JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Rule. Service of rule is waived by Ms. Khatijaben Sidibhai Qureshi who has appeared as party in person for respondent driver being his heir and legal representative. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and at the request of the learned advocate for the petitioner as well as the party in person for respondent driver, the matter is taken up for final hearing today itself. Brief facts of the present petition are to the effect that the original respondent namely deceased Sidibhai Valihhai Qureshi (hereinafter referred to as the "respondent-driver") was an employee of the petitioner-corporation in the cadre of driver. That the respondent-driver remained absent from 22nd September. 1995 to 18th December. 1995 without any prior permission of the competent authority and had left the head-quarter. Thereafter also, he remained absent from his duty and, hence, a letter was written to the respondent to resume his duty and, thereafter, other letters were also sent through registered Post A.D. or through UPC Post but he neither joined the duty nor gave any explanation. Hence, a charge-sheet was issued on 16th February, 1996 and the respondent driver was charged under the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. Even many letters were sent to the respondent driver to remain present in the departmental inquiry to defend his case but he failed to do so and hence a notice to show-cause was sent to the respondent workman and after considering all the factual aspects and considering absence of the respondent-driver from duty. his services were terminated by order dated 29th June, 1996. Said order dated 29th June, 1996 terminating the services of the respondent- driver was challenged by the respondent-driver before the labour Court at Junagadh by filing Reference (LCJ) No. 68 of 1997. Before the labour Court. detailed reply was filed and even necessary record was also produced before the labour Court. According to the petitioner, the labour Court has, without considering the said reply and record produced by the petitioner before it, passed the award dated 28th March. 2000 and has directed the petitioner-corporation to pay full back wages for the intervening period from 28th June, 1996 to 31st July, 1997 alongwith other consequential benefits. Feeling aggrieved by the said award made by the labour Court the petitioner-corporation has approached this Court and has challenged the said award dated 28th March, 2000. 2. 2000 and has directed the petitioner-corporation to pay full back wages for the intervening period from 28th June, 1996 to 31st July, 1997 alongwith other consequential benefits. Feeling aggrieved by the said award made by the labour Court the petitioner-corporation has approached this Court and has challenged the said award dated 28th March, 2000. 2. During the course of hearing, learned advocate Mr. Barot appearing for Mr. Munshaw has raised a contention that the labour Court has committed an error in granting back wages for the intervening period from 28th June, 1996 to 31st July. 1997. According to him, on the basis of the purshis filed by the respondent driver before the labour Court, the labour Court has come to the conclusion that the departmental inquiry initiated against the respondent-driver was legal and valid and the charge levelled against the respondent-driver was held to be proved and the findings recorded by inquiry officer were also considered to be legal and valid and, therefore, the labour Court ought not to have awarded the back wages to the respondent-driver. According to him, the labour Court has no power and/or authority to modify or set aside the order of dismissal while exercising the powers under Sec. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, therefore, the award made by the labour Court is erroneous and bad in law and, therefore, same is required to be quashed and set aside. 3. Legal heir and representative of the deceased respondent-driver namely Khatijaben Sidibhai Qureshi has remained personally present before this Court as party in person and has submitted that the respondent-driver was to reach the age of superannuation in the year 1997 and yet an order of termination of his services has been passed by the petitioner-corporation and considering this aspect, the labour Court has rightly passed an award granting full back wages and continuity of service. She has also submitted that now her husband i.e. respondent-driver has already expired on 22nd September, 2000 and she is the sole widow having five daughters and three sons wherein four daughters are already married and they are residing at Dungarpur in the District of Junagadh. She has also submitted that her husband has actually worked from the years 1961 to 1993 but till this date, no retirement benefits have been paid to her by the petitioner-corporation. She has also submitted that her husband has actually worked from the years 1961 to 1993 but till this date, no retirement benefits have been paid to her by the petitioner-corporation. She has urged before this Court to consider the case of a poor widow in light of the fact that the labour Court has granted the back wages only for the period of one year and one month or so. She has also urged to consider the fact that the respondent driver has already expired on 22nd September. 2000. She has also submitted that there is no error committed by the labour Court which would warrant interference of this Court while exercising the powers under Arts. 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. I have considered the submissions made by Mr. Barot, learned advocate for Mr. Munshaw for the petitioner-corporation. I have also considered the submissions made by Khatijaben widow of the respondent-driver. There are certain undisputed facts on record. It is an admitted fact that the respondent-driver had remained absent from duty from 22nd September, 1995 to 18th December, 1995 without any prior permission of the competent authority. It is also an admitted fact that the respondent-driver was about to reach the age of superannuation in the year 1997 whereas order of termination of his service was passed for his remaining absent form duty for the aforesaid period. Before the labour Court, legality, validity and propriety of the departmental inquiry as well as the findings recorded by the authority were not challenged by the respondent-driver. The conclusions drawn and the findings recorded by the labour Court are based upon the legal evidence brought on record before the labour Court but the labour Court has exercised the powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 and in exercise of such powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. The conclusions drawn and the findings recorded by the labour Court are based upon the legal evidence brought on record before the labour Court but the labour Court has exercised the powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 and in exercise of such powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. in light of the facts of the case, the labour Court has also considered the gravity of the misconduct on the part of the respondent driver and has also considered the fact that the respondent driver has already reached the age of superannuation and has in all put in the service from the years 1961 to 1993 and earlier, once, he was dismissed from service for absence but considering the default card, there was no other serious default during the long service from 1961 to 1993 and, therefore, while exercising the powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, the labour Court has modified and set aside the order of punishment and also granted back wages from 28th June, 1996 to 31st July, 1997. In view of these peculiar facts, relevant provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are required to he considered. As per the provisions of Sec. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, the labour Court while abjudicating the reference, if satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may by its award set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct the reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any as it think fit or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. Such powers are vested with the labour Court as per the provisions of Sec. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. While exercising such powers. the labour Court has examined the facts and circumstances of the case and has given reasons and discussed the matter at issue at page 20, internal page 7 and has considered that the respondent- driver was once dismissed from service for his absence and the respondent driver had worked from the years 1961 to 1993. The labour Court has also considered the dufault card vide Exh. 54 and has considered that during such a long years of service. The labour Court has also considered the dufault card vide Exh. 54 and has considered that during such a long years of service. there was no serious offence or misconduct committed by the respondent-driver. The labour Court has also considered that during his long years of service, the respondent- workman was not in the habit of remaining absent time and again and his past record was found to be good by the labour Court. Over and above these considerations the labour Court has also considered that the respondent has completed sixty years of age and was to retire on account of superannuation on 31.7.1997 and was thus due to retire in the year 1997 and yet. at the time of his retirement, the petitioner-corporation has imposed the harsh and extreme punishment of dismissal from service and in such circumstances, the labour Court, was of the view that the punishment is required to be modified. Therefore, in view of such circumstances, the labour Court while exercising the powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, has modified and set aside the impugned order by directing the Corporation to pay full back wages for the intervening period of about one year and one month and has also directed the petitioner to give continuity of service to the respondent-driver. 5. In light of these factual aspects, there is one decision of the Apex Court in case of Union of India & Ors. v. Giriraj Sharma reported in AIR 1994 SC 215 wherein the Apex Court has found that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate. The Apex Court has made certain observations in Para 2 of the said decision which are relevant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. They are, therefore, reproduced as under: "2. Mr. Jain the learned counsel for the appellant Union of India contended that the interpretation placed on Section 11(1) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act. 1949 (hereinafter called "the Act") is not correct and it is on account of this erroneous understanding of the provisions that the High Court quashed the order of dismissal. In support of his contention, he invited our attention to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1965 Raj. 140 . 1949 (hereinafter called "the Act") is not correct and it is on account of this erroneous understanding of the provisions that the High Court quashed the order of dismissal. In support of his contention, he invited our attention to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1965 Raj. 140 . He also relied on certain other decisions but it is sufficient to state that according to him the learned Judges of the High Court had committed an error in interpreting the said sub-section. In our opinion, it is not necessary for us to construe Sub-section (1) of Sec. 11 of the Act in the backdrop of the facts of the present case. Assuming Mr. Jain is right, we are of the opinion that so far as the present case is concerned, the allegation is in regard to the incumbent having over stayed the period of leave by 12 days. The incumbent while admitting the fact that he had over stayed the period of leave had explained the circumstances in which it was inevitable for him to continue on leave as he was forced to do so on account of unexpected circumstances. We are of the opinion that the punishment of dismissal for over staying the period of 12 days in the said circumstances which have not been controverted in the counter is harsh since the circumstances show that it was not his intention to wilfully flout the order. but the circumstances force him to do so. In that view of the matter, the learned counsel for the respondent has fairly conceded that it was open to the authorities to visit him with a minor penalty. If they so desired, but a major penalty of dismissal from service was not called for. We agree with this submission." There is also another decision of the Apex Court in case of Sved Zuheer Hussain v. Union of India & Ors.. reported in 1999 Lab IC 2616 wherein the Apex Court has observed as under in Paras 3 & 4 of the decision: "3. The short question is whether the appellant who was working as Sorting Assistant under the Respondents" organisation could have been dismissed from service only because he was alleged to be unauthorizedly absent from 9.1.1985 to 15.1.1985. When he tried to resume his duties thereafter. The short question is whether the appellant who was working as Sorting Assistant under the Respondents" organisation could have been dismissed from service only because he was alleged to be unauthorizedly absent from 9.1.1985 to 15.1.1985. When he tried to resume his duties thereafter. he was placed under suspension on 16.1.1985 and after a departmental enquiry, was dismissed from service. He went to the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that the punishment meted out to the appellant was grossly disproportionate but could not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction. That is how the appellant is before us on grant of special leave. 4. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment of dismissal from service is too harsh and on the contrary, it is required to be substituted by appropriate lesser punishment. Learned counsel for the respondent after instruction has stated that appropriate lesser punishment may be awarded by this Court. It will be acceptable to the respondents. In our view, ends of justice will be served if we set aside the order of dismissal of the appellant and instead direct reinstatement of the appellant in service with continuity and with all other benefits save and except withdrawing 50 per cent of back wages from the date of dismissal i.e. 11.10.1988 till today. In our view, this punishment which will involve substantial monetary loss to the appellant will meet the ends of justice and will be a sufficient corrective measure for the appellant. The request of the learned counsel for the respondents that two future increments may also be withheld without cumulative effect does not appear to be justified on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In our view, the aforesaid monetary loss to the appellant will meet the ends of justice so that he may he careful in future. It is ordered accordingly. At the request of the learned counsel for the respondents, eight weeks' time is granted to the respondents to comply with the present order and to reinstate the appellant with continuity in service and with all other benefits. We make it clear that from today onwards, the appellant will be entitled to full salary. Both the appeals are allowed accordingly. The orders of the Tribunal dated 4.11.1996 and 13.2.1997 are set aside. We make it clear that from today onwards, the appellant will be entitled to full salary. Both the appeals are allowed accordingly. The orders of the Tribunal dated 4.11.1996 and 13.2.1997 are set aside. O.A. No. 714 of 1993 filed by the appellant in the Tribunal shall stand allowed in the aforesaid terms. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs." 6. Therefore, in light of the observations as aforesaid made by the Apex Court in aforesaid two decisions and also in view of the discretionary powers enjoyed by the labour Court under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 wherein the labour Court has satisfied itself about the disproportionate punishnlent in light of the gravity of misconduct of remaining absent from duty, as per my view, the labour Court was right in setting aside the order of punishment of dismissal from service as harsh in the peculiar circumstances of the case and in granting the relief of back wages for the short period of about one year and one month with continuity in service, in exercise of the powers vested in it under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, as per my view, the labour Court has rightly exercised the powers under Section 11-A of the Act by giving sufficient and cogent reasons for exercise of such powers in favour of the respondent-driver. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw has not been able to point out as to how such exercise of power was perverse or without jurisdiction. 7. It is a settled law laid down by the Apex Court in case of Scooter India Ltd.. Lucknow & Ors. v. Labour Court, Lucknow & Ors., reported in AIR 1989 SC 149 that even if the legality and validity of the enquiry is admitted and findings of the enquiry officer are established to be proper, valid and proved, even in such a case, the labour Court has power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 to grant some relief to a workman when the labour Court is satisfied that the dismissal order is unjustified in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. In para 7 of the decision in case of Scooter India Ltd., (Supra), the Apex Court has held as under: "7. 1947 to grant some relief to a workman when the labour Court is satisfied that the dismissal order is unjustified in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. In para 7 of the decision in case of Scooter India Ltd., (Supra), the Apex Court has held as under: "7. The High Court has considered at length the nature of the powers conferred on the Labour Court by Section 6(2-A) of the Act for setting aside an order of discharge or dismissal of a workman and substituting it with an order of lesser punishment and as such it cannot be said that the High Court has failed to consider the facts in their entirety. As regards the third contention we may only state that the Labour Court was not unaware of the nature of the charges framed against the respondent or the findings rendered by the Inquiry Officer and the acceptance of those findings by the Disciplinary Authority. The Labour Court has observed as followed:" "The workman has unfortunately to blame himself for much of the bad blood which has developed between him and the management and, therefore, his conduct motivated by ideals which are not relevant has been far from satisfactory. In so far as it was rough, bordering on rudeness and with highly exaggerated sense of his duties. In these circumstances it will meet the ends of justice if back wages to the extent of 75% are allowed to the workman. I would make my award accordingly, but there shall be no order as to costs." It cannot, therefore, be said that the Labour Court had exercised its powers under Section 6(2-A) of the Act in an arbitrary manner and not in a judicial manner. The Labour Court has taken the view that justice must be tempered with mercy and that the erring workman should be given an opportunity to reform himself and prove to be loyal and disciplined employee of the petitioner company. It cannot, therefore, be said that merely because the Labour Court had found the inquiry to be fair and lawful and the findings not to be vitiated in any manner, it ought not to have interfered with the order of termination of service passed against the respondent in exercise of its powers under Section 6(2- A) of the Act." 8. It cannot, therefore, be said that merely because the Labour Court had found the inquiry to be fair and lawful and the findings not to be vitiated in any manner, it ought not to have interfered with the order of termination of service passed against the respondent in exercise of its powers under Section 6(2- A) of the Act." 8. In such a situation, as per the decision of the Apex Court in case of I.O.B. v. LO.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union. reported in 2000 SCC Lab. & Service. 471. while exercising the powers under Arts 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot reappreciate the findings of fact and it is not having appellate powers. As per the said decision, insufficiency of evidence or that another view is possible is also no ground to interfere with the award made by the concerned Court. As per the decision of the Apex Court in case of Sugarbhai M. siddiq & Ors. v. Rdunesh S. Hankare (Dead) by L Rs. , reported in 2001 (8) SCC 477 . as regards the scope of powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court has held that the High Court is concerned not with the decision of the lower Court or Tribunal but with its decision making process. The Apex Court has also held that the High Court must ascertain whether such Court or Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with a particular matter and whether the impugned order is vitiated by procedural irregularity. In the instant case, learned advocate Mr. Munshaw has not been able to point out that the labour Court was not having jurisdiction. He has also not been able to point out that the impugned award is vitiated by any procedural irregularity and, therefore, same is required to be quashed and set aside. 9. Therefore, in view of these observations made by the Apex Court as regards the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court under Arts. He has also not been able to point out that the impugned award is vitiated by any procedural irregularity and, therefore, same is required to be quashed and set aside. 9. Therefore, in view of these observations made by the Apex Court as regards the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court under Arts. 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, according to my view, considering the factual aspects of the matter as well as the merits of the matter, the labour Court was right in exercising the powers in favour of the respondent-driver and the labour Court was also right in granting relief of back wages for a short period of about one year and one month in light of the fact that though the respondent driver was to reach the age of superannuation in the year 1997, though, instead of imposing any lesser punishment, harsh punishment of dismissal from service was imposed upon the respondent-driver in the year 1996 for the alleged misconduct of remaining absent for some period. Admittedly, the labour Court has exercised the powers under Section 11-A of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner- corporation has not been able to point out any jurisdictional error committed by the labour Court while making the award in favour of the respondent-driver. He has also not been able to show that such findings recorded by the labour Court are otherwise perverse. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly in view of the fact that the respondent-driver has already expired and in view of these peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, according to my view, there is no substance in this petition and the labour Court has not committed any error which would require any interference of this Court while exercising the powers under Arts. 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, this petition is required to be dismissed. Same is, therefore, dismissed. 10. Once the petition has been dismissed by this Court there are limitation for this Court to pass any direction against the petitioner-corporation. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, since the widow of the respondent driver is facing hardship in view of the death of her husband since September. Same is, therefore, dismissed. 10. Once the petition has been dismissed by this Court there are limitation for this Court to pass any direction against the petitioner-corporation. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, since the widow of the respondent driver is facing hardship in view of the death of her husband since September. 2000, for directing the petitioner to make payment of the amount which was due and payable to the respondent- driver, in view of these facts, some directions are required to be issued to the petitioner in the interest of justice. Therefore, in view of these facts, it is directed to the petitioner-corporation to implement and execute the award passed by the labour Court in Reference (LC]) No. 68 of 1997 dated 28.3.2000 latest by 15th March, 2002 and to pay all the retirement benefits which were available to the respondent driver, to the widow of the respondent driver latest by 15th March, 2002 in accordance with the rules and regulations of the petitioner-corporation. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Petition Dismissed.