Judgment ( 1. ) WE are deciding these Misc. Appeals which have been preferred by both the parties under Section 39 (vi) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29th March, 1985 passed by Additional District Judge, Mhow in Civil Suit No. 5/1983. Both the parties have challenged the aforesaid judgment and decree by separate appeals before us. ( 2. ) SUCCINCTLY narrated, the facts of the case are that the respondent of Misc. Appeal No. 161 of 1985 was a Military Contractor. In the years 1941 to 1946 the said contractor took military contracts for construction of buildings and supply of furniture to the military services at Bairagarh, Ajmer, Nasirabad and Mhow. The Contract No. C-444, dated 28-6-1944 was entered into between contractor and Lt. Col. E. L. Farley R. E. C. R. E. , Mhow at Mhow. There was some dispute in respect of the aforesaid Contract No. C-444 between the parties and the matterwent up to the Honble Supreme Court. On 20-11-1978 parties entered into a compromise before the Supreme Court. The contractor was claiming a sum of Rs. 28,226. 00 as per the award and also a sum of Rs. 16,475. 00 as a security deposit with interest amounting to Rs. 1,31,121. 00. The appellants/department despite notice has not paid the aforesaid amount to the contractor, hence an application under Section 20/8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, was filed by the contractor for referring the dispute to the arbitrator. The application was objected on the ground that there was no dispute or difference between the parties and it was also objected that the plaintiffs claim is barred by time. ( 3. ) BY order dated 4-5-1981 the Reference Court referred the matter to the arbitrator as per the agreement. Originally Major General Incharge Administration Central Command (Army) was appointed as an arbitrator but on his expressing inability to act as arbitrator, Retd. Major General Shri S. N. Bhatiya was appointed as arbitrator. The arbitrator passed his award on 14-6-1983, In this award the arbitrator did not decide the point of limitation and gave his finding on the point of costs though it was not referred to him. In the meantime contractor also claimed some additional amount of Rs. 9,333. 31 ps. Major General Shri S. N. Bhatiya was appointed as arbitrator. The arbitrator passed his award on 14-6-1983, In this award the arbitrator did not decide the point of limitation and gave his finding on the point of costs though it was not referred to him. In the meantime contractor also claimed some additional amount of Rs. 9,333. 31 ps. The District Court by order dated 7-10-1983 remitted back the award to the arbitrator for giving his fresh award considering the point of limitation and also the newly added amount. The award concerning the costs was set-aside by the Court. The arbitrator gave fresh award on 19-12-1983 in the light of the Court order dated 7-10-1983. ( 4. ) AS per the original award dated 14-6-1983 the arbitrator found that the contractor was entitled to recover the amount of Rs. 16,475. 00 as security deposit and Rs. 28,446. 00 against the other dues and Rs. 83,328. 45 ps. towards interest from 21-12-1947 to 20-11-1978 at the rate of 6% per annum and Rs. 3,07,832. 20 ps. towards interest from 21-114978 to 14-6-1983 at the rate of 15% per annum. By second award dated 19-12-1983 the arbitrator again held that the claim of the contractor was within limitation and the claim for Rs. 9,333. 31 ps. with interest was also justified. ( 5. ) THE aforesaid awards were filed before the Court for making the Rule of the Court. Various objections were raised on behalf of the Union of India before the Court regarding validity of the reference and jurisdiction of the Court. After hearing parties, the Court held that the Mhow Court was fully competent to make the reference to the arbitrator under the agreement and Mhow Court was also having territorial jurisdiction to decide the matter and also to appoint the arbitrator. The Court which was hearing the parties on the question of making the awards as a Rule of the Court, after considering various documents, agreement and evidence on record held that a difference and dispute existed between the parties and, therefore, the reference was rightly made by the Court to the arbitrator and the objections relating to the validity of reference were rejected. This objection that award passed by the arbitrator was in excess of his powers and thus it was invalid, was also negatived by the Court. This objection that award passed by the arbitrator was in excess of his powers and thus it was invalid, was also negatived by the Court. It was further held by the Court that application for referring the dispute to the arbitrator was within time from the date of the demand as the demand was first made on 21-3-1979 by a notice and the application for appointment of arbitrator was filed on 5th January, 1981. The other objection about the legal misconduct committed by the arbitrator in considering the inadmissible documents while passing the award was also negatived and it was found that the arbitrator was not guilty of any misconduct as the award was passed, not only on the basis of some documents, but after considering the entire material on record. This objection that the arbitrator did not give award on each point separately and, therefore, the award was bad-in-law was also rejected and it was held that the arbitrator is not bound to give separate award for each claim and he can award lump-sum amount. ( 6. ) LASTLY it was submitted before the rule making Court that there was no contract to pay the interest and, therefore, award pertaining to grant of interest is invalid. This objection was accepted by the Court below and it was held that the amount of interest of Rs. 83,328. 45 ps. awarded by the arbitrator was not proper and the rate of interest of 15% per annum awarded from 21-11-1978 was also not found justified and this rate of interest from 21-11-1978 till the date of the decree by the Court was reduced from 15% to 6% and the award for the period prior to 21-11-1978 was set aside and it was found that there was no justification for awarding interest for that period. ( 7. ) THE award was only found in excess for the claim of interest prior to 21-11-1978. For rest of the amount, the award was found to be legal and proper and this objection that the award was not filed before the Court in time was also not found to be legal and proper. The Court below partially made the award as a Rule of the Court and ordered that the plaintiff is entitled for a principal sum of Rs. 54,254. 00 alongwith 6% interest from 21-11-1978 till the date of payment. The Court below partially made the award as a Rule of the Court and ordered that the plaintiff is entitled for a principal sum of Rs. 54,254. 00 alongwith 6% interest from 21-11-1978 till the date of payment. The costs of the arbitration proceedings were worked out to Rs. 9,366. 45 ps. and it was directed that the same would be shared by the parties to the arbitration and with the aforesaid modification the award was made as a Rule of the Court. Against this judgment and decree, both the parties have filed these appeals challenging the judgment and decree. ( 8. ) WE have heard Shri B. G. Neema, learned Senior Standing Counsel for appellants/union of India and Shri P. K. Saxena, learned Senior Advocate instructed by Shri Fazal Hussain, for respondent/contractor, in both these appeals. ( 9. ) THE submission of Shri Neema, learned Senior Standing Counsel for Union of India in this appeal was that the Court below, while making the award as a Rule of the Court, has not considered the objections which were raised before making the award as a Rule of the Court. It was further submitted that the Court below has committed an illegality in making the award as a Rule of the Court and not setting-aside the same. He further reiterated all the objections which he had raised before the Court below. His further submission was that the arbitrator has committed legal misconduct and the award was bad-in-law on the face of it. ( 10. ) IN reply Shri Saxena, learned Senior Advocate submitted that it is a case in which the contract was awarded on 28-6-1944 and since then the contractor is running from pillar to post to get justice. His further submission was that a reasonable award was passed by the arbitrator who was a departmental officer and he has not committed any misconduct what to say about legal misconduct. His further submission was that the learned Court below though has made the award as a Rule of the Court after rejecting the objections filed on behalf of the Union of India but has wrongly disallowed the rate of interest which was awarded by the arbitrator from 21-12-1947 to 20-11-1978 at the rate of 6% per annum and has wrongly reduced the rate of interest from 21-11-1978 at the rate of 6% per annum instead of 15% per annum. He further argued that under the provisions of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 the scope of interference by the Reference Court is very limited and only confined to the provisions of law where an arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings, that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after the arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 33, and that an award has been improperly procured or it is otherwise invalid. ( 11. ) WE have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for parties and perused the record. We have also perused the award passed by the arbitrator as well as the judgment of the Court below making the award as a Rule of the Court. In our considered opinion the Court below was fully justified in rejecting all objections which were raised by the Union of India but the Court below was not justified in setting aside the interest awarded by the arbitrator prior to 21-11-1978, i. e. , from 21-12-1947 to 20-11-1978 at the rate of 6% per annum but we find that the Court below was justified in awarding interest from 21-11-1978 to 14-6-1983 but not at the rate of 15% per annum which is on higher side. ( 12. ) IN the light of the aforesaid arguments, we have re-examined the factual and legal findings recorded by the Court below, while making the award as a Rule of the Court and reconsidered all the objections which were raised by the Union of India before the Court below. The Court below after considering all the objections vide its order dated 4-5-1981 had made the reference to the arbitrator and as per this order the arbitrator was to decide about plaintiffs claim for the amount which was lying deposited with the Union of India. Thus, the arbitrator was appointed by the Court and he has passed the award on 14-6-1983. In the said award two questions were not decided by the arbitrator and for that a fresh application was filed in the Court and by its order dated 7-10-1983 the points were referred to the arbitrator for its award. The aforesaid orders, for the reference of a dispute to the arbitrator, were not challenged by the Union of India in appeal or revision. The aforesaid orders, for the reference of a dispute to the arbitrator, were not challenged by the Union of India in appeal or revision. The question of validity of reference and the question of jurisdiction were challenged before the Court below, while making the award as a Rule of the Court and it was objected that the Mhow Court had no territorial jurisdiction regarding the payment of supplies made to Nasirabad, Ajmer and Bhopal, The Court below rejected these objections solely on the ground that the agreement containing arbitration clause had taken place at Mhow and, therefore, the Mhow Court was competent to make reference to the arbitrator under the agreement. Since the order of the Reference Court regarding the dispute was not challenged at the relevant time by the Union of India, therefore, this objection was rightly overruled and rejected by the Court below and we also do not find any substance and merit in this objection, as the agreement had taken place between the parties at Mhow, therefore, the Mhow Court was also competent to make reference to the arbitrator under this agreement. ( 13. ) THE Court below had also rejected this objection that there was no dispute or difference existed between the parties for the reference of the same to the arbitrator. The Court below found that under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 validity of the award can be challenged at this stage also and in this regard reliance has been placed on Supreme Court judgment in the case of Union of India v. Om Prakash, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1745 , in which it has been held that-" invalidity of reference can be examined as the existence of difference between the parties in the arbitration agreement is a first condition for making reference to the arbitrator". In the light of the aforesaid legal position, the Court below after examining the dispute as well as the Arbitration Clause No. 35 of the agreement, came to a conclusion that failure to pay amount, and further more the question of liability to refund deposits and whether the contractor was entitled to claim any refund of the security deposits and the amount of liability under the agreement and also about the liability of the interest were the questions which were fully covered under the arbitration clause in the agreement. The Court below has held that the agreement is wide enough to cover the dispute regarding refund of security deposit as under the arbitration clause disputes regarding payments after completion of the work are also covered. Thus, it was held by the Court below that there existed a dispute and difference between the parties. Therefore, the reference was rightly made by the Court to the arbitrator. ( 14. ) WE have further examined the question of dispute and difference in the light of the Clause No. 35 of the agreement which is being reproduced hereinbelow:- "all other disputes and difference the settlement of which is not provided for under any other clause of this contract and which shall arise either during the progress of the work or after completion thereof concerning the work of the execution or maintenance thereof or the construction or meaning of these conditions of contract or as to any other matter arising out of or relating to the contract or the work to be executed or payments to be made in pursuance thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of Major General Incharge Administration Central Command, whose decision shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the contract," ( 15. ) THUS, from the bare reading of the aforesaid clause of the agreement and looking to the dispute between the parties, it is manifestly clear that the dispute and difference, which were referred to the arbitrator, arose in the case under the agreement and the same were rightly referred to the arbitrator. We have also examined the next objection which was raised on behalf of the Union of India before the Court below that the arbitrator was not competent to order the defendant to make the payment inasmuch as there was nothing in the reference empowering to him to do so. This objection was also rejected by the Court below on the ground that the arbitrator was not appointed merely for an academic purpose but by making reference to the arbitrator, the Court wanted to know the liability of the defendants in respect of the amount shown in Schedules A and B when the arbitrator found that the amounts shown in Schedules A and B were found to be payable. The arbitrator was justified in directing the defendants that the amounts due are payable to the contractor and we also find that the Court below was legally justified in recording such a finding. ( 16. ) THE another objection which was raised on behalf of the defendants that the claims of the contractor were pertaining to the deposits made in the year 1947, therefore, the claims were hopelessly barred by time. The Court below found that the claims were within time as demand was made for the first time on 21-3-1979 and an application for appointment of arbitrator was moved on 5th January, 1981, i. e. , within 3 years from the date of demand when the claim was made on the basis of compromise dated 20-11-1978 and cause of action was pleaded on the same basis than the Court below was perfectly justified in holding that the claims were within time. According to us also there is no scope for interference in such a finding and neither the arbitrator nor the Court below has committed any misconduct in recording such a finding. ( 17. ) THE other two objections regarding assigning reasons by the arbitrator while passing the award and also admitting the inadmissible documents in the evidence were also considered and rejected. We are also of the view that the arbitrator is not bound to give separate award for each claim and arbitrator has not committed any illegality in placing reliance on some documents for which it has been argued that they were inadmissible in evidence and that the award was beyond the period of limitation. After hearing learned Counsel for parties and on perusal of the objections and record, we are in full agreement with the reasonings assigned by the Court below for rejecting the objections. In this case a lumpsum award has been passed. Thus, it is not in dispute before us and it is the settled law that an arbitrator is not bound by the technical rules of evidence, nor he is bound to record separate findings on the various points on which the parties are at issue, or to pass a reasoned award. In this case a lumpsum award has been passed. Thus, it is not in dispute before us and it is the settled law that an arbitrator is not bound by the technical rules of evidence, nor he is bound to record separate findings on the various points on which the parties are at issue, or to pass a reasoned award. To concur with the fundamental principles in the arbitration matters, the Supreme Court in the case of Santa Sila Devi v. Dhirendra Nath Sen, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1677 , after reviewing the various authorities had observed that-" where an award given by the arbitrator is filed in Court and is challenged, on the ground of its incompleteness, the Court has to bear in mind certain basic principles which are:- " (1) a Court should approach an award with a desire to support it, if that is reasonably possible, rather than to destroy it by calling it illegal; (2) unless the reference to arbitration specifically so requires the arbitrator is not bound to deal with each claim or matter separately, but can deliver a consolidated award. The legal position is clear that unless so specifically required an award need not formally express the decision of the arbitrator on each matter of difference; (3) unless the contrary appears the Court will presume that the award disposes finally of all the matters in difference; and (4) where an award is made de praemissis (that is, of an concerning all the matters in dispute referred to arbitration), the presumption is that the arbitrator intended to dispose finally of all the matters in difference; and his award will be held final, if by any intendment it can be made so. " ( 18. ) AS a general rule, the following acts of an arbitrator cannot be considered to be misconduct and cannot be a ground of challenge :- " (1) Coming to an erroneous decision by itself is not misconduct, whether his error is one of fact or law, and whether or not his findings of fact are supported by evidence. It may be misconduct if there are gross errors in failing to hear, or improperly receiving evidence. These cases fastened no rules to attribute misconduct on the arbitrator so long he follows the principles of natural justice. (2) It is no ground that the facts were wrongly found. It may be misconduct if there are gross errors in failing to hear, or improperly receiving evidence. These cases fastened no rules to attribute misconduct on the arbitrator so long he follows the principles of natural justice. (2) It is no ground that the facts were wrongly found. (3) That the conclusion is wrong in fact. (4) That the arbitrator did not give a reasoned award. (5) It is also not misconduct that the arbitrator came to a wrong conclusion in law. Mere error in law is no ground of misconduct, unless the error in law appears on the face of the award. (6) The award cannot be set aside merely because there are some contradictions or even inconsistencies in certain parts of the award, consisting partly of finding and partly narrative. (7) It is not misconduct for the arbitrator to make mistake of law. (8) It is not misconduct for an arbitrator to misconceive or mistake the arguments to him. " ( 19. ) IT is also the settled principle of law that the scope of challenge to an award is limited, as compared to a judgment in a civil case. It is essentially on the principle that the parties have decided to abide by the verdict of a forum chosen by them. Unless the party challenging the award is able to show that the arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction in taking into consideration a matter beyond his jurisdiction. It is quite clear that the Court will not allow itself to be made a Court of Appeal against the decision of the arbitrators. The Court should also give wide latitude to the arbitrators to decide rightly or wrongly and the mistake of the arbitrators, if he proceeds honestly and impartially, will not be available for correction unless it appears a mistake of jurisdiction on the face of the award. It is also settled position that interference by the Court on the factual aspect of the matter is remotely available. It is also settled position that interference by the Court on the factual aspect of the matter is remotely available. As observed in the case of Tarapore and Company v. Cochin Shipyard Ltd. , reported in AIR 1984 SC 1072 , it clearly transpires that if a question is specifically referred and it become evident that the parties desired to have a decision on the specific question from the arbitrator about that rather than one from Court, then the Court will not interfere with the award of the arbitrator on the ground that there is an error of law apparent on the face of award even if the view of the law taken by the arbitrator does not accord with the view of the Court. ( 20. ) "judicial demolition" of an award is possible only when some legal proposition is stated in the award and which is found absolutely illegal on the face of it. Generally in case of erroneous award the Court does not interfere in the non-speaking awards because the arbitrator is the final arbitrator or Judge both on the question of law and facts. Even an erroneous decision by him on a question of law does not vitiate the award unless the error appears on the face of the award. ( 21. ) TO advert on the question of scope of interference in this appeal against a judgment making the award as a Rule of the Court, it is too well settled that the scope in appeal against such judgment is very limited. The Appellate Court cannot interfere unless the discretion is exercised in a perverse manner, or is vitiated under the law. The Supreme Court has already ruled the powers of the Appellate Court and scope for its interference in appeal in the case of Printers (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph, reported in AIR 1960 SC 1156 , as under :-" if the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the Trial Courts exercise of discretion. As is often said, it is ordinarily not open to the Appellate Court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of Trial Court except that in exercising its discretion the Trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts and has adopted an unjudicial approach then it would certainly be open to the Appellate Court and in many cases it may be its duty to interfere with the Trial Courts exercise of discretion. In cases falling under this class the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court is in law wrongful and improper and that would certainly justify and call for interference from the Appellate Court. " ( 22. ) RECENTLY in the case of Ispat Engineering and Foundary Works, B. S. City, Bokaro v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. , reported in AIR 2001 SC 2516 , the Supreme Court after discussing various previous authorities has held that:-"needless to record that there exists a long catena of cases through which the law seems to be rather well settled that the reappraisal of evidence by the Court is not permissible. This Court in one of its latest decisions Arosan Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 9 SCC 449 : (1999 AIR SCW 3872: AIR 1999 SC 3804 ) upon consideration of decision in Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. , AIR 1923 PC 66 : 1923 AC 480, Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture (P) Ltd. , AIR 1967 SC 1032 : (1967) 1 SCR 324 ; N. Chellappan v. Secy. , Kerala SEB, (1975) 1 SCC 289 : ( AIR 1975 SC 230 ); Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Government of Kerala, (1989) 2 SCC 38 : ( AIR 1989 SC 890 ); State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. , (1994) 6 SCC 485 : (1994 AIR SCW 5061) as also in Olympus Superstructures (P) Ltd. v. Meena Vijay Khetan, (1999) 5 SCC 651 : (1999 AIR SCW 1831 : AIR 1999 SC 2102 ) has stated that reappraisal of evidence by the Court is not permissible and as a matter of fact, exercise of power to re-appraise the evidence is unknown to a proceeding under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act. This Court in Arosan Enterprises (supra) categorically stated that in the event of there being no reason in the award question of interference of the Court would not arise at all. In the event however, there are reasons, interference would still be not available unless of course, there exist a total perversity in the award or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. This Court went on to record that in the event however, two views are possible on question of law, the Court would not be justified in interfering with the award of the arbitrator if the view taken recourse to is a possible view. The observations of Lord Dunedin in Champsey Bhara (supra), stands accepted and adopted by this Court in Bungo Steel Furniture (supra) to the effect that the Court had no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case or to examine the documentary and oral evidence in the record for the purposes of finding out whether or not the arbitrator has committed an error of law. The Court as a matter of fact, cannot substitute its own evaluation and come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Be it noted that the award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive unless a contra intention is disclosed in the agreement itself. This Court in Ralliaram (Union of India v. A. L. Ralliaram), (1964) 3 SCR 164 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1685 ) stated that right or wrong the decision of the arbitrator is binding excepting in the case of error of law on the face of it or in the event the award itself or in a document actually incorporated in it, there is found some legal proposition which stands out to be the basis of the award and which is erroneous. Ralliarams decision expressly records that the Civil Courts cannot exercise apparent power over the decision of an arbitrator wrong or right irrespective (excepting however the situation noticed above ). Ralliarams decision expressly records that the Civil Courts cannot exercise apparent power over the decision of an arbitrator wrong or right irrespective (excepting however the situation noticed above ). In Jivarajbhai v. Chintamanrao Balaji, (1964) 5 SCR 480 : ( AIR 1965 SC 214 ) it has also been laid down that it is not open to Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion and it is not open to the Court to attempt to assess the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of the award. Law thus seems to be well settled on the score of exercise of jurisdiction of law Courts as regards interference with an award of arbitrator or umpire as the case may be. " ( 23. ) THUS, in view of the foregoing discussions it is clear that ordinarily it is not open to this Appellate Court to substitute its own discretion unless it is shown that the Court below has acted unreasonably or capriciously and has not adopted judicial approach in the matter. The learned Counsel for the Union of India has failed to show any material to us for coming to a different conclusion. He also could not make out a case for interference and could not show us that how the judgment of the Court below making the award as a Rule of the Court is unjustified and illegal. Thus, we also do not find that any case is made out for interference by this Court in this appeal and in the reasonings adopted by the Court below in making the award as a Rule of the Court. ( 24. ) THUS, we do not find any merit or substance in the appeal filed by the Union of India and accordingly the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. ( 25. ) MISC. Appeal No. 149 of 1985 has been preferred by the contractor against that part of the award by which the Court below has set-aside the interest with effect from 21-12-1947 to 20-11-1978 and has also reduced the rate of interest from 15% to 6% per annum for the period from 21-11-1978 to 14-6-1983. We have perused the award passed by the arbitrator. We have perused the award passed by the arbitrator. By order dated 22nd November, 1982 the Court of Xth Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore had referred the following disputes to the arbitrator, namely (i) payment of security deposits of various contracts withheld by the Union of India amounting to Rs. 16,475. 00; and (ii) payment of amount of various arbitration awards withheld by the Union of India amounting to Rs. 28,446. 00. And by subsequent/extended award dated 19-12-1983 awarded a sum of Rs. 9,333. 31 ps. in favour of the contractor and the interest on the amounts ibid accrued subsequent to Supreme Court decision of 20-11-1978 for the period from 21-12-1947 to 20-11-1978 and from 20-11-1978 to the date of the decree by the Court. All the disputes were referred to the arbitrator by the Court and by award dated 14th June, 1983, the following award was passed by the arbitrator :-" (a) that payment shall be made to Messrs Chhujjoomul and Sons of Security Deposits of various contracts withheld by the Union of India amounting to total of Rs. 16,475. 00 (Rupees sixteen thousand four hundred seventy five only ). (b) that payment shall be made to Messrs Chhujjoomul and Sons of various arbitration awards amounting to total of Rs. 28,446. 00 (Rupees twenty eight thousand four hundred forty six only) withheld by the Union of India. (c) that interest (simple) at the rate of 6% on the above amounts, i. e. , Rs. 44,921. 00 shall be paid to Messrs Chhujjoomul and Sons from 21-12-1947 to 20-11-1978 amounting to Rs. 83,328. 45 (Rupees eighty three thousand three hundred twenty eight and paisa forty five only ). (d) that Simple Interest at the rate of 15% on the above amounts, i. e. , Rs. 44,921. 00 shall be paid to Messrs Chhujjoomul and Sons from 21-11-1978 to 14-6-1983 amounting to Rs. 30,783. 00 (Rupees thirty thousand seven hundred eighty three and paisa twenty only ). (e) that Simple Interest at the rate of 15% on the above amounts, i. e. , Rs. 44,921. 00 shall be paid to Messrs Chhujjoomul and Sons from 15-6-1983 to the date of decree by the Court. (f) that the fee and charges in respect of this arbitration amounting to Rs. 20,852. (e) that Simple Interest at the rate of 15% on the above amounts, i. e. , Rs. 44,921. 00 shall be paid to Messrs Chhujjoomul and Sons from 15-6-1983 to the date of decree by the Court. (f) that the fee and charges in respect of this arbitration amounting to Rs. 20,852. 00 (Rupees Twenty thousand eight hundred fifty two only) to be borne by each party as under :" And by award dated 19-12-1983, the following award was passed by the arbitrator:-" (a) Limitation: that the claims of the claimant as awarded in my award dated fourteenth June, 1983 and the claim now being awarded under this award are not barred by limitation. (b) Final bill for Rs. 9,333. 31 and interest: that the claim is justified and the respondent will pay to the claimant Rs. 9,333. 31 with interest to be calculated on the basis of my award dated fourteenth June, 1983. " ( 26. ) FROM the bare reading of the aforesaid awards, it is very much clear that the question of interest prior to 20-11-1978 and post 20-11-1978 was clearly referred to the arbitrator. Arbitrator has passed the award for the interest from 21-12-1947 to 20-11-1978 at the rate of 6% per annum which the Court while making the award as a Rule of the Court has set aside. After perusal of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the Court below has wrongly set aside the impugned award when the same was subject-matter of the disputes before the arbitrator. Thus, we allow interest on a sum of Rs. 44,921. 00 at the rate of 6% per annum amounting to Rs. 83,328. 00. The arbitrator had also allowed interest on a sum of Rs. 44,921. 00 at the rate of 15% per annum from 21-11-1978 to 14-64983 amounting to Rs. 33,783. 20 ps. which has been reduced by the Court below from 15% to 6% per annum. Looking to the present market rate of interest and also the rate of interest fixed by the Reserve Bank of India and Scheduled Nationalised Bank, the Court below was fully justified in reducing the award of interest for this period from 15% to 6% per annum as there was no justification for grant of 15% per annum interest for this period by the arbitrator. While referring the disputes to the arbitrator, the rate of interest was not specified. On the aforesaid sum of Rs. 44,921. 00 the arbitrator has also allowed simple interest at the rate of 15%. per annum from the date of award, i. e. , 15-6-1983 till the date of the decree by the Court. The Court below granted pendente lite and further interest at the rate of 6% per annum till the date of its payment. ( 27. ) UPTIL now there was lot of controversy in judicial pronouncements on the question of power of the arbitrator for grant of pre-reference interest and also on the question of pendente lite interest. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa and Ors. v. G. C. Roy, reported in JT 1992 (6) SC 349, has held that arbitrator has jurisdiction to award pendente lite interest and has held as under:- "a dispute between two parties may be determined by Court through judicial process or by arbitrator through a non-judicial process. The resolution of dispute by Court, through judicial process is costly and time consuming. Therefore, generally the parties with a view to avoid delay and cost, prefer alternative method of settlement of dispute through arbitration proceedings. In addition to these two known process of settlement of dispute there is another alternative method of settlement of dispute through statutory arbitration. Statutory arbitrations are regulated by the statutory provisions while the parties entering into agreement for the resolution of their dispute through the process of arbitration are free to enter into agreement regarding the method, mode and procedure of the resolution of their dispute, provided the same are not opposed to any provision of law. Many a time while suit is pending for adjudication before a Court, the Court with the consent of the parties, refers the dispute to arbitration. On account of the growth in the international trade and commerce and also on account of long delays occurring in the disposal of suits and appeals in Courts, there has been tremendous movement towards the resolution of disputes through alternative forum of arbitrators. The alternative method of settlement of dispute through arbitration is a speedy and convenient process, which is being followed throughout the world. The alternative method of settlement of dispute through arbitration is a speedy and convenient process, which is being followed throughout the world. In India since ancient days settlement of disputes by Panches has been a common process for resolution of disputes in an informal manner. But now arbitration is regulated by statutory provisions. " ( 28. ) THE question about awarding pre-reference interest by the arbitrator also arose before the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division, Orissa v. N. C. Budharaj (Dead) by L. Rs. , reported in JT 2001 (1) SC 486, in which it has been held that the arbitrator appointed with or without the intervention of the Court, has jurisdiction to award interest, on the sums found due and payable, for the pre-reference period, in the absence of any specific stipulation or prohibition in the contract to claim or grant any such interest. The decision in the case of Executive Engineer (Irri.) v. Abhaduta Jena, reported in JT 1987 (4) SC 8, taking a contra view does not lay down the correct position and stands over-ruled. In case of N. C. Budharaj (supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court that :- "if that be the position, Courts which of late encourage litigants to opt for and avail of the alternative method of resolution of disputes, would be penalising or placing those who avail of the same in a serious disadvantage. Both logic and reason should Counsel Courts to lean more in favour of the arbitrator holding to possess all the powers as are necessary to do complete and full justice between the parties in the same manner in which the Civil Court seized of the same dispute could have done. By agreeing to settle all the disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the contract between the parties through arbitration instead of having recourse to Civil Court to vindicate their rights the party concerned cannot be considered to have frittered away and given up any claim which otherwise he could have successfully asserted before Courts and obtained relief. By agreeing to settle all the disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the contract between the parties through arbitration instead of having recourse to Civil Court to vindicate their rights the party concerned cannot be considered to have frittered away and given up any claim which otherwise he could have successfully asserted before Courts and obtained relief. By agreeing to have settlement of disputes through arbitration, the party concerned must be understood to have only opted for a different forum of adjudication with less cumbersome procedure, delay and expense and not to abandon all or any of his substantive rights under the various laws in force, according to which only even the arbitrator is obliged to adjudicate the claims referred to him. As long as there is nothing in the arbitration agreement to exclude the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to entertain a claim for interest on the amounts due under the contract, or any prohibition to claim interest on the amounts due and become payable under the contract, the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to consider and award interest in respect of all periods subject only to Section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and that too the powers of the Court thereunder, has to be upheld. The submission that the arbitrator cannot have jurisdiction to award interest for the period prior to the date of his appointment or entering into reference which alone confers him power is too stale and technical to be countenanced on our hands, for the simple reason that in every case the appointment of an arbitrator or even resort to Court to vindicate rights could be only after disputes have cropped up between the parties and continue to subsist unresolved and that if the arbitrator has the power to deal with and decide disputes which cropped up at a point of time and for the period prior to the appointment of an arbitrator, it is beyond comprehension as to why and for what reason and with what justification the arbitrator should be denied only the power to award interest for the pre-reference period when such interest becomes payable and has to be awarded as an accessory or incidental to the sum awarded as due and payable, taking into account the deprivation of the use of such sum to the person lawfully entitled to the same. " ( 29. " ( 29. ) THUS, as per the aforesaid Constitutional Bench decisions in the case of N. C. Budharaj (supra), the arbitrator is also having powers to award pre-reference period interest and same was allowed by the arbitrator in this case but has been disallowed by the Court below. Thus, in view of the latest pronouncement of the Apex court in case of N. C. Budharaj (supra), we set aside the aforesaid direction of the Court below and restore the award passed by the arbitrator for granting interest on the aforesaid sum of Rs. 44,921. 00 with effect from 21-12-1947 to 20-11-1978 at the simple interest rate of 6% per annum. We also uphold the award of the Court below for the interest with effect from 20-11-1978 till its recovery at the simple interest rate of 6% per annum on a sum of Rs. 44,921. 00. We further allow future interest at the rate of 6% per annum on a sum of Rs. 54,254. 00 from 29-3-1985 till its recovery with costs of Rs. 2,000. 00 to the respondent/ contractor. The contractor shall also be liable to share 50% arbitration expenses as directed by the Court below. ( 30. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussions, the appeal filed by the Union of India is hereby dismissed and the appeal filed on behalf of the contractor is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. ( 31. ) RETAIN this order in the record of Misc. Appeal No. 161 of 1985 and place its copy in the record of connection Misc. Appeal No. 149 of 1985.