentioned. 14. In such a factual matrix, we fail to see, merely because in paragraph 6 of the Hindi translation of the grounds of detention, there is a reference to C.R. 140/2001 of Antop Hill Police Station and that there is no reference in it to C.R. No. 119/2001 of V.P. Road Police Station, as to how the detenu's fundamental right of making an effective and purposeful representation would have been impaired. In our view there is no nexus between the averments contained in paragraph 6 of the grounds of detention and the fundamental right of the detenu to make a representation at the earliest opportunity. We make no bones in observing that had the infirmity in translation pertained to the grounds of detention, enumerated in paragraph 4, the detenu certainly could have made a grievance that his fundamental right of making a representation at the earliest opportunity, was impaired. And since this is not so here, the aforesaid fundamental right is not violated. 15. For the aforesaid reasons we do not find any merit in ground 6(F). 16. Although Mr. And since this is not so here, the aforesaid fundamental right is not violated. 15. For the aforesaid reasons we do not find any merit in ground 6(F). 16. Although Mr. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has pleaded in the petition three other grounds, namely grounds 6(A), 6(C) and 6(D), but we have not dealt with them as he has not pressed the same. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule. Certified copy expedited. Petition dismissed. -----