L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals arise out of the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 1877 of 1988 on the file of the III Additional Judge, City civil Court, Secunderabad. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as arrayed in the suit. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs filed the suit for partition. The father of the plaintiffs by name Pentaiah and defendants 1 to 3 are the 4 sons of one Mr. Pochaiah. According to the plaintiffs, the joint family comprising of pochaiah and his sons acquired 3 items of immovable properties namely two residential houses situated at Gollaguda and kalasiguda (Item Nos. l and 2) and an open site of 600 yds. , at Srinivasanagar Colony (Item No. 3) and therefore, the plaintiffs jointly have l/4th share in each of these 3 items. ( 3 ) THE 1st defendant filed a written statement claiming that items 1 and 2 are his self-acquired properties. According to him item No. l was purchased by him in the name of his mother Gunnamma. He has also stated that he paid the consideration for item No. 2 but out of love and affection he got the sale deed executed in the names of all the 4 brothers including himself. He stated that he has been enjoying Item Nos. l and 2 of the suit schedule property as his own, made reconstruction of the houses and the said items are not available for partition. He further stated that he has incurred an expenditure of about Rs. 1,00,000. 00 for the litigation to protect the property in Item no. 3. He stated that he has no objection for partitioning of the said property viz. , item no. 3 provided the plaintiffs contribute their share of expenditure towards litigation. ( 4 ) DEFENDANTS 2 and 3 filed separate written statement disputing the claim of the defendant No. l that Item Nos. 2 and 3 (sic. 1 and 2) are his exclusive properties. They claimed share in those two items. However, they sailed with the 1st defendant in denying a share to the plaintiffs in item nos. l and 2. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:- (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule house? They claimed share in those two items. However, they sailed with the 1st defendant in denying a share to the plaintiffs in item nos. l and 2. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:- (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule house? (2) Whether the suit is properly valued? (3) Whether the first defendant perfected his title by adverse possession over items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the mesne profits? (5) Whether Item No. 2 of plaint schedule properties is the self-acquired property of the first defendant? (6) To what relief? ( 6 ) ON behalf of the plaintiffs, the 2nd plaintiff examined himself as P. W. I and marked Exs. A-1 to A-6. Defendants 1,2 and 3 examined themselves as D. Ws. l, 3 and 4. They also examined D. W. 2 who is a civil labour contractor. They have also marked exs. B-1 to B-197. ( 7 ) ON an appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court found that all the three items of the suit schedule are available for partition. It also recorded a finding that the 1st defendant has incurred expenditure for reconstruction of houses as well as for litigation in respect of item No. 3 of the suit schedule property and held that the plaintiffs are liable to pay an amount of rs. 50,000/- to the defendant No. l towards their share of the said expenditure, so as to enable them to claim the shares. A decree in terms of the said findings was passed. ( 8 ) THE plaintiffs filed CCCA No. 167 of 1997 aggrieved by the decree of the trial court in so far it directed them to pay an amount of Rs. 50,000. 00 to the defendant No. l for claiming their share. The defendant no. l, in turn, filed CCCA No. 138 of 1997 challenging the judgment and decree of the court below in its entirety. ( 9 ) SRI K. Somakonda Reddy, learned counsel for defendant No. l, submits that though items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule properties were purchased in the name of the mother; and himself and his brothers respectively, it was the 1st defendant who has paid consideration. ( 9 ) SRI K. Somakonda Reddy, learned counsel for defendant No. l, submits that though items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule properties were purchased in the name of the mother; and himself and his brothers respectively, it was the 1st defendant who has paid consideration. The various developmental activities that have been undertaken by the 1st defendant ever since the date of purchase of items 2 and 3 (sic. 1 and 2) would clearly establish that the said items are his exclusive properties. As regards item No. 3, the learned counsel submits that it was the 1st defendant alone who has initiated and defended the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the appellate court and he had incurred an expenditure of about Rs. 1,00,000. 00. He summed up his submissions by stating that the finding of the trial court that items 1 and 2 are available for partition cannot be sustained on the basis of evidence on record and that the decree of the trial court as regards the entitlement of the plaintiffs in item No. 3 subject to payment of their share of the expenditure deserves to be upheld. ( 10 ) SRI P. Venugopal, learned counsel for the plaintiffs on the other hand, submits that a reading of the recitals in the sale deeds under which items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule property were purchased clearly indicate that the claim of the 1st defendant is absolutely without any basis. It is his further contention that since the 1st defendant enjoyed the properties for last several decades to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, the defendants are under an obligation to account for not only the rents but also the benefit of occupation and enjoyment of the said premises. As regards the expenses for the legal proceedings, the learned counsel submits that the claim was without any basis and exorbitant. According to him the receipts by way of rents etc. , from the other premises were sufficient enough for meeting the legal expenses in respect of item No. 3. ( 11 ) THE submissions of Sri K. Gangadhar, learned counsel for the defendants 2 and 3, broadly touch the arguments of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs. According to him the receipts by way of rents etc. , from the other premises were sufficient enough for meeting the legal expenses in respect of item No. 3. ( 11 ) THE submissions of Sri K. Gangadhar, learned counsel for the defendants 2 and 3, broadly touch the arguments of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs. ( 12 ) IN view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the points that arise for consideration in these appeals are: (1) Whether items 2 and 3 (sic. land 2) of the suit schedule property are the self acquisitions of D. W. I; and (2) Whether the plaintiffs are liable to pay the amount of Rs. 50,000. 00 towards their share of reconstruction of items 1 and. 2 and legal expenses for item 3 of the suit schedule property. ( 13 ) THE relationship of the parties is not in dispute. The existence of the three items of suit schedule is also not in dispute. While it is the claim of the plaintiffs that the 3 items are the joint family properties and are available for partition, D. W. I claims that items 1 and 2 are his self-acquisitions. ( 14 ) A reading of the sale deed dated 17-5-1863 i. e. , Ex. B-2 under which item No. l of the suit schedule property is purchased, shows that the purchasers are defendants 1 to 3 and the father of plaintiffs. Ex. B-1 dated 8-7-1964 is the sale deed under which item no. 2 of the suit schedule is purchased in the name of mother of the defendants and the father of the plaintiffs i. e. , Pentaiah. If these sale deeds are to be taken on their face value, the property has to be treated as belonging to the joint family and available for partition. D. W. I claims that though the sale deeds are obtained in the names of his brothers (who included the father of the plaintiffs) and mother, it is he who has paid the consideration. He did not place any evidence before the court in support of his contention. He relies on the only factor tha the plaintiffs father was a mason working on daily wages and D. W. I being a highly educated person in the family, was in a position to mobilize the funds from out of his salary, tuitions etc. He did not place any evidence before the court in support of his contention. He relies on the only factor tha the plaintiffs father was a mason working on daily wages and D. W. I being a highly educated person in the family, was in a position to mobilize the funds from out of his salary, tuitions etc. ( 15 ) IN his written statement, D. W. I stated that the father of the plaintiffs left the family in 1957. In his evidence he states that it was in the year 1965 that the father of the plaintiffs left the family. No reason is assigned as to how and under what circumstances he included the name of the plaintiffs father in the sale deed Ex. B-1. The only reason assigned is love and affection. The tenor of the evidence of D. W. 1 does not gain confidence of the Court. It only shows that he takes advantage of his education and claims superiority over all-other brothers. He admits the fact that the toiling of his father and elder brother, who is the father of the plaintiffs, facilitated his education. He does not plead that any partition has taken place in the family earlier. Where a family has acquired certain properties that too in the names of all the coparceners, one out of them cannot be permitted to claim exclusive rights. As long as the family remained joint, if one of the coparceners claims any exclusive right over certain items of the property, the burden is exclusively upon him to establish that the property was acquired by him and the same is not available for partition. On a consideration of the evidence before it, the trial court recorded a finding that the 1st defendant failed to discharge that burden and I am not persuaded to differ with the same. Therefore i hold that item Nos. l and 2 of the suit schedule property are not the self- acquisitions of D. W. I and as such those 2 items are also available for partition. ( 16 ) THE trial court recorded a finding that the 1st defendant incurred an expenditure of about Rs. 2,26,000. 00 for undertaking reconstruction to items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule property. On the basis of such finding it directed the plaintiffs contribute an amount of Rs. 50,000. 00 towards their share of the reconstruction. ( 16 ) THE trial court recorded a finding that the 1st defendant incurred an expenditure of about Rs. 2,26,000. 00 for undertaking reconstruction to items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule property. On the basis of such finding it directed the plaintiffs contribute an amount of Rs. 50,000. 00 towards their share of the reconstruction. So far as the expenditure for the litigation in respect of item No. 3 is concerned, it took the view that since the suit schedule properties were yielding income, the plaintiffs need not be burdened with the same. ( 17 ) IN this regard, it needs to be observed that D. W. I in his written statement as well as in chief-examination claimed that he incurred an expenditure of about rs. 1,00,000/- for the litigation in respect of item No. 3 of suit schedule property. However, in his cross-examination, he deposed as under:"i do not have any proof or document to show that I have spent Rs. 80,000. 00 to rs. 90,000/- towards litigation. "in the face of this admission the claim of d. W. I as regards legal expenditure cannot be sustained. Had he come forward with a true and correct account of the expenditure, he would have certainly been reimbursed proportionately. His pleadings in the written statement and tenor of his deposition does not gain confidence of the court. It only shows that he wants to take advantage of his academic superiority over the others particularly the plaintiffs. ( 18 ) COMING to the expenditure that is incurred for reconstruction of items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule property, the trial court failed to take into account one important aspect. On his own admission, D. W. I claimed the said two items of property as his exclusive and was enjoying the same as such ever since the date of purchase. If the plaintiffs are to be burdened with the share of expenditure incurred for reconstruction, they would be equally entitled for the share of the income from the said two items of property either before or subsequent to the reconstruction undertaken by D. W. I. However, that could have been relegated for determination at the stage of final decree proceedings. ( 19 ) THEREFORE I do not see any justification in the direction given by the trial court to the plaintiffs to pay an amount of Rs. 50,000. ( 19 ) THEREFORE I do not see any justification in the direction given by the trial court to the plaintiffs to pay an amount of Rs. 50,000. 00 as a condition precedent for their entitlement to a share in the suit schedule properties. The decree to that extent is set aside. Accordingly CCCA no. 138 of 1997 is dismissed and CCCA no. 167 of 1997 is allowed and the decree of the trial court is modified to the extent indicated below. (1) There shall be a preliminary decree for partition of the suit schedule properties into 4 equal shares, one each to be allotted to the defendants 1 to 3 and one to the plaintiffs jointly. (2) The parties shall be entitled to adduce evidence or such other material in the final decree proceedings as they wish to, as regards the expenditure incurred for making reconstructions on items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule property and also the income the said items could have yielded from the date of purchase till the date of partition. (3) The 1st defendant shall be entitled for reimbursement of the expenditure incurred in the litigation in respect of Item No. 3 duly satisfying the court as to the correctness of the same. The amount so arrived at shall be subject to adjustment. ( 20 ) EACH party shall bear their own costs.