ORDER Dipak Misra, J. In this writ petition preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the notices issued vide Annexures P/1 to P/11 by the respondents No. 2 and 3 and further to issue a writ of mandamus commanding them not to make any demand in relation to property tax from the petitioner. The expose of facts is that the petitioner is a registered wakf under the Wakf Act, 1954. The said Wakf was created 123 years back for religious and charitable purposes. It is engaged in religious and other educational activities in the city of Jabalpur. It runs four High Secondary Schools, one English Higher Secondary School and two girls colleges one in Arts and another in Commerce. It holds various religious functions, namely, Prophet Day, Foundation Day and conducts sports activities in various schools every year. It pays salaries to its teachers for teaching religious education to the children belonging to Muslim minority community in the city. It is putforth in the petition that the Wakf owns residential and non-residential houses for commerce purposes which are let out to various tenants and the rental income derived therefrom is exclusively used for religious and charitable purposes. According to the writ petitioner the Property Tax Officer of the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, respondent No. 3 herein, issued a demand notice on 16-1-1997 for payment of property tax as per Annexure P/1. Further demand notices which were sent for payment of the aforesaid tax have been brought on record as Annexure P/2 to P/11. The petitioner submitted his objection in regard to payment of the property tax. The said petition was sent by letter dated 25-11-1997. In reply to the same the respondent No. 2 vide Annexure P/3 dated 24-12-1997 communicated to the petitioner that no exemption under the provisions of section 136 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 is permissible in respect of the houses which are let out to the tenants. The petitioner submitted its reply to the said letter taking the plea that the entire income derived from the rented premises is exclusively utilised for religious purposes and public charitable institutions for payment of salaries to the teachers of Arabic religious school and other institutions. The petitioner submitted its reply to the said letter taking the plea that the entire income derived from the rented premises is exclusively utilised for religious purposes and public charitable institutions for payment of salaries to the teachers of Arabic religious school and other institutions. It was also putforth that various buildings and lands belonging to the petitioner are used for educational purposes including running of higher secondary schools, one in Ram Manohar Lohiya Ward Old (Marhatal) Mohallas and the other at Gohalpur. A stand was also taken that there is a big library in the buildings belonging to the petitioner and it has taken other building on rent at Naya Mohalla and Cantonment Jabalpur where the Higher Secondary Schools are run. In spite of the aforesaid objection the respondents erroneously assessed the petitioner to the property tax. It is averred in the petition that as the rental income obtained from the premises in question is exclusively used for religious and public charitable institutions, the petitioner is not liable to pay the property tax. Reliance has been placed on its bye-laws to highlight the aims and objects of the petitioner Trust. It is urged in the petition that religious purposes do include ritual ceremonies, imparting education, making provision of burial of the dead and relief to orphans and destitutes and giving aids to poor students and earning money for charitable purpose. It is averred that buildings and schools are managed from the said amount and salaries of various employees are made good from the said income. It is highlighted that religious or charitable purposes are not to be rigidly and narrowly construed to exclude the incidental expenses which have direct nexus with the upkeep, maintenance and existence of the Wakf and its properties. It is putforth that the petitioner owns enormous property which are to be kept in proper maintenance for which it has employed many persons for the said purpose and also, if required, to get into litigation. Reference has been made to section 72 of the Wakf Act to show that contribution is paid to the Wakf Board and, therefore, question of payment of property tax to the Municipal Corporation does not arise. Reference has been made to section 72 of the Wakf Act to show that contribution is paid to the Wakf Board and, therefore, question of payment of property tax to the Municipal Corporation does not arise. A counter affidavit has been filed by the answering respondents No. 2 and 3 contending, inter alia, that the petitioner has not exhausted the alternative remedy by filing an appeal before the District Court, as provided u/s 149 of the Municipal Corporation Act and when an efficacious statutory remedy is available this Court should be slow to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. It is further urged that the petitioner has constructed 85 shops in the building where a school, namely, Robertson Anjuman Islamia High School, Jabalpur runs and all these shops have been rented out to various persons. It has been setforth in the return that exemption sought for by the petitioner under the Municipal Corporation Act is not applicable as the property in question does not come within that category. It has been putforth that buildings which have been let out to tenants are for commercial purposes and the income derived from the said property is used for payment of salary to the teachers and staff and as the same is admitted position the exemption claimed by the petitioner is untenable. A distinction has been drawn in the reply between the properties used for educational purposes and the properties exclusively used for religious and charitable purposes. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner setting forth the stand that the plea relating to alternative remedy is incorrect and unsound as no appeal lies in a case of this nature. It is further putforth that income received from the property when used for educational purposes is bound to be exempted and the artificial distinction which has been brought on record by the respondent is unappreciable. It is also putforth that the income is spent for religious and charitable purposes and, therefore, denial of exemption to the petitioner is totally unwarranted. Certain additional documents have been brought on record to highlight how the entire income is being spent. Reference has been made to Public Trust Act, 1951 to show that religious purpose would include charitable purposes and which in its broader spectrum would include religious teaching in various educational institutions. Certain additional documents have been brought on record to highlight how the entire income is being spent. Reference has been made to Public Trust Act, 1951 to show that religious purpose would include charitable purposes and which in its broader spectrum would include religious teaching in various educational institutions. It has been reiterated that charitable purpose cannot be applied or understood rigidly and narrowly to exclude all other incidental expenses. It is the stand of the petitioner in the rejoinder that the respondent No. 3 has not considered the pleas advanced by the petitioner in proper perspective and has imposed the property tax as if the petitioner has not spent money for religious and charitable purposes. I have heard Mr. A.S. Usmani, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents No. 2 and 3. It is submitted by Mr. Usmani that the demands made by the respondents are totally unjust, improper and incorrect inasmuch as the properties in question being utilised for religious charitable purpose are entitled to exemption but the same has not been considered in proper perspective. The learned counsel has submitted that the authorities have not taken note of the bye-laws of the petitioner which would go a long way to show that it is exclusively engaged in the avowed purpose to bring it within the sweep of exemption. The learned counsel has canvassed that if section 136 of the Municipal Corporation Act is appreciated in proper perspective it is quite vivid that the property owned by the petitioner-trust is entitled to the benefit. To bolster his submission he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, , Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad Vs. Hyderabad Race Club, and Shri Deo Radha Madhava Lalji Genda Trust, Sagar vs. Property Tax Officer, Sagar and ors, 1980 MPLJ 385 . Mr. S.K. Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, sounding a contra note, has canvassed that the petitioner is not entitled to exemption and the protective umbrella which has been created u/s 136 of the Act in its quintessence does not give it shelter. The learned counsel has submitted that there is a gulf of difference between the religious and charitable purpose and the educational purpose and both cannot be understood to connote the same. The learned counsel has submitted that there is a gulf of difference between the religious and charitable purpose and the educational purpose and both cannot be understood to connote the same. The learned counsel has submitted that the stand of the petitioner is totally unjustified as proper opportunity was afforded before the tax was imposed. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Children Book Trust, , Laxminarayan Sharma vs. Property Tax Officer, Shajapur, 1978 JLJ 17 and Mathuram Agrawal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, . He has also reiterated the plea taken in the counter affidavit with regard to availability of alternative remedy. The seminal issue that arises for adjudication in this writ petition is whether the petitioner-Trust is entitled to get exemption from payment of property tax. Section 135 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 deals with imposition of property tax. Section 136 of the Act speaks of out exemptions. The said provision reads as under:-- 136. Exemptions. The seminal issue that arises for adjudication in this writ petition is whether the petitioner-Trust is entitled to get exemption from payment of property tax. Section 135 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 deals with imposition of property tax. Section 136 of the Act speaks of out exemptions. The said provision reads as under:-- 136. Exemptions. -- The property tax levied u/s 135 shall not be leviable in respect of the following properties namely:-- (a) buildings and lands owned by or vesting in -- (i) the Union Government; (ii) the State Government; (iii) the Corporation; (b) buildings and lands the annual value of which does not exceed six thousand rupees in case of Municipal area having population of one lac or above and four thousand eight hundred rupees in case of Municipal area having population below one lac: Provided that if any such building or land is in the ownership of a person who owns any other building or land in the same city, the annual value of such building or land shall for the purposes of this clause, be deemed to be the aggregate annual value of all buildings or lands owned by him in the city; (c) buildings, and lands or portions thereof used exclusively for educational purposes including schools, boarding houses, hostels and libraries if such buildings and lands or portions thereof are either owned by the educational institutions concerned or have been placed at the disposal of such educational institutions without payment of any rent; (d) public parks and playgrounds which are open to the public and building and land attached thereto if the rent deprived therefrom is exclusively spent for the administration of parks and playgrounds to which they are attached; (e) buildings and lands or portions thereof used exclusively for public worship of public charity such as mosques, temples, churches, dharmashalas, gurudwaras, hospitals, dispensaries, orphanages, alms houses, drinking water fountains, infirmaries for the treatment and care of animals and public burial grounds, or other places for the disposal of the deal: Provided that the following buildings and lands or portions thereof shall not be deemed to be used exclusively for public worship or for public charity within the meaning of this section, namely:-- (i) buildings in, or lands on, which any trade or business is carried on unless the rent derived from such buildings or lands is applied exclusively to religious purposes or to public charitable institutions aforesaid; (ii) buildings or lands in respect of which rent is derived and such rent is not applied exclusively to religious purposes or public charitable institutions aforesaid; (f) buildings and lands owned by widows or minors or persons subject to physical disability or mental infirmity owing to which they are incapable of earning their livelihood, where the main source of maintenance of such widows or minors or persons is the rent derived from such buildings and lands: Provided that such exemption shall relate only to the first twelve thousand rupees of the annual value of such buildings and lands. (g) buildings and lands owned by freedom fighters, retired members of Defence Services and their widows during their lifetime if they are exempted from income tax; (h) buildings and lands owned by blind persons, abandoned women and mentally incapacitate persons if sufficient proof is produced in this behalf and if the main source of their maintenance is the rent derived from such buildings and lands. (i) buildings and lands in occupation of owner for his residence shall be exempted from property tax to the extent of fifty percent. (j) The electric pole erected by the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board. Submission of Mr. Usmani is that as rental income of the Trust is exclusively utilised for religious and public charitable purposes it is entitled to the exemption under clause (c), e(i) and e(ii) of section 136 of the 1956 Act. On a scanning of clause (c) it is manifest that if buildings and lands or portions thereof used exclusively for educational purposes including schools, boarding houses, hostels and libraries if such properties are owned by educational institutions or have been placed at the disposal of such educational institutions without payment of any rent, they are to get the privilege of exemption. Thus, the aforesaid clause can be segregated into two parts, namely, the buildings which are used exclusively for educational purpose must be owned by educational institutions or secondly if they are given to them, they must be utilising the same without payment of rent. As far as Clause (e) of section 136 of the Act is concerned it deals with properties used exclusively for public worship or for public charity. Certain properties or lands have been enumerated to be covered under the said purpose. The proviso carves out certain exceptions. The buildings and lands or portions thereof would not be deemed to be used exclusively or public worship or for public charitable institutions within the meaning of the section, if the rent derived from the said buildings or lands is not applied exclusively for religious purpose or public charitable institutions which find mention in the main section and Secondly if the buildings or lands in respect of which rent is derived and such rent is not applied exclusively to religious purposes or the earlier mentioned charitable institutions. It is urged by Mr. It is urged by Mr. Usmani that when there is no definition of religious purpose or public worship or public charity the scope is of immense magnitude and religious purpose would include imparting of education and payment of salary to the staff of the schools and colleges. Per contra, submits Mr. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents that the Trust has constructed shops and has been collecting rent but the said rental income, as has been admitted, is utilised or applied for running the educational institutions. I have referred to the aforesaid provisions and analysed them to highlight what exactly the said provisions convey. Mr. Usmani has commended me to the decision rendered in the case of Royal Hatcheries Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, (1994) 92 STC 239 SC. The aforesaid case, submitted the learned counsel has been relied upon to show that Court would not adopt a construction which would render some of the words nugatory or superfluous. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court was dealing with the terms used in taxation statute and expressed the opinion that words used in taxing statute must be understood in their popular sense. Thus, in essence, submission of Mr. Usmani is that as the words like religious purpose, public worship or public charity have not been defined they should be understood in common parlance and meaning with wider connotation should be given to them. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Commissioner of income tax vs. Shri Ram Education Foundation, (250) ITR 205 /504. In the aforesaid case the High Court of Delhi was required to answer a reference referred u/s 256(1) of the income tax Act, 1961. The said question evolved on the factual matrix whether the business of "Jugnu" was property held under trust for charitable purpose and income therefrom was to be exempted under the provisions of section 11 of the Act. The facts in that case are that a registered society was founded to furnish theoretical and practical education in business of science and in furtherance of the aforesaid objects the foundations run schools and colleges and other educational institutions, opened industrial and commercial undertaking as a means of training men or in support of the institution solely or in partnership with others. An institution known as Lala Madan Mohan Lall Mahila Shilp Vidyalaya Society transferred its assets and liability to the foundation on the condition that it shall apply the assets for the objects of the society. The assets were placed on trust with the foundation which was running a vocational training centre in the name of 'Jugnu' which trained women in the art of stitching and embroidery. When the matter went to the income tax Commissioner, the Tribunal recorded the following: On the materials placed before us there is no scope for concluding that the primary object or dominant purpose of the institution is the carrying on of an activity of profit. The real purpose of the institution is the advancement of the object of imparting vocational training and teaching to needy women. We therefore hold that the business of the Jugnu activity is property held under trust and for charitable purposes and income therefrom is to be exempted in accordance with the provisions of section 11. The lower authorities were wrong on this point and the decisions are set aside. The aforesaid finding of the Tribunal was concurred with by the High Court by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, . It is worthy of mention here that in the aforesaid case exemption was claimed in respect of income u/s 11 of the Income Tax Act and the income tax Officer was of the view the activity run by the foundation had resulted in surplus which was not charitable. In that context the High Court opined that income was exempted u/s 11 of the Act. Hence, I am of the considered view the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the case at hand. I may hasten to add that the Tribunal was of the opinion that the property was owned by the trust for charitable purpose. Submission of Mr. Usmani is that the aforesaid decision supports the proposition that the expenses incurred in teaching would come within the ambit and sweep of charitable purposes. I shall be dealing with that subtle facet at a later stage. Mr. Submission of Mr. Usmani is that the aforesaid decision supports the proposition that the expenses incurred in teaching would come within the ambit and sweep of charitable purposes. I shall be dealing with that subtle facet at a later stage. Mr. S.K. Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3 has submitted that the public worship and public charity u/s 136 have been put in a different compartment and educational purposes have been put in a different category. It is putforth by him that the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 is a complete Code in itself and on certain conditions precedent it has exempted the buildings and lands or portions thereof from property tax. If a particular building or land or a portion thereof is not covered by the provision relating to exemption the sphere would be broadened by referring to other statutes. On the contrary Mr. Usmani has contended that if the amount is spent for charitable purpose the Board is entitled to exemption and charitable purpose does include spending money for education. To bolster his submission he has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Shri Deo Radha Madhava Trust (supra). In the aforesaid decision the Division Bench of this Court was dealing with the provision of M.P. Nagariya Sthavar Sampatti Kar Adhiniyam (14 of 1964). In the said case the petitioner-trust was created and registered under the M.P. Public Trusts Act. The Trust owned many premises which were let out to tenants and the rental income derived from the houses of the Trust was exclusively utilised and applied for religious and charitable purposes and also for charitable institutions. The petitioner therein resisted the imposition of property tax on the houses of the Trust on the ground that rental income from the properties was applied exclusively on religious and charitable purposes according to the direction of the Trust. After a series of proceeding the matter travelled to this Court as the assessing authority came to hold that the amount was not spent exclusively for religious and charitable purposes. The order was maintained by the appellate authority. This Court referred to section 6 of the relevant statute and in paragraphs 7 and 8 and held as under:-- 7. After a series of proceeding the matter travelled to this Court as the assessing authority came to hold that the amount was not spent exclusively for religious and charitable purposes. The order was maintained by the appellate authority. This Court referred to section 6 of the relevant statute and in paragraphs 7 and 8 and held as under:-- 7. At the very outset, it may be made clear that the words and expression 'religious purpose', 'public worship', or 'public charity' are neither defined by the Adhiniyam nor by the M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 and, therefore, there is a wide scope for interpreting those expressions, with reference to the context in which they are used in section 6 of the Adhiniyam. Broadly speaking "religious purpose" under the Adhiniyam will include objects relating to the observance of rituals, ceremonies and propagation of the tenets of religion as also its advancement. Similarly term "charity" or "charitable purpose" will include relief to the poor, education, medical relief and advancement of any other object of public utility. In view of this, what we feel is that the income applied for fulfilment of a religious purpose or charitable object such as construction of temple for public worship and construction of a Dharmashala for public utility and convenience and maintenance of trust properties, payment of salaries of the employees of the trust engaged of realising the rent etc, would be all items for expenditure directly relating to and connected with the main object of trust within the scope and meaning of section 6(f) of the Adhiniyam. After perusal of the provisions of section 6(f), we find that in order to support a claim for exemption of tax under this section, the concurrence of the following main conditions is necessary:-- (i) that building and land or portions thereof are exclusively used, for public worship or public charity as enumerated in section 6(f); (ii) that the rent derived from the properties is applied, exclusively for public charitable institutions; and (iii) that the rent derived from the properties is exclusively applied for religious purposes. After so holding in paragraph 9 the Division Bench posed the question whether the income derived from the rent from the houses is exclusively applied for religious and charitable purposes or not, so as to bring it within the exemption clause. After posing such a question in paragraph 10 held as under:-- 10. After so holding in paragraph 9 the Division Bench posed the question whether the income derived from the rent from the houses is exclusively applied for religious and charitable purposes or not, so as to bring it within the exemption clause. After posing such a question in paragraph 10 held as under:-- 10. The terms, "religious purposes" or "charitable purposes" to our mind are not to be so rigidly and narrowly construed so as to exclude all other incidental expenses which are directly connected with the upkeep, maintenance and existence of the trust itself the objects of which are exclusively religious and charitable. In our opinion, the terms noted above, have not been used in a narrow and limited sense, but they have been used in a larger and wider sense so as to cover and include within its ambit all expenses directly connected with the ancillary to the maintenance, upkeep, safety and existence of the corpus of trust, it is an admitted fact that the trust owns enormous house properties which are let out to various tenants. Naturally, proper and regular accounts have to be maintained and the properties have to be kept under proper repairs and maintenance for which the trust will have to employ some persons for this purpose as also to recover and collect rent from the tenants. If need be, the trust will have to institute suit for recovery of rent and to seek their evictions and thus to incur expenses in litigation will be paid only out of the rental income and if the trustees feel it necessary to insure the trust properties or any part thereof against fire, theft or other damages, it will have to pay premium for the same. In our opinion, these are all incidental expenses relating to and connected with the main objects of the trust which are exclusively religious and charitable. If the trust property is not property maintained and proper accounts are not kept, the very existence of the trust will be in jeopardy and its object and purpose will be lost. In this view of the matter, simply because a part of the rental income is spent in the maintenance, repairs, payment of salaries to employees, taxes and legal expenses etc., it could not be said that the rent derived from the trust houses is not applied exclusively in religious purposes or charitable institutions. In this view of the matter, simply because a part of the rental income is spent in the maintenance, repairs, payment of salaries to employees, taxes and legal expenses etc., it could not be said that the rent derived from the trust houses is not applied exclusively in religious purposes or charitable institutions. Submission of Mr. Usmani is that the aforesaid decision applies in all fours to the present factual matrix inasmuch as their Lordships in paragraph 7 have held that the term "charitable purpose" would include relief to the poor, education, medical relief and advancement of any other object of public utility. Mr. Agrawal, on the contrary, has submitted that the controversy did not arise squarely in the aforesaid case, as their Lordships were only adverting to the exclusion of ancillary expenses. It is submitted by him the controversy in that case was related to exclusion of incidental expenses connected with main object of the Trust which are exclusively religious and charitable. That apart, the thrust of the matter in the said case was income spent for a "Dharmashala" which is utilised for public utility. I shall advert to the aforesaid submission in great detail after noting down certain citations which have been commended to me at the Bar. In the case of Laxminarayan Sharma (supra) a Division Bench of this Court while interpreted section 6(f) of the Nagariya Sthawar Sampattikar Adhiniyam, 1964 in paragraph 8 wherein Rule 33 was referred to show what is meant by public charitable institution. It is apposite to refer to Rule 33 of the relevant rules. It reads as under:-- 33. Public Charitable Institutions. It is apposite to refer to Rule 33 of the relevant rules. It reads as under:-- 33. Public Charitable Institutions. -- (1) For the purposes of clause (i) and of the proviso to clause (f) of section 6 the public charitable institutions shall be as follows -- (a) an orphanage; (b) a hospital or dispensary other than belonging to Government; (c) an alms house; (d) an institution for supplying free drinking water to the public; (e) an infirmary for the treatment of animals; (f) an institution for the purpose of burial or burning grounds or other places for the disposal of the dead; (g) an educational institution not belonging to the Government; (h) an institution established for widows; (i) Goshala: Provided that all such public charitable institutions shall be certified by the Assistant Property Tax Commissioner of the area concerned: Provided further that the regular accounts of income and expenditure of such institutions are maintained and are open to inspection by the Assistant Property Tax Commissioner or such other person as he may appoint in this behalf to satisfy himself that the rent derived from such land or building sought to be exempted is exclusively being spent for one or more of these institutions. (2) A certificate under Sub-rule (i) shall be in Form XIX and shall unless cancelled, continue in force for the Assessment year for which it is issued but shall be renewable by the Assistant Property Tax Commissioner. (3) If at any time the Assistant Property Tax Commissioner is satisfied that he has wrongly issued an certificate or that the institutions concerned has ceased to be charitable Institution, it shall be open to him to cancel the certificate and inform the Assessing Authority. In that context the Division Bench held that if it is found that rent derived from 'Dharmashala' is applied exclusively for religious purpose then certainly Dharmashala would not be required for the levy of tax. Thereafter in paragraph 8 the Bench proceeded to state as under:-- 8. Clause (f) of section 6 of the Act as reproduced above clearly exempts a Dharmashala from payment of tax under the Act. Thereafter in paragraph 8 the Bench proceeded to state as under:-- 8. Clause (f) of section 6 of the Act as reproduced above clearly exempts a Dharmashala from payment of tax under the Act. This provision is, however, subject to the proviso to the section which says, that the buildings specified in Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of this proviso shall not be deemed to be a building used exclusively for public worship or public charity within the meaning of clause (f) of section 6 of the Act. In order to bring the Dharmashala in question in the category of buildings specified in Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of the proviso, it was necessary for the respondents to show that the rent derived from the Dharmashala in question is not applied exclusively to religious purposes. In the return filed by the respondents it is nowhere stated that the charges collected from the travellers and the rent received from the tenants is applied to any purpose other than the maintenance of the building, payment of salary to the staff including Chowkidar, sweeper etc. It is also not contended that the nominal charges recovered from the visitors and the rent received from the tenants is applied for any purpose which cannot be called a religious purpose. Construction of a Dharmashala and its maintenance is undoubtedly a religious purpose. It is meant for visitors to come and stay there. It is not a building from which rent is being realised by the person who dedicated it for earning any profit. The accounts filed as Annexures B to F show that the only nominal-virtually nil charges are realised from the visitors who come and stay in the Dharmashala and the only income derived from the rent is applied for the payment of salary to the Choukidar and sweeper etc. No part of the income so derived is used for any purpose whatsoever, which is not connected with the maintenance of the Dharmashala, for undertaking the necessary repairs and for payment of salary to the staff. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the view taken by the respondents, according to whom since the institution in question was not covered by public charitable institutions specified for the purpose of clause (i) of the proviso to section 6(f) it could not be exempt from payment of tax. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the view taken by the respondents, according to whom since the institution in question was not covered by public charitable institutions specified for the purpose of clause (i) of the proviso to section 6(f) it could not be exempt from payment of tax. In our opinion, the Dharmashala in question is exempt from payment of tax both in accordance with the provisions of section 6(f) of the Act and clause (ii) of the proviso to this section, the Dharamshala could have been liable for tax only if it has been established that the rent derived from it is not applied to religious purpose. As, in our opinion, it has not been either alleged or proved by the respondents that rent derived from Dharmashala is not applied for religious purpose the provisions of clause of section 6 of the Act are clearly applicable to the facts of the case and on that ground the Dharamashala in question would be exempt from payment of tax under the Act. In the case of Surat Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association (supra) the majority view which was expressed by Bhagvati, J. in paragraph 16 stated thus: ........Where an activity is carried on as a matter of advancement of the charitable purpose or for the purpose of carrying out the charitable purpose, it would not be incorrect to say as a matter of plain English Grammar that the charitable purpose involves the carrying on of such activity, but the predominant object of such activity must be to subserve the charitable purpose and not to earn profit. The charitable purpose should not be submerged by the profit making motive; the latter should not masquerade under the guise of the former. The purpose of the trust, as pointed out by one of us (Pathak, J.) in M/s Dharmodeepti vs. Commr. of income tax, Keral (C.A. No. 82 of 1975 decided on 24th July, 1978): (reported in AIR 1978 SC 1417 ), must be "essentially charitable in nature" and it must not be a cover for carrying on an activity which has profit-making as its predominant object. This interpretation of the exclusionary clause in section 2 clause (15) derives considerable support from the speech made by the Finance Minister while introducing that provision. This interpretation of the exclusionary clause in section 2 clause (15) derives considerable support from the speech made by the Finance Minister while introducing that provision. The Finance Minister explained the reason for introducing this exclusionary clause in the following words: The definition of 'charitable purpose' in that clause is at present so widely worded that it can be taken advantage of even by commercial concerns which while ostensibly serving a public purpose, get fully paid for the benefits provided by them namely, the newspaper industry which while running its concern on commercial lines can claim that by circulating newspapers it was improving the general knowledge of the public. In order to prevent the misuse of this definition in such cases, the Select Committee felt that the words 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit.' should be added to the definition.' It is obvious that the exclusionary clause was added with a view to overcoming the decision of the Privy Council in the Tribune case where it was held that the object of supplying the community with an organ of educated public opinion by publication of a newspaper was an object of general public utility and hence charitable in character, even though the activity of publication of the newspapers, was carried on commercial lines with the object of earning profit. The publication of the newspaper was an activity engaged in by the trust for the purpose of carrying out its charitable purpose and on the facts it was clearly an activity which had profit-making as its predominant object, but even so it was held by the Judicial Committee that since the purpose served was an object of general public utility, it was a charitable purpose. It is clear from the speech of the Finance Minister that it was with a view to setting at naught this decision that the exclusionary clause was added in the definition of 'charitable purpose'. The test which has, therefore now to be applied is whether the predominant object of the activity involved in carrying out the object of general public utility is to subserve the charitable purpose or to earn profit. Where profit-making is the predominant object of the activity, the purpose, though an object of general public utility would cease to be a charitable purpose. Where profit-making is the predominant object of the activity, the purpose, though an object of general public utility would cease to be a charitable purpose. But where the predominant object of the activity is to carry out the charitable purpose and not to earn profit, It would not lose its character of a charitable purpose merely because some profit arises from the activity. The exclusionary clause does not require that the activity must be carried on in such a manner that it does not result in any profit. It would indeed be difficult for persons in charge of a trust or institution to so carry on the activity that the expenditure balances the income and there is no resulting profit. That would not only be difficult of practical realisation but would also reflect unsound principle of management. We, therefore, agree with Beg, J. when he said in Sole Trustee, Lok Sikshana Trust case (supra) that 'if the profits must necessarily feed a charitable purpose under the terms of the trust, the mere fact that the activities of the trust yield profit will not alter the charitable character of the trust. The test now is, more clearly than in the past, the genuineness of the purpose tested by the obligation created to spend the money exclusively or essentially on charity." The learned Judge also added that the restrictive condition 'that the purpose should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit would be satisfied if profit-making is not the real object. In the case of Municipal Corporation Hyderabad (supra) a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in paragraph 4 held as under: 4. What the High Court has completely failed to realize is that the 'occupation' of the land and buildings or the 'user' of the land and buildings must be for a 'charitable purpose' and that it is altogether irrelevant as to the manner in which the income of the club is utilised. Section 202(1)(b) makes no reference to the question as regards the employment of the income of the club or the purpose for which the income is so employed. Exemption is granted only in respect of buildings which are 'solely' used, meaning thereby exclusively used, for charitable purpose. Section 202(1)(b) makes no reference to the question as regards the employment of the income of the club or the purpose for which the income is so employed. Exemption is granted only in respect of buildings which are 'solely' used, meaning thereby exclusively used, for charitable purpose. For instance, if the premises are occupied for the purposes of benevolent activities such as the running of a free dispensary or clinic or for running of a free school for the children, such user of the building would constitute a user for a charitable purpose and entitle the owner, of the building to claim exemption. It is impossible to subscribe to the view that occupation or user for 'any' purpose would constitute a user for a charitable purpose provided the income is used for a charitable purpose. Clutching at the tail of this reasoning, one would be induced to the conclusion that user of a building for running a common gaming house (or for any immoral or illegal purpose) would be user for a 'charitable' purpose provided the income of the common gaming house is utilised for a charitable purpose. The argument deserves no further scrutiny and must be rejected outright. No further exercise need be undertaken in order to find out whether or not. Section 202(1)(b) is attracted in the facts of the present matter. The judgment of the High Court insofar as the High Court holds that section 202(1)(b) is attracted must therefore be reversed and set aside. We are of the opinion that the user of the premises for the Race Course Club will not constitute occupation or user for a charitable purpose within the meaning of section 202(1 )(b) and the Race Course Club will not be entitled to claim exemption from levy of general tax. In another decision rendered in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) in paragraphs 75 and 76 it was held as under:-- 75. We have already seen that merely because education is imparted in the school, that by itself, cannot be regarded as a charitable object. Today, education has acquired a wider meaning. If education is imparted with a profit motive, to hold in such a case, as charitable purpose, will not be correct. We are inclined to agree with Mr. B. Sen, learned counsel for the Delhi Municipal Corporation in this regard. Therefore, it would necessarily involve public benefit. Today, education has acquired a wider meaning. If education is imparted with a profit motive, to hold in such a case, as charitable purpose, will not be correct. We are inclined to agree with Mr. B. Sen, learned counsel for the Delhi Municipal Corporation in this regard. Therefore, it would necessarily involve public benefit. The rulings arising out of income tax Act may not be of great help in the income tax Act "charitable purpose" includes the relief of the poor, education, medical relief and the advancement of any other object of general public utility. The advancement of any other object of general public utility is not found under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. In other words, the definition is narrower in scope. This is our answer to question No. 1. I have referred to the aforesaid decisions to highlight that Mr. Usmani has heavily relied on the decision rendered in the case of Shri Deo Radha Madhava Lalji Genda Trust, Sagar (supra) that the Division Bench in paragraph 7 has included the word "education" in connection with charity or charitable purpose. But the real hub of the matter is whether the aforesaid decision applies to the present factual matrix. Submission of Mr. Usmani is that as the properties are rented out and the rental income is utilised to give salaries to the various employees of the schools and colleges as well as to the employee of the Wakf, the same ought to be excluded. He has drawn inspiration, as has been indicated hereinbefore, from paragraph 11 of the judgment rendered in the case of Shri Deoradhabhai Lala Madhav Trust Sagar (supra). In that case the Division Bench interpreted the terms 'the rent derived from such building' and thought it apposite to exclude the expenses incurred legitimately in recovering and collection of the rent as well as other incidental expenses. In this context, the provision enshrined u/s 136 has to be scanned, scrutinised and interpreted in proper perspective. I have already reproduced section 136 of the Act before. clause (c) of the aforesaid provision deals with buildings and lands or portions thereof used exclusively for educational purposes including schools, boarding houses, hostels and libraries, if such buildings, lands and portions thereof are either owned by educational institution concerned or have been placed on the disposal of such educational institution without payment of any rent. clause (c) of the aforesaid provision deals with buildings and lands or portions thereof used exclusively for educational purposes including schools, boarding houses, hostels and libraries, if such buildings, lands and portions thereof are either owned by educational institution concerned or have been placed on the disposal of such educational institution without payment of any rent. On a studied analysis of the afQresaid provision it is quite luminescent that exemption is extendable to such buildings or lands if they are exclusively used for the purposes mentioned therein or if they are placed at the disposal of such educational institutions without any payment of rent. To elucidate: what gets prominence is the use or total disposal at the hands of educational institutions. In the case at hand the buildings or lands or portions thereof, are neither used exclusively for educational purposes nor are they at the disposal of educational institutions without payment of rent. They are rented for commercial venture as they are shops given to tenants on rent and the claim is that income from rental is used for payment of salaries for staff and teachers of educational institutions and for the purpose of wakf. In that event, this clause, in my considered opinion, is not attracted. The gravamen of contention of Mr. Usmani is that proviso to clause (e) deals with exclusive house for worship or public charity. There is use of words "such as' in the said clause. The proviso to the aforesaid clause stipulates that which kind of buildings and lands and hospitals shall not be deemed to be exclusively used for public worship or for public charity within the meaning of the said section. Though I have reproduced before, I still think it appropriate to reproduce here the relevant two clauses (i) and (ii) of section 136(e) of the Act: 136(e)(i) buildings in, or lands on, which any trade or business is carried on unless the rent derived from such buildings or lands is applied exclusively to religious purposes or to public charitable institutions aforesaid; (ii) buildings or lands in respect of which rent is derived and such rent is not applied exclusively to religious purposes or public charitable institutions aforesaid; Mr. Usmani submitted that this provision would apply to all the clauses of the section but if the proviso is read in proper perspective conjointly with the riders as has been provided therein, it is manifest that they have nexus only with religious purpose or public charitable institutions. The two qualifiers cover two different fields. There is a certain difference between the two facets inasmuch as the first one relates to rent received from buildings or lands in which any trade or business is carried and rent is derived and the second compartment pertains to buildings or lands in respect of which the rent is derived. The emphasis is on application of the rental income for religious purposes or public charitable institutions. The key word is also 'aforesaid'. The aforesaid has to have connection with the institutions which find mention in the main part of clause (e) of section 136 of the Act. It is perceivable that buildings and lands which are used for educational purposes have been enumerated in a different clause i.e., clause (c) and religious charitable purposes have been kept in a different compartment i.e. in clause (e). In the case of Children Book Trust (supra) their Lordships expressed the opinion that education has acquired a wider meaning and if education is imparted with profit motive in such a case to hold that it is for charitable purpose will not be correct. That apart, in the case at hand when education has been kept in a different category and public and charitable purposes have been kept in a different category they have to be differently understood. In the case of Shri Deo Radha Madhava Lalji Genda Trust (supra) the Division Bench was not dealing with the case of this nature. It only observed charitable purpose includes education. The provision their Lordships were interpreting was quite different than the present one. In this context I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Mathuram Agrawal (supra) wherein D.P. Mohapatra, J. Speaking for the Constitution Bench in paragraph 11 expressed the view as under:-- ........The intention of the legislature in a taxation statute is to be gathered from the language of the provisions particularly where the language is plain and unambiguous. In a taxing Act it is not possible to assume any intention or governing purpose of the statute more than what is stated in the plain language. It is not the economic results sought to be obtained by making the provision which is relevant in interpreting a fiscal statute. Equally impermissible is an interpretation which does not follow from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. Words cannot be added to or substituted so as to give a meaning to the statute which will serve the spirit and intention of the legislature. The statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of the tax law i.e. the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. If there is any ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the needful in the matter. In the light of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the terms used "such as" in the aforesaid provision has to be given due significance and cannot be interpreted to make it redundant or superfluous. It is well settled that Legislature does not use a word without a purpose. Where education purpose has been put in a different compartment it again cannot be dragged into another compartment as that would frustrate the very purpose and the scheme of the provision. Mr. Usmani submitted that when there is public utility and there is no involvement of carrying on an activity of profit, the petitioner is entitled to exemption. The learned counsel has also referred to the meaning of the term 'charity' given in the case of Commissioner for Special Purposes of income tax vs. Pemsel (1891) AC 631 wherein, Lord Macnaghten held thus:-- Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trust for the advancement of religion, and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed every charity that deserves the name must do, either directly or indirectly. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed every charity that deserves the name must do, either directly or indirectly. The learned counsel has also referred to the definition under the Income- tax Act where 'charitable purpose' has been defined. It is well known principle that charity in its denotative sense encompasses altruistic thought and action. Inherent policy that lies behind this is to help and assist others than to gain benefit for oneself. Altruism is the basic foundation of charity and stands in distinction to profit motive. These are basically general principles but in the case at hand u/s 136 of the Act various categories and classes of buildings have been exempted. There are certain clauses pertaining to value of the buildings, certain categories relate population of the Municipal area; certain lands are concerned for public utility like public parks and playgrounds certain buildings owned by certain types of persons; namely, widows, minors or persons subject to physical disability or mental infirmity, buildings owned by freedom fighters, retired members of Defence Services and their widows, buildings or lands owned by blind persons abandoned women and self owned houses and further buildings used for education purposes which has been given definitive meaning. Similarly, public worship and public charity have been given a precise meaning as has been stated earlier. The words 'such as' as already stated, has immense signification. The buildings or lands which find mention in clause (e) of section 136 are mosques, temples, churches, dharmashalas, gurudwaras, hospitals, dispensary orphanages, alms houses, drinking water fountains, infirmaries for the treatment and care of animals and public burial grounds, or other places for the disposal of the dead and they are exempted. Thus, if any building or land or portion thereof otherwise falls in that category may warrant exemption, but when buildings or lands or portions thereof used exclusively for educational purposes which have been carved out in a separate class in my considered opinion, both the clauses have to be read distinctively and there cannot be overlapping. The language of the Statute must be understood in the context and in that way homogeneity is achieved between the text and context. The language of the Statute must be understood in the context and in that way homogeneity is achieved between the text and context. In this context, I may profitably refer to the three Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, wherein the Apex Court ruled thus :-- 10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation, one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Even provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the Legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the Legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford vs. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC 1 "we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there". In case of an ordinary word, there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase the general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well- settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. (See, Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. Vs. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and another, , Union of India and another Vs. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well- settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. (See, Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. Vs. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and another, , Union of India and another Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, , Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. Price Waterhouse and Another, 1997 SCC 312 and Harbhajan Singh Vs. Press Council of India and Others, ''. I have referred to the aforesaid decision only to highlight that the language employed u/s 136 has its own denotative impact and no word can be ignored. When there has been compartmentalisation and words 'as such' and 'aforesaid' have been used they have to be looked at generally and in the context of its use they cannot be read out de hors the context. In fact if they are read in the context proper meaning is understood and no confusion emerges. On the contrary if submission of Mr. Usmani is accepted, there would be disharmony between the text and context which would mother confusion and hence, I am not inclined to accept the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Though I have negatived the contentions of Mr. Usmani on the ground that if the income is utilised for education purpose the benefit or privilege is not available to the petitioner Trust, however, it is observed that if the petitioner claims exemption in any other clause it is open to do so by putting adequate material before the competent authority of the respondent Municipal Corporation. In that event the Corporation shall advert to each and every item and may assess the amount. I may hasten to add the demand has already been made and the petitioner has straight away approached this Court being emboldened by the concept of exemption. The ground which has been putforth in the writ petition does not make out a case for exemption. In this factual backdrop I have granted leave to the petitioner to approach the Corporation seeking exemption. If permissible, on any other ground. The Corporation shall hear the petitioner and proceed in accordance with law. It is hereby made clear the demands made against the petitioner Trust are not quashed because of leave granted. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed